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 Introduction
For every problem one can always find a solution. My only fear is that we do not take problems to be problematic at all. It  
is the same with illnesses that make us feel pain, which can always be treated, whereas chronic afflictions which do not  
cause any suffering are really impossible to cure.1
一切的問題總可以設法解決。只怕我們根本上不把一問題當作問題。猶如痛癢的病總可醫，不知痛癢的病，才真
是不可救藥的痼疾。
Tang Junyi
1. Aims and approach of the present study 
It is usually assumed that generalizations are dangerous, and this sentence too is probably no exception. 
In academic works, prefaces and introductions, as well as conclusions, are the places where one is most 
likely to encounter these treacherous entities, or at least where they are usually reflected on in a more 
self-conscious manner than throughout the main body of the text, perhaps because the writer desires to 
get over with offering a general justification for what he or she has still to write, or has just finished 
writing, and move on to more pressing matters. At the same time, they can provide the author with the 
space and the opportunity to reflect on certain difficulties which have beset his specific study or which 
inhabit his entire field of research. A high degree of academic authority enables an author to present 
problems  encountered  in  or  stemming  from  his  own  inquiries  as  relevant  for  his  colleagues  or, 
depending on the degree of specialization, even a whole discipline; an advantage I obviously do not 
have as a doctoral candidate.  Nevertheless, I hope this dissertation will  be of interest  to a broader 
public than those already familiar with some of the more esoteric topics treated in the following pages. 
Terms such as “the self-negation of moral reason” (daode de ziwo kanxian 道德的自坎陷) and “the 
horizons of the mind” (xinling jingjie 心靈境界) tend to scare readers away. 
To get to the point: I have the impression that research into Chinese, or non-Western philosophy in 
general, is for the most part highly sensitive to precisely these two entwined issues of generalization 
and justification. An average monograph on the thought of canonical Western thinkers such as Kant or 
1 “Attitudes towards Culture which Our Compatriots Should Change” (Guoren dui wenhua ying gaibian zhi taidu 國人對
文化應改變之態度), [1936] in ZB, p.41.
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Hegel for example can more easily get away with diving straight into the thing itself (e.g. “isn't Hegel 
ultimately  more  Kantian  than  Kant  himself”?)  without  having  to  provide  a  sometimes  almost 
apologetic string of explanations and reasons why one has deemed it necessary to devote a whole study 
to these philosophers and why it is important for us to commence or continue engaging with them. 
Additionally, one does not need to spend quite as much time explaining what is specifically “Western” 
about them, let alone specifying how they differ from their Chinese counterparts. This only becomes a 
real issue in the context of comparative approaches. It is hard not to notice that things stand rather  
differently in the case of a book on figures such as Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 (1909-1995), Tang Junyi 唐君
毅 (1900-1978), or Xiong Shili 熊十力 (1885-1968), who will be the three thinkers most often referred 
to and drawn upon in the course of my study. Usually, one is already forced to come up with elaborate 
strategies of justification before even being able to begin a research project, that is to say (to put things 
in a positive light), one is forced to reflect on the relevance and the use of presenting and commenting 
on their ideas. Because they are approached, presented, marketed, and perceived as quintessentially 
Chinese philosophers, and not just as philosophers  tout court, their cultural particularity immediately 
imposes itself as a problem to be addressed and accounted for.2 Their overall relevance needs to be 
clarified, and above all, justified, without a question-begging recourse to the fetish of culture, and with 
an  audience  in  mind  that  does  not  necessarily  put  great  stock  in  the  paramount  importance  of 
transcultural dialog. What do these philosophers, who point towards the – or rather, a very specific and 
largely constructed – past almost every time they are confronted with a specific (conceptual and/or 
social) problem or a problematic state of affairs in the modern world, still have to say to us today? Not 
everyone will automatically be swayed by the standard argument that China's economic rise has made 
it exceptionally pertinent and urgent for us to gain a better understanding of Chinese culture, even 
through the unwieldy medium of intricate and sophisticated philosophical theories if necessary. Even 
when one assumes that it is China's economic and geopolitical rise which has contributed a great deal 
2 As Rey Chow acutely observes: “[W]hereas it would be acceptable for authors dealing with specific cultures, such as 
those of Britain, France, the United States, or the ancient Greco-Roman world, to use generic titles such as  Women 
Writers and the Problem of Aesthetics, Gender Trouble, Otherness and Literary Language, The Force of Law, The Logic  
of Sense,  This Sex Which Is Not One,  Tales of Love,  and so on, authors dealing with non-Western cultures are often 
expected to mark their subject matter with words such as Chinese, Japanese, Indian, Korean,Vietnamese, and the like. 
While the former are thought to deal with intellectual or theoretical issues, the latter, even when they are dealing with  
intellectual  or  theoretical  issues,  are compulsorily required to  characterize such issues  with  geopolitical  realism,  to 
stabilize and fix their intellectual and theoretical content by way of a national, ethnic, or cultural location. Once such a 
location is named, however,  the work associated with it  is  usually considered too narrow or specialized to warrant 
general interest.” Rey Chow, “Introduction: On Chineseness as a Theoretical Problem”, in Modern Chinese Literary and  
Cultural Studies in the Age of Theory: Reimagining a Field, edited by Rey Chow, Durham and London: Duke University 
Press, 2000, p.3.
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to  the renewed surge of  interest  in (the reinterpretation of)  traditional  ideas,  it  is  not  immediately 
obvious what the latter have to offer in return. Of course, such demands are not specific to research in 
the field of Chinese studies, and in their absence as firmly institutionalized requirements, questions of 
relevance and pertinence would crop up anyhow. This is hardly surprising, seeing how these are among 
the major questions thinkers such as Mou Zongsan and Tang Junyi themselves constantly posed and 
answered in a variety of ways. What one encounters in the work of these authors, and in that of many 
other intellectuals belonging to the first  generations of modern Chinese intellectuals,  is precisely a 
whole spectrum of generalizations, often embedded in philosophized cultural typologies, employed to 
provide justifications for the reinvention and the revival of what, to use this outdated Marxist term, “the 
progressive forces of history” had judged to be superfluous impediments to modernization. 
This  dissertation  is  intended  as  a  contribution  to  the  study of  modern  Chinese,  more  specifically 
Confucian, philosophy; a field of research which has already generated an enormous, even bewildering, 
amount of literature in both the People's Republic of China and in the Republic of Taiwan, but is still in 
the process of slowly but steadily expanding in Western academia. I have been fortunate enough to 
profit from the publication of an increasing number of studies in Western languages during the last few 
years which address the general topic of “New Confucianism” (xin ruxue 新儒学 ),  deal with the 
resurgence of Confucian themes in contemporary Chinese society and politics, or provide much-needed 
studies  of  individual  thinkers  classified  under  the  category  or  on  the  margins  of  “Modern  New 
Confucian philosophy” (xiandai xin rujia zhexue 现代新儒家哲学 ). This is a most welcome trend 
which goes against the tendency unfortunately still prevalent in continental philosophy to continue to 
employ “China”, “Chinese”, or “(East) Asian” in general, as mere floating signifiers, either as examples 
and corroborations, or, more often, as exceptions and limit concepts, instead of as possible systems of 
meaning  with  a  certain  autonomy  and  legitimacy  of  their  own.3 Philosophers  with  universalist 
aspirations can use the non-Western world as a testing ground for the validity of their ideas, or better 
still,  wait for the emergence of a global following to creatively adopt their theories to a variety of 
different cultural contexts, and consider the matter closed.4 This general indifference has not remained 
3 For a thought-provoking study drawing on the Marxist thinker Alfred Sohn-Rethel, see Daniel Vukovich, “China in 
Theory: the Orientalist Production of Knowledge in the Global Economy”,  Cultural Critique, 76, 2010, pp.148-172. 
Vukovich claims that “it is as if the knowledge about China that is produced in the West has to be as abstract and, in  
short, as commodified as the other products of labor circulating between China and its business partners.” (p.149). He 
refers to the work of Agamben, Hardt and Negri, and Žižek amongst others. 
4 Fortunately, there are fruitful exceptions, such as the fascinating work on dialetheic logic carried out with reference to 
Buddhist thought by the analytic philosopher Graham Priest. 
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without consequences of its own, and fuels the already strongly felt need for self-justification on the 
part of those active in the fields of non-Western culture and thought.
It will be evident to anyone who does a quick Internet search on the topic of modern or contemporary 
Chinese and Confucian philosophy that there is already a staggering number of articles and books 
dealing  with  the  issue  of  Confucianism  and  modernity.  The  relation  between  Confucianism  and 
modernity is beyond doubt one of the most hotly debated issues within the whole discipline of modern 
Chinese  intellectual  history and cultural  studies.  This  has  made it  both  possible  and  necessary to 
construct “topographies” of modern Confucian discourse.5 Still, my own investigation departs from the 
impression, which grew from the reading of an obviously partial and incomplete corpus of texts, that 
precisely this particular topic has not been sufficiently and adequately investigated and problematized. 
Again, this observation comes with a certain, probably inevitable, degree of generalization. It seems to 
me that in many studies, the focus is placed on either the compatibility or the contradictions between 
Confucianism and modernity, in both cases taken as two phenomena which can be clarified separately 
on their own terms and afterwards recombined with varying results. In caricatural terms, this can come 
down to throwing Confucius into the ring with modernity in order  to observe who will  come out  
bruised and beaten, and who will emerge victorious with teeth shining and gloves raised. Scholars who 
are sympathetic or even devoted to the cause of revitalizing the Confucian tradition or adopting certain 
Confucianist ideas, practices, and concepts on the other hand, tend to draw on their subject matter as a 
reserve of solutions to problems supposedly stemming from the planetary dominance of a Western 
rationality characterized by dichotomous dualisms. The idea that a traditional Chinese perspective on 
the fundamental interdependence and harmony between human beings and nature can point a way out 
of our current materialistic anthropocentrism (for which Daoism would probably be a better candidate 
than Confucianism) and the ecological catastrophe assumed to have resulted from this outlook is one of 
the most often encountered instances of such a line of reasoning.6 An initial problem to be signaled is 
5 Lee Seung-hwan,  A Topography of Confucian Discourse. Politico-philosophical Reflections on Confucian Discourse  
since Modernity, New Yersey: Homa & Sekey Books, 2004.
6 See for example Tu Weiming, “The Ecological Turn in New Confucian Humanism: Implications for China and the 
World”,  Daedalus, vol.130, no.4, 2001, pp.243-264. Several things are left out of the picture in this way. I will only 
make a few tentative remarks here. One has to clearly distinguish between anthropocentrism as a normative perspective  
(“Be fruitful, multiply, fill the earth, and subdue it”, Genesis 1:28), and the neutral observation that the human race is the 
only species which theoretically disposes over the means to practically remedy or neutralize the effects of its own vanity.  
Even when one insists on approaching the environmental crisis as an essentially moral problem, one can argue, as Tang 
Junyi did repeatedly, that only human beings are able to effectively extend their ethical concerns to other species and 
thereby overcome their own “speciesism” (Peter Singer). See Tang's The Spiritual Values of Chinese Culture (Zhongguo 
wenhua zhi jingshen jiazhi 中國文化之精神價值), Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, [1953b] 2005, pp.145-146, 
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that solutions of this kind would seem to predate the situations they are meant to solve, functioning as  
preadaptive reactions to what are actually historically specific problems and novel forms of historical 
discontinuity.  I  would  like  to  opt  for  a  different  approach  by  turning  to  the  reformulations  and 
reinventions of Chinese philosophy by some of its most well-known modern representatives not in 
search  of  solutions that  await  discovery and need only to  be  pointed  at,  but  in  order  to  look for 
problems. The problems I have in mind are those encountered in studying the solutions these thinkers 
elaborated through comparative exercizes in philosophical thought, solutions which I assume to have 
been conditioned by their confrontation with modernity. In short, my intention is to trace some of the 
conceptual consequences of modernity in the context of twentieth-century Chinese intellectual history, 
without exclusively focusing on the impact the introduction of Western philosophies had on modern 
conservative  intellectuals  in  China.  I  believe  more  has  to  be  taken  into  account  than  the  fruitful 
transmission and reinterpretation of Western ideas on their way east (dongjian 东渐). 
Following  the  German  sociologist  Niklas  Luhmann  (1927-1998),  I  do  not  conceive  of  modernity 
primarily as a normative set of identifiable ideas or beliefs (usually captured by the slogan of “science 
and democracy”) which Confucianism should adapt itself to or incorporate in order to emancipate or 
pp.213-215.  That we are already living in the so-called  Anthropocene  era is a fact that cannot be covered over by a 
nostalgic celebration of some antediluvian state of harmony supposedly attested in traditional Chinese thought.  The 
latter in my opinion has very little to do with what we nowadays call environmental awareness. The notion of “Heaven” 
(tian 天) in the famous catchphrase “Heaven and Man are united” (tian ren heyi 天人合一) cannot be considered apart 
from its political dimension and taken to denote a natural environment devoid of and uncontaminated by human and 
social determinations. This is even the case for the conceptualization of the workings of the human body in traditional 
Chinese medicine, which is all to often simplistically explained as being based on a “correlative holism” between human 
beings and nature. However, in this context too “nature” is fundamentally a socially conditioned category. According to 
the historian of Chinese medicine Paul Unschuld, the fundamental “anatomical” or rather functional distinction made in  
Chinese medical texts between two types of organs - zang 臟 (“reserves”, organs of production) and fu 腑 (“palaces”, 
organs of consumption) - came about under the influence of the important socio-economic changes accompanying the 
unification of China as an empire under the Qin dynasty, such as a growing difference between centers of production and 
centers of consumption. See  Medicine in China: a History of Ideas, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985, 
pp.79-83. That chaos and entropy are just as importance as “balance” and “harmony” for the continuation of biological  
life  is  also  something  to  be  taken  into  account.  Crucially,  the  factual  and  already  accomplished  destruction  and 
disappearance of enormous areas of the natural environment can make it hard to determine what the “natural” state of a  
certain ecosystem actually refers to, and what the effects of trying to forcibly recover this state would in turn have on an 
environment which “naturally” evolved in response to human intervention. As a concept, the modern idea of “nature” 
came into existence precisely in response to growing industrialization and urbanization, and thus referred to something 
no longer present that would have to be recovered from its very inception. The distinction between merely influencing 
and negatively destabilizing the environment cannot simply be “intuited”, but can only be drawn in scientific research,  
which operates within an environment of its own, i.e. modern society. The knowledge science produces, even when 
incontestably “true”, does not thereby automatically endow it with power. It is possible for truth, even when conceived 
of in an anti-relativist manner as singular, unchangeable, and absolute, to remain without consequences, since it cannot 
determine its own conditions. The same obviously applies to ideals such as a harmonious relation between human beings 
and nature. The shift in perspective deemed necessary to put a stop to the ongoing destruction of the natural environment  
can neither be simply transferred from human subjects to systems, nor straightforwardly “applied” by the latter. 
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“enlighten” itself,  but as denoting a fundamentally novel constellation of functionally differentiated 
social structures characterized by a radical degree of operational autonomy and independence from the 
individual human beings and communities subject to them. From a Marxist point of view, which is not 
directly compatible with,  but also not necessarily diametrically opposed to a Luhmannian one,  the 
emergence of such structural autonomy is historically closely linked to the rise of the capitalist world  
economy and the dominance of  the capitalist  mode of production.  The assumption that  the global 
spread of these social structures had corresponding effects on a semantic level in societies with very 
different cultural backgrounds need not be taken as presupposing the existence of neat, symmetrical 
correspondences between a “material base” and a “spiritual superstructure”. It would be meaningless to 
characterize social  systems such as  politics,  the legal  system, the mass  media,  or  the economy as 
somehow exclusively “material”. It is obvious that the financial system for example currently operates 
in a completely “otherworldly” fashion, and behaves more like a consequent Platonist contemplating 
the starry heavens of mathematical entities and complex algorithms than an obdurate materialist poking 
around  for  celestial  secrets  in  the  dirt.  Instead  of  concrete  and  tangible  commodities,  one  finds 
subliminal entities such as “credit default swaps” and “futures” on the stock markets. Besides, there are 
enough indications that Marx himself was the first to grasp the performative force of abstraction at 
work in the logic of capital, which already in its “superficial” form of appearance as interest-bearing 
capital  (money  generating  more  money:  M-M')  learns  how  to  free  itself  considerably  from  the 
constraints of the real world where it still needs to materialize into a particular commodity (C) in the 
generation  of  surplus  value  (M-C-M').7 Additionally,  as  Luhmann  notes  at  the  beginning  of  his 
Observations on Modernity, the distinction between structure and semantics “is self-contained […] It is 
itself a semantic distinction”8. Translated into traditional Marxist terms: the distinction between base 
and superstructure is drawn on the level of the latter, even when granting that the superstructure neither  
floats around in nor comes out of thin air, but is determined by the base. Still, in an elementary sense, I 
subscribe to the basic historical materialist conviction that “social being determines thought”, although 
what this formula entails precisely stands in need of further clarification. I will try to do this in the 
context of the more specific analyses which make up my study rather than in the form of preemptive 
formulaic statements of my own. I must confess that I do not have a fully worked-out concept of 
modernity  at  my  disposal.  The  only  thing  I  can  offer  the  reader  instead  for  the  time  being  is, 
embarrassingly enough, a metaphor; namely of modernity as a “horizon”. I do have my reasons, or at 
7 Capital. A New Abridgement, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp.93-100.
8 Observations on Modernity, Stanford (Cal.): Stanford University Press, 1998, p.1.
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least excuses, for this methodological incompleteness, which to some extent stems from the nature of 
the problem of modernity itself. In my own defense, this arguably has the advantage that I cannot be 
accused of having “applied” a closed conception of modernity to modern Chinese philosophy as a 
passive receptacle. My assumptions were to a considerable extent arrived at immanently and resulted 
from an attempt to engage with the texts on which my study is based. Obviously, the following remarks 
are only meant as preliminarily considerations which still require further substantial elaboration. 
As a more or less technical term, the notion of “horizon” (Horizont) derives from the phenomenology 
of  Edmund  Husserl  (1859-1938)9,  appears  in  Hans-Georg  Gadamer's  (1900-2002)  work  on 
hermeneutics10, and is repeatedly employed by Luhmann within the framework of his systems theory as 
well.11 In all three cases, the notion of a horizon denotes both a limit to observation, as a line beyond 
which  nothing can  be identified  or  discerned,  as  well  as  a  determinate  perspective  which  enables 
observations and interpretations to take place through limiting and making selections from a potentially 
endless and indiscriminate totality of information. In the language of the philosophy of transcendental 
subjectivity:  a  horizon  mediates  between  the  perceiving  “subject”  and  the  perceived  “object”  and 
allows the former to perceive something specific and contextualized instead of remaining faced with 
the inaccessible “whole” of a reality devoid of discriminations.12 For Tang Junyi too, there could be no 
object without a simultaneously restrictive and enabling horizon (jingjie 境界 ) intrinsically linked to 
the subject, even when the horizon in question is one in which individual subjects do not distinguish 
themselves from the “scatteredness of the myriad things” (wanwu shusan 萬物殊散), are completely 
caught up as one “thing” amongst others in what they observe, and do not yet realize that the category 
of “thingliness” is but one (in Tang's view the lowest) mode of perception contingent and dependent on 
the subject's involvement.13 The “object” made accessible through a determinate horizon of observation 
9 For a  systematic  study,  see  Saulius  Geniusas,  The Origins of  the Horizon in  Husserl’s  Phenomenology,  Dordrecht: 
Springer, 2012.
10 Truth and Method, London and New York: Continuum, 2004, pp.301-306.
11 See  for  example  Introduction  to  Systems  Theory,  Cambridge:  Polity  Press,  2013,  pp.167-174.  On  Luhmann's 
appropriation of Husserl see Hans-Georg Moeller, Luhmann Explained. From Souls to Systems, Chicago and La Salle: 
Open Court, 2003, pp.181-185.
12 “The possibilities of a meaningful grasp of the world are themselves attuned to – and then require – the necessity of a 
purely momentary grasp of the world at any time. Only very little can form the actual focus of attention or be treated as  
an actual theme of communication. Everything else, including the world as a whole, is […] accessible only sequentially  
and selectively […] This is what Husserl meant when he described the world as the “horizon” of actual intentions. It is 
actual as a horizon, never as a  universitas rerum  [totality of things].” Niklas Luhmann,  Ecological Communication, 
London: Polity Press, 1989, p.17. 
13 See Life, Existence, and the Horizons of the Mind (Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie 生命存在與心靈境界), Beijing: 
Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, [1977] 2006, pp.29-83.
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however, is not necessarily an external reality incapable of drawing distinctions of its own, but can 
come in the form of another subject, as well as in that of observations of other subjects. The latter can 
in turn constitute interpretative horizons in their  own right,  applicable to different “objects” in the 
aforementioned sense. When understood as a horizon, modernity refers to the (a prior inaccessible) 
totality of semantic transcriptions of the structural features of modernity, which obviously cannot be 
straightforwardly  given  as  a  predetermined  and  circumscribed  whole.  Tang  Junyi  himself  already 
described the  present  age  as  the “communal  horizon” (gongtong zhi  jing 共同之境 )  of  his  own 
philosophical work.14 For Luhmann, it is in a sense social systems, not individual human beings, which 
dispose over  their  own operational  horizons,  meaning that  radically different  socially performative 
distinctions are made depending on whether,  say an individual human being (and this is already a 
specific  determination),  is  approached  as  a  physical  body,  a  taxpayer,  a  customer,  a  defendant,  a 
transcendental  subject,  or  the  sinful  pinnacle  of  creation.  Luhmann  does  not  assume that  “human 
beings, understood as self-grounding subjects, can choose the distinctions with which they dissect the 
world  and  designate  what  is  to  be  observed”.  On the  contrary,  he  thinks  that  “human beings  are 
socialized through participation in social communication to such a degree that they can choose only 
from within the framework of possibilities that have been made accessible for this choice.”15 Modern 
societal  complexity  thus  enters  into  the  in  itself  already  enormously  complicated  epistemological 
question of the overall conditions of knowledge. This means that, to paraphrase Kant, the question 
concerning the conditions of the possibility of knowledge in general has to be related to the conditions 
of the possibility of the “objects” of knowledge, insofar as the latter are taken to refer to structural 
formations which determine which and the way in which semantic accounts of their functioning and 
effects  are  given  and  reformulated.  This  should  not  be  interpreted  as  implying  that  the  “purely 
philosophical”  question  which  asks  how knowledge in  general  or  accurate  and true  knowledge in 
particular is possible has to be discarded as illegitimate, let alone pointless. But an inquiry into what is 
at stake in different versions of this “perennial” question at a particular moment in time and within a 
specific socio-historical setting has important consequences for our understanding of what it means to 
pose this question in the first place and can indicate what is included and excluded by the way in which 
it is posed.16 From this perspective, it is modernity as a dynamic ensemble of social structures which 
14 Tang, [1977], p.661.
15 Niklas  Luhmann,  Theories  of  Distinction:  Redescribing  the  Descriptions  of  Modernity,  Stanford  (Cal.):  Stanford 
University Press, 2002, p.127.
16 “To be historically means that knowledge of oneself can never be complete. All self-knowledge arises from what is  
historically pregiven, what with Hegel we call "substance," because it underlies all subjective intentions and actions, and 
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ultimately  conditions  how  philosophical  theories  such  as  the  New  Confucian  one  observe  the 
environment  of  modern  society  through  the  lens  of  other  (philosophical,  political,  economical) 
observations received and produced there. This is also the underlying reason why I think it is necessary 
to problematize the conceptual solutions encountered in modern Chinese philosophy. My intention is 
not to “debunk” or “expose”, but to understand them, even if this involves occasionally resorting to 
what Gilles Deleuze famously described as his method of interpretative “enculage”.17 Heidegger once 
complained, full of pathos, and somewhat pathetically, about the tragic spectacle of great philosophers 
having to put up with being “refuted” by doctoral candidates. But perhaps one does a greater disservice 
to them by nodding at their ideas in reverent bewilderment. Conversations only tend to go on so long 
after people find themselves in perfect agreement. 
Before presenting a short overview of the content of my study, I would like to go on to provide a 
further idea of my overall take on the phenomenon of New Confucianism. My approach is in a way 
close to, yet also miles apart from, the one articulated by Jesús Solé-Farràs in a recent monograph.18 
Solé-Farràs sets out to grasp the resurgence of interest in Confucianism in twenty and twenty-first 
century China by analyzing New Confucianism as a specific form of discourse, constructed from the 
early twentieth century onwards, without thereby restricting himself to the “speculative endeavors”19 of 
its  most  philosophically-minded  representatives.  I  have  already indicated  that  it  is  precisely  these 
particular endeavors in which I am personally most interested. As he states at the beginning of his 
study: “Since current Chinese society is in no way an institutionally Confucianist society, therefore, at 
this time it is especially pertinent to speak essentially of a discourse when we talk about Confucianism,  
because, indeed, we may not be able to talk about anything else.”20 Joël Thoraval makes the following 
apposite remarks: 
What has disappeared are the material and symbolic conditions of this form of thought, both in the case
of ritual as well as bodily practices. What we today call Confucian philosophy is the result of a dramatic
hence both prescribes and limits every possibility for understanding any tradition whatsoever in its historical alterity.  
This almost defines the aim of philosophical hermeneutics: its task is to retrace the path of Hegel's phenomenology of  
mind until we discover in all that is subjective the substantiality that determines it.” Gadamer, 2004, p.301.
17 Gilles Deleuze, Pourparlers, 1972-1990, Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1990, p.15.
18 Jesús Solé-Farràs,  New Confucianism in Twenty-first Century China. The Construction of a Discourse, New York and 
London: Routledge, 2014.
19 Solé-Farràs, 2014, p.1
20 Solé-Farràs,  2014,  p.5.  Emphasis  added.  Cf.  John  Makeham,  Lost-Soul:  'Confucianism'  in  Contemporary  Chinese  
Academic Discourse, Cambridge, MA and London, England: Harvard University Asia Center, 2008, p.17: “The most 
visible expression of the [Confucian] movement remains a body of discourse.”
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effort to preserve valuable teachings which have been severed from their conditions of possibility in a
new language.21 
However, it seems to me that Solé-Farràs's attempt to approach the appearance of New Confucianism 
as essentially a discursive or semantic phenomenon is marred from the onset by his self-professed but 
dogmatically presented acceptance of Confucianism as “the core and preferential vehicle of Chinese 
culture”, of which he assumes that the fundamental ethics “as a syncretic evolution, and presumably 
uninterruptedly,  has  survived  into  the  twenty-first  century”.22 The  author's  methodologically 
unmotivated overidentification with his subject matter is, in my view, detrimental to what he sets out to 
accomplish. He runs the risk of remaining on a purely descriptive level, reiterating a selective number 
of self-identifications of the “object” of study and thereby remaining in an uncritical agreement with 
what he describes. One thus gets the impression of reading a manual for assembling a home appliance, 
which never questions the reason why let alone contests the fact that the commodity in question needs 
to be produced, bought, and used in the first place. It comes as no surprise then that at the end of his  
book,  Solé-Farràs's  descriptive  approach  culminates  in  a  categorized  list  summarizing  the 
“philosophical and ideological principles of New Confucianism” with regards to anything ranging from 
ontology, cosmology, ethics and religion, to science and technology, politics, education, the economy 
and so on23, without considering how this distinctly modern disciplinary division of knowledge already 
affects, reorders, and possibly distorts those aspects of the Confucian tradition which are categorized 
under one of these rubrics.24 One cannot help but wonder how generalizing assumptions such as the one 
21 Joël Thoraval, “Sur le transformation de la pensée néo-confucéenne en discours philosophique moderne. Réflexions sur 
quelques apories du néo-confucianisme contemporain”,  Extrême-Orient, Extrême-Occident, 27, 2005, p.94. Emphasis 
added. Also see Jing Haifeng 景海峰, “The Path of Philosophication in the Modern Interpretation of Confucian Thought 
and its Significance” (Rujia sixiang xiandai quanshi de zhexuehua lujing ji qi yiyi 儒家思想现代诠释的哲学路径及其
意义), 2005, http://www.confucius2000.com/admin/list.asp?id=2507. 
22 Solé-Farràs,  2014,  p.2.  Cf.  p.229:  “We  have tried,  by theorising its  construction,  to  explain the importance of  the 
discourse, and have already done so without distancing ourselves from the discourse of New Confucianism as a concrete 
example, because we believe in its future projection”. My italics.
23 Solé-Farràs, 2014, pp.217-220. Solé-Farràs's “discourse analysis” of the 1958 New Confucian Manifesto (see chapter 1 
of this study) reads like a bare summary of the content of this text. See Solé-Farràs, 2014, pp.171-213. 
24 See Immanuel Wallerstein, World-System Analysis. An Introduction, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2004, 
pp.1-9 and Jing Haifeng 景海峰, “The Construction of Chinese Philosophy against the Background of Systematization” 
(Yi  zhiduhua  wei  beijing  de  Zhongguo  zhexue  jiangou 以 制 度 化 为 背 景 的 中 国 哲 学 建 构 ),  2014, 
http://www.ica.org.cn/nlb/content.aspx?nodeid=290&page=ContentPage&contentid=4759.  The  staunchly  traditionalist 
Ma Yifu's 馬一浮 (1883-1967) propagation of the “Six Arts” (liu yi 六藝) for example was perhaps more in line with the 
modern taxonomy of knowledge than one might suspect, given the correspondences he establishes:  Book of History 
(Shujing 書經) = history, Book of Odes (Shijing 詩經) = poetry, Book of Changes (Yijing 易經) = metaphysics, Book of  
Rites (Liji 禮記) = rites, Book of Music (Yuejing 樂經) = music, Spring and Autumn Annals (Chunqiu 春秋) = politics. 
See  Umberto Bresciani,  Reinventing Confucianism: the New Confucian Movement,  Taipei: Taipei Ricci  Institute for 
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just quoted (Confucianism as the “core” and “preferential vehicle” of Chinese culture) can be squared 
with the theoretical logic behind Solé-Farràs's rather sketchy presentation of his idea of discourse. For 
Solé-Farràs, “discourses are dynamic concretions [...] singularizations constantly being refined which, 
by virtue of the association of ideological elements […] occur within complex, heterogeneous and 
permeable structures called discursive spaces.”25 He rightly stresses the importance of these “discursive 
spaces”, which, at least as I understand it, should be viewed as susceptible to influences from the non-
discursive  in  the  broadest  sense  of  the  word,  that  is  to  say,  from  the  historical  and  the  social 
environment of a given discourse. As Foucault put it succinctly: “One cannot just talk about anything in 
any age”.26 This remains the case even when one assumes the environmental impact on discursive 
phenomena to necessarily occur  only mediately (within discourse),  i.e.  only after  the discourse in 
question has formed a specific representation of the historical environment in which it is embedded, an 
environment which is never so much “given” as it is constructed, on the basis and within the constraints 
of conditions set by this environment.27 In this specific sense, indeed, “il n'y a pas de hors-texte”28. This 
constructivist  assumption  also  implies  that  a  certain  discourse  can  constitute  an  environment  for 
another discourse and is able to use the semantics of different discursive formations in representing and 
making the (non-discursive) social reality by which it is conditioned accessible. Bearing this in mind, I 
do not think it is quite so easy to distinguish, as Cheng Zhihua 程志华 does in the introduction to his 
comprehensive  study of  the  thought  of  Mou Zongsan,  between a form of  “internal  interpretation” 
(neizai quanshi 内在诠释) which traces the inner logic and immanent goals of philosophical ideas and 
theories on the one hand, and a mode of “external interpretation” (waizai quanshi 外在诠释) inquiring 
into the embeddedness of philosophical discourse in history and social reality on the other.29 Rather, the 
externality of the environmental context to the inner workings of discourse is something which first of 
all  has  to  be  established  “internally”,  but  no  matter  what  degree  of  freedom  from  external 
determinations a certain type of discourse grants itself (and philosophy often goes very far in its pursuit 
of liberty), the fact that even this internally established immunity to the “outside” is conditioned by the 
Chinese Studies, 2001, pp.96-97. 
25 Solé-Farràs, 2014, p.3.
26 Michel Foucault, L'archéologie du savoir, Paris: Gallimard, 1969, p.65. 
27 See Luhmann, 2002, chapter 6: “The Cognitive Program of Constructivism and the Reality that Remains Unknown”, 
pp.128-154.
28 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997, p.158. 
29 A Study of Mou Zongsan's Philosophy – The Possibility of Moral Metaphysics (Mou Zongsan zhexue yanjiu – Daode de  
xing'ershangxue zhi keneng 牟宗三哲学研究 — 道德的形而上学之可能 ), Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2009, pp.33-
51.
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socio-historical environment goes to show that discursive closure can only be assumed to go so far. It is 
only within specific situations and circumstances that it becomes a problem to stress the dependence of 
semantics  on structure.  That  Cheng Zhihua identifies  the “internal”  form of interpretation with an 
outlook  which  “discusses  essence  through  itself”  ( 即 本 质 以 论 本 质 ),  whereas  the  external 
interpretative approach “discusses essence with reference to existence” (即存在以论本质 ) entails a 
ontological distinction that is not straightforwardly reconcilable with a philosophical perspective which 
protests against the separation of essence and existence, such as is found in the works of Mou Zongsan. 
I think it is precisely the problematic relation between essence and existence which can be effectively 
clarified (though of course not explained away or let alone “solved”) through the adoption of what 
Cheng  calls  an  “external”  approach.30 In  any case,  the  complexity  of  what  Solé-Farràs  terms the 
“consubstantial interdependence”31 between a (semantic) discourse and the (structural) discursive space 
in which the former is embedded, should not be passed over in silence, but reflexively applied in his  
own (highly metaphorical) treatment of discourse.32 Doing so could help to cast some light on  Solé-
Farràs's approach of discourses as merely functional operators, largely dependent on a seamless “inner 
coherence”, and seemingly endowed with the sole purpose of simultaneously preserving themselves 
and maintaining what they describe, a purpose manifesting itself in the “need to adapt to the changing 
circumstances  of  external  reality”33.  He takes  it  to  be  self-evident  that  “the  very concepts  of  this 
[Confucian] culture are not just conjectural, but rather, through constant adaptation wherever necessary 
to  the  requirements  of  reality,  have  even survived the  demise  of  the  Chinese  empire”34.  It  seems 
doubtful to me that “its transformation into a philosophical discourse, in the Western sense of the term, 
must be seen merely as one of the multiple manifestations of Confucianism”35, insofar as this is meant 
to  imply  that  such  a  manifestation  does  not  involve  a  considerable  degree  of  mediation,  if  not 
distortion. All of this makes the author's first announcement in the introduction that “this is a book on 
discourse”36 rather  doubtful,  suggesting  instead  that  his  work is  part  and parcel  of  the  very same 
discourse it sets out to analyze. Solé-Farràs's Confucianism, which strangely enough is supposed to 
30 I do not think Cheng is justified in leaving Mou Zongsan's earliest articles on socio-political issues out of consideration 
and consequently arguing that Mou's philosophical career only really takes off with his researches into the  Book of  
Changes as a source of cosmological knowledge. See Cheng, 2009, pp.86-87. I draw on some of these in my opinion 
crucial texts in chapter 2 and 3 of my dissertation.
31 Solé-Farràs, 2014, p.3.
32 It is a pity that Solé-Farràs relegates the Foucauldian concept of discourse to a mere footnote (p.8) and simply notes that  
he has no desire to enter into a discussion with it nor to contradict it (p.5). 
33 Solé-Farràs, 2014, p.4.
34 Solé-Farràs, 2014, p.229.
35 Solé-Farràs, 2014, p.10. My italics.
36 Solé-Farràs, 2014, p.1.
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both  originate  with  and  predate  the  figure  of  Confucius,  seems  to  have  the  miraculous  ability  to 
manifest itself in a variety of ways without ever losing its self-identity or becoming truly subject to and 
conditioned by the discursive spaces in  which it  has  always managed to find and recognize itself 
throughout  the  ages.  I  must  confess  to  being  largely  agnostic  concerning  the  question  of  what 
Confucianism  is  or  is  not.  But  I  fundamentally  disagree  with  Solé-Farràs's  statement  that  “the 
Confucianist discourse of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries is only intelligible to us if we can 
understand  the  basic  concepts  of  its  philosophical  tradition.”37 I  am inclined  to  take  the  opposite 
hermeneutic approach. I think this particular discourse can only be understood if its present discursive 
space is taken into account, and if one understands something about the historical juncture at which 
something like  “tradition”  and “philosophy”  comes  to  be  constructed  and renegotiated  in  the  first 
place.38 This does not mean that I dismiss the question of what certain Confucian ideas originally meant 
(e.g. what does ren 仁  (“humaneness”) mean in the text of the Lunyu 論語 , and how was this notion 
interpreted in subsequent commentaries?), in their own historical context, as irrelevant. I simply mean 
that the present time, which unavoidably forms the horizon of any observation aimed at “unearthing” or 
reconstructing such a meaning, cannot but influence a theory about, say, the meaning of ren, since the 
question of what ren means for us today (and “we”, as Satan says about himself to Jesus in the Gospels, 
“are many”) is always, so to speak, the question behind this question. Perhaps one can argue that asking 
what ren means is already a false start, and that one should instead inquire into what it does, or try to 
find out how one can do it. If on the other hand, our object of inquiry, such as in the case of New 
Confucianism, is a modern form of discourse, which describes itself constantly with reference to a past 
that  can only be accessed and represented through the present, it  seems logical not to shift all our 
attention to the “formative era” (the Zhou 周 dynasty, the Warring States period, Song-Ming 宋明 Neo-
Confucianism) identified by this discourse, but instead, to look at how the past it  describes can be 
grasped in the context of the present day.39 
It  would  obviously  fall  outside  the  scope  of  this  introduction  to  give  anything  even  remotely 
resembling  a  non-trivial  account  of  how  discourses  such  as  the  Confucian  one  (and  the  one  on 
Confucianism) are caught up in non-discursive or extra-discursive mechanisms of power and control, 
37 Solé-Farràs, 2014, p.10.
38 See David Gross, The Past in Ruins: Tradition and the Critique of Modernity, Amherst: The University of Massachusetts 
Press, 1992.
39 Foucault cautions: “Il ne fait pas envoyer le discours à la lointaine présence de l'origine; il faut le traiter dans le jeu de  
son instance.” Foucault, 1969, p.39.
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and of how these mechanisms influence philosophical and popular argumentation and opinion. To do so 
would imply embarking on the complex and difficult endeavor of theorizing the impact ideas have on 
the  realities  they  attempt  to  describe,  and  in  many  cases  purport  to  be  able  to  transform.  Karl 
Mannheim rightly called this relation between thought and experience an “inexhaustible theme”40, with 
the same sense of pioneering enthusiasm Husserl displayed when describing his “discovery” of the 
phenomenological  method.  Such  an  undertaking  would  be  complicated  by  the  simple  fact  that 
discourse  not  only  influences  and  mediates  (e.g.  political)  power,  but  at  the  same  time  offers  a 
description of its own real or intended discursive power and social performativity. Such a description 
allows a given discourse to reflect on its own observed, anticipated or imagined societal impact and is 
part and parcel of how it articulates this concrete functioning within the world it distinguishes from 
itself on and in its own terms. The self-description of a certain discourse is not simply a supplementary 
dimension, but determines how it is observed by other social agents (often with a discursive framework 
of their own) and how it attempts, succeeds, or fails to influence them. The problem of ideology clearly 
imposes  itself  here.  One would have  to  go on to  provide  a  theorization  of  ideology with  enough 
explanatory force to account for the position from which one can observe what ideology is and is not 
and what does and does not qualify as ideological. As the philosopher and sociologist Edgar Morin 
stresses by invoking the work of David Bloor41, it is naive to think that “only error is the prisoner of its 
social  or  cultural  conditions  of formation” and to  consider  truth “as the meta-social  emergence of 
adequation to reality”42. If I were to attempt a very general and formal definition of ideology here, I 
would propose the following provisional formula: an ensemble of representations primarily intended 
not to influence a certain state of affairs (which it represents 'directly' as well as mediately through a 
40 Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia. An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge, London and Henley: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, 1960, p.72.
41 See David Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagery, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1976, pp.8-13.
42 Edgar Morin, La méthode 4. Les idées. Leur habitat, leur vie, leurs moeurs, leur organisation, Paris: Seuil, 1991, p.17. 
As Bloor writes: “Thus the sociology of knowledge is confined to the sociology of error.” Bloor, 1976, p.12. Morin 
believes that this leads to the following paradox: “En vertu même des principes qui l'autorisent à réduire la connaissance 
scientifique à ses conditions sociales et historiques de formation, une telle sociologie de la connaissance devient elle-
même un produit historique propre à un certain type de société et elle détruit le trône souverain où elle croit s'installer.”  
Morin, 1991, p.17. I think Morin is a bit too quick to dismiss the determinism he takes to be inherent in the approach  
which does not exclude (scientific and logical) truth from external conditioning as the source of this paradox, which can  
be otherwise accounted for by a recourse to the self-referential nature of systems of meaning (Luhmann), though of  
course not explained away. Morin's grounding of the autonomy of (individual) thought from its (biological, cultural and 
social) conditions in the possibility of deviance as individual creativity (p.26, pp.111-133) is in itself distinctly modern, 
and thus equally conditioned by that which it seeks to emancipate itself from. See section 2.4 of the second chapter of  
my study.  Morin also fails  to  address  Bloor's  own arguments against  critics  who claim that  his  “strong program”, 
extending the sociological study of knowledge to the hard sciences (without supposing that something is necessarily 
“false” simply by virtue of being causally conditioned by external factors) is self-refuting. See Bloor, 1976, pp.17-18.
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description of its own putative efficacy in changing this state of affairs), but rather  to influence the  
position of its own representation of this state of affairs itself within the real state of affairs behind this 
very same representation. An ideological representation would then be one which is not so much set up 
to  effect  a change in the represented state of affairs,  but one which is  bent on increasing its  own 
discursive power within the real state of affairs, distorting the latter as much as is needed to accomplish 
this  covert  goal. The focus thus shifts  from the (social,  political)  problem itself  to magnifying the 
ability of the representation in question to intervene in and change the state of affairs put forward as in 
some sense problematic. In simpler terms: the solution comes to override the problem, mystifying the 
latter in the process, while acting as a semantics unimpeded by structure. As Althusser wrote, inspired 
by Marx, but perhaps equally indebted to Kant: “[I]t is  in the question itself, that is,  in the way it  
reflects that object (and not in the object itself) that ideological mystification […] should be sought.”43 
Additionally, one could qualify as ideological any representation of a state of affairs which presents 
itself as being able to intervene in the problem it addresses without becoming part of, or at least tangled 
up in, the very same problem, like a god for whom the divine economy governing the world is a matter  
of perfect indifference, who invests and risks nothing through his mysterious expenditure and observes 
the perdition and anticipates the final salvation of all things while pairing his nails, without realizing 
the clippings will bring disaster to some and become a new source of revenue for others. In any case, 
ideology is not only a quality we as observers of a certain discourse may or may not attribute to a 
particular  socially  performative  statement,  but  also  provides  a  criterion  for  some  discourses  to 
distinguish themselves from others. This leads one to the entirely unsurprising but nonetheless crucial  
observation  that  descriptions  of  ideology  can  themselves  be  ideological.  This  self-referential  or 
“autological” quality of discourse cannot be simply reasoned away.44 We can thus exclude a priori the 
possibility of a neutral and “objective” viewpoint from nowhere, which would really leave us with 
nothing to look at and nothing to see through. I will not dwell on these questions concerning what 
philosophers would call the relation between thought and being any further for now. They were merely 
raised in order to point beyond what can be treated here and indicate them as the horizon against which  
the following observations take place, a horizon which the latter can hopefully help to outline in the 
process. They are questions in which, as Heidegger used to say, “we ourselves, the questioners, are also 
included in the question, placed in the question”.45 
43 Louis Althusser, For Marx, London and New York: Verso, 2005, p.66, note 29.
44 See Luhmann, 2002, part 2: “Paradox and Observation”, pp.79-154. 
45 Martin Heidegger, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. World, Finitude, Solitude, Bloomington and Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 1995, p.9. 
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2. Chapter outline
(1) In the first chapter, I provide a critical overview of some prominent examples of discourse on the 
revival and reinvention of Confucianism and the Chinese tradition in contemporary China. I start out by 
discussing the position of the Chinese Communist Party vis-à-vis the return of Confucius to the post-
revolutionary mainland and analyze the duplicitous attitude both the Party as well as intellectuals and 
academics  who  call  for  a  modernized  and  selective  restoration  of  Confucianism display  towards 
cultural tradition, which they approach as both a self-sufficient source of (transcendental) “values” and 
a functional resource of (empirical) “interests”. I indicate that the apparent rebirth of historical and 
cultural  consciousness following the de facto exorcism of the specters of Marx and Mao from the 
People's Republic is primarily run through with nationalist intentions and pragmatic motivations, and is 
predicated on an active forgetfulness towards the recent past, as well as on a tactical bracketing of the 
problem of modernity and the Communist Party's  unprecedented embrace of capitalist  strategies of 
development. As a result, the problematic relation between the difference represented by a culturally 
specific semantics and the identity of a fundamentally “wordless” societal structure is disavowed and 
repressed  in  a  piecemeal  and  ideological  remembrance  of  the  past.  Zhang  Xianglong's  Utopian 
proposal  to  establish  “conservation  areas  for  Confucian  culture”  is  used  as  an  illustration  of  the 
conceptual and practical difficulty of insulating cultural conservatism from the logic of development. I 
then go on to introduce Jiang Qing's much-debated, controversial project of “political Confucianism” 
and analyze the unstable distinction he draws between a “spiritual Confucianism” represented by Tang 
Junyi and Mou Zongsan, and his own vision of an institutionalized and authoritarian Confucian order. I 
argue that Tang's and Mou's categorical rejection of Marxism and communism and their initial attempts 
to establish an educational framework for the transmission of Confucian learning and Chinese culture 
at  large  through the  Hong Kong New Asia  College  in  the  context  of  the  Cold War,  belie  Jiang's 
sectarian classification of these thinkers as aloof, apolitical “metaphysicians”. In this way, I try to show 
that their appropriation of the dialectical philosophy of Hegel had an irreducibly historical dimension 
and  cannot  be  explained  away  as  a  regrettable  instance  of  traditionalist  intellectuals  being 
“epistemologically colonized” by Western thought. In the remaining portion of the chapter, I explore 
the implications of the fact that Jiang shares an explicitly anti-communist and largely Hegelian idea of 
Chinese culture as a simultaneously substantial and subjective Spirit in common with Mou and Tang, 
and trace the continuing impact of the paradigm of culture as Spirit in contemporary Chinese political 
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philosophy,  specifically  in  relation  to  culturalist  rejections  of  democracy.  In  doing  so,  I  try  to 
demonstrate  that  a  closer  study of  the  thought  of  “spiritual”  Confucianists  can  provide  a  critical 
perspective on the historical rootedness of current discourse on historical and cultural consciousness, 
and can clarify some of the conceptual contradictions which have accompanied attempts to ground the 
specificity and validity of Chinese philosophy for the modern world in a comparative manner.
 
(2) The intention of the second chapter is to further historically situate the genesis of New Confucian 
philosophy  as  well  as  to  retroactively  contextualize  recent  narratives  surrounding  the  so-called 
“Confucian revival”. The focus throughout this chapter lies on the problem of discontinuity, that is to 
say of time, or rather of a time specific to our present day and age. After the introductory section in 
which I reflect on the issue of tradition and (dis)continuity, I proceed by first sketching the broader 
historical background of the emergence of New Confucian (philosophical) discourse, something that 
was not yet adequately done in the first chapter, which had a more contemporary focus. I single out the 
period of May Fourth/the New Culture Movement and the way it has been remembered and interpreted 
by  traditionalist  thinkers  such  as  the  New  Confucians  in  order  to  do  so.  Next,  I  approach  the 
phenomenon of New Confucianism in the context of the modern reclassification of knowledge. Firstly, 
I  reflect  on  the  transformation  of  Confucianism  into  a  form  of  philosophy  and  the  structurally 
conditioned abstraction from history involved in this process. Secondly, I analyze the position of New 
Confucian  philosophy towards  science  developed  in  the  wake of  the  1923 debate  on  science  and 
metaphysics and outline what the intellectual historian Wang Hui has described as the “turn towards the 
subject” occurring in the aftermath of this epochal debate. Throughout, I refer to Tang Junyi's and Mou 
Zongsan's dialectical criticism of Marx, Marxism and communism, and give some indications of their 
indebtedness to German Idealist philosophy (specifically Hegel) as a resource of socio-political ideas 
and a vehicle for reversing what they took to be the disastrous course of the materialist dialectic. In  
their recurring and trenchant criticisms, as I try to demonstrate via a brief discussion of Feng Youlan's 
social  philosophy  in  the  light  of the  work  of  the  Marxist  theorist  Moishe  Postone,  “Marx”  and 
“Marxism” can be taken as signifiers for modernity in general.  Since Tang's and Mou's relation to 
Marxism and communism has generally been glossed over in the existing secondary literature, this will 
require  the  introduction  of  a  significant  amount  of  textual  material,  for  which  I  ask  the  reader's 
indulgence. The specific problem of the historical discontinuity resulting from modernization, which 
for Tang and Mou was symbolized by revolutionary Chinese communism, is put forward as revealing 
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the inner tension in their work between the theoretical presuppositions they comparatively ascribed to 
the Chinese tradition on the one hand, and the ontological baseline stemming from their critique of 
modernity on the other. 
(3) In the third and final chapter, I further elaborate on the philosophical consequences of the above-
mentioned contradictory tension with reference  to  Tang Junyi's,  Mou Zongsan's,  as  well  as  Xiong 
Shili's “purely philosophical” works, in which their historical and socio-political concerns have been to 
a  large extent  sublimated into conceptual  tensions  and notional  fault  lines.  In the process  I  try to 
connect and merge  the two main aspects of my object of research and thus of my own dissertation, 
namely  the  historical  dimension  captured  by the  question  concerning  the  structural  and  semantic 
impact of modernity and novel forms of discourse on neoconservative intellectuals in twentieth-century 
and contemporary China on the one hand, and the philosophical dimension focused on delineating the 
conceptual repercussions of the specific conception of modernity articulated in the work of the modern 
Confucian philosophers I have studied on the other. In the first section of this chapter, I investigate the 
fluctuating boundaries drawn by Xiong Shili and Tang Junyi between science and philosophy and try to 
think  through  the  significance  of  the  residual  category  of  “wisdom”  as  a  form of  knowledge  by 
contrastively invoking the work of the phenomenologist Edmund Husserl. I then proceed by addressing 
some  of  the  crucial  paradoxes  and  aporias  which  have  beset  their  attempts  to  establish  various 
ontological and epistemological unities in the context of their own endeavors to both accommodate and 
keep  a  certain  distance  from  the  scientific  worldview  and  endow  Confucian  philosophy  with  a 
comparatively established identity distinct from both Western philosophy and Buddhist thought. In the 
case  of  Xiong,  I  mainly  focus  on  his  magnum  opus,  the  New  Treatise  on  the  Uniqueness  of  
Consciousness  from 1932, while at  the same time drawing attention to his  somewhat understudied 
socio-political writings. Tang's work on the other hand is presented through the medium of a relatively 
little-known essay from 1943 entitled Introduction to the World of Sense. The second and largest part of 
this chapter is devoted to studying and situating the thought of Mou Zongsan philosophically as well as 
historically. I outline the trajectory from his earlier works on logic and epistemology to his mature 
“double-leveled”  ontology inspired  by Kant,  Heidegger,  and Wittgenstein,  and try to  establish the 
socio-political background of his philosophical undertaking with reference to his concept of the “self-
negation  of  moral  reason”  and  his  lifelong  mission  to  overcome  Communist  ideology  through 
philosophy. 
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Chapter 1: History and Historical Consciousness in Contemporary China: 
Political Confucianism, Spiritual Confucianism, and the Politics of Spirit
They  are  to  be  rescued  as  a  bit  of  unconscious  transcription  of  history.  For  they  must  be  helped  to  procure  self-
consciousness against what they explicitly mean.
Adorno1
In fact, I do understand history; it is just that I do not remember it.
其實我是懂歷史，只是不記得歷史。
Mou Zongsan2
1.1 Introduction: enter the ghost of Confucius
The  renewed  interest  in  and  discursive  prominence  of  Confucianism in  contemporary  China  is  a 
remarkable  and complex phenomenon.  Once vilified  as  the  main  obstacle  standing in  the  way of 
modernization and progress and condemned as the supreme symbol and idol of a backwards, feudal 
ideology destined for the infamous “dustbins of history”, Confucius seems to have made a surprising 
comeback on the Chinese scene. During most of the twentieth century, his name was most often heard 
on the mainland in the ominous rallying cry to “smash the Confucian shop” (dadao kongjiadian 打倒孔
家店), a slogan first formulated by Hu Shi 胡适 (1891-1962) in 1921, one of the leading figures of the 
iconoclast  New Culture Movement (Xin wenhua yundong 新文化运动 )  which saw radical socio-
political and cultural change as a prerequisite for “saving the nation”  (jiuguo 救国 ). Decades later, 
towards the end of the Cultural Revolution, Confucius came to be identified with Mao Zedong's 毛泽
东 heir apparent turned traitor Lin Biao 林彪 as the enemy of the people  par excellence during the 
Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius  Campaign (Pi Kong pi Lin yundong 批孔批林运动 ) which lasted 
from 1973 to 1976.3 Nowadays, following the reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping 邓小平 from 1978 
onwards and China's subsequent rise as an economic superpower on the international stage, the tide 
1 Theodor W. Adorno, Against Epistemology. A Metacritique, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013, p.39.
2 Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 ,  Nineteen Lectures on Chinese Philosophy (Zhongguo zhexue shijiu jiang 中国哲學十九講 ), 
[1983b] vol.29 of MJ, p.12.
3 See A. James Gregor and Maria Hsia Chang, “Anti-Confucianism: Mao's Last Campaign”, Asian Survey, vol.19, no.11, 
1979, pp.1073-1092.
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seems to have turned, making it possible for Confucius to open up shop on the mainland once again. 
The dustbins are now looked upon as treasuries, the garbage men and the gravediggers have taken to 
recycling  and  effecting  miraculous  resurrections.  There  is  much  talk  nowadays  of  a  revival  of 
Confucianism, but it is not always clear precisely what is being revived and who stands to gain in the 
process. As befitting such a dramatic comeback, a prize had to be paid for being brought back from the 
dead. Confucius can now be made to say and mean virtually anything, and can be presented as anything 
ranging from a proto-anarchist,  a communitarian or a personal improvement guru, to a provider of 
wisdoms  to  smooth  over  business  negotiations.4 The  dual  trends  of  commodification  and 
depoliticization have perhaps been the dominant features of the Confucian comeback to contemporary 
Chinese society.5 In a  sense,  the transformation of the proper name “Confucius” into an infinitely 
malleable  signifier  was  already  to  a  considerable  extent  accomplished  in  the  above-mentioned 
campaign  against  general  Lin  Biao,  who  was  rather  randomly associated  with  Confucius,  simply 
because the latter had come to mean “counterrevolutionary” and not much else besides. This makes the 
current rectification of the name of Confucius all the more remarkable. Even earlier, during the “New 
Life Movement” (xin shenghuo yundong 新生活運動 )  launched by Chiang Kai-shek 蔣介石 in 
February 1934, one could already witness a radical reduction of traditional cardinal virtues such as li 禮 
(“ritual propriety”)  to  standards  of  “public  morality”  (gongde 公德 ).  This  movement  aimed  at  a 
complete transformation of society (and ultimately at “national salvation”) through a revitalization of 
“traditional”  morality by mobilizing the populace in mass campaigns for “hygienic and behavioral 
reform”, in order to root out “decadent” habits such as spitting, littering, gambling, disorderly queuing 
and so on. Needless to say, popular mobilization was conducted under strict supervision of the army 
and the Nationalist Party (Guomindang 國民黨, GMD).6 From Chiang Kai-shek's Outline of the New 
4 See Michael Nylan, “A Confusion of Confuciuses:  Invoking Kongzi in the Modern World”,  in Michael Nylan and 
Thomas Wilson, Lives of Confucius. Civilization's Greatest Sage through the Ages, New York: Doubleday, 2010, pp.192-
246.  Nylan  characterizes  Confucius  as  a  “Protean  dragon riding the  times”.  Also see  Kam Louie,  “Confucius  the 
Chameleon: Dubious Envoy for 'Brand China'”, boundary 2, vol.38, no.1, 2011, pp.77-100. Such is probably the fate it 
shares  in  common with  philosophy or  anything  (defined  as)  “philosophical”  in  general,  which,  specifically  in  its 
postmodern guise, has become committed to serving, according to Richard Rorty, to “embellish conversation”. 
5 See Peng Guoxiang, “Inside the Revival of Confucianism in Mainland China: the Vicissitudes of Confucian Classics in 
Contemporary China as an Example”,  Oriens Extremus, 49, 2010, pp.225-235. The most famous incarnation of these 
trends is probably Yu Dan 于丹, sometimes called China's Oprah Winfrey, a professor of media studies and television 
host  who published her best-selling  Insights from the Analects (Lunyu xinde 论语心得 ) in 2006. On the Yu Dan 
phenomenon,  see  Anna Sun,  Confucianism as  a World  Religion.  Contested  Histories  and Contemporary  Realities , 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013, pp.140-144.
6 Arif Dirlik, “The Ideological Foundations of the New Life Movement: A Study in Counterrevolution”, The Journal of  
Asian Studies, vol.34, no.4, 1975, pp.945-980. Also see Lloyd E. Eastman, “The Kuomintang in the 1930s”, in  The 
Limits of  Change. Essays on Conservative Alternatives in Republican China,  edited by Charlotte Furth, Cambridge 
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Life Movement (Xin shenghuo yundong gangyao 新生活運動綱要 ),  it  becomes apparent that the 
tradition the movement wanted to restore was a very peculiar and specific one, since the behavior of the 
Western bourgeoisie, “including the way they dress, eat and walk”, as well as their “love for the state 
and loyalty to the nation” was presented in this text as being “in total accordance with li [禮, ritual], yi  
[義, righteousness], lian [廉, honesty] and chi [恥, a sense of shame]”.7 It would not be such a stretch 
of the imagination to compare the Guomindang's movement for “orderliness and cleanliness” to the 
education campaign spearheaded by the Central  Commission for Guiding Cultural  and Educational 
Progress of the Chinese Communist  Party (Zhongguo gongchandang zhongyang jingshen wenming 
jianshe zhidao weiyuanhui 中国共产党中央精神文明建设指导委员会 ) in the months leading up to 
the  2008  Beijing  Olympics,  in  which  a  similar  rhetoric  appealing  to  “traditional  morality”  was 
employed to discourage (perhaps equally traditional?) habits and customs considered to be uncivilized 
and offensive in the eyes of the Western world imagined to be observing the Olympic games.8 
Of course, the ambiguity of the signifiers “Confucius” or “Confucian” need not stand in the way of  
their meaningfulness and social relevance, nor should it lead us to overlook the symbolic significance 
of their reappearance and reappraisal.  That being said, the risk of over-inflating the magnitude and 
significance of the return of Confucius to mainland China is perhaps much greater. This is undoubtedly 
mainly because the gradual and partial reemergence of Confucianism has also manifested itself in an 
often discussed adoption of Confucianist or at least Confucian-sounding terms by the ruling Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP).9 The current president of the People's Republic (PRC), Xi Jinping 习近平 , 
has  made statements  which directly put  forward the  idea  that  writings  such as  the  Analects are  a 
fountainhead of wisdom that could benefit both China in its search for sustainable growth, as well as 
Western  countries  in  their  struggle  against  the  economic  crisis.10 The  establishment  of  academic 
(Mass.) and London: Harvard University Press, 1976, pp.200-205. 
7 Quoted in Dirlik, 1975, p.960. Transcription amended from Wade-Giles to pinyin.
8 See  “Olympic  Crackdown  on  China's  Bad  Habits”,  BBC  News,  6  August,  2007,  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia 
pacific/6927361.stm. Rana Mitter makes the same comparison in A Bitter Revolution: China's Struggle with the Modern  
World, Oxford (N.Y.): Oxford University Press, 2004, p.301. Visitors to Beijing can still see the slogan “Respecting the  
elderly and caring for the young is a beautiful traditional virtue of the Chinese people” (尊老爱幼是中华民族的传统美
德) displayed non-stop on information displays in subway carriages.
9 See Sébastien Billioud, “Confucianism, 'Cultural Tradition', and Official Discourse in China at the Start of the New  
Century”, China Perspectives, 3, 2007, pp.50-65 and Jesús Solé-Farràs, “Harmony in Contemporary New Confucianism 
and in Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”, China Media Research, vol.4, 2008, pp.18-21. 
10 Chris  Buckley,  “Xi  Touts  Communist  Party  as  Defender  of  Confucius’s  Virtues”,  New  York  Times,  Sinosphere:  
Dispatches from China, 13 February 2014 http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/13/xi-touts-communist-party-as-
defender-of-confuciuss-virtues/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0. Exhortations to study the words of the Sage in order to 
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institutions and specialized journals devoted to Confucianism has received substantial support from the 
Party and the government ever since the 1980s.11 The global proliferation of the contested “Confucius 
Institutes” (Kongzi xueyuan 孔子学院), hundreds of which have already been established in countries 
all over the world, is another notable example of how China uses Confucianism as a form of symbolic 
capital capable of  metonomously representing the whole nation.12 That the PRC's alternative to the 
Nobel Peace Prize bears the name “Confucius Peace Price” (kongzi hepingjiang 孔子和平奖), awarded 
to Vladimir Putin in 2011, is also telling.13 However, as the widely reported incident of a huge bronze 
statue of Confucius being installed in January 2011 in front of the National Museum on Tiananmen 
square, only to be removed a few months later indicates, it is safe to say that we are far from witnessing 
a full-scale conversion to Confucianism on the part of CCP and its over eighty million members, even 
on the highly malleable level of (nationalist) symbolism.14 Many still believe that Confucius belongs in 
and not in front of a museum. According to most sources, the removal of the statue of the Sage came 
about  under  the  pressure  of  the  Party's  left-wing  fraction,  which  remains  very  much  opposed  to 
anything even remotely smelling of “Confucian feudalism”. Indeed, some observers see indications that 
Maoism is  also  in  the  process  of  being  revived  alongside  its  historical  nemesis,  especially  as  an 
overcome the evils of capitalist “greed” and to apply Confucian ethical principles in business management as a way of  
turning capitalism into a force beneficial to the world's population can also be found in philosophical discourse. See for  
example Cheng Zhongying 成中英, “Creating the Fate of Humanity in the Twenty-First Century: Globalized Economic 
Development and the Position of Confucianism and Confucian Merchants” (Chuangzao ershiyi shiji de renlei mingyun:  
quanqiuhua jingji fazhan yu ruxue ji rushang de dingwei 创造二十一世纪的人类命运：全球化经济发展与儒学及儒
商的定位), Kongzi yanjiu 孔子研究, 2, 2000, pp.4-10. 
11 See Peng, 2010. 
12 As Stephen  C.  Angle  dryly notes,  “there  is  nothing  terribly “Confucian”  about  the  institutes”.  Stephen  C.  Angle, 
“Confucianism on the Comeback: Current Trends in Culture, Values, Politics, and Economy”,  Social Education, vol.74, 
no.1, 2010, p.25. James F. Paradise (“China and International Harmony: The Role of Confucius Institutes in Bolstering 
Beijing’s Soft  Power”,  Asian Survey,  vol.49, no.4, 2009, pp.647-669) discusses the widespread suspicion voiced by 
research institutes, universities and governments in other countries that Confucius Institutes function as “Trojan horses” 
on pp.659-662 and attempts to alleviate such concerns: “Ultimately […] the success of the Confucius Institute project 
will be highly dependent on the attractiveness of Chinese culture, which makes it essentially a soft power  activity,  ” 
(p.662).  For  an  overview  of  the  debates  on  Confucius  Institutes  in  the  American  context,  see  Elisabeth  Redden, 
“Confucius says...”, Inside Higher Ed, 4 January 2012.
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2012/01/04/debate-over-chinese-funded-institutes-american-universities
13 Kong Qingdong 孔庆东 , a “direct descendant” of Confucius and a controversial social commentator who combines 
nationalist, anti-Western, cultural traditionalist, and pro-New Left (pro-Bo Xilai) rhetoric in his public interventions, 
played an important role in the creation of this prize. See Patrick Boehler, “China’s Confucius Prize Announces Its 
Wacky  2012  Short  List”,  Time,  9  September  2012,  http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/09/11/chinas-confucius-prize-
announces-its-wacky-2012-short-list/
14 See Melinda  Liu,  “Confucian  Comeback:  China  Remains  Divided  Over  Reviving its  Ancient  Sage”,  Newsweek,  9 
October  2012,  http://www.newsweek.com/confucian-comeback-china-remains-divided-over-reviving-its-ancient-sage-
64651 and Andrew Jacobs, “Confucius Statue Vanishes Near Tiananmen Square”,  New York Times,  22 April, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/23/world/asia/23confucius.html.
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ideological tool in the inter-party struggle for political  power.15 The recent spectacular downfall  of 
Chongqing Party secretary Bo Xilai 薄熙来 would seem to corroborate this suggestion. Moreover, as 
Sébastien  Billioud  cautions,  “[t]he  frequently  encountered  expression  of  a  “Confucian  revival”  is 
indeed very problematic: not only does it point today to very different social phenomena, but it also 
artificially  gives  the  impression  of  a  community  of  worldviews  among  Confucian  activists  and 
sympathizers.”16 On the level of philosophical discourse, such an undue homogenization is also the 
immediate side effect of incautiously using the catch-all term “New Confucianism” (xin ruxue 新儒学) 
to (often retrospectively) denote and group a variety of thinkers together into a consistent “movement”, 
divided into different “generations”.17 This homogenization obscures a different common ground which 
cuts through the sometimes rather sectarian boundaries between Confucian and non-Confucian modern 
Chinese intellectuals. One of the main ambitions of this study is to try to show more precisely how the  
New Confucian movement can be contextualized as a crucial yet essentially “unexceptional” part of 
recent Chinese intellectual history, unexceptional in the sense that unlike the often highly idiosyncratic 
semantics of their (conceptual) solutions, the conditions and the problems New Confucians were and 
are still facing are not, so to speak, their own. 
In the next section (1.2),  I will start by further briefly considering (perceptions of) the Communist 
Party's changed attitude towards Confucianism before turning to the main subject of this chapter, which 
will be devoted to situating a few representative examples of academic discourse on the revival of 
15 For  a  very  detailed,  well-documented  and  engaging  discussion,  see  Willy  Lam,  “The  Maoist  Revival  and  the 
Conservative Turn in Chinese Politics”, China Perspectives, 2, 2012 pp.5-15. 
16 Sébastien Billioud, “Carrying the Confucian Torch to the Masses: The Challenge of Structuring the Confucian Revival 
in the People’s Republic of China”, Oriens Extremus, 49, 2010, p.220. 
17 See  John  Makeham,  “The  Retrospective  Creation  of  New  Confucianism”  and  “The  New  Daotong”,  in  New 
Confucianism: a Critical Examination, edited by John Makeham, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, pp.25-54 and 
pp.55-78. According to Makeham, “there is little evidence that New Confucianism had attained a degree of integration 
or coalescence sufficient for it to be recognized and promoted as a distinct philosophical movement or school of thought  
before the 1970s.” (p.25). He further dates the emergence of a group of thinkers explicitly defining themselves (each on 
their own terms) as “New Confucianist” as late as the 1980s.  On the various “generations” of New Confucians, see 
Umberto Bresciani, Reinventing Confucianism: the New Confucian Movement, Taipei: Taipei Ricci Institute for Chinese 
Studies, 2001, pp.11-23. Liu Shuxian刘述先 for example distinguishes a total of three generations. The first generation 
is further divided into two groups: 1) Liang Shuming梁漱溟, May Yifu 馬一浮, Zhang Junmai張君勱, Xiong Shili 熊
十力 and 2) Feng Youlan馮友蘭, He Lin賀麟, Qian Mu钱穆, Fang Dongmei方东美. The second generation groups 
together Tang Junyi 唐君毅, Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 and Xu Fuguan徐復觀. The third generation consists of Yu Yingshi
余英世, Cheng Zhongying 成中英, Du Weiming杜维明 and Liu Shuxian himself. Liu takes the second generation to be 
“the mainstay of New Confucianism”. See Liu Shuxian, “Contemporary New Confucianism: Background, Varieties, and 
Significance”, in  Contemporary Chinese Political Thought: Debates and Perspectives,  edited by Fred Dallmayr and 
Zhao Tingyang, Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2012, pp.95-96. Also see Liu's  Essentials of Contemporary  
Neo-Confucian Philosophy, Wesport: Praeger, 2003, pp.21-40.
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Confucianism and traditional  culture  in  contemporary China  (Kang Xiaoguang,  Zhang  Xianglong, 
Jiang Qing, Fan Ruiping, Zhao Tingyang and Tu Weiming amongst others) within the general context 
of the problem of modernity and in relation to the work of what is known as the “second generation” of 
New  Confucian  thinkers  (1.3  and  1.4).  I  will  argue  that  the  revival  of  Confucian  discourse  in 
contemporary China, which given recent historical events such as the Cultural Revolution, could be 
seen  as  a  historical  transformation  of  considerable  significance,  is  conditioned  by  an  anterior 
transformation in the conception of history and historical consciousness within this discourse. In doing 
so, the idea of history as Spirit and the notion of historical consciousness as the consciousness of this  
history will emerge as a common interpretative framework behind a whole range of varied, diverse and 
sometimes even conflicting approaches of the relation between Confucianism (and traditional culture in 
general)  and the  modern  world.  My guiding assumption  is  that  the  communality of  this  semantic 
framework is in turn grounded in the basic structural unity of modernity, which has been and is still 
reproducing itself throughout societies across the globe. 
25
1.2 Confucianism in contemporary China: between historical value and present 
interest
From a historical point of view, it is hard to miss the irony of the current situation: a revolutionary party 
which continued to champion campaigns against Confucianism when the latter had already lost most of 
its self-evidence and firm standing as a political force and framework for the organization of social life 
now routinely pays lip-service to the Sage from Qufu曲阜 (in the present province of Shandong 山东) 
as  a  venerable  representative  of,  to  use  the  official  catchphrase,  “China's  outstanding  traditional 
culture”  (Zhonghua youxiu chuantong wenhua 中华优秀传统文化 ).  A telling example of how the 
attitude of China's leadership towards its own tradition at large has changed is the government-funded 
“National Qing History Project” (Guojia Qingshi Gongcheng 国家清史工程), which was launched in 
2002  and  employs  over  1600  scholars  from  academic  institutions  all  over  the  country  in  the 
compilation of a new official history of the last imperial dynasty, the Qing 清, which ruled from 1644 
to 1912. This new history would serve to supplant the Draft of the History of the Qing dynasty (Qingshi  
gao 清史稿), compiled under the patronage of the Republican government in 1928 by officials who 
had more or less retained their allegiance to the Manchu empire, or at least strove to establish a form of 
historical and political continuity between the old empire and the new nation-state. The draft is now 
generally considered to provide more insight into the historical outlook of its compilers than into the 
actual history of the dynasty in question.18 It is not altogether impossible that the same will prove to be 
the case in a more indirect and complex way for the outcome of the current project. 19 Meanwhile, 
government investments in the project have already risen to 75 million US dollars and are estimated to 
result in a massive multi-volume work of over 30 million Chinese characters. In an article discussing 
the project, Norman Ho notes that the government's involvement reveals that the CCP has drastically 
changed its course since the Cultural Revolution. He also makes the following important observation:
Throughout Chinese history, one of the most important jobs of a new dynasty was to write the history
of the dynasty that preceded it. These official histories, or zhengshi [正史], written under state patronage
and direction, served as a legitimizing force for the new dynasty in question since they placed the new
18 See Zhao Ma, “Research Trends in Asia.'Writing History during a Prosperous Age': The New Qing History Project”,  
Late Imperial China, 29, 2008, pp.120-145 and Liping Mao and Zhao Ma, “ 'Writing History in the Digital Age': The  
New Qing History Project and the Digitization of Qing Archives”, History Compass, vol.10, no.5, 2012, pp.367-374.
19 See Benjamin A. Elman, “The Failures of Contemporary Chinese Intellectual  History”,  Eighteenth-Century Studies, 
vol.43, no.3, 2010, p.337. 
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emperors within the long timeline of China’s dynastic history. Through the act of writing and publishing
the zhengshi, the new dynasty would in essence establish itself as the valid successor to the preceding
dynasty.20
The direct and substantial support for the Qing History Project would thus seem to suggest that instead 
of  defining  itself  in  contradistinction  to  the  past,  as  was  once  and  for  a  long  time  the  case,  the 
Communist Party is beginning to present itself as a legitimate successor to and inheritor of China's 
imperial history. In a speech delivered in the hallowed environment of the Great Hall of the People at a 
prestigious international conference organized in September 2014 on the occasion of commemorating 
the 2565th birthday of Confucius, president Xi Jinping took care to point out that although the CCP still 
adheres to Marxism as its  guiding ideology, its members should not be taken for either “historical 
nihilists” (lishi xuwuzhuyizhe历史虚无主义者) or “cultural nihilists” (wenhua xuwuzhuyizhe 文化虚
无主义者 ).21 Put differently: tradition is no longer considered to be something that, in the words of 
Karl Marx, “weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living”22, but rather as a continuum stable and 
enduring enough to accommodate even the most violent outburst of a once so iconoclastic Chinese 
communism. When Jiang Zemin 江泽民, president of the PRC from 1993 to 2003, spoke of the “self-
perfection of socialism” (社会主义的自我完善 )  over  and against  the Party's  former “Stalinist 
economics”23, he obviously assumed the existence of such a continuum, allowing the economic reforms 
to be seen as an internal correction, rather than as an abandonment, of socialism. Nevertheless, Chen 
Duxiu陈獨秀 (1879-1942), one of the founding members of the CCP, would undoubtedly be surprised 
20 Norman Ho, “Unlikely Bedfellows?”,  Harvard International Review, 2009.  http://hir.harvard.edu/agriculture/unlikely-
bedfellows. Zhao Ma discusses the government's involvement in the project in Zhao, 2008, pp.123-126. He is however 
clearly  less  interested  in  how  the  compilation  of  a  new  history  of  the  Qing  possibly  reflects  the  altered  self-
understanding of China's political elite and is wary of interpreting the project as a primarily ideologically motivated 
undertaking. Zhao writes: “if we look at the project as nothing but a mere government-sponsored showcase in the field  
of humanities and social sciences, we might risk reducing, and even neglecting, the project’s potential academic value  
and its contemporary relevance, particularly for scholarly communication both within China and beyond.” (p.124). 
21 “Speech  at  the  Inaugural  Session  of  the  International  Seminar  Commemorating  the  2565 th Birthday  of  Confucius 
coinciding with the Fifth Congress of the International Confucian Association [ISA] (Zai jinian Kongzi danchen 2565  
zhounian guoji xueshu taolunhui ji guoji ruxue lianhehui di wu jie huiyuan dahui kaimuhui shang de jianghua 在纪念孔
子诞辰 2565 周年国际学术研讨会暨国际儒学联合会第五届会员大会开幕会上的讲话 ), 24 September 2014, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2014-09/24/c_1112612018.html. 
22 Karl Marx, [1852], “The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte”. https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-
brumaire/ch01.htm
23 Quoted in Zhang Boshu,  Marxism and Sociobiology. The Perspective of Economic Reforms in China, Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1994, p.14.  In a similar vein, Kang Xiaoguang speaks of Deng's “pursuit of the self-
improvement of socialism”. See Kang Xiaoguang, “Confucianization: a Future in the Tradition”, in Social Research: An 
International Quarterly, vol.73, no.1, 2006, pp.77-120.
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to see the “idols” which he incited his countrymen to destroy now resurrected and reinstated.24 The 
Party's  former  anti-traditionalism is  thereby reduced  to  superficial  ripples  in  a  deep-level  cultural 
continuity. In doing so, there is an increasing shift from revolutionary politics to cultural nationalism as 
a source of political legitimacy for a party and a state presenting itself as quintessentially identical to 
the nation.25 After all, the idea is still that the downfall of the Party (wangdang亡党) would equal the 
end of the country (wangguo 亡国 ). As Bart Dessein convincingly demonstrates, Confucianism thus 
comes to serve as a nationalist “civil religion” legitimizing CCP rule.26
According to Adrian Chan's research on Chinese Marxism, there were already signs in the early 80s 
that  such  a  shift  was  underway.  At  that  time,  party  theoreticians  were  beginning  to  argue  for  a 
pragmatic adaptation of Marxism-Leninism to the new historical circumstances in response to Deng's 
reforms. The gradual de facto abandonment of socialism was justified by such theoreticians through a 
sly and somewhat sophistic appeal to the Marxist and Maoist stress on the primordial importance of 
praxis, that is to say by appealing to the supposed principles of those political ideologies in order to 
justify  the  practical  abandonment  of  precisely these  very same ideologies.27 Such  a  logic  of  “the 
negation of negation”, according to which the full prior deployment of all the contradictions inherent in 
capitalist society is the condition of the possibility for the strategically deferred realization of socialism, 
is of course not foreign to the Marxist tradition at large, specifically in the pseudo-Hegelian variant 
initiated  by  Engels  and  later  gratefully  adopted  by  states  intent  on  realizing  “socialism  in  one 
country”.28 One need only think of the  Communist Manifesto, which, as has been often pointed out, 
heaps lavish praise on the bourgeoisie's revolutionary achievements, and does so “more powerfully and 
profoundly than its members have ever known to”.29 According to Adrian Chan, cultural nationalism in 
24 See Chen's “Treatise on the Destruction of Idols” (Ouxiang pohuai lun 偶像破坏論 ) from 1918, reprinted in Chen 
Duxiu 陈独秀 et.al.,  Selection of Texts from New Youth  (Xin qingnian jingxuan 新青年精选 ), Beijing: Zhongguo 
shudian, 2012, vol.2, pp.94-95. 
25 See  Suisheng  Zhao,  “A  State-led  Nationalism:  The  Patriotic  Education  Campaign  in  Post-Tiananmen  China”,  
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, vol.31, no.3, 1998, pp.287-302. 
26 Bart Dessein, “Faith and Politics: (New) Confucianism as Civil Religion”, Asian Studies, vol.2, no.1, 2014, pp.39-64.
27 See Adrian Chan,  Chinese Marxism, London: Continuum, 2003, p.5, p.179, pp.193-199. Also see Maurice Meisner, 
“The  Ritualization  of  Utopia:  Chinese  Marxism  in  the  Post-Maoist  Era”,  chapter  8  of  Marxism,  Maoism,  and 
Utopianism. Eight Essays, Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1982, pp.212-239.
28 Tom Rockmore insists on upholding a strict distinction between Marx and (Engelsian) Marxism. See Tom Rockmore,  
Marx after Marxism. The Philosophy of Karl Marx, Oxford: Blackwell, 2002. Also see the next chapter of this study, 
section 2.3.2.
29 Marshall Berman, All That Is Solid Melts Into Air. The Experience of Modernity, New York: Penguin Books, 1988, p.92. 
See the first part of the Communist Manifesto, “Bourgeois and Proletarians”,
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/ch01.htm#007
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the  form of  a  renewed  appraisal  of  Confucianism thus  presented  itself  as  an  ideal  means  for  the 
alignment of Chinese socialism with what can only be described as full-fledged capitalist strategies of 
development under strict supervision of the state. David Harvey wryly speaks of “neoliberalism with 
Chinese  characteristics”,  instead  of  what  has  become  known  as  “socialism  with  Chinese 
characteristics”  (Zhongguo  tese  shehuizhuyi 中国特色社会主义 ),  a  phrase  in  which  “Chinese 
characteristics” would seem to function merely as an indeterminate negation rather than as denoting 
any positively identifiable attributes.30 
Unsurprisingly, the Chinese leadership's unprecedented turn to cultural nationalism has not failed to 
attract  the  attention  of  both  scholars  and  governments  worldwide.  In  July  2011,  the  U.S.-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission published a report entitled “The Confucian Revival in the 
Propaganda Narratives of the Chinese Government”.31 The report considers the adaptation of Confucian 
terms  and  concepts  such  as  “harmonious  society”  (hexie  shehui 和谐社会 )32 and  “moderately 
prosperous society” (xiaokang shehui 小康社会 )33 by the Chinese government to be what it calls a 
“logical  choice”  in  an  attempt  to  legitimize  its  rule,  now  that  the  government's  policies  have 
increasingly come to contradict the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought, 
to which it continues to voice its adherence. Of course one could question just how new and significant 
30 See David Harvey,  A Brief History of Neoliberalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, pp.120-151. The phrase 
“socialism with Chinese characteristics' became current from 1982 after a crucial revision of the constitution reflecting 
Deng Xiaping's reforms. See Yeonsik Choi, “The Evolution of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”: Its Elliptical 
Structure  of  Socialist  Principles  and  China’s  Realities”,  Pacific  Focus,  vol.26,  no.3,  2011,  pp.385–404  for  a 
comprehensive discussion of the concept's origin and development. Also see Arif Dirlik, “Post-Socialism Revisited:  
Reflections  on  “Socialism  with  Chinese  Characteristics”,  its  Past,  Present,  and  Future”,  in  Culture  and  Social  
Transformations. Theoretical Framework and Chinese Context, edited by Cao Tianyu et.al., Leiden: Brill, 2014, pp.263-
291.
31 John Dotson, “The Confucian Revival in the Propaganda Narratives of the Chinese Government”, U.S.-China Economic 
and  Security  Review  Commission  Staff  Research  Report,  20  July  2011.  http://www.uscc.gov/Research/confucian-
revival-propaganda-narratives-chinese-government.
32 See for example the Hu Jintao 胡锦涛 administration's “Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist 
Party Regarding Certain Fundamental Problems in the Construction of a Socialist Harmonious Society” (Zhonggong 
zhongyang guanyu goujian shehuizhuyi hexie shehui ruogan zhongda wenti de jueding 中共中央关于构建社会主义和
谐社会若干重大问题的决定), a document ratified during the sixth plenary session of the sixteenth Central Committee 
of the CCP on October 11 2006. http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/64168/64569/72347/6347991.html.
33 See Sheldon H. Lu,  Chinese Modernity and Global Biopolitics: Studies in Literature and Visual Culture,  Honolulu: 
University of Hawai'i Press, 2007, pp.200-203 for an interesting discussion of this term in comparison to the related  
notion of “Great Unity” (datong大同), which Lu claims was developed into a concept of “noncapitalist globalization” 
by the reformer Kang Youwei康有為. In an analysis building on the work of Arif Dirlik, Lu notes: “Interestingly, the 
word datong is not heard any more in contemporary China; it is as if it had disappeared from the Chinese lexicon. The  
agenda of Chinese communism has changed its nature as well: it means building a society of moderate affluence amid 
global capitalism.”
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such rhetorical maneuvers are, since Mao himself had already invoked the notion of “Great Unity” 
(datong大同) to describe future communist society in On the People's Democratic Dictatorship34 and 
could not resist the temptation to quote Confucius and Mencius in denouncing the “reactionary ideas” 
of Liang Shuming  梁漱溟  (1893-1988), often seen as one of the first New Confucians.35 Another 
famous case in point is Liu Shaoqi's刘少奇 use of Confucian rhetoric in his On the Self-Cultivation of  
Members of the Communist Party (Lun gongchandangyuan de xiuyang 论共产党员的修养).36 Still, it 
is  difficult  if  not  entirely  impossible  to  continue  taking  the  idea  that  the  Party  is  the  dutiful 
representative of the “universal class” of the proletariat seriously, especially since the introduction of 
Jiang Zemin's “important thought” (重要思想) of the “three representations” (san ge daibiao 三个代
表) in 2002, i.e. the idea that the CCP represents, in an order that is most certainly not arbitrary, 1) the 
“advanced productive forces”, 2) China's “advanced culture” and 3) the “fundamental interests of the 
Chinese people”. According to Yingjie Guo, this theory marked a definitive step away from any class-
based idea of “the people” (renmin 人民).37 Indeed, over the years, it has become harder and harder to 
see what is specifically communist about the Chinese Communist Party or what is particularly socialist  
about the so-called “socialism with Chinese characteristics”. Jiawen Ai describes the latter  term as 
“vacuous and plastic”, harshly judging that it  “derives its importance from the fact that the CCP, a 
historically revolutionary party, decided to use it to maintain its authoritarian regime, rather than being 
in any way the authentic wellspring of a political spirit.”38 Thierry Pairault muses “whether China's 
prospective identity is symbolized by Marx wearing the rags of Confucius”.39 The Review Commission 
34 See  Farràs,  2014,  p.45,  note  43.  For  Mao's  text,  go  to  https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-
works/volume-4/mswv4_65.htm.
35 See Criticism of Liang Shuming's Reactionary Ideas, [1953], http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-
works/volume-5/mswv5_35.htm.
36 See Christos Lynteris,  The Spirit of Selflessness in Maoist China: Socialist Medicine and the New Man , Hampshire: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, pp.29-57. An English translation of Liu's lectures (delivered in Yan'an in 1939) is available at 
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/liu-shaoqi/1939/how-to-be/index.htm.  The  Confucian  elements  of  these 
lectures were already noted by Xu Fuguan徐復觀 (1903-1982), see Xu Fuguan zawen xuju徐復觀雜文續集, Taibei: 
Shibao chuban gongsi, 1981, pp.220-221. Quoted in Gao Kunyuan 高焜源 ,  An Investigation of the Thought of Xu  
Fuguan – A Inquiry into Postwar Taiwanese Intellectual History  (Xu Fuguan sixiang yanjiu – yi ge zhanhou Taiwan  
sixiang shi de kaocha 徐復觀思想研究 — 一個台灣戰後思想史的考察), Phd Dissertation, National Taiwan Normal 
University, 1997, pp.233-234.
37 Yingjie Guo,  Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary China: the Search for National Identity under Reform, London: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2004, pp.40-41. 
38 See Jiawen Ai, “The Refunctioning of Confucianism: The Mainland Chinese Intellectual Response to Confucianism 
since the 1980s”, Issues & Studies, vol.44, no.2, 2008, p.38.
39 Thierry  Pairault,  “China's  Response  to  Globalization.  Manufacturing  Confucian  Values”,  in  Globalization  and 
Transformations of Local Socio-economic Practices, edited by Ulrike Schuerkens, London and New York: Routledge, 
2008, p.114.
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document further claims that the selective emphasis put on values such as social stability and order in 
government  rhetoric  are  instrumental  in  discrediting  the  idea  and  the  possibility  of  installing  a 
representative democracy in China. This, the report states, is done by portraying the democratic form of 
governance as  fundamentally unsuitable  to  Chinese culture,  which supposedly privileges collective 
stability  and  intersubjective  harmony  over  the  caprice  and  volatility  of  subjective  opinion  and 
individual rights.40
It is probably true that there is a strong ideological and centrally enforced dimension to the resurgence 
of Confucianism in contemporary China. One sometimes has the impression that we are simply dealing 
with the promotion of ideas that come close to prescribing a form of voluntary submission to authority,  
cunningly redefined as a culturally specific form of freedom. “Harmony” (he 和) in this respect comes 
to designate an accomplished but precarious state arrived at through repressive pacification instead of 
an attitude integrated in a broader practice of self-cultivation open to the other and to the world at  
large.41 Even the virulently anti-communist Kang Xiaoguang 康晓光  (b. 1963), who is most well-
known  for  his  controversial  proposal  to  “Confucianize”  (ruhua 儒化 )  the  CCP and  to  establish 
Confucianism as a state religion (guojiao 国教)42, seems to believe that the existing political structures 
can basically be preserved as they are; all one really needs to do is endow them with a Confucian 
content.  The  Party  schools  for  example,  would  remain  in  place,  but  would  have  to  change  their 
curriculum from the obligatory fundamentals of historical materialism and the theories of former and 
present leaders of the CCP to the teaching of Confucian classics.  In the process, communist  party 
cadres turned Confucian scholars would not lose a modicum of power. “In plain words”, Kang writes, 
40 Cf.  Leïla  Choukroune  and  Antoine  Garapon,  “The  Norms  of  Chinese  Harmony:  Disciplinary  Rules  as  Social 
Stabilisers”, China Perspectives, 3, 2007, pp.36–49.
41 In a recent work, Li Chenyang李晨阳 makes an elaborate attempt to save the Confucian ideal of harmony from being 
misinterpreted and abused as an instrument of repression. See The Confucian Philosophy of Harmony, London and New 
York: Routledge, 2014.
42 See Kang Xiaoguang, 2006; Kang Xiaoguang, “An Outline of Cultural Nationalism” (Wenhua minzu zhuyi ganglun 文化
民族主义纲论), in Zhanlüe yu guanli  战略与管理  [Strategy and Management], 2, 2003, pp.9-27. Also see Monika 
Gänßbauer,  “Kang  Youwei  und  Kang  Xiaoguang.  Die  Suche  nach  Zukunftsfähigkeit  für  China  zwischen 
Zivilgesellschaft und Ziviltheologie”, minima sinica, no.1, 2011b, pp.52-73; and David Ownby, “Kang Xiaoguang et le 
projet  d’une religion confucéenne.  Itinéraire d’un intellectuel engagé”,  Perspectives Chinoises, 4, 2009, pp.109-120. 
Ownby remarks: “Le caractère ambigu du confucianisme en Chine contemporaine, et surtout sa non-inclusion dans la 
catégorie des religions, ont permis une flexibilité considérable, à la fois pour les citoyens activistes qui cherchent à  
promouvoir un renouveau confucéen dans leurs communautés, et pour les autorités d'Etat qui restent ambivalentes sur 
les valeurs ultimes du confucianisme du fait du poids encore persistant de la référence marxiste.” The most extensive 
English-language  study  of  Kang's  ideas  is  Monika  Gänßbauer,  Confucianism  and  Social  Issues  in  China:  The  
Academician  Kang Xiaoguang.  Investigations  into  NGOs in  China,  the  Falun  Gong,  Chinese  Reportage,  and  the  
Confucian Tradition. Bochum and Freiburg: Projekt Verlag, 2011a. 
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“benevolent  government  is  a  dictatorship  by the  community of  Confucian  scholars”.43 Apart  from 
reproducing the dubious logic of a “function” (yong用) ontologically indifferent to and detached from 
its “substance” (ti 體 ), made famous by Zhang Zhidong's 張之洞  (1837-1909) motto of “China as 
substance,  the  West  as  function  (zhongti  xiyong 中體西用 )”44, the  treatment  of  existing political 
structures as neutral instruments which can simply be “filled” with a different content and other values 
also  implies  a  problematic  naturalization  of  the  existing  state  of  affairs  as  inherently  rational, 
unquestionable and necessary. The invisible hand of government-enforced tradition is assumed to take 
care of business, its internal  telos is put forward as the only possible measure for social rationality. 
Kang Xiaoguang claims that “the government's action is rational because its agencies and officials are 
rational. In fact, as long as the institutions and their members are pursuing their own best interests, the 
action of the government is bound to follow and reflect a rational logic.”45 The boundaries between 
rationality, reality, and normativity are thus completely effaced. I think it is highly questionable to what 
extent such ideas can pose a challenge to “mainstream values” as Kang claims at one point. Kang's plea 
for an authoritarian Confucianism cannot help but remind one of the endorsement of Yuan Shikai's 袁
43 Kang, 2006, p.95. 
44 See Sor-Hoon Tan, “Modernizing Confucianism and ‘new Confucianism’”, in  The Cambridge Companion to Modern  
Chinese Culture, edited by Kam Louie, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, pp.136-137:  “Philosophically, 
the formula distorts the neo-Confucian notion of tiyong, which implies an intrinsic organic relation between the ti  and 
yong of all things, into one of external relation involving no more than a superficial juxtaposition of arbitrarily separated  
elements of different cultures. It obscures rather than clarifies the relationship between Western thought and practice 
representing modern cultures on the one hand, and Confucianism as an entire culture or way of life on the other, because 
it  fails  to  appreciate  that  in  any  culture,  substance  and  use  are  intrinsically  and  organically  related.  Modernizing 
Confucianism requires  transformation  of  both  substance  and  use.”  Xiong Shili 熊十力  (1885-1968) had  already 
criticized Zhang Zhidong's formula on very much the same grounds in his Essential Instructions on the Reading of the  
Classics (Dujing shiyao讀經示要), see the recent reprint, Shanghai: Shanghai shudian chubanshe, [1945] 2009, pp.4-6. 
To be fair, for Zhang Zhidong, yong (function) already had a political dimension, and was no longer limited to purely 
technical aspects of technology and machinery. See Li Zehou 李泽厚 ,  Historical Essays on Chinese Modern Thought  
(Zhongguo xiandai sixiang shilun 中国现代思想史论), Beijing: Dongfang chubanshe, 1987, pp.312-315. It is worth 
noting that distinctions similar to the one between ti and yong also appeared in other countries and regions of the world 
around  the  same  period  in  world  history.  See  Guy Alitto,  The  Last  Confucian:  Liang  Shu-ming and the  Chinese  
Dilemma of Modernity, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976, pp.9-10. In Japan, for example, Sakuma Shōzan 
佐久間象山 (1811-1864) had already formulated the idea of “Eastern morality, Western learning” (tōyō dōtoku, seiyō  
gakugei 東洋道德，西洋學芸) during the Edo period before Zhang Zhidong. It later reappeared in the Meiji period in 
the form of the slogan “Japanese Spirit, Western techniques” (wakon yōsai 和魂洋才). According to He Shaoming何晓
明 , the ti-yong paradigm, as one of the first and most important semantic strategies designed to cope with the divide 
between tradition and modernity, continued to exert a strong influence on conservative intellectuals such as the New 
Confucians.  See He Shaoming 何晓明  “ A General  Overview of Modern Chinese Cultural  Conservatism” (Jindai 
Zhongguo wenhua baoshouzhuyi zongshu 近代中国文化保守主义综述), Jindai shi yanjiu 近代史研究, 5, 1998, pp.40-
66. 
45 Kang  Xiaoguang,  “A Study  of  the  Renaissance  of  Traditional  Confucian  Culture  in  Contemporary  China”,  in 
Confucianism and Spiritual Traditions in Modern China and Beyond, edited by Fenggang Yang and Joseph B. Tamney, 
Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2012, p.51. 
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世凯 usurpation of the newly founded Republic in 1915 by the “Society for the Religion of Confucius ” 
(kongzi jiaohui 孔子教会), a society presided over by the reformer Kang Youwei康有为 (1858-1927), 
who was the first to advocate turning Confucianism into a modern state religion. This endorsement had 
a  catastrophically  damaging  effect  on  the  reputation  of  Confucianism,  reverberating  through  the 
following decades.46 Kang Xiaoguang's argument  for  the existence of  broad popular  support  for  a 
revival of Confucianism, which he wants to effect in a strongly hierarchical manner, relies on the idea 
that this hierarchy is already firmly entrenched in those who would become formally subject to its  
power.  In  obeying  the  laws  of  a  state-sponsored  Confucianism,  the  people  would  be  obeying  a 
culturally inscribed potential  quasi-genetically preserved within themselves.  Consider the following 
passage from a recent article by Kang:
Because the essence of Confucian culture is harmony, participants [in the Confucian revival] are unlikely 
to adopt confrontational strategies [...] most participants hope for the government's assistance, support, 
and even leadership. They have never treated the government as their enemy, and naturally they would
not intentionally oppose the government.47
On a related note, Stephen C. Angle has called into question Kang's argument that the “Confucian 
practice of succession”, in which the “Heavenly Mandate” (tianming 天命) is bestowed on a legitimate 
successor, “is already being practiced in contemporary China”. Angle rightly speaks of a “grotesque 
distortion of recent history” regarding Kang's suggestion 
that the transitions from one CCP leader to another have been “abdications”, and furthermore that –
just as we read in Mencius – only abdications that are accepted by the masses are truly legitimate. Mao
Zedong's abdication in favor of Hua Guofeng failed because the masses did not  support him. Deng
Xiaoping's  abdication eventually succeeded (with Jiang Zemin),  despite  the  masses'  rejection of Hu
Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang.48
46 See Yong Chen, Confucianism as Religion. Controversies and Consequences, Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013, p.46. 
47 Kang, 2012, p.61. Second emphasis added. Cf.  p.59: “[T]here is  no doubt that  consensus is  not enough,  a  mature  
movement also needs a dominant framework.”
48 Stephen  C.  Angle,  Contemporary  Confucian  Political  Philosophy.  Towards  Progressive  Confucianism,  Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2012, p.43. Angle also notes the ambiguity in Kang's position on the question of popular legitimacy: “He  
wants the  min  [民 , the people] to be agents, capable of forming judgments, the holders of rights, and appropriately 
requiring free access to information and extensive (if still limited) forms of democratic participation. At the same time  
though, he is still committed to his “authoritarian” premise and its clear distinction between the elite rulers and the  
“mass” who are ruled.” Ibid., p.46. 
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This  being said,  I  believe  one should not  be  overhasty in  concluding that  the renewed interest  in 
Confucianism is exclusively the result of top-down efforts by the Chinese government to legitimize its 
rule  with  the  help  of  a  few obliging  intellectuals.  Even  if  one  were  to  dismiss  the  invocation  of 
Confucianism as “superficial” or as a case of “mere ideology”, it would be necessary to add the critical  
rejoinder that since it has a performative effect as an institutionalized speech act, ideology is never 
superficial  and  is  something  worthy  of  serious  consideration  and  discussion.  At  any  rate,  John 
Makeham's meticulous research has made it abundantly clear that we are not dealing with a rhetorical 
shift in discourse orchestrated by the party-state and seamlessly and unquestionably reproduced on all 
levels of Chinese society.49 In the latter point of view, there is a clear danger of implicitly adopting the 
spurious  notion  of  a  passive  and  docile  “Oriental  psychology”  that  is  often  either  implicitly  or 
explicitly put forward as a core idea in the very discourse one wishes to expose as nothing but ideology. 
To begin with, there is the obvious fact that self-descriptions of Chinese society as either already or 
ideally  Confucian  are  often  strongly  contested  and  criticized,  by  leftist,  liberal  as  well  as  other 
conservative thinkers. Furthermore, all kinds of hybrid forms have already come into existence, such as 
projects that attempt to develop a form of “Marxist Confucianism” or “Confucian Marxism”.50 There is 
an even larger body of work concerning the compatibility of Confucianism with liberal democracy, 
human rights, gender equality, sustainable development and so on, which is often if not always bent on 
finding “traces” of these in various forms of ancient Chinese thought. The seemingly endless stream of 
articles  and  books  exploring  both  traditional  and  modern  Confucian  philosophy and  its  supposed 
relevance for understanding and possibly improving the modern world is in itself remarkable enough, 
and  cannot  be  explained  away  as  the  complicit  academic  equivalent  of  “propaganda  narratives”. 
Moreover,  Confucianism  is  no  longer  the  exclusive  interest  of  “conservative”,  “traditionalist”  or 
“reactionary” thinkers in the strict sense of the word51, but has come into a complex and ambiguous 
49 Makeham, 2008, p.7 and pp.42-57.
50 I am thinking in particular of the work of Li Zehou李泽厚 and Chen Weigang陈维纲. I should add that Marxism itself 
is far from dead and gone as an intellectual current in contemporary China and is no longer constrained by the doctrinal  
discipline previously enforced by the Party. The CCP generally does not meddle with theoretical disputes concerning, 
say, the relation of the Grundrisse to Das Kapital. See Robert Ware, “Reflections on Chinese Marxism”, Socialism and 
Democracy, 2013, vol.27, no.1, pp.136-160. 
51 Stephen C. Angle (2012, pp.11-17) distinguishes at least six types of Confucian-inspired thinkers active in today's China: 
1) philosophical historians, 2) Confucian revivalists, 3) Kantian New Confucians, 4) Critical New Confucians, 5) Neo-
classical Confucians and 6) Synthetic Confucians. To this list Angle proposes to add his own brand of “progressive 
Confucianism”, which he locates “in between the Kantian and Critical New Confucianisms” (p.17) and summarizes in  
the idea “that ethical  insight leads to progressive political  change, which in turn leads to greater realization of our  
potential  for  virtue”,  while  “social  structures  that  set  barriers  to  the realization of  virtue need to  be  critiqued  and 
changed” (p.16). 
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alignment with modernization and development, simply because the latter have already changed the 
meaning and status of tradition itself. Indeed, the very idea of “tradition”, “culture” and “traditional 
culture” can only be understood against this background. As Chris Jenks notes: “[T]he idea of 'culture' 
can be witnessed emerging in the late eighteenth century and on into the nineteenth century as part of, 
and largely as a reaction to, the massive changes that were occurring in the structure and quality of 
social life.”52 According to the sociologist Niklas Luhmann, the notion of culture as a counterconcept to 
nature was invented “to bring under conceptual control the immense horizon of comparison of modern 
society, which was expanding from a regional and historical point of view”.53 Gan Yang甘阳 is I think 
right to stress that  the  questions which have been so often posed concerning whether or not Chinese 
culture in general or Confucianism in particular can still be of use in various aspects of modern life 
already  betray  a  distinctively  modern  approach,  namely  of  what  he  considers  to  be  (a  quite  un-
Confucian)  concern  for  utility  and  applicability.  Gan  wants  to  put  an  end  to  the  endless  debates 
revolving around how Confucianism can be instrumentalized for the sake of modernization, a form of 
“rational adjustment” (Max Weber's description of Confucianism) which he thinks must be overcome. 
Instead, he proposes to introduce another question, namely how the resources of Confucian practices 
and thought can be employed for formulating a critique of modernity in developing a form of “critical 
cultural conservatism” (批判的文化保守主义).54 Gan Yang is no doubt aware that this critical attitude 
is  just  as  modern  as  a  utilitarian  one.  He  seems  to  waver  between  the  desire  to  formulate  an 
emancipatory critique of the present society and the idea that the “rationality” and operative logic of 
modern society cannot be (not: must not be!) overcome. I must admit that I recognize my own position 
somewhere  in  this  predicament.  Turning  away  from  ideological  attempts  to  smooth  over  the 
overinflated tension between Confucianism and a modernity which is not so much straightforwardly 
normative as it  is problematic would involve actively revisiting and positively appreciating certain 
incompatibilities between Confucian ideals and the pathologies prevalent in modern society. Still, one 
would have to confront the fact that incompatibility in itself is hardly sufficient as a criterion for a 
social normativity which has the ambition of going beyond mere protest, subversion, denunciation, or 
worse, simply the bare assertion of  difference.55 That being said,  I wholeheartedly agree with Gan's 
52 Chris Jenks, Culture, London and New York: Routledge, 1993, p.7. 
53 Niklas  Luhmann,  Theories  of  Distinction:  Redescribing  the  Descriptions  of  Modernity,  Stanford  (Cal.):  Stanford 
University Press, 2002, p.38.
54 See Gan Yang甘阳, The Struggle between Present and Past and between China and the West (Gujin zhongxi zhi zheng  
古今中西之争), Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 2012, pp.113-135. 
55 Otherwise one ends up calling Hamas and Hezbollah “social movements that are progressive, that are on the Left, that 
are part of a global Left” like Judith Butler. See Michael J. Totten, “The Anti-Imperialism of Fools”, World Affairs, 28 
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lucid observation that “actually, modern industrial culture is something completely new for the whole 
of humanity,  which means that there is  fundamentally no need to expect any traditional culture to 
contain the basic seeds of modern society.”56
As things now stand, I think it is safe to say that there is a direct though by no means transparent 
relation between China's economic conversion to a universalizing regime of production and exchange 
on the one hand and its desire to become what it calls a “cultural superpower” (wenhua qiangguo 文化
强国) on the other. Everything “cultural”, “historical” and “traditional” would seem to be intended to 
symbolically  secure  China's  particularity  and  uniqueness  within  the  relatively  homogeneous  and 
culturally  anonymous  world  of  commodity  exchange,  prize  fluctuations,  technological  innovation, 
calculated investments and growth rates.57 Commodities are after all, as Marx already wrote in Capital, 
“citizens  of  the  world”.58 The  anthropologist  Marc  Augé has  analyzed the  concrete  effects  of  this 
abstract  equivalence  as  leading  to  an  increasing  proliferation  of  “non-places”  (non-lieux),  such  as 
railway  stations,  supermarkets,  airports,  hotel  lounges,  fast-food  chains  and  coffee-shops,  in  the 
globalized life-world.59 Capital is thus the archetypal cynic, who, in Oscar Wilde's eloquent phrasing, 
“knows the price of everything and the value of nothing”. It should be borne in mind that the very habit 
of speaking of the particularity of socio-cultural life in terms of “value” is peculiar to the modern era.60 
What Tu Weiming (Du Weiming) 杜维明 (b. 1940) calls “the transvaluation of Confucian values as a 
creative  response to  the  hegemonic  discourses  of  Western  Europe and North  America”61 was  thus 
preceded by an anterior transformation of discourse by the idea of value itself. To paraphrase the less 
often quoted second part of Wilde's celebrated aphorism, sentimentalists are those who disregard the 
market prize which tends to accompany everything of value. The symbolic doubling of value into a 
August 2012, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/michael-j-totten/anti-imperialism-fools. 
56 事实上，现代工业文明对于整个人类都是一种全新的事物，根本没有必要要求某一传统文化必须具备现代社会
的基本因子。Gan, 2012, p.120.
57 See Arif Dirlik,  Culture and History in Post-revolutionary China. The Perspective of Global Modernity, Hong Kong: 
The  Chinese  University  Press,  2011,  pp.97-156;  Arif  Dirlik,  “Thinking  Modernity  Historically:  Is  “Alternative 
Modernity” the Answer?”, Asian Review of World Histories, vol.1, no.1, 2013, pp.5-44 and Arif Dirlik, “Confucius in the 
Borderlands: Global Capitalism and the Reinvention of Confucianism”, boundary 2, vol.22, no.3, 1995, pp.229-273.
58 See Karl Marx, Capital. A New Abridgement, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p.35.
59 Marc Augé, Non-lieux. Introduction à une anthropologie de la surmodernité, Paris: Le Seuil, 1992.
60 See Karl Mannheim, 1960, p.73 and Jürgen Gebhardt, “Die Werte. Zum Ursprung eines Schlüsselbegriffs der politisch-
sozialen Sprache in der deutschen Philosophie des späten 19. Jahrhunderts”, in  Anodos. Festschrift für Helmut Kuhn, 
edited by Rupert Hofmann, et. al.,  Weinheim: VCH, Acta Humaniora, 1989, pp.34-54. Tang Junyi for one was well  
aware of the novelty of the semantics of value. See his Introduction to Philosophy (Zhexue gailun 哲學概論), Beijing: 
Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, [1961e] 2005, vol.2, p.707. 
61 Tu Wei-ming, “Implications of the Rise of 'Confucian' East Asia”, Daedalus, vol.129, no.1, 2000, p.212.
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“colorblind”, universal exchange value on the one hand, and a culturally specific set of values with an 
irreducible  particularity  on  the  other,  entails  an  identification  of  the  latter  with  history,  historical 
consciousness and memory. It is thus the idea of “value” itself which can serve as means of overcoming 
the so-called “tension between history and value”.62 According to Andreas Huyssen, this can be seen as 
representing an “attempt to slow down information processing, slow down the dissolution of time in the 
synchronicity of the archive”.63 Prasenjit Duara notes that “[t]he problem of identity, so characteristic 
of modern societies, is most fundamentally a problem of time. It is a quest to retain a sense of self when 
everything around is perceived to be in flux.”64 The relation between culturally specific values and a 
fundamentally “cosmopolitan” (or “wordless”65)  exchange value is  not so much one of a seamless 
dialectic as it is one of tension, contradiction and ambiguity. On the one hand, insisting on the cultural 
specificity of certain values can be instrumental in defining a nation's stance towards other nation-
states, but the adaptation of this stance is not so much motivated “purely” or “autonomously”, in the 
Kantian  sense  of  being  exclusively  determined  through  the  normative  rationality  of  the  maxims 
prescribed by these values themselves, but will rather only be emphasized “pathologically”66, that is to 
say when the adherence to cultural value serves to increase a nation's interests in more mundane terms 
of cold hard cash value67, at which moment the empirical drive reveals itself as having dominion over 
62 See Joseph B.  Levenson,  Confucian China and its  Modern Fate.  The Problem of  Intellectual  Continuity,  London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958 and Gao Like高力克, The Tension between History and Value – Historical Essays on  
Chinese Modernizing Thought, (Lishi yu jiazhi de zhangli – Zhongguo xiandaihua sixiang shilun历史与价值的张力—
中国现代化思想史论), Guiyang: Guizhou renmin chubanshe, 1992. 
63 Andreas Huyssens, Twilight Memories: Marking Time in a Culture of Amnesia, New York: Routledge, 1995, p.7. 
64 Prasenjit Duara, “Civilizations and Nations in a Globalizing World”, in Reflections on Multiple Modernities: European,  
Chinese and Other Interpretations, edited by Dominic Sachsenmaier and Jens Riedel, Leiden: Brill, 2002, p.91. 
65 In an article discussing the 2011 London riots Slavoj Žižek writes: “Alain Badiou has argued that we live in a social  
space which is increasingly experienced as ‘worldless’ [...] although by virtue of being global it encompasses the whole  
world, it sustains a ‘worldless’ ideological constellation in which people are deprived of their ways of locating meaning.  
The fundamental lesson of globalisation is that capitalism can accommodate itself to all civilisations, from Christian to  
Hindu or Buddhist, from West to East: there is no global ‘capitalist worldview’, no ‘capitalist civilisation’ proper. The 
global  dimension of  capitalism represents  truth without  meaning.” Slavoj  Žižek,  “Shoplifters  of  the World Unite”,  
London Review of Books, 19 August 2011 http://www.lrb.co.uk/2011/08/19/slavoj-zizek/shoplifters-of-the-world-unite.
66 See Immanuel Kant,  Critique of Practical Reason, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1993, chapter 2: “The Concept of an 
Object  of  Pure  Practical  Reason”,  pp.59-75.  Weber's  classic  distinction  between value-rationality and  instrumental  
rationality could also be invoked here: “Actions are  purely  value-rational when the agents, regardless of foreseeable 
consequences, act according to their convictions of what seems to them to be required [...]”. Max Weber, Economy and 
Society, vol.1, edited by Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978, p.25.
67 The “wisdom of the East” is routinely employed and put to service in today's management literature.  The title of the 
following article is almost embarrassingly revealing in this regard: Michael Harris Bond and Geert Hofstede, “The Cash  
Value of Confucian Values”,  Human Systems Management, vol.8, no.3, 1989, pp.195-199. Mentioned in  Dirlik, 2011, 
p.155. For another example see Sun Yunfeng孙云峰, “A Tentative Analysis of the Application of Confucian Thought in 
Corporate Management” (Qianxi rujia sixiang zai qiye jingying guanli zhong de yunyong 浅析儒家思想在企业经营管
理中的运用 ),  Zhongguo zhexue shi 中国哲学史 ,  1,  1991, pp.58-61. Unsurprisingly,  associations of “Confucian 
merchants” (rushang 儒商 ) have already sprung up throughout China. See Sun, 2013, p.90. One should be careful 
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the powerless axiological component. The “new Axial Age” Tang Yijie 汤一介 saw emerging with the 
renaissance of traditional culture68 remains caught in the gyrations of the abstract general equivalence 
of  political  economy.  This  implies  that  an  occasional  and  well-timed  stress  on  the  importance  of 
culturally grounded values can go hand in hand or alternate with a more “realist” approach which 
rejects the encroachment of cultural value on the normal flow of investment and expenditure. This is 
the only way to understand why ideologically opposed nation-states can continue doing business with 
each other under the table while staring angrily into each other's eyes, keeping their arms stubbornly 
crossed and occasionally striking the top surface in barely muted fury. An article first published in the 
pro-government Global Times (Huanqiu shibao环球时报) and later taken over in the English edition 
of the People's Daily (Renmin ribao 人民日报 ) in March 2012, bearing the headline “Benefits, Not 
Values, Define BRICS Unity”, is interesting in this respect:
The mission of the BRICS [Brazil,  Russia, India, China and South Africa] is not directly related to
values.  After all  values are not  central  to today's world.  Too much preaching on values today is  as
absurd as class struggle was in China in the 50s and 60s.  Human rights tend to be centered on values,
but the issue never really dominates world politics.69
Such  a  pragmatic-realist  standpoint  downplays  the  importance  of  culturally  specific  values  in 
international relations and replaces the idea of “values” by that of “benefits” or “interests” (liyi 利益), a 
term familiar from (Chinese) diplomatic jargon, where it appears in such locutions as the “fundamental 
interests” (基本利益) of a country or a people. What is further interesting about this passage is that it  
defines the attitude of so-called developed countries or “the West” as centered around a discourse on 
values, whereas the emerging economies are urged to pursue a more realist course. This would then 
enable them to bypass the ideologically infused level of value in order to engage in a form of political 
however in not letting the abuse suffered by classical texts in such forms of managerial exegesis reflect negatively on 
these texts themselves, as if they were written for ideological purposes in the first place. This seems to be an implicit  
assumption behind Žižek's argument concerning the “speculative identity” between what he calls “Western Buddhism” 
and the ideology of global capitalism. See Slavoj Žižek, On Belief, London and New York: Routledge, 2001, pp.12-15. 
Cf. Mario Wenning, “Daoism as Critical Theory”,  Comparative Philosophy, vol.2, no.2, 2011, p.54. Ironically, even 
Marxism has hardly proven immune to managerial appropriation, as is obvious from the existence of articles such as the 
following: Xiaohe Lu, “Business Ethics and Karl Marx’s Theory of Capital – Reflections on Making Use of Capital for  
Developing China’s Socialist Market Economy”, Journal of Business Ethics, 91, 2009, pp.95–111. 
68 See Tang Yijie, “The Contemporary Significance of Confucianism”, Frontiers of Philosophy in China, vol.3, no.4, 2008, 
pp.477–479.
69 “Benefits, Not Values, Define BRICS Unity”, Global Times, 28 March 2012. 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90780/7771978.html. Emphasis added. 
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“direct action” by starting out from a nation's economic and political “interests”, which are apparently 
seen as a form of empirically given data untainted by any external bias, rather than as already the result 
of  structurally conditioned and socially constructed observations.  An idealism of  values  is  thereby 
traded  in  for  a  bleary-eyed  positivism  of  interests.  This  is  intriguing,  because  it  is  precisely  in 
developing nations such as China where there is perhaps the most talk about the revival and reinvention 
of  traditional  values  and  ideas.  The  contradiction  between  prescribing  a  value-centered  culturalist 
approach on a national level and a value-free universalist stance when it comes to relations between 
nations already suggests that there might be a dialectical relation between both forms of discourse. We 
could  also  note  that  the  post  factum condemnation  of  the  class  struggle  in  this  article  raises  the 
suspicion that the most dangerous form of “traditionalism” in contemporary China would perhaps not 
consist in the reinvention of ancient Chinese politico-religious ideas, but in the rediscovery of a much 
more recent tradition, i.e. that of militant Maoism. This tradition would find itself squarely at odds with 
a Communist Party which has graciously allowed “capitalist roaders” (zouzipai走资派) – a term which 
incidentally was used by Mao in his political purge of Deng Xiaoping during the Cultural Revolution70 
– and “bourgeois reactionaries” of all kinds into its ranks. According to Kang Xiaoguang, “there has 
been  no trouble  between the  capitalists  and the  CCP ever  since  the  beginning of  reform.  On the 
contrary,  they have been living in harmony, even in collusion with each other.”71 He also believes 
“[t]hat peasants and workers are at the bottom of Chinese society is an indisputable fact.”72 This reveals 
that there is a whole different side to Kang's thought than what we encountered in the above: behind his 
misguided authoritarian  solutions  lurks  an  irreducible  recognition  of  fundamental  social  problems. 
Even  Kang's  purebred  cultural  conservatism needs  to  be  understood  against  the  background  of  a 
critique of the present. Consider the unabashed militancy in this passage from one of his earlier articles: 
Now, the elite  are  plundering the masses  to  an extreme degree.  Sweatshops no longer satisfy  their
progressiveness. The elite even leave the sweat and toil wages of the migrant workers in arrears and
repudiate the payment. This is no longer a question of sweatshops, but a matter of open robbery and
fraud.  Such  violence  includes  both  nongovernment  violence  bought  off  by  the  capitalists,  the
underworld, and governmental violence – the police and the armed police. In addition, not only the
capitalists are engaged in this type of fraud and robbery, but also the government at all levels. More
70 See “Criticizing the Unrepentant Capitalist-Roader”, Peking Review, no.14, vol.2, 1976, pp.9-10. 
https://www.marxists.org/subject/china/peking-review/1976/PR1976-14c.htm
71 Kang, 2006, p.80.
72 Kang, 2006, p.79.
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often, it is done by the government and private business people in collusion. I have often said that equity  
is  a wild wish in China today, and what we can expect is  only “sustainable pillage and controlled
extortion.” This is the highest ideal that I can dream of!73
An internal memo that began to circulate in April 2013 following the ascendancy of Xi Jinping to the 
height  of  political  power,  entitled “Report  Concerning the Current  State  of  Affairs  in  the Field of 
Ideology” (Guanyu dangqian yishixingtai qingkuang de tongbao关于当前意识形态领域情况的通报, 
also  known  as  “Document  no.  9”)  issued  by  the  CCP's  General  Office  (Zhonggong  zhongyang 
bangongting 中共中央办公厅)74, is an adamant expression of the Party's opposition to the spread of 
“Western values”, such as constitutionalism, democracy, civil society, free speech, journalistic freedom 
and grassroots political dissidence, all of which are presented in the memo as conspiring to undermine 
the CCP's authority and to challenge its “leadership of the masses” by “setting the Party against the 
masses”.75 The memo also bears witness to the Party's fear of the dissemination of what it delusionally 
calls the “mistaken” idea that the “reform and opening up” (gaige kaifang 改革开放 ) constituted a 
definitive abandonment of (or at least serious deviation from) socialism. The Quixotic attempts made in 
the document to draw a sharp distinction between a neoliberal West and a socialist China make for a 
painful read. I think it is clear that a Marxist critique of the Party's state-led capitalist modernization 
could be a lot more unsettling than liberal criticisms of its authoritarian grasp on political power and 
the undue “stifling” of the free market. The concerns voiced in the memo thus ultimately stem from 
doubts  over  the Party's  ability to  maintain what  has  now become its  main,  if  not  only,  source  of  
legitimacy: the ability to “steer” and “redistribute” the “fruits” of economic growth. Given the recent 
slowdown of the economy in a country where one third of all wealth is concentrated in the hands of one 
percent of the population76, these fruits could well turn into grapes of wrath in the not too distant future.
 
73 Kang, 2006, pp.82-83. Emphasis added. As Monika  Gänßbauer remarks: “On the one hand, he [Kang] is an active 
member of the academic establishment of the People's Republic of China and of various “think-tanks” sponsored and 
organized by the Chinese government; on the other, he often denounces, in an uncompromising manner, social injustices 
and abuses of power and exercises a harsh critique of the existing system.” Gänßbauer, 2011a, p.12.
74 See  Chris  Buckley,  “China  Takes  Aim  at  Western  Ideas”,  New  York  Times,  19  August  2013 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/20/world/asia/chinas-new-leadership-takes-hard-line-in-secret-memo.html?
pagewanted=all.
75 For  an  English  translation  of  the  leaked  text,  go  to http://www.chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-translation.  The 
original Chinese text of this document seems to have been successfully expunged from the Internet.
76 See Yu Xie and Xiang Zhou, “Income Inequality in Today's China”, PNAS, vol.111, no.19, 2014, pp.6928–6933.
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1.3 Excursus on Zhang Xianglong
I think it can be argued that the ambiguous stance towards tradition in the case of the Chinese political 
elite, discernible in the dialectical tension between “value” and “interest”, is not solely the result of the 
ideological dimension intrinsic to the political rhetorics of a party which is increasingly shifting the 
source of its legitimacy from recent history to ancient culture. A good example of how difficult it is to 
disentangle the reappropriation of traditional culture from the pregiven functional structures of modern 
society can be found in the work of Zhang Xianglong 张祥龙  (b.  1949), a professor of Chinese and 
comparative philosophy at Beijing University. In what follows, I base myself on his 2007 book entitled 
The Refuge of Thought: Ancient Chinese Wisdom in the Age of Globalization (Sixiang binan: quanqiu 
shidai zhong de Zhongguo gudai zheli 思想避难：全球时代中的中国古代哲理 ), where Zhang 
discusses his proposal to establish “conservation areas for Confucian culture” (rujia wenhua baohu qu
儒家文化保护区).77
Zhang's Utopian vision grew out of a critical reflection on the problematic reduction of the traditional 
“arts of the Way” (daoshu 道术 ) to the academic discipline of “philosophy” within the established 
institutional structures of the modern university78, which are “designed both to produce new knowledge 
and to reproduce the producers of knowledge”79.  One scholar has amusingly compared the modern 
institutionalization  and compartmentalization  of  traditional  forms  of  knowledge and their  resulting 
fragmentation to the well-known story in the Zhuangzi莊子 of Hundun混沌 (“Chaos”), who dies from 
being  “tidied  up”  (given  apertures  which  he  lacks)  by  his  more  orderly  guests.80 Readers  of  the 
77 Zhang Xianglong张祥龙, The Refuge of Thought: Ancient Chinese Wisdom in the Age of Globalization (Sixiang binan:  
quanqiu shidai zhong de Zhongguo gudai zheli 思想避难：全球时代中的中国古代哲理 ), Beijing: Beijing daxue 
chubanshe,  2007,  pp.10-26.  The  reader  can  also  consult  Zhang  Xianglong,  “What  Does  it  Mean  to  Construct 
Conservation Areas for Confucian Culture?” (Jianli Rujia wenhua baohuqu yiweizhe shenme? 建立儒家文化保护区意
味着什么？), Kexue Zhongguoren 科学中国人, 10, 2001, pp.33-35. 
78 See Sébastien Billioud and Joël Thoraval, “The Contemporary Revival of Confucianism. Anshen liming or the Religious 
Dimension of Confucianism”,  China Perspectives,  3, 2008, pp.99-100.  Also see Xiangjun  Li, “A Reconstruction of 
Contemporary Confucianism as a Form of Knowledge”,  Frontiers of Philosophy in China, vol.1, no.4, 2006, pp.561-
571.
79 Immanuel Wallerstein,  Open the Social Sciences. Report of the Gulbenkian Commission on the Restructuring of the  
Social Sciences, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996, p.7. Quoted in John Makeham, “Introduction”, in Learning 
to Emulate the Wise. The Genesis of Chinese Philosophy as an Academic Discipline in Twentieth-Century China , edited 
by John Makeham, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2012, p.8.
80 See John  Makeham,  “The  National  Studies  Craze.  Historical  Antecedents  and  Contemporary  Aspirations”,  China 
Perspectives, 1, 2011, p.19. Makeham discusses the critique of academic specialization in the context of the “national  
studies craze” (guoxue re 国学热) and concomitant attempts to “sinicise” the human and social sciences on pp.19-21.
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Zhuangzi have long since been warned that “the art of the Way in time comes to be rent and torn apart 
by the world” (道術將為天下裂).81 In general, it should not be forgotten that the establishment of the 
first university in China (the Imperial Peking University,  Jingshi daxue tang 京師大學堂 ), directly 
resulted  from  the  First  Sino-Japanese  War  of  1894-189582,  meaning  that  the  development  of  an 
institutional  framework for the modern order of knowledge was an immediate consequence of the 
position of China as a state subject to imperialism in the expansive world-system.  The conservation 
areas Zhang Xianglong seeks to establish outside of the confines of the university are conceived of in 
analogy with natural reserves, where endangered species are preserved in their original habitat, and 
with communities which attempt to uphold their own way of life within and largely outside of modern 
society, such as the Amish in the US. At the beginning of his exposition, Zhang claims that in the near 
future,  conservation will  become more important than development,  both on an ecological as on a 
cultural level. Referring to the degradation of Confucianism in revolutionary China and its subsequent 
reappraisal in the post-revolutionary constellation, Zhang notes that “since the dustbins of history have 
no permanent members, there is also no preestablished order [in which things are dumped there]”.83 
However, he does acknowledge that the Confucian tradition is still in a precarious situation, cannot 
survive on its own without an “ark” (方舟 ) and needs, so to speak, help from above. Zhang further 
makes the following dramatic prediction: “When a forest is cut down, this can lead to sandstorms. If  
Confucian culture were to completely vanish, then it is very likely to lead to a sandstorm in the very 
way of life of the Chinese people.”84 The establishment of “conservation areas for Confucian culture” is 
meant to prevent such an apocalyptic scenario from coming true. Zhang goes on to provide a relatively 
detailed outline of what life in such conservation areas would be like. I will only cite a few of the  
elements he lists: in contrast to what he considers to be typical of Western liberalism, not the private 
individual,  but  family  life  would  serve  as  the  basis  for  the  organization  of  society,  ranging  from 
economic  activity,  the  educational  system and  care  for  the  elderly,  to  the  settlement  of  conflicts 
between members of the community. The people living in a Confucian conservation area would use 
traditional, environmentally friendly technology in agriculture and manufacturing and would mainly 
rely on Chinese medicine for their health care. A modified version of the agricultural calender would be 
81 Translation quoted from Burton Watson (trans.),  The Complete Works of Zhuangzi, New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2013, p.289.
82 Xiaoqing Diana Lin, Peking University: Chinese Scholarship and Intellectuals, 1898-1937, Albany: State University of 
New York Press, 2005, p.2.
83 历史的垃圾箱中既没有固定的成员，也没有固定的次序。Zhang, 2007, p.11.
84 森林砍了，会有沙尘暴；儒家文化全死透了，很可能会有中国人生存形态中的沙尘暴的。Zhang, 2007, p.14. 
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used, calculating the start of the Common Era from the birth of Confucius instead of that of Christ. A 
linear form of history is thus given a different reference point, without reviving the cyclical conception 
of time prevalent in premodern China.85 Clothes, music and customs would follow Confucian patterns, 
and something similar to the imperial examination system would be used for appointing government 
officials to institutions which embody the balance between yin and yang and the principle of “harmony 
without uniformity” (he er bu tong 和而不同)86. Establishing these conservation areas in poorer regions 
of the country would also make it possible to combine the reconstruction of Confucianism with the 
improvement of socio-economic conditions. The ideal type of economic activity that Zhang describes is 
reminiscent of small-scale cooperatives where the fruits of labor are communally and fairly distributed 
and  enjoyed,  not  unlike  the  Jewish  kibbutzim.  There  would  seem  to  be  a  hint  of  nostalgia  for 
communism in this Confucianist Utopia. The areas would also be internally divided into various zones, 
ranging from the central areas where the traditional Confucian way of life has been restored to the 
highest possible extent, to “buffer zones” (暖区) where more contact with the outside world is possible. 
After an initial stage in which relations with the outside world would be severely restricted in order to 
make cultural restoration possible in a controlled environment, the intention is to gradually attain what 
Zhang calls a state of “non-conflict” (与世无争) with society at large, allowing the preservation area to 
“gradually flow over” (潜润) into the world outside its boundaries, and thus provide a secure basis for 
Confucianism to flourish within the whole of China. According to Zhang, the question will then be 
asked “whether we protected Confucian culture or are [still] being guarded by it”87.
It is quite possible that a casual observer will be inclined to discard the idea of conservation areas for  
Confucianism out of hand as nothing but a far-fetched phantasm, blind to the ineluctable laws of the 
modern world. It is equally possible that one feels rather queasy and uncomfortable with the idea of a 
revival of Confucianism affecting so many of the basic aspects and details of everyday life. If that is the 
case, then this is probably because one suspects that ideas in general, however abstract and fanciful 
they may appear at  first  sight, are not completely detached from nor indifferent to the reality that 
continues to operate behind their back even in their deepest dreams.  It will come as no surprise that 
85 Certain academics, such as Jiang Qing 蒋庆, occasionally use the expression 孔元 (kongyuan, “Confucian Era”), instead 
of the standard 公元 (gongyuan, common era ) when dating their writings.
86 The reference is to the Analects 13.23: 君子和而不同，小人同而不合  (“The exemplary person harmonizes without 
equalizing, whereas lesser people equalize without harmonizing”).
87 Zhang, 2007, p.18: “是我们保护了她，还是她护卫着我们?”
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Zhang Xianglong's proposal has met with severe criticism and various contestations. Objections range 
from the question as to who would finance the establishment of the conservation areas to that of the 
overall relevance of conserving a tradition which critics consider to have already irrevocably died out. 
The  main  target  in  such  criticisms  has  been  the  undeniable  utopianism  of  the  project  and  its 
questionable  practical  feasibility.88 However,  I  think  another  dimension  of  the  problem  has  been 
neglected and obscured in the process. What is in my opinion most striking about Zhang's project is 
that, in spite of the fact that it is overtly aimed at conservation, he ends up reproducing the very same 
developmental  logic  that,  from  a  broader  historical  perspective,  necessitated  the  construction  of 
conservation areas in the first place. Stating that conservation is more important than development does 
not automatically do away with this logic, nor with its paradoxical entanglement with conservation. 
This  is  most  obvious  from his  description  of  the  various  stages  running  up  to  the  final  goal  he 
envisages. At one point, Zhang himself makes the comparison between his cultural conservation areas 
and the well-known special economic zones (SEZs, jingji tequ 经济特区), and links them to the CCP 
policy formulated under Deng Xiaoping of “one country, two systems” (yiguo liangzhi 一国两制), the 
constitutional principal which allows a unified China to selectively adopt different administrative and 
economic approaches within a single territorial unity.89 One finds the same analogy in a similar, though 
less far-reaching, proposal to establish a “special zone for Chinese culture” (Zhongguo wenhua tequ 中
国文化特区) in Qufu put forward in 2011 by Zeng Zhenyu曾振宇(b. 1962), a professor specializing in 
classical Chinese philosophy at Shandong University, who probably has a lot more political clout than 
Zhang  as  a  member  of  the  Shandong  Committee  of  the  Chinese  People's  Political  Consultative 
Conference (Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi Shandong sheng weiyuanhui 中国人民政治协
商会议山东省委员会).90 In both cases, the underlying logic is that of a state of exception gradually 
generalized to become the norm, ultimately intended to supplant the norm from which it derives its 
exceptionality.91 In formal terms, the exception (“difference”) allows the norm to internalize that which 
88 See for example Dang Guoying 党国英, “Who Will Construct 'Protection Areas for Confucian Culture'?” (Shei lai jianli  
'rujia wenhua baohuqu'?  谁来建立“儒家文化保护区”？ ),  China Review, 7 January 2002,  http://www.china-
review.com/sao.asp?id=1586
89 Zhang, 2007, p.15.
90 See Zeng Zhenyu曾振宇, “Suggestions Concerning the Proposition to Establish a “Special Zone for Culture” in Qufu” 
(Guanyu  sheli  Qufu  “wenhua  tequ”  de  jianyi 关于 设立曲阜“文 化特区”的 建议 ),  19  february  2011. 
http://chinarujiao.net/info.asp?PID=9924 and Zeng's  “A Few Propositions Concerning the Establishment of a 'Special 
Zone for Chinese Culture in Qufu'” (Guanyu jianshehao Qufu “Zhongguo wenhua tequ” de ji dian jianyi关于建设好曲
阜“中国文化特区”的几点建议 ),  http://www.confucius2000.com/admin/list.asp?id=5570.  Also see Li  Qian, 
“Confucius Confusion”, Global Times, 23 August 2012, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/728725.shtml.
91 Cf. Tu Wei-ming, “Cultural China: The Periphery as the Center”, Daedalus, vol.120, no.2, 1991, pp.1-32. 
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is  different  from itself,  while  the  right  or  the  authority  to  determine  what  qualifies  as  being  an 
exception (being different) remains firmly vested in the norm, which cannot ground its own normality 
and normativity without recourse to self-reference, and thus to tautology and paradox.92 The problem 
with the “state of exception”93 approach is that it does not really problematize or challenge the basic 
structures and conditions of the social environment in which the zones would be embedded and by 
which they would remain surrounded even if they were to be successfully established and developed 
one day. Such a complicit embrace of the developmental logic of modernization is paired uneasily with  
a  clear  nostalgia  for  an  idealized  socialism,  evident  from  the  economic  dimension  of  Zhang 
Xianglong's  Utopia.  In general,  it  is  not  uncommon to find intellectuals inspired by Confucianism 
advocating or defending policy measures which are straightforwardly identifiable as “socialist” (insofar 
as  one  takes  this  to  mean a  support  for  a  strong,  interventionist  state),  which  makes their  almost 
exclusive focus  on liberal  political  theories (mostly John Rawls)  in  drawing a distinction between 
Western and Chinese “moral paradigms” highly suspect.94 It betrays, I think, an unwillingness on the 
part of such thinkers to contextualize their arguments on and for the revival of Confucianism within the 
post-socialist constellation of contemporary mainland China, or an inability to at least think through the 
conceptual  consequences  of the general,  global  context  in  which their  discourse is  located.  If  this 
92 See Niklas Luhmann,  Essays on Self-Reference, New York: Columbia University Press, 1990, pp.123-143 and Niklas 
Luhmann, Social Systems, Stanford (Cal.): Stanford University Press, 1995, pp.437-477.
93 See Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, London and Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005. 
94 A  notable  exception  is  Fan  Ruiping's  “reconstructionist  Confucianism”.  See  Ruiping  Fan,  Reconstructionist  
Confucianism.  Rethinking  Morality  after  the  West, Dordrecht:  Springer,  2010.  Fan  is  overtly  hostile  to  (Chinese) 
socialism/communism and attempts to mount a “Confucian” defense of private property and free-market capitalism. He 
goes so far as to claim that one can find a “classical argument” for the moral and practical desirability of the free market 
in  Mencius.  See  Fan,  2010,  pp.64-67.  His  plea  for  Singapore's  “Central  Provident  Fund”  (gongjijin 公积金 ),  a 
compulsory savings plan for individual citizens intended to provide for pension funds and health care (see p.61) hardly 
fits his celebration of the free market. Fan's understanding of capitalism and socialism would seem to be limited to the 
distinction  between  private  property  and  common  ownership/collectivization,  which  is  both  inadequate  and 
anachronistic. This becomes farcical at the times, as when he writes: “Confucius clearly states that government should 
not tax people for more than 10% of their income” (p.110). Fan's position can, I think, simply be summarized as that of a 
cultural conservative with economically (neo)liberal inclinations. He clearly favors government intervention, but only of 
a kind which benefits the “free market”. Immanuel Wallerstein has already pointed out that this is a common feature of  
the  capitalist  economy,  the  primary  beneficiaries  of  which  only  rhetorically  favor  a  free  market,  while  actually  
depending on the intervention of state power (from which they can then ideologically distance themselves) for the  
successful  maximization  of  profit.  See  Wallerstein,  2004,  pp.23-41.  By  saying  that  Fan  is  basically  an  ethically  
conservative neoliberal, I do not mean to disparagingly suggest that this would automatically render all of his arguments  
ideological  and false.  I  do believe that  his use of  a neologistic  and intentionally vague vocabulary of “Confucian” 
concepts simply obfuscates the fact that many of his position are standard conservative and/or neoliberal rhetoric for 
which he would undoubtedly find a receptive audience in entirely “non-Confucian” circles. More importantly, Fan does 
not in my view manage to clarify what is particularly Confucian about his stance on health care, economic policy, 
business ethics and other issues. He simply seems to “derive” them metaphorically from a self-serving formulation of  
some rigid Confucian “moral paradigm”, grounded in a misguided distinction between a homogeneously Confucian 
China and a liberal West, the latter apparently populated by self-centered individualists whose entire social and moral  
behavior has been hard-wired by a miraculous prenatal (and somewhat sketchy) reading of A Theory of Justice. 
45
background is not taken for granted, then at least it is often left unthought, and therefore uncontested. 
As the “New Left” thinker Wang Hui 汪晖 (b. 1959) remarks:
In its  rejection of Western values,  Confucian capitalism enables exponents to embrace the capitalist
mode of production and the global capitalist system […] while adding a layer of cultural nationalism on
top. In this context, Confucian capitalism and the contemporary Chinese socialist reforms are simply two
sides of the same coin.95
The implementation of a project such as Zhang Xianglong's would obviously have to depend on the 
existing structures of power and organization in order to become possible at all. Precisely how the 
development  of  preservation  areas  for  traditional  culture  could  in  turn  influence  these  structures 
remains very much unclear. In its current form, Zhang's proposal would condemn the conservation of 
cultural  value  to  undiminished dependency on the unchecked expansion of  exchange value  and is 
overall more likely to lead to the construction of another theme park96 than to the genuine creation of an 
“authentic” cultural habitat. In South Korea, one can find a considerable number of “Folk Villages”, the 
inhabitants of which are often subsidized by the government to retain their traditional way of life. The 
considerable revenues such villages create through domestic and international tourism are an important 
clue to the logic behind government investment in the conservation and maintenance of (tourist-proof) 
tradition. The insulation of a certain community from the forces of modernization is thus bargained for 
with the latter's bountiful “fruits”, and already presupposes a prior containment of the exception within 
the rule. In any case, a project such as Zhang's is unlikely to be judged purely on its own terms, by an 
appeal to its intrinsic value. Any judgment of its value and merits will have to tolerate the intrusion of 
external interests, determined through the observations of an outside environment in which it must seek 
to embed itself as a, if not functional, than at least harmless and inconsequential, exception. It is highly 
improbable that the environment of modern society will relinquish the right to look in, to calculate and 
quantify, to ascertain costs and benefits, and interrupt or intervene where necessary. All of this will be 
done according to standards of necessity derived from its functionally differentiated subsystems and in 
keeping with norms which this  society is  no longer willing to,  if  at  all  capable of,  adopting from 
anywhere else.97 
95 Wang Hui, “Contemporary Chinese Thought and the Question of Modernity”, Social Text, 5, 1990, p.22.
96 What Arif Dirlik calls “the most recent location for history under global capitalism”. Dirlik, 1995, p.273.
97 See Niklas Luhmann, Observations on Modernity, Stanford (Cal.): Stanford University Press, 1998, pp.1-21.
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1.4 Political Confucianism, spiritual Confucianism, and the politics of Spirit
1.4.1 Jiang Qing's constitutional reordering of Confucianism
In a recent edition of the influential journal Confucius  Studies (Kongzi yanjiu 孔子研究 )98, a short 
article authored by Lü Peng 吕鹏 examines the possibility of what he calls “introducing elements of 
Confucianism (儒学因子) into the system”. Lee Kuan-Yew's 李光耀 Singapore, the central point of 
reference during the debates on Asian Values in the 90s, is cited as a model for combining a Western-
style free market economy supplemented with certain Confucian values. These values are taken to 
denote the dimension of morality, the importance of which must be reaffirmed against the perceived 
(Western) tendency to subordinate ethical judgments to the purely formal legal categories of right, 
supposedly  lacking  a  properly  “onto-ethical”  foundation  in  a  thick  account  of  human  existence.99 
According to Lü Peng, Confucian values could serve to counter what the author considers to be a 
number of pathologies of modernity; listing hedonism, excessive individualism, a decline in morality, 
drug abuse, violence and pornography as examples. Such an overburdening of Confucianism with what 
Chen Ming calls  the “onerous task” of coming up with solutions to virtually all  imaginable social 
problems  (and  pseudo-problems)  is  not  uncommon  in  the  discourse  of  Confucian  political 
philosophy.100 These modern ills could, Lü claims, be remedied by a selective re-appropriation of what 
he calls the “core values of the Chinese nation and the Shandong spirit” (the latter referring to the 
province where Confucius was born). From the author's point of view, the introduction of Confucian 
elements into the existing political system is also necessary in order to prevent Confucianism from 
becoming a “wandering soul” (youhun遊魂)101, confined to the windowless world of academia and the 
98 Kongzi yanjiu is published by the government-sponsored Confucius Foundation of China (Zhongguo Kongzi jijinhui 中
国孔子基金会). See Farràs, 2014, pp.46-47, note 63. On its website, one can read that the aim of the foundation is “to 
raise funds, and actively organize and promote Confucius, Confucianism and Chinese traditional research work, for the 
purpose of strengthening socialist spiritual civilization and material civilization construction, and serve for international 
cultural exchanges and human peace in the world.” http://confucius.uonbi.ac.ke/node/741
99 Cf. Chung-ying Cheng, “Integrating the Onto-Ethics of Virtues (East) and the Meta-Ethics of Rights (West)”,  Dao: A 
Journal of Comparative Philosophy, vol.1, no.2, 2002, pp.157-184. 
100Chen Ming, “Modernity and Confucian Political  Philosophy in a Globalized World”, in  Dallmayr and Zhao,  2012, 
p.110.
101See Yu Yingshi余英时, “The Predicament of Contemporary Confucianism” (Xiandai ruxue de kunjing現代儒學的困
境), in A General Perspective on the Development of Confucianism (Ruxue fazhan de hongguan toushi 儒學發展的宏觀
透視), edited by Du Weiming杜維明, Taibei: Zhengzhong shuju, 1997, pp.28-34 and Yu Yingshi, “Confucian Thought 
and Everyday Life” (Rujia sixiang yu richang rensheng 儒家思想与日常人生), in Essays on Modern Confucianism 
(Xiandai ruxue lun 现代儒学论), Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1998, pp.241-249. 
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misty regions of philosophical speculation, divorced from the everyday life of ordinary people and thus 
without  any  practical  relevance  for  the  problems  of  the  real  world.  The  institutionalization  of 
Confucian teachings would thus be a positive thing for both the system into which it is introduced and 
for the practical application and realization of Confucianism itself. In short: Confucianizing modernity 
and  modernizing  Confucianism  can  be  brought  about  through  a  largely  unspecified  form  of 
institutionalization with overtly nationalist  goals.  Lü further  proposes that  a  partial  introduction of 
traditional elements into the system would not only be beneficial for internal social harmony in the 
People's  Republic,  but could also help “reunite the hearts  and minds of the people across the two 
straits” and thus pave the way for a future return of Taiwan to the mainland.102 
While Lü Peng limits himself to arguing for the adaptation of certain “elements” of Confucianism, 
there are intellectuals who go much further and provide a more detailed account of precisely which 
“elements” of Confucianism should be introduced into exactly what sort of “system”. In what follows, I 
will focus on the work of Jiang Qing蒋庆 (b. 1953), who is probably the most controversial and most 
often mentioned and discussed example of such thinkers. Much like Kang Xiaoguang, Jiang will settle 
for nothing less than a full and far-reaching institutionalization of Confucianism. In doing so, he takes a 
firmly anti-universalist stance, while at the same time contending that “[t]he Way of Humane Authority 
[Renzheng 仁政 ] is the best possible form of government that human beings have ever invented”.103 
The institutionalization he proposes would serve to replace a fundamentally un-Chinese communism, 
transcend the deficiencies of Western liberal democracy, and put an end to what he calls “a hundred 
years of cultural  self-humiliation”.104 What Yingjie Guo remarks concerning cultural nationalism in 
general  is  supremely  applicable  to  Jiang  Qing  in  particular:  “cultural  nationalism  […]  seeks  to 
'renationalize' the current state formation, which is considered illegitimate, as it fails to fit with 'the 
nation' in terms of its aspirations, cultural traditions and moral values”.105 
102Lü Peng 吕鹏 ,  “Some Reflections on the Introduction of Confucian Elements into the System” (Guanyu ruxue yinzi  
jinru zhidu de ji dian sikao关于儒学因子进入制度的几点思考), Kongzi yanjiu 孔子研究, 5, 2012, pp.116-118. On the 
role of the appraisal of traditional culture as a tool for reunificationist rhetoric on cross-strait relations, see Peter Moody, 
Conservative  Thought  in  Contemporary  China,  Plymouth:  Lexington  Books,  2007,  pp.87-88  and  Kelvin  Chi-Kin 
Cheung,  “Away  from  Socialism,  Towards  Chinese  Characteristics:  Confucianism  and  the  Futures  of  Chinese 
Nationalism”, China Information, vol.26, no.2, 2012, pp.205–218. 
103Jiang Qing,  A Confucian Constitutional Order: How China’s Ancient Past Can Shape its Political Future , Princeton 
(N.J.): Princeton University Press, 2012, pp.42-43. See Zhang Xianglong,  “Is Political Confucianism a Universalism? 
An Analysis of Jiang Qing’s Philosophical Tendency”, in  The Renaissance of Confucianism in Contemporary China, 
edited by Ruiping Fan, Dordrecht: Springer, 2011, pp.225-237. 
104Jiang, 2012, p.67. 
105Guo, 2004, p.19. 
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Jiang has a long list of what he expects from the revival of Confucianism in civil society and social life, 
including  “universalizing  the  education  of  Confucian  classics,  promoting  social  morality  […] 
disseminating good customs, prescribing daily rites, sponsoring ancestral worship and sacrifice”106, as 
well as the setting up of charitable institutions for orphans, the poor and needy.  On the level of the 
state, he proposes a tricameral parliamentary system of government, consisting of 1) a more or less 
democratically  elected  “House  of  the  Common People”  (shumin yuan  庶民院 ),  2)  a  “House  of 
Confucian Continuity” (tongru yuan 通儒院 ) populated by Confucian scholars schooled in the Four 
Books (sishu四書) and the Five Classics (wujing五經), and 3) a “House of National Essence” (guoti  
yuan 国体院) made up of descendants of the Confucius family and other representatives from various 
upper strata of society, including “descendants of great sages of the past, descendants of the rulers, 
descendants of famous people, of patriots, university professors of Chinese history, retired top officials, 
judges, and diplomats, worthy people from society, as well as representatives of Daoism, Buddhism, 
Islam, Tibetan Buddhism, and Christianity.”107 These representatives are to be appointed by a symbolic 
monarch, a direct descendant from the Kong family bloodline, who would otherwise have a largely 
ceremonial function.108 The three houses correspond to Humanity (ren 人), Heaven (tian 天), and Earth 
(di  地 )  as  the  three  sources  (“popular”,  “sacred”  and  “cultural”)  of  political  legitimacy  Jiang 
distinguishes. Notably, the “House of Confucian Continuity” would be given permanent veto power to 
block legislation, even when it has already been passed by the two other houses.109 On the “House of 
the Common People”, Jiang has not much more to say than that its members will be “chosen according 
to the norms and procedures of Western democratic parliaments.”110 The three Houses would be further 
supervised by an Academy composed of Confucian scholars, which would be endowed with the highest 
constitutional authority in order to ensure a limitation of executive power through morality (instead of 
through  rights).111 The  Academy  would  be  responsible  for  organizing  examinations  aimed  at  the 
recruitment  of  top  officials  for  both  executive  and  judicial  functions,  preside  over  state  religious 
ceremonies  (as  a  gesture  against  the  tide  of  modern  “secularization”)  and  be  given  the  power  of 
106Chen, 2013, p.178.
107Jiang, 2012, p.41.
108See Jiang, 2012, pp.79-96.
109See Jiang,  2012,  pp.41-42:  “The House  of  Ru  enjoys  a  permanent  power  of  veto.  A bill,  such  as  one  permitting 
homosexuals to found a family, that passes the House of the People but is against the Way of heaven will be vetoed by 
the House of Ru.”
110Jiang, 2012, p.41. 
111Jiang, 2012, pp.54-55. 
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impeachment and recall, which it can exercise directly without the mediation of any other state body.112 
1.4.2 Jiang Qing on political vs. spiritual Confucianism
I will not go further into the details of Jiang Qing's plans for a Confucian constitutional order here, nor  
address  their  viability and desirability head-on, since this  has  already been repeatedly done in  the 
existing secondary literature.113 I believe there are more important problems to be cleared away before 
one  can  begin  to  directly  address  the  feasibility  and  practicality  of  Jiang  Qing's  proposed 
institutionalization of Confucianism as a political alternative to the status quo. I will proceed instead by 
focusing on the distinction between “political Confucianism” (zhengzhi ruxue 政治儒学) and “spiritual 
Confucianism” (xinxing ruxue 心性儒学 )114 Jiang is credited with having introduced. He considers 
“spiritual  Confucianism” to be centered around individual  self-cultivation (extended to include the 
network of direct social relations in which the self is formed and cultivated), whereas the “political” 
version  is  more  practically  oriented  and  deals  with  questions  of  governance,  rulership  and 
administration on the larger level of society and social life as a whole. It is important to stress from the 
onset that this distinction is not merely descriptive, let alone neutral. Jiang uses it both to distinguish 
his own attempt at revitalizing Confucianism from that of other traditionalist thinkers, and as a marker 
that can be retroactively applied to the entire Confucian tradition. He does not only utilize the contrast 
between political and spiritual Confucianism to set himself apart from his direct forebears, but also 
applies it to the history of Confucian thought in its entirety. Mencius  孟子 , Zhu Xi 朱熹 and Wang 
Yangming王陽明 are classified as belonging to a line of spiritual, speculative thinkers bogged down in 
problems of “metaphysics” and self-cultivation. Confucius himself, Dong Zhongshu董仲舒 and Kang 
Youwei 康有為 are praised as authentic, political Confucians representing the Gongyang 公羊 school, 
concerned with the practical organization of social life and matters of political legitimacy, effective 
112See Jiang, 2012, pp.55-64.
113The reader can consult a recent volume (Jiang, 2012) which contains three chapters by Jiang in which he summarizes his 
ideas, as well as a number of responses by both critics and fellow travelers. A useful summary of Jiang's main ideas can 
be found in an appendix to Daniel A. Bell's  China's New Confucianism: Politics and Everyday Life in a Changing  
Society, Princeton (New Jersey): Princeton University Press, 2008, pp.175-191. Reprinted in Fan, 2011, pp.139-152. Bell 
has played an important role in the rise to fame of Jiang Qing in Western sinology. Also see Ruichang Wang, “The Rise 
of Political Confucianism  in Contemporary China”, in Fan, 2011, pp.33-45. David Elstein patiently discusses Jiang's 
ideas in his Democracy in Contemporary Confucian Philosophy, London and New York: Routledge, 2015, pp.144-166. 
114I am aware that translating the term xinxing by “spiritual” hardly does any justice to the conceptual content and scope of 
the classical Neo-Confucian concepts of xin and xing, but have decided to retain it for the purpose of contrast since it 
seems to function as the standard translation of the term in the context of discussions of Jiang's distinction. 
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institutions  and  benevolent  governance.  In  order  not  to  drag  the  whole  historical  trajectory  of 
Confucianism into the discussion, I will restrict myself to considering the implications this distinction 
has  when  applied  to  its  modern  representatives.  The  fact  that  twentieth-century  “spiritual” 
Confucianists  disposed  over  their  own  historiographical  schemes  to  divide,  classify  and  regroup 
currents in Confucian thought would necessitate a careful comparative exposition of “political” and 
“spiritual” classifications of the tradition. Such an exposition cannot be provided here.115 Although the 
distinction between spiritual and political Confucianism is, as I will try to show, largely artificial, it can 
still  serve as a good starting point for continuing our investigation into the relation between New 
Confucianist discourse and modernity. In what follows, I will basically argue that both approaches start 
out  from  claiming  some  sort  of  socio-political  performativity.  Neither  would  declare  themselves 
satisfied with remaining a purely academic affair  solely of interest to a handful of specialists. Jiang's 
distinction between  political and  spiritual Confucianism obscures this  communality and obfuscates 
their shared discursive kernel, namely what could be called a politics of spirit. 
In a crucial article entitled “From Spiritual to Political Confucianism: on Another Path of Development 
for Contemporary New Confucianism” (Cong xinxing ruxue zouxiang zhengzhi ruxue – lun dangdai  
xin ruxue de lingyi fazhan luxiang从心性儒学走向政治儒学 — 论当代新儒学的另一发展路向) 
from 1991, Jiang Qing proposes what he calls a self-criticism of the Confucian tradition, a criticism 
that  comes to  terms with certain deficiencies  of  Confucianism by employing the resources  of  this 
tradition itself,  without  adopting an external  standpoint.116 He believes that  the merit  and value of 
Confucianist  ideas  can and should be judged on their  own terms,  and do not  require  a normative 
criterion,  such  as  liberal  democracy  or  revolutionary  communism,  foreign  to  the  tradition.  The 
distinction he draws between spiritual and political Confucianism serves in effect to initiate such an 
auto-critique. Jiang argues that the former current, best represented by thinkers such as Mou Zongsan
115Interesting parallels could be drawn between Jiang Qing's approach, and that of Xiong Shili 熊十力, who is generally 
considered to be the father of New Confucianism in its “spiritual” guise.  See section 3.1.2 of the third chapter of my 
study. Suffice it so say here that  although Jiang would not support Xiong's  egalitarian reading of Confucian political 
ideals, he is just as concerned as Xiong is to distinguish a critical “political Confucianism” (政治儒学) from “politicized 
Confucianism”  (政治化儒学 ),  the  latter  referring  to  the  dynastic  political  order  in  imperial  China.  See  Jiang's 
Introduction to Gongyang Learning (Gongyangxue yinlun 公羊学引论), Shenyang: Liaoning daxue chubanshe, 1995, 
pp.9-26. 
116Jiang  Qing,  “From Spiritual  to  Political  Confucianism:  on  Another  Path  of  Development  for  Contemporary  New 
Confucianism” (Cong xinxing ruxue zouxiang zhengzhi ruxue – lun dangdai xin ruxue de lingyi fazhan luxiang 从心性
儒学走向政治儒学 — 论当代新儒学的另一发展路向), Shenzhen daxue xuebao深圳大学学报, 8, 1991, pp.80-91. 
Also see Jiang Qing, Political Confucianism (Zhengzhi ruxue政治儒学), Beijing: Sanlian chubanshe, 2003, pp.11-95 
and Jiang Qing, “From Mind Confucianism to Political Confucianism”, in Fan, 2011, pp.17-32. 
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牟宗三 (1909-1995) and Tang Junyi 唐君毅 (1900-1978) who fled the mainland for Taiwan and Hong 
Kong shortly before the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949, has made Confucian ideals 
irrelevant to everyday life and to the socio-political structures by which human existence is determined 
and in which it is situated. The exaggerated focus he claims these philosophers laid on metaphysical 
and existential problems resulted in a forced withdrawal of Confucian philosophy into the safe but 
claustrophobic  confines  of  individual  human  subjectivity.  Jiang  firmly  objects  to  the  tendencies 
towards  “extreme individualization” (极端个人化 ),  “extreme metaphysization” (极端形上化 ), 
“extreme interiorization” (极端内在化) and “extreme transcendentalization” (极端超越化) he finds 
rampant in their  philosophies.117 Jiang argues that each of these tendencies can for a large part  be 
attributed to the influence of German Idealism, specifically of Kant and Hegel, on Mou's and Tang's 
philosophical outlooks. This influence increased their  alienation from the more pressing matters of 
socio-political reality. Generally speaking, it is not uncommon for scholars of New Confucianism to 
attribute perceived flaws in the philosophy of Tang and Mou to their adoption of a vocabulary and a  
corresponding set of concepts strongly influenced by Hegel and Kant. The implication seems to be that  
this  outside,  foreign  influence  had a  considerably distorting  effect  on  their  otherwise  faithful  and 
unproblematic  continuation  of  the  Chinese  tradition.118 For  all  his  criticism  of  the  spiritual 
Confucianists, Jiang does attribute a mediating role to them. Their attempts to reinvent Confucianism, 
flawed as they may have been in his eyes, did pave the way for a future return of Confucius to the 
mainland to someday reclaim his position as the “uncrowned king” (suwang 素王 ) of the whole of 
China, and thus constituted a laudable act of filial piety of “a child feeding its parents” (fanbu反哺) 
towards Chinese culture.119 Jiang's own brand of political Confucianism departs from the idea that “the 
heavenly Way and the intrinsic principles” (tiandao xingli 天道性理 ) should be manifested within a 
concrete cultural framework of customs and norms, and must be embodied in a determinate political 
system if they are to be effectively realized. Otherwise, they are bound to remain vacuous floating 
signifiers  whose function  is  restricted  to  embellishing  the  moral  conscience  of  individual  subjects 
powerless  against  the  outside  world.  A  restriction  of  this  sort  would  in  turn  have  disastrous 
117See Jiang, 1991, pp.81-83. Cf. Jiang, 2011, pp.18-20. 
118An important factor in Yu Yingshi's 余英时 attempt to rescue his teacher  Qian Mu 錢穆  (1895-1990) from being 
classified, stored away and forgotten in the convenient category of New Confucianism is the putative absence of German 
Idealist influences in Qian's work. See “Qian Mu and the New Confucians” (Qian Mu yu xinrujia 钱穆与新儒家), in Yu 
Yingshi,  Essays on Modern Confucianism (Xiandai ruxue lun 现代儒学论 ), Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 
1998, pp.170-228.
119See Ai, 2008, p.30 and Makeham, 2008, p.78. 
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consequences for individual human beings. Jiang thinks that  “if the Confucian ideals of Heaven and 
human values cannot be actualized in reality, human life may lose its meaning. Individuals’ empty 
minds  may  then  become  terribly  vulnerable  and  easily  swayed  by  the  various  forms  of  modern 
nihilism.”120 According to Jiang, the spiritual new Confucians were unable to even theoretically effect 
the “generation of a new outer kingliness” (kaichu xin waiwang开出新外王) and proved incapable of 
establishing a strong connection between “inner sageliness” (neisheng 内圣) and “outer kingliness”.121 
The “new outer kingliness” of the likes of Mou and Tang consisted in nothing but the unreflective and 
uncritical adaptation of Western democracy and a constitutional form of government, both of which 
they  failed  to  successfully  derive  from  the  resources  of  the  mainstay  of  the  Chinese  tradition.  
“Subjective” self-cultivation thus stayed without an “objective” basis and remained deprived of an 
institutional embodiment. Jiang further sees the irredeemable split between “inner sage” and “outer 
king” as overlapping with the cultural divide between China and the West. Tang's and Mou's positive 
appraisal of Western liberal democracy as something to be wholeheartedly adopted by China could not 
be  reconciled  with  their  shared  insistence  on  grounding  moral  subjectivity  in  the  quintessentially 
Chinese tradition of Confucianism. Jiang would undoubtedly agree with the staunchly iconoclast Bao 
Zunxin's 包遵信 summary judgment that their grounding of democracy, human rights and science in 
Confucianism resembles “a magician pulling rabbits from his pocket”.122 Jiang's criticism would have 
to  be extended to Tu Weiming, for whom “Confucian personality ideals (the authentic  person, the 
worthy, or the sage) can be realized more fully in a liberal democratic society than in either a traditional 
imperial  dictatorship  or  a  modern  authoritarian  regime.”123 It  is  true  that  one  sometimes  gets  the 
impression  that  in  accommodationist  approaches,  such  as  Stephen  C.  Angle's  “progressive 
Confucianism”, modern political institutions and practices are assumed to be already in themselves (an 
sich) adequate realizations of Confucian values124, the only remaining step to the “for itself” (für sich) 
then being to retroactively acknowledge their Confucian nature and to spell out how and to what avail, 
120Jiang, 2011, pp.20-21.
121The terms  neisheng and waiwang can be traced back to the  Tianxia 天下 chapter of the  Zhuangzi 莊子 . See Watson 
(trans.), 2013, pp.287-289.
122Bao Zunxin 包遵信 ,  Criticism and Enlightenment (Pipan yu qimeng 批判与启蒙 ), Taibei: Lianjing, 1989, pp.4-5. 
Quoted in Christian Jochim, “Interpreting Confucian Spirituality in Postwar Taiwan: The New Confucians and Their 
Critics”, in Confucian Spirituality, edited by Tu Wei-ming and Mary Evelyn Tucker, New York: Crossroad Publishing 
Company, 2004, vol.2, p.405. Also see Bao Zunxin, “Confucian Thought and Modernization – A Discussion of the New 
Confucians” (Rujia sixiang yu xiandaihua – Xin rujia shangdui 儒家思想与现代化—新儒家商兑 ), Beijing shehui  
kexue 北京社会科学, 3, 1986, pp.86-96. 
123Tu, 2002, p.211.
124Angle, 2012, p.9: “[C]ritical modern innovations like broad political participation, the rule of law, and the active rooting 
out of social oppression, actually better enable one to be a good Confucian.”
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say, a democratization of Confucianism and a Confucianization of democracy can be brought about. 
Still, Angle is right in raising the obvious yet devastating objection that “the institutions that Jiang 
proposes have virtually no precedents in Chinese history and Jiang acknowledges borrowing them from 
Western democratic thought”125. The same could be said about Jiang's and Kang Xiaoguang's idea of 
installing Confucianism as a state religion. Jiang is well aware that religion is a “Western” (modern) 
concept, which he thinks can be used as an “expedient means” (fangbian quanfa方便权法) for the full 
restoration of the Confucian Way. Once fully restored, the latter will no longer need to cloak itself in 
borrowed, foreign categories.126
1.4.3 The institutional dimension of spiritual Confucianism
There are several remarks to be made concerning Jiang Qing's objections to “spiritual Confucianism”, 
objections which are, to be clear, not new or unique.127 First of all, even a casual glance at the works of 
Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan would suffice to make it clear that they were consistently concerned with 
criticizing and overcoming the very idea of individuation and individual subjectivity Jiang ascribes to 
them. Their writings abound in arguments against the notion of the individual as a self-sufficient atom 
detached from the intersubjective relations in which they believe something as an individual human 
being  first  becomes  possible  to  begin  with.128 In  a  way,  it  was  precisely  this  philosophical 
presupposition  that  forced  them  to  recognize  the  importance  of  an  institutional  grounding  of 
Confucianism, connected with,  but larger than,  the sphere of the individual  subject and his or her 
immediate relationships. Their adoption of a strongly dialectical mode of thought, according to which 
(in the words of Hegel) “essence must appear”129, led them to describe the institutionalization of the 
Confucian “spirit” as the latter's objectification into a “concrete universal”. Much like Jiang Qing, they 
grounded the reciprocal interdependence between the individual (concrete/particular) and its cultural 
125Angle, 2012, p.53. 
126See Chen, 2013, p.3 and p.68.
127See Zheng Jiadong郑家栋, “New Confucians and Chinese Modernization” (Xin rujia yu Zhongguo xiandaihua 新儒家
与中国现代化), in Xu, 2000, pp.191-206.
128See Stephan Schmidt, “Humanity as Trans-Individuality: Tang Junyi's (1909-1978) Philosophy of Renwen Humanism”, 
in Shaping a Humane World: Civilizations – Axial Times – Humanisms, edited by Oliver Kozlarek, Jörn Rüsen and Ernst 
Wolff, Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2012, pp.257-280.  Tang Junyi serves as an important point of reference in Roger 
Ames's “Confucian role ethics”. See Roger T. Ames,  Confucian Role Ethics: a Vocabulary,  Hong Kong: The Chinese 
University Press, 2011, pp.77-86 and pp.128-133. Also see Roger T. Ames, “Achieving Personal Identity in Confucian 
Role  Ethics:  Tang  Junyi  on  Human  Nature  as  Conduct”,  Oriens  Extremus, 49,  2010,  pp.143-166.  On  Ames's 
appropriation of Tang, see my comments in the third chapter, section 3.1.4.
129G.W.F. Hegel, The Science of Logic, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, p.437.
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tradition  (abstract/universal)  in  socio-political  institutionalization.  The  self-styled  “post-New 
Confucian”  philosopher  Lin  Anwu 林安悟 refers  to  the  intellectualist  approach of  the  Confucian 
tradition by philosophers such as Mou Zongsan as a “misplacement of the Way” (道的錯置), a Way 
which should in the first place be concerned with concrete praxis.130 Of course, the objection could be 
raised that there is a considerable mismatch between the modern concepts of “theory” as opposed to 
“praxis” on the one hand, and the paired ideas of “inner sageliness” (neisheng) and “outer kingliness” 
(waiwang) on the other. “Inner sageliness” is already in itself fundamentally a “practical” matter of 
self-cultivation. It is true that at times, Mou seems to succumb to the temptation to blur the difference 
between these two distinctions. But from passages such as the following, it is evident that he saw the 
same necessity as Jiang to provide Confucianism with an institutional dimension beyond the level of 
individual morality in order to realize its own ideal of “the unity of human beings and heaven” ( tianren 
heyi 天人合一):
Confucians  realize  humaneness  through  practice  and  observe  the  Heavenly  Way  through  the
manifestation of humaneness. They have never engaged in empty talk about the Heavenly Way being
such and such apart from the practice of humaneness. Humaneness is manifested through the practice of
humaneness; it is both the Way of Humanity and the Way of Heaven. That is why humaneness is a
universal rationality. When humaneness is made into the Way, then the Way will necessarily manifest
itself as Spirit.131
儒者由實踐而踐仁﹐由仁之呈現而見天道。未有離開仁之實踐而空言天道為如何如何也。由仁之
實踐而表現仁﹐仁為人道﹐亦為天道。故仁為普遍之理性。以仁为道﹐道显然必为精神也。
In  the  past,  Confucianism  held  an  extremely  lofty  position,  but  was  insufficiently  equipped  to
successfully  implement  itself,  precisely  because  the  study  of  logic  and  mathematics  were  not
established. Therefore it could only ascend upwards and could not connect with the lower, it could equal
130See Lin Anwu, “Undoing the 'Misplacement of the Way' ” (Jiekai 'dao de cuozhi' 解开“道的错置”), Kongzi yanjiu 孔
子 研 究 ,  1,  1999,  pp.14-26.  Lin  polemically  adopts  this  expression  from  Mou  Zongsan  himself,  who  spoke  of  
Heidegger's “misplacement of metaphysics” (形上學之錯置 ) in a phenomenology of finite  Dasein. See  Intellectual  
Intuition and Chinese Philosophy (Zhi de zhijue yu Zhongguo zhexye智的直覺與中國哲學), [1971] vol.20 of MJ, p.7 
(preface). On Lin Anwu's “post-New Confucianism”, see John Makeham's critical appraisal in Makeham, 2008, pp.171-
191.
131“The Development of Confucian Learning and its Mission” (Ruxue xueshu zhi fazhan ji qi shiming 儒學學術之發展及
其使命), [1949d] in DY, p.12. Cf. p.4: “Establishing a state-system is that through which absolute spirit can be realized 
and sustained, it is also that through which the individual spirit can be enriched and fulfilled” (故國家政制之建立﹐即
所以充實而支撐絕對精神者﹐亦即所以豐富而完備個人精神者).
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heaven but could not match humanity. [As such,] its ability to equal heaven could not but gradually
become detached and set adrift without being able to take root in the earth.132
儒學在以往有極高之境地﹐而無足以貫澈之者﹐正因名數之學之不立。故能上升而不能下貫﹐能
侔於天而不能侔於人。其侔於天者﹐亦必馴至遠離漂蕩而不能值根於大地。 
The accusation Jiang levels at Mou and Tang of having completely capitulated to Western concepts of 
democracy and governance is unjustified and oversimplified to say the least. One can of course argue 
about the tenability of their arguments for a Confucian form of democracy or a democratic form of 
Confucianism, but that their work contains clear attempts to come to terms with the perceived defects 
of  actually existing Euro-American democracies can hardly be denied.  Apart  from arguing for the 
intrinsic compatibility of Chinese culture with democracy, they also strongly opposed the idea of a 
direct  emulation  of  Western  democracy  unmediated  by  Chinese  culture.133 Although  they  can 
undoubtedly be charged with having read a lot of modern concepts into classical texts, this can hardly 
be said to be a practice specific to them. The first task for a discourse which has lost all its institutional 
standing, as in the case of Confucianism, was to account for the loss of its “object”, that is to say for the 
loss of a world, which it can perhaps only in retrospect imagine to have formerly been made in its own 
image. The external environment of a discourse in such a position comes to weigh heavier on what it  
says and how it says it than on one of which the utterances are if not faithfully realized, then at least 
relatively continuously echoed and repeated.  Given the fact that for the moment,  Jiang's ambitious 
auto-critique of the Confucian tradition has only led to the establishment of a Confucian academy 
(called Yangming jingshe阳明精舍) in the remote Guizhou 贵州 province in 1997134, it is fair to say 
that until now, he has not been more successful than his “spiritual” counterparts in institutionalizing 
132Mou, [1949d], p.4.
133See for example Tang's  “Cultural Problems in Today's World” (Dangqian shijie wenhua wenti 當前世界文化問題 ), 
[1961b] in ZJ, pp.409-415. Also see Li Minghui李明輝, “The Shift from the 'Inner Sage' towards the 'Outer King' – the 
Political Confucianism of Modern New Confucians” (Cong 'neisheng” xiang 'waiwang' de zhuanzhe – xiandai xin rujia  
de zhengzhi ruxue從「內聖」向「外王」的轉折——現代新儒家的政治儒學), Zhongguo wenzhe yanjiu jikan 中國
文哲研究集刊 , 23, 2003, pp.337-350;  David Elstein, “Mou Zongsan’s New Confucian democracy”,  Contemporary 
Political Theory, 2012, vol.11, no.2, pp.192–210; Angle, 2012, pp.31-33 and Thomas Fröhlich, “ 'Confucian Democracy' 
and its Confucian Critics: Mou Zongsan and Tang Junyi on the Limits of Confucianism”,  Oriens Extremus, 49, 2010, 
pp.167-200. Fröhlich resolutely opposes Jiang Qing's “misleading and distorted portrayal” (p.168) of Tang and Mou. 
134See Daniel A. Bell, “A Visit to a Confucian Academy”,  Dissent. A Quarterly of Politics and Culture, 22 September 
2008,  http://www.dissentmagazine.org/online_articles/a-visit-to-a-confucian-academy and  Cao  Hongbei 曹 红 蓓 , 
“Yangming Hermitage – the Most Conservative Modern Academy” (Yangming jingshe – zui fugu de xiandai shuyuan阳
明精舍—最复古的现代书院), Xinwen zhoukan 新闻周刊, 25 October 2005, http://www.gs.chinanews.com/news/2005-
11-25/1/32636.html. Also see Chen, 2013, pp.176-177. 
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Confucianism.135 Jiang evidently wants  to  protect  his privately funded  non-profit  academy against 
political co-optation in order to keep this “embodiment of the Way” from becoming an “ideological 
mouthpiece”.136 In this sense, the conspicuously modest outcome of his rather grandiose scheme for the 
future of Chinese politics is a result of the same historical constraints to which Mou and Tang were 
subject in their attempt to in some way restore Confucianism to its rightful place. As far as I am aware, 
apart from the establishment of the Yangming hermitage, up to this day the only tangible result of 
Jiang's efforts has been his supervision of the publication of “A Reciting Text of Chinese Cultural 
Classics for Elementary Education” (Zhonghua wenhua jingdian jichu jiaoyu songben 中华文化经典
基础教育诵本) which is meant to instill young children with the “Confucian” values of obedience and 
respect.137 Interestingly enough, the wider movement aiming at the recitation of Confucian classics 
(dujing yundong读经运动) was initially moved from Taiwan to mainland China by Wang Caigui王才
貴  (b. 1949), a former pupil of Mou Zongsan.138 Such instances of educational institutionalization, as 
Jiang is  well  aware,  have an important  precedent  in  the activities  of  the  first  generations  of  New 
Confucians. There is the case of Ma Yifu 馬一浮 (1883-1967), perhaps the most traditional-minded of 
all traditionalist intellectuals in twentieth-century China, who established his Fuxing shuyuan復性書院 
in 1939 with the financial support of none other than Chiang Kai-shek.139 After the establishment of the 
People's Republic, Tang Junyi was directly involved in the founding of the New Asia College (Xinya 
shuyuan 新亞書院) together with the historian Qian Mu钱穆 (1895-1990) in October 1949 in Hong 
Kong. He also devoted a considerable number of texts to both the theoretical and practical (curricular)  
aspects of education.140 
135He has also supported a small center for Confucianism in Shenzhen 深圳, China's Silicon Valley. See Sun, 2013, p.xv. 
136See Xiuping Hong, “The Characteristics and Prospect of the Confucian Academy: A Commentary on Jiang Qing’s Ideas 
on the Confucian Academy”, in Fan, 2011, p.187. Hong's commentary contains in-text commentary by Jiang. 
137Published  in  2004  by  the  Higher  Education  Press  under  the  auspices  of  the  Chinese  Ministry  of  Education.  
Unsurprisingly, the “Chinese Cultural Classics” contain only Confucian material. Jiang's preface to this compilation is  
available online: http://www.confucius2000.com/scholar/zhwhjdjcjysbqy.htm.
138See Yong Chen, “Renewing Confucianism as a Living Tradition in 21st Century China: Reciting Classics, Reviving  
Academies, and Restoring Rituals”, in Mapping Religion and Spirituality in a Postsecular World, edited by Giuseppe 
Giordan and Enzo Pace, Leiden: Brill, 2012, pp.64- 68 and Makeham, 2008, pp.319-323. 
139See Sébastien Billioud and Joël Thoraval, “Jiaohua: The Confucian Revival in China as an Educative Project”, China 
Perspectives, 4, 2007, p.7. The secondary literature in Western languages on Ma Yifu is extremely scant. See Bresciani,  
2001, pp.87-114 for a general introduction to his life and works. 
140See  for  example  Tang's  Youth  and Learning (Qingnian  yu  xuewen 青年與學問 ),  Guilin:  Guangxi  shifan  daxue 
chubanshe,  [1960]  2005.  Also  see  Chan-Fai  Cheung, “Tang  Junyi  and  the  Philosophy of  General  Education”,  in 
Confucian Tradition and Global Education, edited by Wm. Theodore de Bary, New York: Columbia University Press, 
2007, pp.59-73.
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For the sake of  completeness,  it  is  important  to  take into account  the political  dimension and the 
institutional heritage of the work of “spiritual” New Confucians such as Tang. The institutional history 
of the New Asia College, which has been painstakingly documented by Grace Ai-Ling Chou in a recent 
monograph141, is in itself interesting enough in this regard. During its heyday, the New Asia College 
attracted  the  support  of  several  American  NGOs  (such  as  the  Yale-China  Foundation,  the  Ford 
Foundation and the Harvard-Yenching Institute), who provided generous funding as a part of a broader 
postwar (government-orchestrated) strategy to contain communism in East Asia.142 The British colonial 
government on its part attempted to use the College to its own advantage, hoping that influencing the 
daily running of the institution would allow it to “regulate the growth of Chinese cultural identity while 
forestalling  any unwelcome cultural  trends  that  might  destabilize  the  colony and its  position  in  a 
particular  world  of  decolonization  and  Cold  War  tensions.”143 Specifically,  the  British  wanted  the 
institution to remain politically neutral, so as to avoid any diplomatic disputes with the communist 
mainland, which it formally recognized as a sovereign state.144 From the very beginning, the College 
was thus caught in a conflict between its own desire to uphold Chinese culture from a position of exile 
and the various interests which had lodged themselves onto the programs and activities of institution 
from its inception. The Taiwanese GMD also attempted to meddle in the affairs of the College, with 
Chiang Kai-shek offering to provide substantial financial aid from his “private” funds. Nevertheless, 
the College leaders strove to keep their distance from direct political involvement and interference.145 
They were perhaps already aware and wary of  the fact  that  the GMD government's  promotion of 
traditional  Chinese  culture  as  an  antidote  to  communism and  as  a  pillar  of  Taiwanese  identity  in 
postwar  Taiwan  involved  the  active  suppression  of  indigenous  traditions,  which  were  labeled  as 
“superstitious” and “backwards” in the process.146 Academica Sinica (Zhongyang yanjiu yuan 中央研
究院), the foremost intellectual center in Taiwan, which at the time generally subscribed to a scientific, 
empirically oriented and anti-philosophical approach, was not a logical ally for the College either.147 
141Grace Ai-Ling Chou, Confucianism, Colonialism, and the Cold War. Chinese Cultural Education at Hong Kong's New  
Asia College,  1949-1963,  Leiden and Boston: Brill,  2011.  My account  is  mainly based on Chou's  informative and 
fascinating book. 
142See Chou, 2011, pp.51-83.
143Chou, 2011, p.4. 
144See Chou, 2011, pp.130-135.
145See  Lee  Seung-hwan,  A  Topography  of  Confucian  Discourse.  Politico-philosophical  Reflections  on  Confucian  
Discourse since Modernity, New Yersey: Homa & Sekey Books, 2004, pp.47-49.
146See Christian  Jochim, “Carrying Confucianism into the  Modern  World:  the Taiwan Case”,  in  Religion in  Modern 
Taiwan.  Tradition  and Innovation  in  a  Changing  Society,  edited  by Philip  Clart  and  Charles  B.  Jones,  Honolulu: 
University of Hawai'i Press, 2003, p.54. 
147Thomas A. Metzger, A Cloud Across the Pacific. Essays on the Clash between Chinese and Western Political Theories  
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When in 1959, the British authorities decided to create a new Chinese University of Hong Kong, in 
which they wanted to incorporate the New Asia College, they were met with considerable opposition 
and resistance on the part of the leaders of the College. That lively debates were occasionally waged 
over  seemingly pedestrian  yet  highly charged issues,  such as  the College  leaders'  desire  and self-
proclaimed right to fly the Taiwanese (neither the British, nor the GMD) flag as a symbol of Chinese  
culture148 in reaction to the plans to incorporate the College into the new university, should not distract 
us from the overall importance of the College as what Grace Ai-Ling Chou calls “a site of contesting 
cultural representations”.149 One of the most interesting aspects of New Asia's institutional history is 
that both its American benefactors and the British government in Hong Kong went more or less directly 
against  the  whole  purpose  and  the  main  intention  of  the  College  by  trying  to  adjust  its  (almost 
exclusive)  focus  on  the  humanities  in  order  to  include  more  specialized  knowledge and  scientific 
training.  Additionally,  both  sought  to  temper  the  importance  the  College  curriculum  attached  to 
Confucianism, which most of the New Asia's leading figures considered to be the core of Chinese  
culture.  For  different  reasons,  both  the  colonial  government  and  the  NGOs  intended  to  keep  the 
traditional “Chinese culture” fostered and revitalized in the New Asia College as vague and malleable 
as possible.150 Of course I do not mean to argue that something like the (relatively short-lived, 1949 - 
1963) New Asia College constituted a “successful” (whatever that might mean) institutionalization of 
Confucianism, or that its ephemeral existence should lead us to celebrate its founders and members as 
radically political activists.151 However, the fact that both spiritual and political Confucians' efforts at 
reviving Confucianism have mostly come in the shape of cultural education, says something about their 
shared dilemma, which is how to relate a discourse without an object (that is to say an object of which 
this discourse itself acknowledges no longer to be in possession) to the extra-discursive conditions for 
the actualization of its object (as a full-fledged social system), conditions which it was not at liberty to 
set and which it cannot internally determine. The solution in both cases seems to come down to the  
Today,  Hong  Kong:  The  Chinese  University  Press,  2005, pp.223-224  and  Carine  Defoort,  “Fu  Sinian's  Views  on 
Philosophy,  Ancient Chinese Masters,  and Chinese Philosophy”,  in  Learning to Emulate the Wise.  The Genesis of  
Chinese Philosophy as an Academic Discipline in Twentieth-Century China, edited by John Makeham, Hong Kong: The 
Chinese University Press, 2012, pp.275-276.
148See Chou, 2011, pp.137-148. 
149Chou, 2011, p.5. 
150See Chou, 2011, p.160, p.217.
151Mou Zongsan had no illusions about his position as a philosopher: “I am not a participant in today's world, but merely 
an observing bystander.” (我不是這個時代的參與者，我是這個時代的一個旁觀者). “The Encounter at the Goose 
Lake  -  The  Grand  Synthesis  in  the  Development  of  Chinese  Culture  and  the  Merging  of  Chinese  and  Western  
Traditions” (Ehu zhi hui - Zhongguo wenhua fazhan zhong de da zonghe yu zhongxi chuantong de chonghui 鵝湖之會 
— 中國文化發展中的大綜合與中西傳統的融合), [1992] in WW, p.451.
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resolve to educate the educators. For  Jiang Qing, the incorporation of the New Asia College into the 
Chinese University of Hong Kong in 1963 signified a regrettable capitulation of what should have 
remained  traditional  Confucian  learning  to  the  modern  education  system,  which  he  not  wholly 
unreasonably  considers  to  be  tailor-made  for  feeding  new  recruits  into  the  iron  cage  of  modern 
bureaucracy and only fit for the pursuit of diplomas and jobs.152 Jiang intends to avoid such a scenario 
by limiting the use of Confucian academies to the education of an elite of literati aspiring to the ideal of 
the  junzi  君子 , “who have no need to worry about jobs”, instead of trying to instruct the  “masses”, 
“who would not understand the profound philosophy and meaning of the Book of Songs, the Book of 
History, the  Book of Rites, the  Book of Changes  and the  Spring and Autumn Annuals”.153 He thus 
seems to waver between the desire to propagate Confucianism and the fear of seeing it contaminated in 
the very process of being disseminated throughout society, for which there are already mechanisms in 
place (the educational system, the mass media), which neither Jiang, nor any one else for that matter, is 
able to directly steer, let alone control. 
1.4.4 The politics of Spirit: Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan encounter Hegel and Marx
One can hardly pretend that Jiang's Confucian forebears were unaware of or unreflective about their 
predicament. In an article published in 1961, bearing the evocative title “The Dispersal of the Blossoms 
and Fruits of the Chinese People” (Zhonghua minzu zhi huaguo piaoling 中华民族之花果飘零 )154, 
Tang Junyi reflects on the situation of exile he had then already been in for 12 years:
Chinese culture and the mind of the Chinese people [...] could be compared to a large tree that has
collapsed in a garden, causing all the blossoms and fruits to drift away and scatter in the blowing wind,
so that they can only find shelter in the shade of someone else's garden and hope to one day grow
again.155 
中國文化與中國人之人心 […] 如一園中大樹之崩倒，而花果飄零，遂隨風吹散；只有在他人園
林之下，托蔭避日，以求苟全。
For Tang, exile (described in this tableau as a movement of dispersal sustained by the uncertainty of 
152See Hong, 2011, pp.189-191.
153Hong, 2011, p.191, p.198. 
154Reprinted in ZJ, pp.1-27.
155Tang, [1961d], p.2
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ever being able to return) is not simply a personal problem. He sees exile as the condition of Chinese 
culture and the Chinese people at large.156 Tang deplores and criticizes the loss or abandonment of 
traditional culture which he considers to be endemic in overseas Chinese communities. An example he 
gives is the phenomenon of migrated Chinese in Hong Kong and other areas of the world trading their  
native language for English. He argues that on a subjective level, such an abandonment of one's mother 
tongue is predicated on a functionalist view of language as a neutral and exchangeable medium or tool.  
On  another  occasion,  he  criticized  the  adoption  of  simplified  Chinese  characters  and  the  idea  of 
replacing  characters  with  a  latinized  system  of  transcription  on  very  much  the  same  grounds.157 
According to Tang however, language, culture and history as well as the forms of social interaction 
transmitted within these domains, cannot be so easily discarded. Far from merely being things the 
individual can dispose of at will, they constitute “the place where our life must take root in order to  
exist and where our very nature and destiny is located” (我们生命之所依所根以存在者，即我们之性
命之所在 ).158 In one of the most pathos-driven pronouncements in his autobiography, we find Mou 
Zongsan making the following related exclamation: “My life is not based in reality. Everything has 
already completely vanished from reality. Where can I find my country or my home [out there]? What I 
base myself on is the cultural life of the Chinese people, the cultural ideals of Confucius and Mencius, 
and nothing else besides.” (吾之生命依據不在現實。現實一無所有矣。試看國在那裡，家在那裡？
吾所依據者華族之文化生命，孔孟之文化理想耳).159 Such a strong affirmation of the social and 
cultural rootedness of the individual allowed Tang and Mou to argue that Chinese people would not 
only cease being Chinese if they cast off their tradition and culture as if they were external implements 
that can be abandoned whenever circumstance requires it. In his text on exile, Tang goes even further 
by affirming that in this case, it would not even be possible for them to truly become individuals in any 
meaningful sense. Tang writes that
156Cf.  Mou  Zongsan,  “Lecture  at  the  Commemorative  Meeting  Ten  Years  after  Tang  Junyi's  Decease”  (Tang  Junyi  
xiansheng shihi shi zhounian jinianhui jiangci 唐君毅先生逝世十周年紀念會講詞), [1988] in SSXB, pp.357-369. Also 
see Vincent Shen, “The Concept of Centrality in Chinese Diaspora”, Religion Compass, vol.6, no.1, 2012, pp.26-40 and 
Luo  Yijun 罗义俊 , Living  Existence  and  Cultural  Consciousness:  Historical  Essays  on  Modern  Confucianism 
(Shengming cunzai yu wenhua yishi: dangdai xin rujia shilun 生命存在与文化意识：当代新儒家史论 ), Shanghai: 
Xuelin chubanshe, 2009, pp.171-179. 
157See “Criticism of the Movement to Latinize Chinese Characters” (Chi ladinghua Zhongguo wenzi yundong斥拉丁化中
國文字運動), [1950a] in ZB, pp.601-610. Mou Zongsan voiced his opposition to the simplification of the Chinese script 
in a more functionalist matter. See Mou Zongsan, “On Simplified Characters” (Guanyu jiantizi關於簡體字), [1955a] in 
SSXB, pp.105-108. Mou criticizes the lack of reasons (liyou 理由 ) for the adoption of simplified characters, whereas 
Tang opposes the process of “rationalization” (liyouhua 理由化) itself. 
158Tang, [1961d], p.8. 
159Mou Zongsan, Autobiography at Fifty (Wushi zishu五十自述), [1957c] vol.32 of MJ, p.117. 
61
“not forgetting where one began from” and “not losing one's origin” [...] are certainly not mere questions 
of habit; on the contrary, it is doing so which enables human beings to truly become human, they are the
real  and necessary principles that  enable me to truly become myself.  If  one derides this attitude as
conservatism, then conservatism is precisely that through which human beings preserve their humanity
and that  through which I preserve myself;  it  is  a conservatism that  the human race cannot but  and
indeed should have.160
不忘其初,不失其本之事 [...] 此決非只是習慣，此乃人所以得真成為人，我所以得真成為我之實
然而又當然之理。如說此是保守，此即是人之所以保守其人，我所以保守其為我，而人類不能不
有、亦當有之保守。
From this  perspective,  he  sharply  criticizes  what  he  considers  to  be  the  empty  and  free-floating 
universalism of some of his compatriots in exile. He concedes that individuals could indeed be said not  
to belong to any particular culture or historical group, but quickly goes on to add that this is only true 
for their “abstract and potential existence”, and not for their “concrete, real and actual existence.”161 
Tang's view of human beings is relational in a double sense: firstly, he argues that individuals cannot be 
severed from the web of intersubjective connections into which they are born and in which they act and 
exist. Secondly, considering human beings apart from their relation to the larger historical and cultural 
community to which they belong requires an unjustifiable abstraction which is often dismissed in his 
texts. It  is clear that Tang does not consider such an abstraction to be merely a case of erroneous 
reasoning. He also identifies it as a real tendency in modern society. To borrow a term from the Marxist 
tradition, his critique of “abstract” individuality is grounded in a recognition of the performative force 
of this abstraction, making it a “real abstraction”.162 Additionally, Tang's socio-political concerns also 
surfaced in more unlikely contexts, such as in this article from 1972, where a theoretical discussion of 
the contemporary relevance of Wang Yangming's王陽明 (1472-1529) notion of liangzhi 良知 (innate 
moral knowledge) is remarkably interwoven with a philosophical analysis of Western imperialism: 
160Tang,  [1961d],  p.15.  Cf.  pp.21-23.  On Tang's  positive  appreciation  of  “conservatism” see  Luo,  2009,  pp.180-193. 
Similarly, Mou gave a positive twist to the accusation leveled at him of adhering to “fundamentalism” (benweizhuyi 本
位主義). See The Way of Political Authority and the Way of Governance (Zhengdao yu zhidao政道與治道), [1961] 
vol.10 of MJ, (preface), p.34.
161Tang, [1961a], pp.10-12.
162See Alfred Sohn-Rethel, Intellectual and Manual Labour: A Critique of Epistemology, London: Macmillan Press, 1978, 
pp.17-29 and Sohn-Rethel,  Warenform und Denkform:  Aufsätze,  Frankfurt: Europäische Verlagsanstalt,  1971, pp.101-
130.
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It is not innate knowledge/goodness which is the origin of evil. The fact that one forces other people to
accept  what  one  considers  to  be  valuable  through  innate  knowledge,  that  is  the  origin  of  all  evil.
However, this [form of] compulsion is not innate knowledge [itself], it comes down to not allowing other
people  the  choice  to  develop  their  innate  knowledge  spontaneously  out  of  themselves,  so  that  by
compelling others one hinders and blocks their innate knowledge […] However if one were not first
endowed with the ability of choosing certain things which one considers to be of value through innate
knowledge, then one would also be unable to force others to choose what one has chosen and have this
desire [to compel others to make the same choice]. Therefore [even] this desire remains dependent on
the choice of innate goodness […] Therefore, the nations that were invaded and repressed by the West in
the  twentieth  century  could  not  but  consider  imperialism  to  be  something  evil,  which  led  to  the
appearance of Gandhi in India and Sun Yat-sen in China, to the will to establish a Greater East-Asian
Co-prosperity Sphere in Japan, and to the desire for independence in all Asian and African nations. Each 
and every one of these things came forth as a manifestation of the resistance against nineteenth-century
Western imperialism and from not being resigned to simply take over what Western people considered to 
be of value through their innate knowledge, but instead demanding to spontaneously and autonomously
determine a value criterion through a choice manifesting their own innate knowledge. From this it is
clear  that  all  hindrances  of  human  beings'  innate  goodness  resulting  from forceful  compulsion  are
nothing but evil, and that they should be breached and negated by this very same goodness […] The
Christian myth we mentioned earlier on, according to which the devil was once the mightiest angel, is an  
extremely interesting one. The mightiest angel was originally God's greatest creation, but God created an  
angel who would later turn into the Devil. If we translate this myth into the language of our current text,
this means that the manifestations of an everlasting innate knowledge can proceed together with the
selfish desires, opinions and intentions of human beings [..] Can we not say there is a similar progression 
of both innate goodness and selfish desire in Western imperialism? I am not only saying that there is, but  
that it is precisely because of this [presence of both goodness and selfish desire] that the West could
invade other countries without  the slightest  sense of guilt  and could continuously occupy the entire
world, leaving only China and Japan as exceptions. From this it is clear that if the Europeans had not
first appointed themselves as angels, they could not have become to devils of imperialism.163
良知不是罪惡之源，但人將其良知所視為有價值者強迫他人接受，是一切罪惡之源。然此強迫不
是良知，是不許他人有自發自動的良知之選擇，此強迫阻塞封閉了他人之良知[…] 然人若先無
其良知之選擇若干其良知所視為有價值者，亦不會強迫他人選擇其所選擇，而有此貪欲，故此貪
163 “The Epochal Significance of Wang Yangming's Study of Innate Knowledge” (Wang Yangming zhi liangzhi xue zhi  
shidai yiyi王陽明之良知學之時代意義), [1972] in ZB, pp.808-809.
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欲仍依其良知之選擇為根而後有 [...] 故二十世紀被西方侵略壓迫的民族，必須以西方帝國主
義為罪惡，由此而印度出甘地，中國出孫中山，日本要建大東亞共榮圈，一切亞非之民族要獨立。
這一切的切，都由於對十九世紀之西方帝國主義之反抗，不甘以西方人之良知視為有價值者為有
價值，而要求皆有其自發自動的良知之選擇之表現，以自定價值標准。此即見一切對人之良知
為阻塞封閉之“強迫”只是罪惡，只是人之良知所要加以衝破的，加以否定的 [...] 上文所提
到之基督教的神話以魔王為最大之天使所變成，是一極有意義的神話。最大的天使本是上帝之一
最大的創造，而上帝之最大的創造則是創造一個後化為魔王的天使。這翻譯為本文的語言，即是
萬古不息的良 知之表現亦可以與人之私欲、意見、意氣同流 […] 我們能說此西方之帝國主義
中即無他們之良知與貪欲共流麼？此不只說是有而亦正因其有而使其侵略之事得問心無愧，一直
霸占了全世界，只留下中國與日本在例外。於此很顯然歐洲人不先自命為天使，亦不會成為帝國
主義之魔王。
It is thus crucial to stress that Tang's and Mou's sometimes highly abstract and abstruse philosophical 
discussions are regularly embedded in or followed by an exposition of the more concrete problems 
towards which they are directed. The argument that they were only concerned with irrelevant, abstract 
philosophical speculations is not only plainly wrong, but also fails to see what was at stake for them in 
engaging with German Idealism, which they saw as close to Song-Ming Confucianism, in the first 
place.164 As  Thomas  Fröhlich  notes:  “[the]  overall  interest  in  their  philosophical  work  was  to 
reconstruct Confucianism in the context, and under the social conditions, of modernity. Therefore, it  
was precisely the social  and political  implications of a philosophical project of this  kind that they 
wished to  articulate.”165 The issue is  more complicated than a  simple dichotomy between political 
Confucianism and a supposedly a-political spiritual Confucianism losing itself in the nebulous regions 
of metaphysical inquiry. Even in texts that are not explicitly political or do not expressly deal with 
164See Stephan Schmidt,  “Mou Zongsan, Hegel, and Kant: The Quest for Confucian Modernity”,  Philosophy East and 
West, 2011, vol.61, no.2, pp.279-286;  Jiang Nianfeng 蒋年丰 , “The Postwar Taiwanese Experience and Hegel in the 
Thought of Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan” (Zhanhou Taiwan jingyan yu Tang Junyi, Mou Zongsan sixiang zhong de  
Heige'er  戰後台灣經驗與唐君毅，牟宗三的黑格爾 ), in  Experiences of Local Development in Postwar Taiwan  
(Guangfu hou Taiwan diqu fazhan jingyan 光復後台灣地區發展經驗), edited by Lai Zehan賴澤涵 and Huang Junjie
黄俊桀, Taibei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan Zhongshan renwen shehui kexue yanjiusuo zhuanshu 27, 1992, pp.37-100; Chen 
Shaoming陈少明, “The Philosophy of Hegel and the Modern New Confucians” (Heige'er zhexue yu xiandai xin rujia
黑格尔哲学与现代新儒家), in Zhexue yanjiu 哲学研究, 2, 1992, pp.60-66; and Rafaël Suter, “Erkenntniskritik und 
Selbstreflexion:  Kritik  als  Praxis.  Überlegungen  zu  einem  neukonfuzianischen  Begriff  der  “Kritik”  anhand  des 
Frühwerks von Móu Zōngsān (1909–1995)”,  polylog, 26, 2011a, pp.73-74. Serina Chan has stressed the influence of 
Hegel on Mou's work, specifically on his cultural nationalist discourse, but does not put Marxism and communism into 
the equation. See Serina Chan, The Thought of Mou Zongsan, Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2011, pp.95-118.
165Fröhlich, 2010, p.169. Cf. Ding, 2011, pp.56-57. 
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social problems of the contemporary world, the critical dimension is never far away in their works. 
Jiang's  claim that  the thought  of his  forerunners  constituted a withdrawal  into an idle  subjectivity 
disengaged from the real world is not only overstated and mistaken, but also cannot account for the 
persistent engagement of Tang and Mou with Hegel's  dialectical  philosophy.  In fact,  paradoxically 
enough, it is precisely in this engagement with the work of someone who is often considered to be one 
of the most abstruse and speculative thinkers in the history of Western philosophy, that the timeliness of 
their thought becomes most palpable and marked.166 The paradox could be considerably diffused by 
calling into question the caricatural image of Hegel as the archetypal otherworldly philosopher, who, 
“with his  nightcap and his  night-shirt  tatters  […] botches up the loopholes  in  the structure of the 
world.”167 In 1857, the critic Rudolf Haym had already voiced his dislike for what he considered to be 
the confusion of the transcendental and the historical in the Phenomenology of Spirit, which he called 
“a  psychology  brought  to  confusion  and  disorder  by  history,  and  a  history  brought  to  ruin  by 
psychology”.168 
The creative “confusion” Hegel's historically grounded and oriented ideas brought to New Confucian 
philosophy can be grasped as the result of an attempt to think through the disorder of recent modern 
history. From a comparative perspective, it is remarkable that the surge of interest in Hegel in France 
after the Second World War also came about under “an acute sense of the burden of history”169. He Lin
166The  adoption  of  Hegelian  elements,  specifically  a  non-individualist  and  historized  notion  of  subjectivity,  and  the 
reinterpretation of Marxism in the light of Kant after the Cultural Revolution by Li Zehou 李泽厚 in his immensely 
popular  and influential  Critique  of  Critical  Philosophy (Pipan zhexue zhi  pipan 批判哲学之批判 )  was  equally 
motivated by historical concerns and should not be seen as a retreat into carefree theoretical speculation. See Lee Ming-
huei, Konfuzianischer Humanismus: transkulturelle Kontexte, Bielefeld: Transcript Verlag, 2013, pp.53-76.
167These are the words of the German poet Heinrich Heine, quoted in Slavoj Žižek,  Less than Nothing. Hegel and the  
Shadow of Dialectical Materialism, New York and London: Verso, 2012, p.8.
168“Eine durch die Geschichte in Verwirrung und Unordnung gebrachte Psychologie und eine durch die Psychologie in  
Zerrüttung gebrachte Geschichte.”, quoted in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes. Mit einem  
Nachwort von Georg Lukács. Texte-Auswahl und Kommentar zur Rezeptionsgeschichte von Gerhard Göhler, Frankurt 
am Main: Uhlstein Verlag, 1973, p.632. English translation quoted from H.S. Harris, Hegel's Ladder: a Commentary on 
Hegel's  Philosophy  of  Spirit,  Indianapolis:  Hackett,  1997,  p.10.  Even  Hegel's  earliest  writings  (from  1795-1800), 
collected by Herman Nohl in 1907 under the title Hegels theologische Jugendschriften, were as Shlomo Avineri notes 
“not theological writings in the strict sense of the word […] The problems which he does try to confront have more to do 
with the historical, social and even economic aspects of religion, with the relationship between types of societies and 
types of religious belief, and with the political context of religious institutions […] What troubles Hegel are not so much  
problems  of  personal  belief  and  individual  salvation  but  issues  related  to  the  social  dimension  of  the  religious  
phenomenon.” Shlomo Avineri,  Hegel's Theory of the Modern State, Cambridge (N.Y.): Cambridge University Press, 
1972, pp.13-14.
169Peter  Button,  “Negativity  and  Dialectical  Materialism:  Zhang  Shiying's  Reading  of  Hegel's  Dialectical  Logic”,  
Philosophy East and West, vol.57, no.1, 2007, p.67. Two crucial figures in the renewal of the French, and more generally 
continental, interest in Hegel were Alexandre Kojève (1902-1968), whose lectures (published in 1947 as Introduction à 
la lecture de Hegel)  on the  Phenomenology of  Spirit  from a Marxist-Heideggerian perspective influenced a whole 
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賀麟  (1902-1992) was one of the first  Chinese intellectuals to embark on a systematic study and 
translation of Hegelian philosophy170, an endeavor which in He's case overrode the concern, felt by 
most of his fellow New Confucians, to elaborate a system of thought of his own. His interest was not in 
the least motivated by the similarity he saw between Hegel's age and the social turmoil which had kept 
China in its grip since the Opium War. In He's own words:
Hegel's logic, which is imbued with content, life, and a sense of history – a logic which analyzes and
reconciles  contradictions  and  overcomes  conflict  and  also  attaches  a  lot  of  importance  to  national
cultural history and to a thinking which strives to transcend the limitations of spiritual life, is actually
sufficiently  able  to  rouse  the  deaf  and  the  stubborn  and  to  awaken  a  self-awareness  about  and  a
confidence in our national spirit, allowing us not to lose ourselves in pursuing what is external in the
development of our nationality and our national culture, without thereby becoming conservative and
complacent [...]171
黑格爾之有內容、有生命、有歷史感的邏輯——分析矛盾、調解矛盾、征服矛盾的邏輯，及其重
視民族歷史文化，重自求超越有限的精神生活的思想，實足振聾起頑、喚醒對於民族精神的自覺
與鼓舞，對於民族性與民族文化的發展，使吾人既不舍己騖外，亦不故步自封[...]
A critical genealogical study of the reception of Hegel in modern China is yet to be made, and I will  
refrain for now from delving into this highly complex subject matter.172 There are clear indications that 
subsequent  generation of  thinkers  (such as  Jean-Paul Sartre,  Jean Wahl and Georges Bataille);  and Jean Hyppolite  
(1907-1968),  teacher to Michel  Foucault  and Gilles  Deleuze, whose  Genèse et  Structure de la Phénoménologie de  
l'esprit de Hegel  from 1946 is still a standard reference work in Hegelian studies. Hyppolite's  Logique et existence.  
Essai sur la logique de Hegel is seen as an important milestone in the genesis of postmodern ontology. See Deleuze's 
review of this work, available at http://www.generation-online.org/p/fpdeleuze6.htm. 
170A wealth of material is collected in He's Collection of Lectures on the Philosophy of Hegel (Heige'er zhexue jiangyan ji
黑格爾哲學講演集), Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1986.
171He Lin,  Fifty Years of Chinese Philosophy (Wushi nian lai de Zhongguo zhexue 五十年來的中國哲學 ), Shanghai: 
Shanghai  renmin  chubanshe,  2012 [1945],  p.126.  Concerning  He  Lin's  relation  to  Hegel,  Peter  Button  writes  the 
following: “In the 1940s, when He Lin first began his Chinese translation of the  Encylopedia Logic […] the global 
extent of those destructive forces [of the second World War] awakened a very similar sentiment in Asia concerning the  
nature of history and the human, and the possibility that a study of Hegel's dialectical logic might shed significant light  
on each.” Button, 2007, p.67. 
172See the  information on  the  reception of  Hegel  in  Huang Jiande 黄见德 ,  A History  of  the Reception  of  Western  
Philosophy in the East in the Twentieth Century – Introduction (Ershi shiji xifang zhexue dongjian shi daolun 20 世纪西
方哲学东渐史—导论), Beijing: Shoudu shifan daxue chubanshe, 2007, pp.134-138, pp.179-185. Also see He, [1945], 
pp.89-135  and  Martin  Müller,  Die  chinesichsprachige  Hegel-Rezeption  von  1902  bis  2000:  eine  Bibliographie, 
Hegeliana 16, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2002. A more systematic study of the influence of Hegel exists in the 
field of Japanology. Peter Suares has written a book on the Kyoto school's appropriation of Hegelian philosophy. See 
Peter Suares,  The Kyoto School's Takeover of Hegel. Nishida, Nishitani, and Tanabe Remake the Philosophy of Spirit , 
Lanham:  Lexington  Books,  2011.  As  is  already  obvious  from  the  title  of  his  work,  Suares  does  not  take  this 
appropriation very seriously from a historical point of view, insisting instead on providing an overview of the Kyoto 
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in  the case of Tang and Mou, their  encounter  with Hegel  marked a  turning-point  in  both of  their  
intellectual itineraries.173 In a lengthy appendix to his 1955 Study of Logic (Lizexue 理則學 )174, Mou 
Zongsan explains that he deemed it necessary to append a discussion of the dialectical method to this  
work (intended as a compendium of formal logic) because of the “exigencies of the age and of society” 
(時代的需要，社會上的需要 )175. Since these exigencies point to a domain which lies beyond the 
reach of “pure logic”, (which he saw as restricted to elucidating the principles and laws of rational 
thought), they had to be tackled through dialectics, which deals with spirit in its entirety, including its 
concrete, temporal manifestations. The need to demarcate the applicability of the dialectic and prevent 
it from coming into conflict with and possibly contaminating formal logic which had occupied Mou in 
his  previous  publications  on the  dialectical  method is  still  present  here,  but  he no longer  restricts 
himself to purely formal arguments abstracting from the social background of his discussion. Similarly, 
in the preface to the revised edition (1978) of Moral idealism (Daode de lixiangzhuyi 道德的理想主
義), Mou recalls the atmosphere and the circumstances that inspired him to write this work176, which he 
groups together with his Philosophy of History (Lishi zhexue 歷史哲學) and his most important work 
on political philosophy, The Way of Authority and the Way of Governance (Zhengdao yu zhidao政道與
治道 ). These works are now collectively known as his “three books on new outer kingliness” (xin 
waiwang sanshu 新外王三書). Zhang Jianjie张健捷 has rightly stressed the importance of these works 
school's various “misreadings” and “distortions” in their “takeover” of Hegel. His comparative endeavor is conducted 
without a horizon outside the immanence of philosophical discourse, i.e. one which does not inquire into the larger  
historical  background of  these  “distortions”,  and  thus  cannot  even  begin  to  ask  why Kyoto  school  thinkers  made 
precisely these and no other misreadings. Suares regrettably does not further develop his own observations that “Hegel's  
politically conservative views of the absolute spirit […] manifested in the state was syntonic [a term from psychology]  
with the conservative trend in Japanese political philosophy” (p.xi) and that “Hegel's principles […] were exploited in  
equal measure by the Marxist foes of the Japanese establishment.” (ibid.) His overall approach is also tainted by a 
nihonjinron-style culturalism and psychologizing overtones from the onset.  In  the introduction to  his study,  Suares 
writes: “Hegel's philosophy took upon itself the task of interpreting, according to its principles, everything human to  
man. It strove to provide a complete account of reality and build up that account into a system. This could not but strike  
a sympathetic chord with the Japanese people, fond as they are of the tangible and the phenomenal, and please their 
sense  for  organization  and  exhaustiveness  [...]  The  philosopher's  appreciation  for  the  socializing  power  of  the 
community and its traditions […] found resonance in the Japanese propensity to derive individual identity from the 
group and the community of one's belonging […] Hegel's views offered a soothing reassurance for a core Japanese  
value.” (p.x, cf. pp.190-191). 
173It was Tang who first introduced Mou to Hegel. See Mou, “Mourning Tang Junyi” (Aidao Tang Junyi xiangsheng哀悼
唐君毅先生), [1978] in SS, p.295, Mou, [1957b], pp.98-101 and Chan, 2011, pp.96-97.
174MJ, vol.12, pp.321-338.
175Mou, [1955c], p.321.
176See  preface  to  DY,  pp.3-4.  Moral  Idealism (1959)  is  actually a  collection  of  14  articles  published  in  the  journal 
Democratic Review (Minzhu pinglun 民主評論), which was founded by Xu Fuguan徐復觀 in Hong Kong shortly after 
the establishment of the PRC. Between 1949 and 1966, Tang Junyi  published over 40 articles in this journal.  See  
Metzger, 2005, p.223. 
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and has convincingly shown how many of Mou's central concepts took root here.177 Mou describes the 
period in which these three works were conceived and written (from 1949 to 1959) as one in which 
“my cultural consciousness and concern for the age was at its most intense” (吾之文化意識及時代悲
惑最為昂揚之時). The work on formal logic with tentative forays into epistemology and Kant's critical 
philosophy which had occupied him during his time at Kunming 昆明  and later at Chongqing 重庆 
(where he was in the company of both his teacher Xiong Shili 熊十力  (1885-1968)178 and his fellow 
student Tang Junyi), culminating in his colossal  Standard of Logic (Luoji Dianfan 邏輯典範 ) from 
1941, proved to be hard to reconcile with the problems of Chinese society and the “evil tides of the 
time” (時風之邪僻). This period also coincided with sustained scholarly activity on the part of Tang 
Junyi, who wrote a series of philosophical works with a strong focus on cultural and socio-political 
problems which are marked by the same sense of urgency and engagement.179 According to Mou, their 
shared concerns and common trajectory eventually led to the drafting of the 1958 Manifesto calling for 
the reappraisal of Chinese culture180, which he describes as the summary of almost twenty years of 
work directed at the problems of the contemporaneous world. All the signatories of this now famous 
text (which went largely unnoticed at its time of publication) drafted by Tang were united in their 
177See Zhang Jianjie, “The Moral Metaphysics of Mou Zongsan” (Mou Zongsan de daode xing'ershangxue 牟宗三的道德
形而上学), in A History of Chinese Confucianism – the Modern Age (Zhongguo ruxue shi – xiandai juan 中国儒学史—
现代卷), edited by Hu Jun 胡军, Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2011, pp.328-350.
178Serina Chan provides an extensive discussion of Xiong's influence on Mou, and demonstrates how Xiong's cultural 
nationalism was passed on to Mou. See Chan, 2011, pp.25-94.
179The Spiritual Values of Chinese Culture (Zhongguo wenhua zhi jingshen jiazhi 中國文化之精神價值 ) [1953],  The 
Reconstruction of the Humanist Spirit (Renwen jingshen zhi chongjian 人文精神之重建) [1955], The Development of  
the  Chinese  Humanist  Spirit (Zhongguo  renwen  jingshen  zhi  fazhan 中國人文精神之發展 )  [1957],  Cultural  
Consciousness and Moral Reason (Wenhua yishi  yu daode lixing  文化意識與道德理性 ) [1958].  Most of these 
monographs consist of or are based on articles published over the years.
180The full title is  A Manifesto to Scholars of the World on Chinese Culture: Our Common Understanding of Chinese  
Scholarly Research and of the Future of Chinese Culture and World Culture  (Wei Zhongguo wenhua jinggao shijie  
renshi xuanyan: women dui Zhongguo xueshu yanjiu ji Zhongguo wenhua yu shijie wenhua qiantu zhi gongtong renshi
為中國文化敬告世界人士宣言: 我們對中國學術研究及中國文化與世界文化前途之共同認識). It was published in 
January 1958 in two journals simultaneously: Democratic Review (Minzhu pinglun 民主評論) and Rebirth (Zaisheng 再
生 ).  The latter is described by Edmund Fung as a “party organ” of Zhang Junmai's  “national  socialist party”.  See 
Edmund  S.K.  Fung,  The  Intellectual  Foundations  of  Chinese  Modernity.  Cultural  and  Political  Thought  in  the  
Republican Era, Cambridge (N.Y.): Cambridge University Press, 2010, p.234 and section 2.3.2.1 in the next chapter.  
The Manifesto was reprinted in  ZJ, pp.865-929.  Its four signatories were Tang (who made the first draft of the text), 
Mou, Zhang Junmai, and Xu Fuguan. From Tang's own account of the creation of the Manifesto, which he traces back to 
a meeting he had with Zhang Junmai during a research visit to the United States, it is clear that its initial purpose was 
rather limited in comparison to the final result, and was originally intended for the more narrow methodological purpose 
of correcting some fundamental misgivings of (American) sinologists, who Tang felt approached Chinese studies either  
as “missionaries” or as “diplomats”. See Tang, “Discussion of the Thought of Zhang Junmai from the Debate on Science 
and Metaphysics” (Cong kexue yu xuanxue lunzhan tan Zhang Junmai de sixiang從科學與玄學論戰談君勱先生的思
想), [1976] in ZB, p.991.
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categorical denunciation of revolutionary communism, the gravedigger of Chinese culture as a “vital, 
living entity” (活的生命之存在).181 In nearly all the above-mentioned works by Mou and Tang, the 
influence of Hegel is palpable and often quite explicit. Most importantly, it was not merely an academic 
confrontation  or  a  disinterested  exercise  in  comparative  philosophy,  but  an  encounter  with  strong 
historical overtones. What was at stake for them in engaging with Hegel was wresting his philosophy 
from the abuse they felt it had suffered at the hands of Marxism in the development of the “iniquitous 
theories” (邪論) of dialectical materialism (weiwu bianzhengfa唯物辯證法) and historical materialism 
(weiwushiguan 唯物史觀 ) forming the theoretical backbone of communism. Clearly aware of the 
historical  link  between  Hegel  and  Marx182,  which  played  a  significant  role  in  the  introduction  of 
Marxism  into  China  in  general183,  they  vigorously  attempted  to  save  the  dialectic  from  various 
materialist “reversals” (顛倒).184 Tang for one did not mince words: 
Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin have completely misunderstood Hegel's philosophy [...] They say they
want to reverse Hegelian philosophy, but it never even occurred to them that his philosophy cannot be
reversed on this particular point [...] [Dialectical materialism] is a philosophical theory that that wants to
explain the emergence of spirit from the dialectical development of matter, [so that] spirit is derived and
of secondary importance. But actually, Hegel's dialectics on the one hand and materialism on the other
are two mutually exclusive terms. This is because if one assumes that matter will necessarily develop in
such a way as to produce spirit, then matter is in fact in a process of self-transcendence through self-
negation, and spirit is nothing else but the concept and the truth towards which it develops. From this it
is clear that materialism will necessarily negate and transcend itself in order to become a philosophy of
spirit. The contradiction internal to dialectical materialism cannot but cause this theory to negate itself.185
馬恩列斯並非真了解黑格爾哲學 [...] 們說要顛倒黑格爾之哲學﹐而未知黑格爾之哲學﹐在此
一點上是不能顛倒的 […] 此哲學思想由物質的辯證發展﹐來說明精神之產生﹐精神是派生
的﹐第二義的。然而實際上黑格爾之辯證法與唯物論﹐即不相容的名詞。因為如果物質必然由辯
證發展以化出精神﹐則物質便是在自己超越自己否定之歷程中﹐其發展所向的理念與真理﹐正是
181Tang et. al., [1958a], p.872.
182The sheer amount of literature on the Hegel-Marx connection is staggering. One of the most interesting works on the 
subject (in spite of, or possibly precisely because of, its uncompromising approach) is still Lucio Colletti, Marxism and 
Hegel, London: NLB, 1971.
183Yvonne Schulz Zinda, “Marxist Views on Traditional Chinese Philosophy Pre-1949”, in Makeham, 2012, p.314.
184Tang's manuscript The Philosophical Spirit of Modern Western Idealism (Xifang jindai lixiangzhuyi zhi zhexue jingshen
西方近代理想主義之哲學精神) written in 1951-1952, in Tang Junyi, Collected Philosophical Essays (Zhexue lunji 哲
學論集), vol.18 of TJ, pp.601-752 is crucial in this regard.
185Tang, [1961e], vol.2, pp.865-866. 
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精神。由是而唯物論本身﹐亦須自己否定自己超越﹐而化為精神哲學。辯證法唯物論本身之此內
在矛盾﹐即必須使此理論﹐否定其自己。
On a similar note, Tang argued that 
if the dialectical method is combined with materialism in order to argue that spirit came to be produced
from matter, then one can only speak of a dialectical process when A produces a B distinct from itself, in  
which A = matter and spirit = B different from A. However, from a dialectical point of view, if A can
give rise to a B different from itself,  then one cannot say that A is only A, one would have to say
[instead] that A is at the same time a B which is not identical to A […] If one says that matter, even
though it could develop and evolve into spirit, is still just matter and nothing else, then this comes down
to saying that  although A can produce a B distinct  from itself,  it  still  remains only A, which is  an
undialectical line of reasoning. This is why I said that one cannot combine dialectics and materialism; if
one  talks  of  materialism,  then  one  will  necessarily  go  against  the  dialectical  method.  Materialist
dialectics is in itself a self-contradictory form of thought. If people say that the whole miracle of the
materialist dialectic lies in the fact that it contains self-contradictory elements within itself,  then one
should add that these elements too will have to be developed on the basis of the dialectical method, and
that they themselves should equally submit to a dialectical development so as to develop into a non-
materialist dialectic, or conversely, into a non-dialectical materialism.186
如吾人於唯物論上﹐再加上辯證法﹐以論精神之由物質而生出﹐則吾人便只有視物質為 A﹐精神為
非A 之 B﹐並謂此由 A 以生出非 A 之 B﹐為一辯證法的歷程。但依辯證法﹐如 A 能生出非 A 之 B﹐則
A 不能只說是 A﹐而當說其兼為非 A 之 B […] 如說物質雖能發展進化出精神﹐然物質仍只是物
質﹐則同於說 A 能變出非 A 之 B﹐而 A仍只是 A﹐此便為非辯證法的思想形態。故我們說﹐講辯證
法決不能同時講唯物論﹐講唯物論即必違悖了辯論法。唯物辯證法本身是一自相矛盾的名辭或思
186“Types of Dialectics” (Bianzhengfa zhi leixing辯證法之類型), [1961a] in Tang Junyi, Collected Philosophical Essays  
(Zhexue lunji 哲學論集 ), vol.18 of TJ, pp.422-423:  Also see Mou Zongsan, “On Hegel's Dialectical Method” (Lun 
Heige'er  de bianzhengfa 論黑格爾的辯證法 )  [1957b],  in  SW,  pp.242-255 and  Sun Daosheng 孙道昇 ,  “Is  the 
Dialectical Method Itself Dialectical?” (Bianzhengfa benshen shi bianzheng de ma?  辯證法本身是辯證的馬？ ), 
[1934],  in  The Debate on Materialist Dialectics  (Weiwu bianzhengfa lunzhan 唯物辯證法論戰 ), edited by Zhang 
Dongsun張東蓀 ,  Taibei: Pami’er shudian, [1934] 1980, pp.305-310. He Lin was a bit more nuanced: “The dialectial 
method cannot be reversed, because it is in itself a fixed totality. Marx uses it to investigate matter, Hegel employs it to 
study the mind, the one pays attention to economic life, the other to spiritual life, the two of them simply use [the 
dialectical method] in a different way, instead of there being a fundamental difference […] If we look at the dialectical 
method as a knife, then Hegel uses it to anatomize the internal organs, and Marx uses it to cut away external sores.” 辯
證法是不能顛倒的，因為辯證法是整個的東西，其本身是一定的。馬克思以之研究物質，黑格爾以之研究心靈，
一個注重經濟生活，一個注重精神生活 [...] 若把辯證法看成一把刀，那麼黑格爾用之剖解髒腑，馬克思用之割
治外症. He, [1945] 2012, pp.79-80.
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想。如人們說唯物辯證法之奧妙﹐正在其本身包涵自相矛盾之成份﹐則須知此自相矛盾之成份﹐
依辯證法﹐便亦須展開﹐而其本身﹐亦應有一辯證的發展﹐以發展成非唯物的辯證法﹐或非辯證
的唯物論。
According  to  He  Lin,  the  introduction  of  Hegelian  philosophy  into  China  in  general  was  often 
accompanied and motivated by anti-Marxist sentiments.187 Mou's and Tang's critical appropriation of 
Hegel's dialectics also led them to focus on those aspects of Hegelian philosophy which they saw as 
lending themselves most easily to being abused and perverted into historical materialism. They thus 
downplayed the central role of contradiction as both a conceptually and socially mediating power, in 
order to discredit the applicability of the concept of class struggle to Chinese history. This is what 
caused Tang Junyi to claim that
[t]he  historical  development  of  Chinese  culture  comes  down  to  a  continuous  broadening  and
externalization of a central spirit from the inside to the outside and is a development that takes places in
peace [...]  When Hegel  looks at  the history of the West he only sees that  struggle and conflict can
stimulate  the  subjective  transcending spirit  of  man  [...]  thus  taking  contradiction  to  be  the  driving
force of historical and cultural development [...] He  was not  aware that China  has  followed a wholly
different path of development.188
中國文化歷史之發展乃依一中心精神由內向外不斷推廣實現，而於和平中發展。[...] 黑格爾觀
西方之歷史唯見戰爭衝突可提起人之超越精神 [...]於是以矛盾為歷史文化發展之動力 […] 不
知中國則適循另一途徑而發展。
Mou Zongsan for his part stated that
the dialectical method is the rich and vast upward path of life, it is not the path of destruction. If the
forces and relations of production are only taken as a material concept, then it would be impossible
for the reversal of opposition into unity to continue endlessly in a dialectical way. There are a great
number of nations which are in a state of stagnation resulting in their destruction. What reason is  
187See He, [1945] 2012, pp.123-125.
188Tang Junyi,  The Spiritual Values of Chinese Culture  (Zhongguo wenhua zhi jingshen jiazhi 中國文化之精神價值 ), 
Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, [1953b] 2005, p.11. Cf. pp.115-120. In fact, both Tang and Mou contested the 
existence of classes in imperial China. See for example Mou's Philosophy of History (Lishi zhexue 歷史哲學), [1955b] 
vol.9 of MJ, p.33 and The Way of Political Authority and the Way of Governance (Zhengdao yu zhidao政道與治道), 
[1961] vol.10 of MJ, pp.26-28.
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there to consider the contradictory opposition between the forces and relations of production from a
material point of view and accordingly come to the conclusion that this opposition will continue to
develop dialectically without ever ceasing? If from an economic point of view, all previous history
really was a development from a primitive communism to a slave society, further developing to first a 
feudal and then a capitalist society, and if in the future the latter will transform into a rational socialist 
society (this cannot  in any way be accomplished through communism, which is  only capable of
destruction) and assuming further that these transitions really are a form of upward progress which is
a dialectical development that will continue infinitely, then social groups clearly cannot simply be
classified as material and the human nature of the individuals that make up these groups are certainly
not  ruled by their  selfish class  interests.  There  is  beyond doubt  a  “spiritual  stimulus”  [at  work]
behind their back.189
辯證的發展是生息向上豐富廣大之道﹐不是毀滅之道。生產力與生產關後﹐若只是物質的概
念﹐其對立統一的顛倒﹐決不能無窮地辯證地發展下去。停滯不進而至於消滅的民族多得很。
有何理由從物質的觀點看生產力與生產關係自身的矛盾對立即斷定其是無窮地辯證地發展下
去? 以往的歷史﹐從經濟觀點說﹐若真是由原始共產社會進到奴隸社會﹐再進到封建社會﹐
再進到資本主義社會﹐而將來且向較為合理的社會主義的社會趨(決不是共產主義所能至﹐
其所至的只是毀滅), 而此種轉變若真是向前發展向上進步﹐而且是辯證地發展﹐且是無窮地
發展下去﹐則社會集團決不只是物類﹐其中的個人之人性決不只是階級的私利性﹐必有「精
神的提撕」在其背後。
There is a lot going on in these passages, the full implications of which will only become clear in the 
course of the following chapters. What is not yet apparent from the extracts I just quoted, and what I  
will have to substantiate further in the rest of my study, is that Mou's and Tang's criticisms of Marxism 
and communism were often, both from a terminological as well as from a conceptual point of view, 
reminiscent  of  Marxism  and  appear  as  kindred  to  the  early  Marx  of  the  1844  Economic  and 
Philosophical  Manuscripts.  It  thus  becomes  possible  to  grasp  their  anti-communism  and  all  its 
philosophical consequences as part of a critique of modernity in general, rather than as being limited to 
the specific form of “socialist” modernization to which they were historical witnesses.190 Jana Rošker 
189 “Refutation of the Communist  Treatise on Contradiction” (Pi gongchanzhuyizhe de 'Maodun lun'  闢共產主義者的
「矛盾論」), [1952b] in DY, pp.97-98. 
190Peng Guoxiang 彭国翔 is probably the first to have drawn attention to the crucial  significance of Mou Zongsan's 
lifelong anti-communism, which has sometimes been wrongly explained in terms of biographical incidents alone. (One 
of Mou's uncles was executed during communist land reforms.) See Peng's “Mou Zongsan's Critique of Communism” 
(Mou Zongsan de gongchanzhuyi pipan 牟宗三的共產主義批判), Zhongguo wenzhe yanjiu tongxun 中國文哲研究通
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remarks that the first two generations of New Confucians
were  forced  […]  to  confront  the  issues  of  modernization  and  capitalism  much  earlier  than  their
colleagues in mainland China […] Thanks to the West's support of Hong Kong, due to its semi-colonial
status, and Taiwan, because it was seen (especially by the Americans) as a democratic alternative to
Chinese communism, both areas began to undergo an explosive process of Westernization as early as the 
1950s.191
 
Remarkably enough, the staunchly anti-communist signatories of the 1958 Manifesto  expressed their 
understanding of the reasons behind the appeal of Marxism and communism to Chinese intellectuals 
and politicians in Marxist terms, as stemming from the fact that the whole of Asia and Africa had been 
transformed into “one great proletarian class” (一大無產階級) by Western colonialism and from the 
unprecedented surge of nationalist sentiment triggered by the war with Japan.192 Their shared aversion 
to the consequences of communist modernization expressed itself in different ways and with varying 
degrees of polemical vehemence and intellectual commitment. To my knowledge, only Zhang Junmai 
(Carsun Chang) 张君劢  (1886-1969) went to the trouble of devoting a whole monograph to refuting 
dialectical materialism.193 Zhang saw a genuine similarity between the 19th-century split between Left 
訊, vol.19, no.3, 2009, pp.27-64. To my knowledge, the only book-length treatment of the New Confucians' relation to 
Marxism and communism to have appeared thus far is Zhang Sanping's张三萍 An Investigation into the Contemporary  
New Confucian View of Marxism, (Xiandai xin ruxue de Makesizhuyiguan yan jiu 现代新儒学的马克思主义观研究), 
Wuhan: Hubei renmin chubanshe, 2011. Zhang's goal is mainly to defend Marx from his Confucian detractors, which 
prevents  her  from considering  the  possibility  that  the  New Confucian  criticism of  Marxism could  be  historically 
accounted for by other means than the “scientific” and “objective” Marxism she tries so desperately to defend. Zhang 
also tends to uncritically take over the New Confucianists' own claims of continuity with traditional Confucianism by 
reproducing their self-descriptions as, in the words of Confucius, “transmitting without creating” (述而不作). A concise 
account of the New Confucian criticism of Marxism can be found in Zhang Shibao 张世保, “An Investigation into the 
Relation between Mainland New Confucianism and Marxism” (Dalu xinrujia yu Makesizhuyi tanlun大陆新儒家与马
克思主义关系探论), Makesizhuyi yanjiu 马克思主义研究, 6, 2008, pp.22-27. The New Confucian critique of Marxism 
and dialectical materialism is also touched upon in Li Yi 李毅 , “The Philosophical Outlook and Essence of Cultural 
Conservatism” (Wenhua baoshou zhuyi de zhexueguan jiqi shizhi 文化保守主义的哲学观及其实质), Jiaoxue yu yanjiu  
教学与研究, 11, 2001, pp.36-41. Gao Kunyuan 高焜源 has drawn attention to Xu Fuguan's opposition to communism 
for understanding Xu's socio-political ideas. See Gao, 1997.
191Jana Rošker, Searching for the Way: Theory of Knowledge in Pre-Modern and Modern China, Hong Kong: The Chinese 
University Press, 2008, p.195.
192See Tang et.al., [1958a], pp.908-913.
193Zhang Junmai  Refutation of Dialectical Materialism  (Bianzheng weiwu zhuyi bolun 辯證唯物主義駁論 ), Taibei: 
Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 1967. Originally published in 1958 in Hong Kong, in the same year the Manifesto came 
out. This work is divided into a largely descriptive “historical part” (歷史部分), pp.3-117, and a polemical “critical part” 
(批判部分), pp.121-189. Throughout, the focus is mostly on the Soviet Union, and not so much on mainland Chinese  
communism. The preface was written by the historian Qian Mu 錢穆. 
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(Young) and Right (Old) Hegelians and the division between revolutionaries and conservatives in the 
New Culture Movement in China.194 In my opinion, not enough attention has been paid to the fact that 
the Hong Kong and Taiwan New Confucians' opposition to communism and Marxism is something 
they  share  in  common  with  Jiang  Qing.  Jiang  himself  remains  largely  silent  on  this  spiritual 
inheritance.195 He would no doubt agree with Tang that “forcing the Chinese people to read Marx's and 
Lenin's works can only be called a form of spiritual abuse” (強迫人民看馬列的書，只是在精神上加
以虐待 ).196 Both  spiritual  and  political  Confucians  identify  communism as  the  harbinger  of  the 
discontinuity of modernity and as the antithesis of Confucianism and Chinese culture in general. Jiang's 
criticism  of  Marxism-Leninism  is  also  interesting  seeing  how  his  denunciations  of  “spiritual 
Confucianism” often read like vulgar historical materialist diatribes against “bourgeois idealists”. 
In what is perhaps his most famous and influential piece of writing, “The Contemporary Significance 
of the Revival of Confucianism in Mainland China and the Problems it Faces” (Zhongguo dalu fuxing 
ruxue de xianshi yiyi jiqi mianlin de wenti 中國大陸復興儒學的現實意義及其面臨的問題)197, Jiang 
launches  a  sustained  assault  on  communism  in  articulating  the  predicament  of  “a  Confucianism 
suffering on the cross” (十字架上受苦受難的儒學 )198. He sees Marxism essentially as the foreign 
ideology of a “different race” (yizu 異族) which has managed to attain the position of a “state religion” 
through the political power of the CCP.199 He argues that the eradication of communism is a much more 
urgent  matter  than  the  democratization  advocated  by  liberals,  since  the  idea  of  communism  is 
fundamentally opposed to the Chinese, i.e. Confucian, spirit, and has helped facilitate the introduction 
of  “nihilist”  Western  doctrines  such  as  existentialism,  psychoanalysis  and  the  philosophies  of 
Schopenhauer  and  Nietzsche.200 It  is  precisely  this  idea  of  a  unique,  historically  continuous  and 
194See Zhang Junmai, 1967 [1958], p.15. Also see Tang, [1951-1952], pp.601-603.
195In a text from 1999 entitled “Spiritual Confucianism and the Coming Century” (Xinxing ruxue yu weilai shiji 心性儒学
与未来世纪), Jiang gives a much more positive appreciation of spiritual Confucianism, calling it “a Confucianism of  
hope”  (希望儒 学 )  which  can  foster  environmental  awareness  and  can  be  deployed  against  the  prevalence  of 
instrumental rationality and the “reification of human life” (人生物化 ) in modern society. Reprinted in The Epochal  
Values of Confucianism (Ruxue de shidai jiazhi 儒学的时代价值), Chengdu: Sichuang renmin chubanshe, 2009, pp.31-
51.
196“Interview on Chinese Culture and the Problem of Modernization” (Zhongguo wenhua yu xiandaihua wenti dawen 中國
文化與現代化問題答問), [1974] in ZJ, p.721.
197Published in the Taiwanese journal Ehu鹅湖 in 1989, two parts; vol.15, no.2, pp.29-38 and vol.15, no.3, pp.22-37.
198Jiang, 1989, no.2, p.30.
199Jiang, 1989, no.2, p.32. 
200Jiang, 1989, no.2, p.36.
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essentially Confucian Chinese spirit, to be defended and safeguarded against the historical violence of 
communism, which Jiang shares in common with Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan. Their criticisms of 
modernity share a common ground in the identification of virtually all negative and nefarious aspects 
of modernization with Marxism and communism. As Mou once put it in his typically uncompromising 
manner, China has to choose between Marx and Confucius.201 Both currents of modern Confucianism, 
insofar as one wishes to maintain the dubious distinction between political and spiritual Confucianism 
at all, are grounded in the idea that there is something like an essential “spirit” of Chinese culture, 
which  must  be  incarnated  in  a  culturally  (over)determined  political  system. In  this  regard,  the 
“historical consciousness” manifest in both forms of New Confucianism should be taken quite literally, 
namely  as  the  substantial,  supra-individual  consciousness  of  a  Spirit  manifesting  itself  in  history. 
Concomitantly, the role played by the concept of the state in their political and cultural philosophies is  
actually very similar. Jiang however seems to have magnified the Hegelian dimensions of the state as 
an organic being reproducing itself throughout history even further than Tang and Mou. Whereas Tang's 
political philosophy at least contained a clear criticism of Hegel's conception of the state in the form of  
a defense of the irreducible importance of direct intersubjective relations as they manifest themselves in 
family life202 and also put forward the ideal of “Al-under-Heaven” (tianxia 天下) as higher and more 
inclusive than that of the nation-state203, Jiang does not seem to be troubled by such concerns at all. 
This  is  apparent  from his  descriptions  of  the  state  as  a  “transcendent,  sacred  existence”  which  is  
“produced by the will of Heaven and is the presence of history” and as the “spiritual, organic and living 
body that has a spiritual life through past, present and future and forever”.204 Such statements obviously 
201See “The Choice of a Cultural Path” (Wenhua tujing de jueze 文化途徑的抉擇), [1953e] in SSXB, p.93.
202See Tang, Junyi,  Cultural Consciousness and Moral Reason (Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing 文化意識與道德理性 ), 
Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, [1958b] 2005, pp.24-57, pp.96-174.
203See Tang, [1951-1952], pp.670-671.
204Jiang, 2012, pp.74-75. Cf. p.36: “A state is an organic, living body. It continues through history. Politics may not break 
with the historical continuity of a state, or else the organic life of the state will be smothered and we will see historical  
nihilism in politics. The state is the state of the past, of the present, and of the future. The role of the state today is to  
transmit the life of the past state to that of the future. The state is not the result of a rational choice or the will of the  
people. It is the fruit of historical continuity and traditional inheritance.”  Jiang Qing adheres to a notion of the state 
which does not seem to be particularly Confucian, but more indebted to a form of romantic nationalism and cultural  
conservatism. See Ding Yun's丁耘 insightful comments on Jiang in Confucianism and Enlightenment. Current Chinese  
Thought  in  the Perspective  of  Philosophical  Encounters  (Ruxue yu  qiming:  zhexue  huitong shiye  xia de dangqian  
Zhongguo sixiang 儒学与启蒙：哲学会同视野下的当前中国思想), Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 2011, p.61. Cf. Gan, 
2012, p.125. Already in 1799,  Novalis  (1772-1801) wrote the following in his  Notes  for a Romantic Encylopedia, 
exposing, at least performatively, the brutal logic behind the idea of the state: “The needs of of a State are the most  
pressing needs of man. In order to become and remain man, he requires a State. The State naturally has rights and duties, 
just like every individual. A man without a State is a savage. All culture arises from the relation of man to the State. The 
more developed, the more one is a member of a developed State. There are barbaric States – there are civilized States –  
moral  and immoral  States  […] States  educate  themselves,  or  are  educated  by other  States.”  Novalis,  Notes  for  a 
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reproduce some of the metaphysical presuppositions of the Hong Kong and Taiwan Confucians he 
criticized  on  the  very same grounds.  He has  inherited  all  the  problems that  are  tied  up with  this 
conception, and given his overt dislike for the mystifying force of dialectics, has no theoretical means 
to  ground  such  a  conception  systematically.  What  is  left  are  bare  statements,  put  forward  as 
commonsensical, which are overtly metaphysical in nature but have renounced either the will or the 
courage to say so. 
1.4.5 The subject as Spirit, and its modern discontents
We are now ready to address an additional problem with Jiang Qing's version of Confucianism and 
explore how this  problem reverberates in contemporary Confucian political  philosophy.  Unlike the 
“individualist” spiritual Confucians, he completely neglect the role individual citizens would play in a 
future Confucian society. He thus condemns what should be the ultimate beneficiaries of the envisaged 
Confucianization of China, namely the Chinese people, to a position of utter passivity. If they are called 
upon to do anything, then it would be to wait patiently for their imminent salvation. At one instance he 
directly echoes Heidegger's idea that “only a god can save us” put forward in the notorious Der Spiegel  
interview from 1966205: “Confucianism”, Jiang says, “puts its ultimate wager of human salvation on the 
reemergence  of  a  sage  king  […]  Only  the  reemergence  of  a  sage  king  can  rekindle  human 
conscience.”206 Adorno seems to have been completely justified in writing that “the wailing about a 
world in which there is nothing to hold on to […] is followed by the proclamation of compulsory order 
as salvation.”207 Ralph Weber has rightly drawn attention to the fact that the notion of “community” is 
insufficiently  developed  in  most  available  versions  of  Confucian  political  philosophy,  since  many 
scholars depart from “the counterfactual assumption that everyone is part of one's community by virtue 
of adherence to a Confucian worldview”.208 As John Makeham remarks, the concept of Confucianism 
Romantic Encyclopaedia. Das Allgemeine Brouillon,  Translated, Edited  and with an Introduction by David W. Wood, 
Albany:  State University of New York Press,  2007, p.98. Also see J.G Fichte,  The Vocation of  Man,  Indianapolis: 
Hackett, [1799] 1987, pp.85-88.
205“Only a God Can Save Us: Der Spiegel's Interview with Martin Heidegger (September 23, 1966)”, in Martin Heidegger, 
Philosophical and Political Writings, New York and London: Continuum, 2003, pp.24-48.
206Quoted in Chen, 2012, p.115. Cf. Jiang, 2012, p.75: “The spiritual life of the state will not be cut short or destroyed by 
the rational choices or deliberate decisions of a group of people at any given time [...] The State [...] is produced by the  
will of heaven and is the presence of history”
207Theodor W. Adorno,  The Jargon of  Authenticity,  Evanston:  Northwestern University Press,  1973a,  p.37.  Emphasis 
added.
208Ralph  Weber,  “Confucian  Political  Philosophy  for  Non-Confucians.”  Paper  presented  at  the  workshop,  “History,  
Morality and Political Thought in Contemporary China”, Institut für Sozialforschung, Goethe-Universität, Frankfurt Am 
Main, July 12, 2014.
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often tends to become “all-consuming”209 in academic discourse. The mainland scholar Luo Yijun罗义
俊 for example presents it as an ordinary matter of fact that “Chinese culture and Confucianism are the 
genes which every Chinese possesses”.210 Cultural conservative  criticisms of democracy and human 
rights as fundamentally unsuitable to China hinges on what Marina Svensson diagnoses as a form of 
“self-orientalization”, that is to say “a form of internal Orientalism” of the elite vis-à-vis the common 
people, who are assumed to be “unable to handle freedom” and “not mature enough for human rights 
and democracy”.211 Svensson notes that this  attitude is also displayed by a considerable number of 
elitist Han  Chinese  towards  “backward”  and  “uncivilized”  ethnic  minorities.212 Though  there  is 
certainly  a  lot  to  be  said  for  the  idea  that  human  rights  and  democracy  are  often  abused  and 
instrumentalized  for  geopolitical  purposes  and  can  as  such  be  justly  suspected  of  being  “pseudo-
universals”213 serving unavowed particular purposes and interests, it remains to be seen whether the 
culturalist notions proposed by Confucian thinkers such as Jiang are capable of having an emancipatory 
potential comparable to the human rights discourse. I am inclined to think that a cynical, but perhaps 
rather accurate indication of the existence of such a potential would be the first case of a Confucian 
revivalist being incarcerated or placed under house arrest by the Chinese authorities. The Noble Prize 
committee would then feel morally obliged to award its imperialist Peace Prize to one of its ideological 
adversaries.  It  certainly  seems  as  though  Jiang  Qing's  and  Kang  Xiaoguang's  notions  are  already 
inherently more subservient to power than the “Western” ideas they condemn. When a nation invokes 
the protection of democracy as an excuse for invading or bombing of another country, this is certainly 
cynicism of the highest level. But would it really be possible to speak of cynicism if the concept of 
“Confucian” social harmony developed by Jiang and Kang would be used for, say, the suppression of a 
strike or a demonstration? As things now stand, it  would not have to be abused at  all,  but merely 
209Makeham, 2008, pp.111-112.
210中国文化和儒学是中国人每人多有的基因。Luo, 2009, p.36. Cf. Li Honglei 李红雷, “The Return of Confucianism 
and Confucianists” (Ruxue de huigui yu ruzhe de huigui 儒学的回归与儒者的回归 ), Kongzi yuanjiu 孔子研究 , 2, 
2013, p.17.
211Marine  Svensson,  “The  Chinese  Debate  on  Asian  Values  and  Human  Rights:  Some  Reflections  on  Relativism, 
Nationalism  and  Orientalism”,  in  Human  Rights  and  Asian  Values.  Contesting  National  Identities  and  Cultural  
Representations in Asia,  edited by Michael  Jacobsen and Ole Bruun,  London:  Curzon,  2000, p.205.  For a  general  
discussion of democracy and (human) rights in post-reform China, see Robert Weatherley,  Making China Strong. The  
Role of Nationalism in Chinese Thinking on Democracy and Human Rights,  New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, 
pp.141-168.
212See Svensson, 2000, pp.205-206. Also see Arif Dirlik, Global Modernity. Modernity in the Age of Global Capitalism, 
Boulder  and  London:  Paradigm Publishers,  2007,  p.30,  where  Dirlik  mentions  that  “the  Chinese  coastal  elite  [in  
economically developed regions] early on internalized imperialist notions of Chinese “lack”, but they projected it on the  
lower classes and the interior [poorer areas of the country]”. 
213Lydia  H.  Liu,  Translingual  Practice:  Literature,  National  Culture,  and  Translated  Modernity--China,  1900-1937, 
Stanford (Cal.): Stanford University Press, 1995, p.7. 
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faithfully applied. The questionable universality of human rights is not really overcome through the 
generic notion of a necessary allegiance to some carefully crafted cultural core as the precondition for 
positive social change. To put it in purely formal terms, such an empty generality is just as abrasive to  
particularity as the former. Moreover, the universality of a certain concept is never a natural or intrinsic 
property of the concept in question, but the result of being recognized and codified as such, even when 
lacking  a  “real  basis”,  which  one  would,  I  think,  be  at  loss  to  non-dogmatically  provide.  The 
recognition through which the universality of an idea is constituted does not (and perhaps need not) 
endow it with a fixed and unassailable rationality, but it is hard to see what other criterion than socially 
constituted recognition one could adduce to distinguish “pseudo-universality” from “real universality”. 
The problem would of course be how much free “subjectivity” such intersubjective recognition really 
allows for in the face of the factual constraints on the social space were the validity of a certain idea 
can be renegotiated. Additionally, it would remain to be seen how the normativity possibly resulting 
from such renegotiation can influence the state of affairs against which it is developed. In any case, the 
point  is  not  that  Western  liberal  democracy stands  at  the  “end of  history”  proclaimed  by Francis  
Fukuyama  after  the  fall  of  the  Soviet  Union  as  the  final  form  of  organization  for  all  societies, 
irrespective of their historical and cultural background. I basically agree with Chen Weigang 陈维纲
when he writes that “only the states of the First World in Europe and North America  can afford  to 
harmonize  their  national  interests  with  the  norms  that  define  the  universalistic,  cosmopolitan 
aspirations  of  the  United  Nations”  since  globalization  remains  marked  by  “hierarchical 
differentiation”.214 It is a rare and privileged position from which value and interest can be made to 
coincide. As Immanuel Wallerstein convincingly argues, “the norm of universalism is an enormous 
comfort  to  those who are  benefiting from the system.  It  makes  them feel  they deserve what  they 
have.”215 But  it  would be I  think  hardly a  step in  the right  direction to  make social  and political 
emancipation  contingent  on  the  question  of  whether  or  not  it  conforms  to  the  highly  contestable 
academically generated notion of some essentialistic cultural identity. As such, the justified concern 
over opposing exclusion and oppression implicit in many narratives of cultural emancipation and pleas 
214Weigang Chen, Confucian Marxism: a Reflection on Religion and Global Justice, Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013, p.16. 
“With hegemonic nationalism and developmental  states as their  only resource for survival  in the capitalist  system,  
peripheral  nations  have  already  been  dragged  by  processes  of  economic  globalization  into  an  almost  impossible 
situation.  They are forced to  move simultaneously in  two completely opposite  directions:  to  be nationalistic  while  
allowing themselves to be denationalized; to be radically multicultural or anti-Western while subjecting themselves to  
supranational institutions governed by norms of Western liberalism.” Ibid.
215Immanuel Wallerstein,  World-System Analysis. An Introduction,  Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2004, 
p.40. 
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for “native” identity, remains largely epistemological and devoid of meaningful political engagement.216 
More importantly, it  should be noted that both the democratic ideal and say a Confucian notion of 
“Great Unity” (datong 大同 )  share the fate  of being ideas and ideals,  the realization of which is 
dependent on more than what  can be determined through mere conceptual analysis  and normative 
prescriptions.  Who would  judge in  the  end whether  or  not  such  an  ideal  has  been  realized?  The 
realization of ideals is dependent on observations, which occur inside various strata of society, where 
not all perceptions carry the same weight or are brought forward in the same manner, and nowhere else. 
There is obviously a lot of room here for negotiation, and if all else fails, coercion. Perhaps an observer 
might put forward the idea that the Communist Party is already in essence Confucian, as has indeed 
been argued in narratives surrounding the so-called “sinicization” and “Confucianization” of Chinese 
Marxism.217 Maybe it  was  already suspicious  of  human rights  as  mere  “petty  bourgeois  interests” 
because of its Confucian unconsciousness? But not Confucian enough perhaps, given the unwillingness 
to formally change its name? Every observation that an ideal has been (if only partly) realized leaves 
ample room for a reintroduction of the distinction between essence and appearance, ideal and reality. 
And this procedure is I think indifferent to the specific content of the ideal in question. Tang Junyi for 
one clearly saw how his precarious and somewhat hesitant argument that the appeal and success of 
communism in China should somehow still be attributed to the unconscious persistence of the basic 
structure of Chinese cultural  consciousness could lead to the communist  disaster  being blamed on 
Confucianism.  Still,  he  insisted  on  maintaining  that  “the  spirit  of  Chinese  culture  is  directly 
concentrated at the bottom of the heart, mind and consciousness of those who seek to negate the spirit  
of Chinese culture” (中國文化之精神，乃直接貫注於想否定中國文化精神者之生命心靈與意識之
底 )218.  Tang's approach already raises  the  question  as  to  how and  at  what  cost  negativity  can  be 
introduced into the heart of the supremely self-identical.
216See  Hahm  Chaibong,  “How  the  East  was  Won:  Orientalism  and  the  New  Confucian  Discourse  in  East  Asia”, 
Development and Society, vol.29, no.1, 2000, pp.97-109.
217See Jin Guantao金觀濤, “The Confucianization of Contemporary Chinese Marxism” (Dangdai Zhongguo Makesizhuyi  
de rujiahua 當代中國馬克思主義的儒家化), in Du (ed.), 1997, pp.152-183 and Guo Qiyong郭齐勇, “Confucianism, 
the Sinicization of Marxism, and Chinese Modernization” (Ruxue yu Makesizhuyi zhongguohua ji Zhongguo xiandaihua
儒学与马克思主义中国化及中国现代化), Makesizhuyi yu xianshi马克思主义与现实, 6, 2009, pp.56-62. Also see Li 
Minghui 李明辉 , “On the So-Called 'Confucianization of Marxism' ” (Lun suowei 'Makesizhuyi de rujiahua' 论所谓
「马克思主义的儒家化」 ),  1991,  http://www.confucius2000.com/admin/list.asp?id=3934.  Unsurprisingly,  Mou 
Zongsan vehemently opposed the analogy some commentators already drew between Confucianist and communist self-
cultivation in his time. See “The Path of Philosophical Investigation” (Zhexue yanjiu de tujing 哲學研究的途徑), [1986] 
in WW, pp.352-353.
218“The Chinese Cultural Background of the Chaos in Present-day China” (Zhongguo jinri zhi luan de Zhongguo wenhua  
beijing 中國今日之亂的中國文化背景), [1950c] in ZJ, p.273.
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In his  critical  and insightful  analysis  of  Francis  Fukuyama's  heavily mediatized  “noisy gospel” of 
liberal democracy and free-market capitalism as incarnating the political and economic “end of history”
and forming the natural habitat for “the last man”,219 Jacques Derrida exposes Fukuyama's oscillation 
between what the  deconstructivist identifies as “two irreconcilable discourses” at work in his “neo-
evangelistic rhetoric”220. On the one hand, Fukuyama refers to “empirical evidence” to support his case 
for Western liberal democracy, while on the other hand he resorts to the downgrading of empirical facts 
which belie his homogenized and idealized vision of the modern world to the level of a contingent 
facticity which can never do any real damage to democracy as a transcendental and regulative ideal.221 
Needless to say that Marxism is not granted such a double source of validity, which is why Fukuyama 
shows no inhibition in declaring it to be dead and buried. It is indeed only from the standpoint of such a 
logic of ideality, which already transcendentally determines which occurrences are to count as factual, 
that a discourse can proclaim a deep sense of contentment  with its  creation222,  or  conversely,  find 
empirical reality severely wanting in the face of its injunctions. Is not the very same dubious logic to be 
found in many, superficially anti-Fukuyamaist,  celebrations of Confucianism as the perfect political 
order (at least for China, conceived of as the latter's conceptual subsidiary)? Both empirical evidence as 
well as certain historical “tendencies” – possibly culled from the mass media, who have their own 
selection criteria  for what qualifies as real223 – can be invoked whenever  necessary or rhetorically 
useful, but seldom will there be a willingness to make the ideal itself contingent on that over which its 
dominion  has  already  been  established  from the  onset,  namely  socially  and  historically  mediated 
contingency. To paraphrase T.S. Eliot, discourse cannot bear too much reality.
As Marine Svensson224 makes clear, arguments against democracy and human rights in China are often 
couched in a cynical form of “historical materialism” which claims that economic development has not 
advanced far enough for political liberties to be implemented in present-day China, and that the right to 
219Jacques Derrida,  Specters of Marx. The State of Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International , New York: 
Routledge, 2006, pp.70-88.
220Derrida, 2006, p.74.
221Derrida, 2006, p.78: “On the one hand, the gospel of politico-economic liberalism needs the event of the good news that 
consists in what has putatively actually  happened […] however, since,  on the other hand, actual history and so many 
other realities that have an empirical appearance contradict this advent of the perfect liberal democracy, one must at the 
same time pose this perfection as simply a regulating and trans-historical ideal.” Also see pp.107-108.
222“To borrow Dirlik’s own words, the scholarly activity around New Confucianism is 'the foremost instance during the 
[1980s] of intellectual discourse creating its object.' ” Makeham, 2003, p.28.
223Niklas Luhmann, The Reality of the Mass Media, Stanford (Cal.): Stanford University Press, 2000.
224See Svensson, 2000. 
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full democratic participation and freedom of speech must remain subordinate to the right to subsistence 
at this stage of development. In this argument a space is opened in which the surprising collusion of 
official Marxism and culturalism can reach its highest level as an ideology of oppression. Even in the  
case of Yu Keping 俞可平 (b. 1959), a liberal intellectual and member of the CCP who currently holds 
the post of deputy director at the Central Compilation and Translation Bureau of the Central Committee 
of the CCP (Zhonggong zhongyang bianyi ju 中共中央编译局 ), for whom  “[r]elatively speaking, 
democracy is the best political system for humankind”225 and who overcomes the usual pseudo-Marxist 
economism by adding that the development of democracy “must be related to the economic  level of 
development of society, the regional politics, and the international environment, and it must also be 
intimately related to the national tradition of political culture, the quality of the politicians and the 
people, and the daily customs of the people”226, the stress remains on the conditioned nature of political 
reform. Yu writes: 
The unconditional promotion of democracy will  bring disastrous consequences to the nation and its
people. Political democracy is the trend of history, and it is the inevitable trend for all nations of the
world to move toward democracy. But the timing and speed of the development of democracy and the
choice of the form and system of democracy are conditional.227 
The problem is that the conditions one chooses to identify impinge on the supposed unconditional 
desirability of democracy. Once again, people are forced to sit back and wait for it to spontaneously 
come about, whereas one could argue that it is precisely the imposition of conditions on democracy that 
inhibits its  emergence.  For  Yu Keping,  “[t]he  basic  approach to  developing  democracy is  not  the 
forceful imposition of a democratic order by the government, but rather the emergence of such an order 
from among the people.”228 But the question as to who is competent to observe whether the various 
economic,  political  and  cultural  conditions  (which  must  themselves  also  first  be  established  and 
observed as  parameters)  have  been met  receives  a  predictable  answer  in  Yu's  argumentation:  it  is 
ultimately the Party which has the “historical responsibility”229 to decide whether or not the time is ripe 
225Yu Keping, Democracy is a Good Thing. Essays on Politics, Society, and Culture in Contemporary China , Washington: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2009, p.4. The New York Times devoted a profile to Yu Keping a couple of years ago See  
Andrew Jacobs, “A Chinese Official Praises a Taboo: Democracy”, 23 July 2010.
     http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/24/world/asia/24beijing.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
226Yu, 2009, p.5.
227Yu, 2009, p.4.
228Yu, 2009, p.5.
229See Yu's essay “How To Achieve Orderly Democracy” (Ruhe shixian youxu de minzhu 如何实现有序的民主 ), 2013, 
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for the conditions to be lifted from the conditional,  and for the latter  to be allowed to become an 
unconditional reality. The historical responsibility thus lies with those who are most able to influence 
the  historical  conditions  which  are  determinative  for  deciding  on the  desirability,  attainability  and 
practicability of  full-scale  democracy.  Both in Jiang Qing's  authoritarian and in  Yu Keping's  more 
liberal reasoning, the subjectivity and subjective participation of Chinese citizens is subjected to larger 
anonymous  forces  which  are  the  final  yardstick  of  reason,  be  it  in  the  form  of  some  purported 
“essence” of Chinese culture or as an alignment with the “ceaseless march towards democracy” Yu 
claims to be able to discern in recent modern history.230 The transhistorical, supra-individual Subject 
always wins out over the historically situated individual subject. The distance between essence and 
appearance can thus be internalized as intrinsic to the Subject as Spirit, as a difference reducible to the 
identity of what is not yet the same. What is required in both cases is not action or participation, but 
more  or  rather  better  observations,  a  task which  the  intellectuals  who indulge  in  these  theoretical 
musings are probably more than willing to take upon themselves. The constant call to consider the 
existing  state  of  affairs  from a  perspective  which  is  more  suited  to  the  cultural  and/or  economic 
specificity of this state of affairs goes hand in hand with a perfect assurance that things will simply 
remain the way they are, which, if this is taken as something regrettable, at least offers a comfortable  
and stable perspective allowing one to observe the whole affair and proclaim oneself competent to read 
off the rational tendency of history. 
In this regard, it is interesting and, from my point of view, revealing, that Jiang refers to the post '78 
transformation of communist China into a “socialist market economy” to argue for the possibility of a 
new constitutional reversal of communism into its  historical  contender,  namely Confucianism. The 
least  one  can  infer  from this  is  that  he  grounds  the  possibility  of  reestablishing  tradition  in  the 
contingent, shifty and unpredictable dynamic of modernity itself, instead of seeing a return to tradition 
as the precondition for modernization.231 Of course, what is formally the very “same” historical logic 
can be invoked to justify the abandonment of Confucianism or traditional culture at large.232 Referring 
https://sinocism.com/?p=9749. Emphasis added.
230Yu, 2013. I am reminded of what Chen Weigang writes about religion, which in his view “legitimates social institutions 
so effectively precisely because it relates the precarious normative structures of empirical societies to “ultimate reality”,  
which by definition is beyond the contingencies of the human will and activity.” Chen, 2013, pp.47-48. 
231See Jiang, 1989, no.2, p.33. Cf. Fan, 2010, p.75: “Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms awoke up many Chinese from 
their self damaging cultural nightmares.”
232See  for  example  Chen  Jiamming,  “The  National  Studies  Craze.  The  Phenomena,  the  Controversies,  and  Some 
Reflections”,  China Perspectives, 1, 2011, p.30: “The reason that Confucian fundamentalism cannot succeed is that it 
violates historical logic and does not realize that history cannot go backwards, and therefore is fated to be as short-lived  
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to the economic reforms and the revision of the Constitution under Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Qing writes:
Surely, this was a miraculous reversal of history! Now given that these principles – private property,  
market economy, and 'bourgeois' human rights, which are contrary to socialism – could yet enter the
constitution, why could the way of Yao, Shun, Confucius, and Mencius that expresses the sacred values
of Chinese culture not also enter the Chinese constitution?233
Chen Lai陈来 (b. 1952) follows the exact same line of reasoning, while projecting it further into the 
distant future: 
[O]nce China has realized modernization, the time for a new development of the Confucian tradition will  
have come. At that time a negative anti-traditionalism will have disappeared, and what will replace it is
necessarily a cultural renaissance rooted in a deep national tradition. In this sense, the chief condition for 
[the] revival of traditional thought is modernisation.234
In a remarkable footnote to the main text of his provocative 1989 article, Jiang even goes so far as to 
praise Marx's theoretical contributions (as distinct from the ideology that later came to bear his name) 
for having enabled capitalism to internally correct the errors which plagued it and the excesses it gave 
rise to at the early stage of its inception.235 In the second part of the same article he offers a moralistic236 
condemnation of what he considers to be the extravagant,  hedonist and decadent lifestyle of many 
capitalist  entrepreneurs,  with  the  surprisingly  functionalist  argument  that  such  uncontrolled  and 
unbridled  expenditure  (what  Georges  Bataille  called  the  “general  economy”237)  is  detrimental  to 
economic  development  and impedes  the  efficient  accumulation  and investment  of  capital.238 In  an 
equally awkward twist, Kang Xiaoguang manages to completely defuse the critical import of Antonio 
Gramsci's notion of hegemony by presenting it as a normative idea which can be instrumentalized by 
the  elites  to  ensure  political  stability  (through  the  enforced  cultural  hegemony  of  Confucianism), 
as Yuan Shikai's attempt to restore the monarchy. Confucianism […] was forsaken by history because it was unable to 
establish a reasonable system.” My italics.
233Jiang,  2012,  p.68.  Cf.  Jiang,  1989,  no.2,  p.33.  In  a  similar  vein,  Kang  Xiaoguang  welcomes  the  fact  that  “the  
marketization process has gradually destroyed the sacred status of Marxism in Chinese society.” Kang, 2012, p.39. 
234Chen Lai, Tradition and Modernity: a Humanist View, Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2009, p.31. 
235See Jiang, 1989, no.2, p.38. 
236Guo, 2004, p.87: “[P]roblems that can hardly be thought of as moral are thrown in the same basket. To Confucians [...]  
the solution to a moral crisis can be nothing but a moral one.”
237Georges Bataille, La part maudite. Essai d’économie générale, Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1967.
238Jiang, 1989, no.3, pp.28-29.
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instead of as a concept developed to account for the continued domination of the ruling class and the 
naturalization of its norms into common sense in capitalist societies.239 Jiang's tendency to interpret the 
communist takeover (and the dismantling of tradition) as part of a larger historical movement that will 
result in the “negation of the negation” of Confucianism is apparent throughout, and is an approach he 
shares in common with his “spiritual” forerunners.240 The only difference is that he finds himself at a 
point  in history where the most  severely affected tradition is  now Chinese socialism.  In my view, 
Jiang's criticism is not able to, in the words of David Gross, “separate itself from what it repudiates”. 241 
Chinese  culture,  redefined  as  and  totalized  into  an  organic  Spirit,  thus  takes  on  the  dynamic  of 
modernization,  along  with  its  procession  of  burials,  excavations,  condemnations  and  reinventions, 
through which it  reproduces itself  and on which it remains parasitic.242 The obvious but dangerous 
implication is that this Spirit might turn out to be just as accommodating and vacuous as the soulless 
waves of exchange value on which it rides along, or by which it is perhaps simply being carried away. 
The vaguely Weberian approach adopted by the self-proclaimed “reconstructionist Confucianist”243 Fan 
Ruiping 范瑞平 goes even a step further in  closing (or perhaps squaring) the culturalist  circle by 
ascribing the “success” of the socio-economic reforms to the existence of “a  strong Confucian sub-
structure”244 and to a Confucian “operative morality of the economy”245. This approach allows him to 
interpret any deficiencies in the existing system and injustices in the current state of affairs as resulting 
from the fact that China is only latently Confucian and has yet to fully realize the potential of its  
inherent Confucian nature.246 The Korean scholar Lee Seung-hwan makes a strong case against the 
whole idea, especially prominent at the height of the debate on Asian values and now echoed again in 
239See Kang, 2012, p.72.
240See Mou's Record of Lectures at the Humanist Society (Renwen jiangxi lu 人文講習錄), [1954b] vol.28 of MJ, p.11, 
where the resistance against the “Demonic Way” (modao魔道) and the generation of a “third period” for Confucianism 
is defined in terms of the “negation of the negation” (fouding zhi fouding 否定之否定).
241David Gross,  The Past in Ruins: Tradition and the Critique of Modernity, Amherst: The University of Massachusetts 
Press, 1992, p.79. Gross adds that “if a forced restoration of tradition were to come about, the help of a powerful,  
centralized state would be essential […] But the contemporary bureaucratic state, itself a product of modernity, cannot 
be counted on to serve antimodern ends.”
242See Yu Keping, “The Developmental Logic of Chinese Culture under Modernization and Globalization”, in Snapshots  
of Intellectual Life in Contemporary PR China, edited by Arif Dirlik, Special issue of  boundary 2: an international  
journal of literature and culture, vol.35, no.2, 2008, pp.157-182.
243Fan is not clear on precisely what he means by the term “reconstructionist”, nor on what this position entails exactly. He  
clearly strives to distinguish his own approach from that of “Neo-Confucians” (New Confucians), who were,  so he 
claims, epistemologically “colonized” by Western assumptions. See Fan, 2010, pp.XI-XII. 
244Fan, 2010, p.232.
245Fan, 2010, p.XIX. 
246Fan, 2010, pp.231-233. 
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relation  to  the  rise  of  China,  that  the  (varying)  economic  successes  of  East  Asian  nations  can  be 
attributed to their shared Confucian background.247 Lee condemns it as a thoroughly “anti-Confucian” 
discourse leading, in the case of South Korea, to a “sullied self-portrait of modern Koreans” which 
“would have been more readily condemned as vice in the traditional period than today”.248 Lee argues 
that positing Confucianism as the cultural source of East Asian Capitalism would entail recognizing the 
nepotistic  and corrupt  business  conglomerates  (chaebol 재벌 ),  such as  Samsung and Hyundai,  as 
incarnations of the Confucian stress on filial piety (xiao孝). He also points out that the discourse on 
“Confucian capitalism” can just as easily be employed to “explain” economic recession or stagnation as 
the  result  of  a  “paternalistic”  and  “inflexible”  business  model  which  hinders  entrepreneurial 
“creativity” once the stock markets start going south. According to Jun Sang-in, the culturalist approach 
(re)born during the discursive boom on Asian Values, which seeks to explain East Asian economic 
successes  (but  not  of  course  downturns)  on  the  basis  of  a  purportedly  shared  Confucian  culture 
consistently distorts the argument put forward by Max Weber in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of  
Capitalism (1905), an argument which is constantly appealed to even in the replacement of “Protestant” 
by “Confucian”.249 Jun claims that Weber's standpoint is generally reduced to that of a defender of the 
idea that “ideas” and “values” are the final determinant in historical development, instead of (more 
modestly)  examining  the  “elective  affinity”  Weber  thought  he  was  able  to  establish  between  the 
Protestant ethic and the emergence of capitalism in Western Europe at a particular point in time.250 Fan 
Ruiping does not take valid objections like these into consideration,  which does not remain without 
consequence for his own argumentation. He condemns economic determinism as encouraging “ethical 
laziness and numbness”251, but does he not force human beings into a very similar stance of passivity 
by claiming (Confucian) morality to be totally independent from its actual conditions? The “moral 
vacuum” which according to Fan characterizes the “post-Communist personality disorder”252, causing 
247See Lee, 2004, chapter 7: “The Anti-Confucian Character of Confucian Capitalism Discourse”, pp.148-170. Also see 
chapter  8,  “Asian  Values  and  Confucian  Discourse”.  Lee's  own  case  for  “capitalism with  a  human  face”  (p.167)  
however, leaves much to be desired. 
248Lee,  2004,  p.154.  Also  see  Geir  Sigurðsson,  “Frugralists,  Anti-Consumers,  and  Prosumers:  Chinese  Philosophical 
Perspectives on Consumerism”, in The Changing Landscape of China’s Consumerism, edited by Alison Hulme, Oxford: 
Elsevier, 2014, pp.125-149.
249See for example Tu Wei-ming, “The Rise of Industrial  East  Asia:  The Role of Confucian Values," in  Copenhagen 
Papers in East and Southeast Asian Studies, 4, 1989, pp.81-97. Also see Dirlik, 1995, pp.242-261.
250See Jun Sang-in,  “No (Logical)  Place for  Asian Values  in  East  Asia's  Economic Development”,  Development and 
Society, vol.28, no.2, 1999, pp.191-204. Jun writes: “Culture often explains everything and nothing at the same time. In 
this context, it is no wonder that the same Confucianism which was once held responsible for the stagnation of the Asian 
economy, is now seen as enhancing its capitalist transformation.” (p.195). 
251Fan, 2010, p.73. 
252Fan, 2010, pp.235-249. 
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political corruption, hedonism, and the unbridled pursuit of profit, splits the (Chinese = Confucian) 
subject into its empirical insufficiency as an imperfect (i.e. not yet fully Confucian) human being and 
an autological and largely autonomous spiritual essence in which the individual subject can, it would 
seem, at best participate (in the Platonic sense of methexis). It is telling that the same Luo Yijun who 
sees Confucianism as a genetic code shared by all Chinese can write that “over a billion Chinese […] 
are deprived of spiritual guidance” and “wander aimlessly on the mainland”253. It is clearly no longer 
Confucianism which is a “wandering soul”, but the subjects divorced from their Subject. If there is 
something like an irreducible metaphysical kernel of modern Confucianist discourse, it is here that one 
should begin to look. Even Tu Weiming, who shares none of the fundamentalist fanaticism of the likes 
of Jiang Qing and Kang Xiaoguang, seems to be caught in this internal splitting of the subject into its 
putative essence and empirical  appearance when he writes that  “East  Asian societies  often exhibit 
totally un-Confucian behavior and attitudes, a clear case of the seemingly unbridgeable gap between 
ideation [sic] and reality.”254 The same problem imposes itself in the context of Jiang Qing's attack on 
the Western idea that the volonté générale is the most fundamental source of political legitimacy and in 
his railing against purely “formal” and “abstract” equality255, which reads much like a watered-down 
Hegelian critique of the putative “formalism” of Kant's ethics in favor of a purely culturalist notion of 
Sittlichkeit. In two crucial passages, Jiang claims that
[e]ven if  popular  opinion  is  willing  to  concede  recognition  and support  to  democracy,  yet  because
democracy lacks roots in the culture and has no source in that [i.e. the Confucian] tradition, it fails to
win recognition and support from that people's cultural tradition and can never be wholly legitimate. The 
will of the people is simply endorsement by the current population of the state at a particular time and
place  [i.e.  merely  “empirical”  and  contingent],  while  the  legitimacy  of  history  and  culture  is  the
endorsement formed by many generations over hundreds and thousands of years [i.e. transhistorical and
transcendent] […] If the majority of wills do not conform to morality, then what they want is illegitimate 
according to the Way of Humane Authority.256
The attempt  to  affirm a culturally specific  form of  political  authority,  and to  overcome the social 
253Quoted in Guo, 2004, p.76. For Mou Zongsan too, very few mainland Chinese were still actually Chinese due to the 
influence of communist ideology. See  Fourteen Lectures on the Encounter between Chinese and Western Philosophy  
(Zhongxi zhexue zhi huitong shisi jiang 中西哲學之會通十四講), [1990b] vol.30 of MJ, pp.28-29.
254Tu, 2002, p.206. 
255See for example, Jiang, 2012, p.39 and p.73.
256Jiang, 2012, p.36, p.38.
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pathologies  of  the present  through a recourse to a  completely ahistorical  notion of “history”,  as  a 
“sacred, mysterious, whole, awe-inspiring, and enduring”257 being manifesting itself in the state hinges 
on a properly metaphysical distinction between the transitory and the eternal. This distinction is then 
lodged onto the  difference  between individual  subjects  and the  inner  essence  which  is  completely 
beyond their reach and control and is further normatively put forward as a political ideal which serves 
to keep the transcendent (the state) from being contaminated by the contingencies of empirical facticity 
(the people/the government).258 As Jiang stresses, “the state is one body with the nation and not with the 
people”.259 For Jiang, unlike the nation-state, the government “is not the product of an autonomous long 
evolution  of  history and culture”  and is  merely a  kind  of  “this-worldly secular  existence”.260 The 
distinction between (transcendent, supra-individual) “spirit” (jingshen 精神) and (empirical, individual) 
“consciousness” (yishi 意識), already found in the work of Liang Shuming, where it served as a means 
of refuting historical materialism261, can be neatly matched onto Jiang's distinction between state and 
government.  The  resulting  heteronomy can  only  be  avoided  if  one  agrees  to  accept  the  spurious 
innateness of these moral values as a given and further assumes them to be, in some way, more real  
than the participating subject itself.262 In the case of Fan Ruiping, the overtly metaphysical implications 
of this kind of discourse sit uneasily with his rejection of a supposedly uniquely Western “substantialist 
tradition”.263 
A similar  cluster  of  problems  teems  in  the  work  of  the  contemporary  political  philosopher  Zhao 
Tingyang 赵汀阳  (b.  1961),  who quickly rose to academic fame thanks to his  elaboration of the 
257Jiang, 2012, p.71. “Confucianism holds that the historical nature of the state is its essence”. Ibid. 
258Jiang, 2012, pp.74-79.
259Jiang, 2012, p.74. 
260Jiang, 2012, p.75. Emphasis added. 
261See Liang Shuming梁漱溟, The Cultures of East and West and their Philosophies (Dongxi wenhua jiqi zhexue東西文
化及其哲學), Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan, [1921] 2012, pp.57-61. Liang saw his project of “rural reconstruction” (農
村建設) as a third way between capitalism and communism. Also see Thierry Meynard, The Religious Philosophy of  
Liang Shuming: the Hidden Buddhist, Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010, pp.28-29 and pp.35-36; and Zhang, 2011, pp.2-3 
and pp.101-102. In Tang Junyi's early work, roughly the same distinction is rendered as the difference between a strictly 
individual and internal  “mind” (xinling 心靈 )  on the one hand,  and spirit  (jingshen)  as characterized by objective 
externalization on the other. See Mind, Matter, and Human Existence (Xinwu yu rensheng 心物與人生), [1953a] vol.2 of 
TJ, pp.188-189.
262See Fan, 2010, p.74: “[T]he Reconstructionist Confucianism I am presenting consists of a set of moral principles that are 
not determined by productive forces, but are mandated by Heaven, rooted in the heart/mind of human beings, articulated  
by  the  Confucian  sages,  practiced  within  Chinese  tradition,  and  possessing  the  eternal  moral  values  transcending 
contemporary society in directing human lives and regulating economic institutions.”
263See Fan, 2010, pp.13-14. 
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paradigm of “All-under-Heaven” (tianxia 天下).264 Let us take care to note that in classical texts, this 
term more often denoted China as an empire, rather than the world as a whole.265 Zhao however wants 
to  overcome the  artificial  limitations  of  the  modern  nation-state  through  this  specific  concept,  by 
refusing to take the “false universality” of the state, which he sees as a cover for particular interests, as  
a point of departure and as a finality, proposing instead to, following Laozi 老子 , “observe the world 
from the world” (以天下觀天下).266 The “perspective of tianxia” can thus be read both in the objective 
and in the subjective genitive.  From a comparative point of view, Zhao Tingyang claims that  “the 
modern Western political system could be described as consisting of  individuals,  communities,  and 
nation-states,  whereas the Chinese system is  structured in terms of  families,  states,  and  all-under-
heaven”.267 The current dominance of an oppositional (对应的) system of nation-states is for Zhao the 
reason why attempts at cosmopolitan internationalism which do not go beyond the state have remained 
abortive.268 “The current world”, he writes, “still remains a “non-world”, it is merely a geographical and 
not a political entity. The most important political problem today is how a world in the political sense 
can  be  created.”269 For  Zhao,  the  appeal  Marxism had for  twentieth-century Chinese  activists  and 
intellectuals was the result of a pre-established harmony between the embracive idea of “All-under-
264See Zhao Tingyang 赵汀阳 ,  The System of All-under-Heaven: an Introduction to a Philosophy for the World System  
(Tianxia tixi: shijie zhidu zhexue daolun 天下体系：世界制度哲学导论 ), Nanjing: Jiangsu jiaoyu chubanshe, 2005; 
Zhao Tingyang,  “A Political  Philosophy in Terms of  All-under-heaven”,  Diogenes,  221, 2009, pp.5-18. For a solid 
account of Zhao's ideas see  Chong Jianxin 徐建新“The System of All-under-Heaven and The World-System – A 
Review of The System of All-under-Heaven: an Introduction to a Philosophy for the World System (Tianxia tixi yu shijie  
zhidu – ping 'Tianxia tixi: shijie zhidu zhexue daolun' 天下体系与世界制度——评《天下体系: 世界制度哲学导
论》), Guoji zhengzhi kexue 国际政治科学, vol.10, no.2, 2007, pp.113-142. Also see Angle, 2012, pp.77-80. For Zhao, 
the term tianxia has three meanings, denoting firstly a geographical unit (the physical planet earth), secondly all of its  
inhabitants, more specifically all “people's minds” (minxin 民心), and thirdly the ideal political unity of the first two. See 
Zhao, 2005, pp.41-42.
265Yu Yingshi余英时 cites the following passage from James Legge (1815-1897), one of the pioneers of modern Sinology,  
in which the impact of the “diplomatic” encounter with Western imperialism and the Treaty of Nanjing on the traditional  
concept of the empire as tianxia is chronicled: “During the past forty years her (i.e., China's) position with regard to the 
more advanced nations of the world has entirely changed. She has entered into treaties with them upon equal [!] terms; 
but I do not think her ministers and people have yet looked the truth fairly in the face, so as to realize the fact that China  
is only one of many independent nations in the world, and that the "beneath the sky," over which her emperor has ruled, 
is not all beneath the sky, but only a certain portion of it which is defined on the earth's surface and can be pointed out  
upon the map.” Quoted in Ying-Shih Yü, “The Radicalization of China in the Twentieth Century”, Daedalus, vol.122, 
no.2, China in Transformation, 1993, p.137.
266Daodejing 道德經 54. Zhao, 2005, p.4: “'Thinking about the world' and 'thinking from the world' are totally different  
modes of thought” (“思考世界”与“从世界思考”是完全不同的思想境界).
267Zhao  Tingyang,  “All-Under-Heaven  and  Methodological  Relationism.  An  Old  Story  and  New  World  Peace”,  in 
Dallmayr and Zhao, 2012, p.51. 
268See Chong, 2007, pp.115-123.
269目前的世界仍然只是个“非世界”(non-world) 。它只是个地理存在，而不是个政治存在。现在最重要的政治
问题是如何创造政治意义上的世界. Zhao, 2005, p.21. 
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Heaven” where “the four seas are one family” (sihai yijia 四海一家 ) and the Marxist notion of a 
universal  class  of  proletarians,  united  in  a  joint  struggle  transcending  all  national  boundaries  and 
ultimately poised towards the future abolishment of the state as an instrument of oppression.270 In the 
presentation of his ideas,  Zhao stresses the methodological importance of adopting an analytical and 
normative standpoint adequate to the Chinese context.271 As he writes in a very interesting yet also 
somewhat disturbing sentence: “truth is certainly not the highest [form of] judgment, the truth must be 
good and the truth must be responsible (真理并不是一个最高的判断，真理必须是好的，真理必须
是责任的 ).272 He grounds his political vision in a familiar-sounding “relational rationality” (guanxi  
lixing关系理性), developed into an “ontology of coexistence, instead of a philosophy of existence”, in 
which “coexistence is prior to existence”273 and where one can “let beings be ([shengsheng] 生生)”274. 
The influence of Levinas and Habermas shines through here, in a form of thought where alterity has 
taken the place of transcendence. He is not far removed from most New Confucians on this point. Half  
a century before Zhao, Tang Junyi had already analyzed the fact that imperial China had fallen prey to 
Western  imperialism  during  the  two  Opium  Wars  as  a  historical  consequence  of  the  age-long 
dominance of “the concept of All-under-Heaven, which had concealed the concept of the state” (天下
觀念，即掩蓋了國家觀念 ) and the preponderance of a political view based on the conviction that 
“one who is humane is not in opposition to things” (仁者與物無對).275 However, Zhao does not see 
himself  as  a  Confucianist  thinker,  since  he  rejects  the  all-too-often  found  identification  of 
Confucianism with the Chinese cultural tradition at large and faults modern New Confucianism with 
being unable to think through the “totality/integrity” (wanzhengxing 完整性) of Chinese thought, since 
it unduly elevates what is a mere (albeit important) part above the whole.276 His point is precisely that 
China as a consistent totality defies any external and abstract division into “parts”.277 He insists that this 
270Zhao, 2005, p.98. 
271See Zhao, 2005, pp.6-7, p.12. 
272Zhao, 2005, pp.5-6, emphasis added.
273Zhao  Tingyang,  “All-Under-Heaven  and  Methodological  Relationism.  An  Old  Story  and  New  World  Peace”,  in 
Dallmayr and Zhao, 2012, p.50.
274Zhao Tingyang uses this Heidegerrian translation of the term 生生, usually translated as “ceaseless creativity”, in “The 
China  Dream  in  Question”,  Harvard-Yenching  Working  Paper  Series,  10  September  2013  http://www.harvard-
yenching.org/features/hyi-working-paper-series-zhao-tingyang.
275See Tang, [1950c], pp.258-260.
276See Zhao, 2005, p.8. Zhao calls the exclusive focus on Confucianism独尊儒术, adopting an expression of the anarchist 
revolutionary Yi Baisha 易白沙 (1886-1921).
277Tang Junyi had already claimed that “the world of the Eastern people is a world without limits/ an unlimited world” (東
方人世界是無限的世界), both ontologically and politically. See “Reflections from a Journey to Korea” (You Han lü si
游韓旅思), [1967] in ZB, p.763.
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(ontological)  assumption must  at  the same time form the (epistemological)  standpoint  from which 
China as an entirety is to be observed and reflected on. One must approach what is whole as a whole.  
And of course it is Chinese thought which is uniquely able to “think with no outside/without exclusion” 
(思考无外) and thereby ethically and politically capable of “not excluding the other” (不拒绝他者).278 
“The  world”,  Zhao  writes  poignantly,  “is  absent  because  of  our  refusal  to  see  it  from  its  own 
perspective.”279 There are reasons however to find this beatific vision doubtful for epistemological (and 
of course also “practical”) reasons. How, one might ask, can one attain a position suited to observe a  
totality that is not already in a way posited within a determinate horizon and thus distinguished from 
something else (i.e. a  particular  totality), as in the case of the Aristotelian distinction, which Zhao 
seems to implicitly uphold, between the irreducible wholeness of substance (ousia) and the contingent 
unity of a temporary aggregate. This distinction, which Zhao would no doubt reject as a typical form of 
Western  dualism,  nevertheless  returns  with  a  vengeance  in  his  own  differentiation  between 
“universalization” (pubianhua普遍化) and “standardization” (biaozhunhua 标准化)280, where the latter 
is assumed to lead to a harmonious instead of a conflictual form of unity, in which difference is not 
subsumed under or overrun by the (self-)identity of the resulting whole.281 Furthermore, it might be 
asked how one can at the same time view such a self-enclosed totality “totally”, that is to say, without 
excluding oneself from what is seen. The ineluctable involvement of the subject in what it can (or 
perhaps only chooses or refuses to) see, implies that it is, so to speak, always standing in its own line of  
sight. If one does not leave such a “blind spot”, every act of cognition comes to incarnate the mystical 
self-transparency of what Fichte called “a self-seeing eye”282, in which the possibility that it is perhaps 
seeing nothing but its own self-observations is, as Kant would have said, dogmatically excluded. In this 
way, it does not see “that it cannot see what it cannot see”283, and can only claim to have access to the 
world it observes by believing and yet at the same time denying itself to be identical with it.  In a 
passage where he attacks the Western bifurcation of self/other and immanent/transcendent, Zhao writes 
278Zhao, 2005, pp.13-16.
279Zhao, 2009, p.7. 
280Zhao, 2005, pp.87-88. For some reason which eludes me, Zhao takes the “standard script, uniform cart axles” (書同文，
車同軌) measures taken by Qin shi huangdi 秦始皇帝 as a laudable example of “standardization”.
281See Deleuze's critique of Hegelian “identity thinking” in  Difference and Repetition, New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1994.
282Or “self-positing eye”. See J.G. Fichte, Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy. (Wissenschaftslehre) Nova Methodo  
(1796/99), edited and translated by Daniel Breazeale, New York: Cornell University Press, 1998, p.130. Also see Dieter 
Henrich,  “Fichte's  Original  Insight”,  in  Contemporary  German  Philosophy,  edited  by Darrel  E.  Christensen  et.al., 
University Park: Penn State Press, 1982, pp.31-40.
283Niklas  Luhmann,  Theories  of  Distinction:  Redescribing  the  Descriptions  of  Modernity,  Stanford  (Cal.):  Stanford 
University Press, 2002, p.129.
90
the following with reference to Kant: 
In  the  Western  frame  of  thought,  a  human  being  (the  subject)  “observes”  the  world;  in  this
epistemological framework, everything which cannot be internally “changed” [化] by the subject is an
absolutely external transcendent entity […] China284 [on the other hand] does not recognize an absolutely 
external transcendent [form of] existence, which is why it opened up a wholly different scope. What
Chinese thought presupposes is that for every single “other”, there is always a way to transform him
into a harmonious entity; or in other words, that any non-harmonious relationship can be changed into a
harmonious one, and that any external entity is an object which can be “transformed” [ 化 ] instead of
being an object that has to be conquered.285
Thus, what is taken to be a pathological distance between self/subject and other/object is bridged in an 
by collapsing the object (ratio essendi) into the subject (ratio cognoscendi), without any check on the 
ambitions of reason (Vernunft) such as Kant's limit-concept of the thing-in-itself (Ding-an-sich). I will 
touch upon this issue later in the third chapter, where we will have more space to discuss this problem 
in the context of Mou Zongsan's much more sustained and sophisticated interpretation of Kant. Let us 
for now instead take up the obvious paradox in Zhao Tingyang's claim that, “only Chinese thought is 
capable of thinking harmony” (只有中国思想才能够思考和谐).286 Bearing the above in mind, one 
could reformulate this claim into the idea that only the whole can think the whole, or, to again invoke 
Aristotle, that only the supreme being is capable of thinking his own thinking (noēsis noēseōs noēsis). 
This culturalist restriction seems to be highly damaging to Zhao's undertaking, and raises the suspicion 
that  even  in  the  idea  of  tianxia,  we  are  really  dealing  with  what  Adorno  would  have  called  an 
“antagonistic entirety”287. William Callahan observes that “even though Zhao is very critical of how 
Western thought employs absolute binaries, he uses the same analytical framework of China/West to 
construct and exclude “the West” as the Other. In this sense, Zhao's Pax Sinica mission is quite similar 
to that of the Western imperialist scholars whom he criticizes.”288 Indeed, it is not hard to see that Zhao 
284Note that the grammatical subject (and philosophically speaking the Subject) here in the Chinese text is literally China.
285西方思想框架是人（主体）在“看”世界，在这个知识论框架中，凡是主观性所“化”不进来的东西就是绝对
在外的超越存在 […] 中国不承认绝对在外的超越存在，所以开拓了思想的另一天地， 中国的思想假定的是，
对于任何他者，都存在着某种方法能够将它化为和谐的存在；或者说，任何不和的关系都可以化成和谐的关系，
任何在外的存在都是可以‘化’的对象而决不是要征服的对象。Zhao, 2005, pp.14-15.
286Zhao, 2005, p.15.
287See Theodor Adorno, Negative Dialectics, New York and London: Continuum, 1973b, pp.10-11.
288William A. Callahan, “Chinese Visions of World Order: Post-Hegemonic or a New Hegemony?”, International Studies  
Review, 10, 2008, p.754.
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Tingyang is caught in the same tension between a programmatic rejection of metaphysical bifurcations 
and a back-door politics of spirit which keeps political Confucianists such as Jiang Qing enthralled. His 
main  object  of  criticism  in  the  comparative  parts  of  his  texts,  is,  not  unexpectedly,  “Western 
democracy”, which he condemns in a similar vein, faulting the democratic mode of governance as 
ignoring the real “qualitative” differences between people, who are abstracted and reified into identical 
units quantifiable in the form of a vote289, ultimately hindering the active transcendence of the state 
towards  an  actual  political  unity  of  the  world  as  “All-under-Heaven”.  Oddly  enough,  given  his 
ontological proclivities, the latter constitutes for Zhao, the “pure theory” (chuncui lilun 纯粹理论)290 of 
“an a priori political unit” (先天的政治单位)291, which forms “the metaphysics of any possible world 
system” (任何可能的世界制度的形而上学).292 One cannot but feel that Zhao's tianxia presupposes 
what  it  purports  to  supplant.  How else  but  through  a  strong interventionist  super-state  would  the 
following be conceivable on a global scale?: “An efficient political system must have the universal 
efficacy to be able to fill the entire possible political space and must have the ability to be completely 
disseminated throughout all possible political levels.”293 Finally, the distinction Zhao makes between a 
democratic “rule of the majority of the people” (minzhu 民主 ) and the real “heart  of the people” 
(minxin 民心) brings the specter of an exorcised transcendence back in after a refreshing slumber in the 
netherworld: the former is a merely “psychological”, ephemeral, and empirical “form” ( 形态 ); the 
latter is the substantial “essential mind” (benxin 本心), equipped with a “spiritual meaning” (精神含
义).294
In the absence of Tang's  and Mou's paraconsistent,  dialectical style  of reasoning, the contradiction 
between  non-dualist  and/or  anti-substantialist  ontological  presuppositions  on  the  one  hand,  and  a 
restoration of such presuppositions in cultural, political and social conceptions on the other, becomes 
289Zhao, 2005, p.27.
290Zhao, 2005, p.51.
291Zhao, 2005, p.48.
292Zhao, 2005, p.39. 
293一个有效的政治制度必须具有充满整个可能的政治空间的普遍有效性和通达每个可能的政治层次的完全传递性 
。Zhao, 2005, p.19. I think Chong Jianxin徐建新 is quite justified in considering this to be one of the most problematic 
aspects of Zhao's theory of tianxia. See Chong, 2007, pp.131-134.
294See Zhao, 2005, pp.28-29, p.33. In arguing against the “quantitative” perversions of Western democratic voting and 
opinion polls, Zhao's contends, in a gesture of confused empiricism, that “the will of the people always expresses itself 
as a social atmosphere that can be intuited or directly felt, furthermore, it would seem that people's intuitions of the  
popular sentiment and their impressions of the social atmosphere can never be mistaken.” 民情总是表现为能够直观的
或者直接感受到的社会气氛，而且，人们关于民情的直观、对社会气氛的感受似乎从来不会出错。Ibid., p.57.
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harder  to  smooth over  or cover  up.  Tu Weiming,  probably the most  well-known spokesman for a 
reinvented Confucianism in Europe and Northern America, is known for his universalist stance and 
embracive position vis-à-vis other “world religions”, which he tries to bring into a constructive dialog 
with Confucianism in its “third epoch”.295 For Tu, Confucianism transcends both time and culture, in 
the sense that it may have started out as the “regional culture of Qufu” at a specific historical juncture 
and was later manipulated as an oppressive ideology by imperial rule, but still succeeded in becoming a 
constitutive part of “East Asian civilization”, and will remain of enduring value for global society at 
large.296 It is fairly obvious however, that this transcendence of time, history and culture can only be 
accomplished precisely by first conceiving of Confucianism as Culture, that is to say, as Spirit. In Tu's 
argument for the value of Confucianism in the contemporary globalized world, the aforementioned 
contradiction comes to the surface in all its bareness:
The modern West's dichotomous world view (spirit/ matter, mind/body, physical/mental, sacred/profane,
creator/creature,  God/man,  subject/object)  is  diametrically  opposed  to  the  Chinese  holistic  mode  of
thinking [...] the Enlightenment mentality is so radically different from any style of thought familiar to
the Chinese mind that it challenges all dimensions of the Sinic world.297
What  is  striking  about  this  passage  is  that  any critical  force  its  rather  commonplace  rejection  of 
purportedly typically “Western” dichotomies might have, is immediately neutralized by the fact that it 
simultaneously reinstates precisely such a binary opposition in the form of a dichotomous distinction 
between the “West” and the “Sinic world”.298 Chenshan Tian's book Chinese Dialectics. From Yijing to  
Marxism299 offers another such, perhaps even more glaring, example with reference to the problem of 
time. Tian identifies a strand of thought he calls  tongbian 通變 , or “continuity throughout change”, 
295Tu Weiming, “Towards a Third Epoch of Confucian Humanism”, in Tu Weiming, Way, Learning, and Politics. Essays  
on the Confucian Intellectual, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993, pp.181-160.
296See Tu Weiming, “Confucian Encounter with the Enlightenment Mentality of the Modern West”, Oriens Extremus 49, 
2010, pp.249-251. Cf. Chen Lai, “On the Universal and Local Aspects of Confucianism”,  Frontiers of Philosophy in  
China, 1, 2006, pp.79-91. Tang Junyi had a similar universalist conception of Confucius: “The Confucius of that time  
did not only belong to the state of Lu, he was also the Confucius of what was then “All-under-Heaven”, that is to say of  
China. Today we must make a further step and turn him into a Confucius of the true All-under-Heaven, or a Confucius of 
the [whole] world.” (孔子在當時不只是魯國之孔子，亦是當時之天下即當時之中國的孔子，後來成為東方的孔
子。今日我們正要再發展一步，使之成為真正之天下的孔子或世界的孔子). ”Concerning the Eastern Humanist 
Society” (Guanyu dongfang renwen xuehui關於東方人文學會), [1962] in ZB, p.744.
297Tu, 2002, p.212. Emphasis added. 
298I  therefore  agree  with  Arif  Dirlik  when  he  observes  that  “for  all  its  purported  constructivism,  the  very  urge  in  
postcolonial criticism to overcome a dichotomous modernity/tradition distinction invites by the back door reified notions 
of culture.” Dirlik, 2007, p.75.
299Chenshan Tian, Chinese Dialectics. From Yijing to Marxism, Lanham: Lexington Books, 2005.
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which was first developed in the “cosmology” of the Book of Changes.300 The Yijing's 易經 “ontology 
of  events”  was  “not  one  of  substance”301,  always  remained  devoid  of  any  dualistic  “sense  of 
transcendence”302 and  continued  to  operate  in  what  it  unfailingly  managed  to  transform  into  a 
distinctively Chinese form of thought with its Midas touch, right up to Chinese Marxists such as Qu 
Qiubai 瞿秋白  (1899-1935),  Ai Siqi 艾思奇  (1910-1966)  and  even  Mao Zedong  himself.  The 
dialectical paradigm of  tongbian, “in which the complementary and contradictory interactions of the 
two basic elements of the polarity of yin and yang produce change”303 could in Tian's view help to 
“overcome  some  of  the  difficulties  that  have  attended  Western  Marxisms”304.  At  one  point,  this 
approach leads Tian to a forced and awkward attempt to prove that “dialectics” (bianzheng辯證) was 
not, as is generally assumed, a neologism invented by Japanese translators of Western concepts, which 
he does by poetically exploiting the richness of the semantic fields covered by the individual characters 
of  the  compound  bianzheng  in  a  manner  reminiscent  of  Heidegger's  most  obscure  writings.305 As 
Karatani  Kōjin  observes,  “the  problem with  etymological  retrospection  is  that  it  tends  to  occlude 
origins of the recent past, the actual historical formation.”306 The resulting occlusion allows Tian to 
paint  Mao Zedong as  a faithful  adherent  to  the specifically Chinese style  of  dialectics and as yet  
another sentinel of “continuity throughout change”, as if the Cultural Revolution never happened.307 
Tian's exposition becomes even more problematic when he applies his notion of  tongbian  to recent 
modern  history  and  approvingly  quotes  a  certain  Liu  Rong 刘荣 ,  for  whom the  transition  from 
socialism to “market socialism” embodies the “wisdom” of Deng Xiapoing in effectively bringing the 
“unity of opposites” (对立的统一 ) into practice. It seems to me that in this way, any considerable 
historical discontinuity can be explained away as just another expression of the same old change. The 
300See Tian, 2005, pp.21-46.
301Tian, 2005, p.10. Tian adopts this view from David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, Thinking through Confucius, Albany 
(N.Y.): State University of New York Press, 1987, p.15.
302Tian, 2005, p.10.
303Tian, 2005, p.9.
304Tian, 2005, p.1.
305Tian refers to the expression bianzheng in the context of traditional Chinese medicine (actually the term bianzheng is 
mostly  written  as 辨證 ,  not  as 辯證 in  medical  texts),  where  it  simply  means  “distinguishing  symptoms”  or 
“diagnosing”, and uses the “correlative holism” of Chinese medicine as “proof” for his contention that  bianzheng (as 
signifying “dialectics”) was a “classical Chinese expression”. See Tian, 2005, pp.71-74.
306Kojin Karatani, Transcritique. On Kant and Marx, Cambridge (Mass.): MIT Press, 2003, p.36.
307When Mao spoke of adapting Marxism to Chinese conditions (now usually termed “sinification”), the latter were not  
understood culturally, but mainly referred to the absence of an industrial working-class and the importance of agriculture 
and of the peasants as potential agents of social revolution. See Nick Knight, “Applying Marxism to Asian Conditions. 
Mao Zedong, Ho Chi Minh and the ‘universality’ of Marxism”, in Twentieth Century Marxism. A Global Introduction, 
edited by Daryl Glaser and David M. Walker, London and New York: Routledge, 2007, pp.141-153.
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paradox in the idea, already known since Heraclitus of course, that there is “nothing continuous but 
change”,  can be dissolved through the inherent sovereignty of continuity over change,  and is  thus 
diluted into the wearisome wisdom of Solomon that “there is nothing new under the sun”. This line of 
reasoning seems to come down to a culturalist appropriation of the Medieval theological doctrine of 
occasionalism, a doctrine according to which nothing ever really happens in the world out of itself (that 
the collision of one object with another for example cannot be understood in terms of cause and effect),  
but only constitutes an occasion for God to intervene in the (dis)order of the world, since nothing is 
assumed to be able to happen without Him. Culture waits patiently backstage for History to give the 
cue. As such, the idea of Spirit is really only absent in name.
1.4.6 Concluding remarks
Contradictions between basic philosophical positions and political stances (derived, or quite simply 
detached from them) are of course not unique to modern Confucianist discourse.308 But in the work of 
the second generation of New Confucians, the paradoxical coexistence of anti-substantialism as a way 
of distinguishing Chinese from Western philosophy on the one hand309 and the propagation of culture as 
a living transhistorical substance on the other is staring the reader in the face as a contradiction begging 
to  be accounted for.  The ontologically staunchly anti-substantialist  Tang Junyi  for example has no 
problem writing that
the Spirit of Chinese culture has an incomparable strength, it is directly linked to the depths of the life
and Spirit  of all  Chinese. But one must  understand that this  Spirit  can only exist objectively in the
society, history and culture of the entire people and exist in the present through its presence in the minds
of all  Chinese. It  absolutely does not belong to any individual or political party.  It  is nothing but a
vast  flowing  river  searching  for  its  own  path  completing  its  own  development,  soundlessly  and
ceaselessly following its  necessary  direction  in  accordance  with  is  own nature.  “Those  who  act  in
accordance with Heaven will persist, those who go against Heaven will perish.” It [the Spirit of Chinese
308See Derrida's analysis of the notorious case of Heidegger. Jacques Derrida,  Of Spirit.  Heidegger and the Question, 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989. 
309See Tang Junyi, “An Interpretation of the Fundamental Spirit of Chinese Culture” (Zhongguo wenhua genben jingshen 
zhi yi zhong jieshi 中國文化根本精神之一種解釋 ), [1935] in  Collection of Comparative Essays on Chinese and  
Western Philosophical Thought (Zhongxi zhexue sixiang zhi bijiao lunwen ji 中西哲學思想之比較論文集), vol.11 of 
TJ, pp.1-40.
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culture] is nothing but the God of the Chinese people310 [...] All your efforts should be devoted to this
Spirit. It is nothing but your innermost self.311
中國文化精神有無比的大力，它是直接貫注於中國之全部人之生命與心靈之深處。但是必須了解，
這個精神只是一個客觀的存在於整個民族社會歷史文化中，並通過全中國之人心而存在於今日者。
它絕對不屬於任何一私人，或一政黨。它只是一浩浩的長流在尋求它自己之道路，完成其自身的
發展，而無聲無息向著它之自然且合於當然的方向流。順天者存，逆天者亡。它即是中華民族的
上帝。[...] 你一切的努力必須是為了它。而它即是你之最內在的自己。
I  do  not  think  such  theologically  infused  passages  can  be  dismissed  as  instances  of  “polemical 
parallelism”.312 They  sit  uneasy  with  Tang's  opposition  to  what  he  took  to  be  Hegel's 
instrumentalization  of  the  particular  in  service  of  a  universal  which  merely uses  the  former  as  a 
transitional (過渡) station on its way to self-completion instead of as a self-sufficient goal which does 
not merely serve ulterior ends.313 The “Ruse of Reason” (List der Vernunft) is simply replaced by the 
“Ruse of Culture”: “Cultural life is our goal, [whereas] existence is merely our means [to achieve this  
goal]” (文化生命是我們的目的，生存只是我們的手段)314. In this regard, it is all very well to stress 
that  the  concept  of  a  metaphysical  Spirit,  which  is  “not  only  substance,  but  also  subject”315, is 
310Cf. Mou, “Introspections after a Great Disaster” (Da nan hou de fansheng 大難後的反省 ), [1947] in  ZW2, p.970, 
p.972: “Adam was God's first son. The lure of the snake at his side, he could see his father when looking back. But only 
by trembling in fear before his sinful side could he begin to repent and turn back. It has been over sixty years since Japan 
invaded China, and only now [after the World War II] has this sin been lifted [from us]. But now we are caught again in  
a new source of sin [i.e. Chinese communism]. Taking advantage of this juncture in time, our whole people should  
experience a deep sense of repentance, and realize that we have to turn back to look around as soon as possible. Behind  
us stands our father. We must search for our father, and only after we have found him will we be at peace and be able to 
establish ourselves. […] Our whole people should repent before the history our ancestors laid out for us and express  
their repentance before the great cultural continuity forged by Confucius and Mencius.” (亞當是上帝的第一個兒子。
蛇惑在旁。回頭是父。唯有戰栗於罪惡之側者，始能懺悔，始能回頭。日本侵略中國有六十余年，直到今日才
解除這個罪惡。然而現在又陷於一個新的罪惡之淵。際此時機，全民族都應當有深深的懺悔，都應當急急猛醒
回頭。回頭是父。我們應當找我們的父。惟有找得了自己的父，才得有安頓，才得建立自己 [...] 我必首先要求
全民族向著我們的祖先所締造的歷史懺悔，向著孔、孟所鑄造的文化大統懺悔).
311“The Spirit of Chinese Culture and its Latent Power” (Zhongguo wenhua jingshen yu qi qianzai liliang 中國文化精神與
其潛在力量 ), [1952b] in  ZB,  p.651. My italics. The passage quoted by Tang is from Mencius, 4A,7. Translation 
amended from The Works of Mencius, translated by James Legge, New York: Dover, 1970, p.296.
312On this notion, see Volkhard Krech, “Dynamics in the History of Religions. Preliminary Considerations on Aspects of a 
Research Program”,  in  Dynamics  in  the  History of  Religions between Asia and Europe.  Encounters,  Notions,  and  
Comparative Perspectives, edited by Volkhard Krech and Marion Steinicke, Leiden: Brill, 2012, p.63.
313See Tang, [1953b], pp.168-173 and  “The Ideal World of Humanism” (Lixiang de renwen shijie 理想的人文世界 ), 
[1949c] in RJ, pp.55-56.
314“Attitudes towards Culture which Our Compatriots Should Change” (Guoren dui wenhua ying gaibian zhi taidu 國人對
文化應改變之態度), [1936] in ZB, p.30. Cf. p.32.
315G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977, p.10.
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incompatible  with  or  even  contradictory  to  traditional  forms  of  Chinese  thought,  which  indeed 
generally never showed a proclivity for such ontological distinctions. However, one cannot thereby 
bypass the question as to why philosophers such as Tang and Mou, despite their unceasing efforts to 
philosophically combat and transcend categorical ontological and epistemological bifurcations, were 
unwilling to abandon the idea of a substantial Spirit (and a clear distinction between the phenomenal 
and  the  noumenal)  for  what  David  Hall  and  Roger  Ames  take  to  be  the  “radical  immanence” 
characteristic of Chinese (Confucian) thought.316 Perhaps one could say that what is philosophically 
most disagreeable about their work is at the same time what is historically most interesting. As Fabian 
Heubel points out, insisting on the pervasiveness of complete immanence is often linked to the idea that 
Chinese thought is characterized by a sense of passive conformity and a lack of critical distance from 
the world.317 The theme of transcendence in both Tang's and Mou's work can in my view be interpreted 
as a space for critical reflection on the historical condition in which comparatively established cultural 
generalizations, such as the one based on the distinction between transcendence and immanence, are 
established. In any case, as we have seen in the last section, the metaphysics of Spirit is apparently 
perfectly able to endure a rhetorical dismissal of metaphysical distinctions, which can be reinstated in 
the  very act  of  dismissing  them as  alien  to  Spirit.  As  Hegel  already knew,  the  latter  “contains  a 
becoming-other”,  its  life  not  being  one  which  “shrinks  from death  and  keeps  itself  untouched by 
devastation, but rather […] endures it and maintains itself in it”, so that it “wins its truth only when, in 
utter dismemberment, it  finds itself”.318 In the next chapter, we will begin to tease out some of the 
philosophical  consequences  of  the  paradoxical  coexistence  of  a  philosophical  revolt  against 
“substantialism” and the idea of a godlike spiritual-cultural substance (along largely right-Hegelian 
lines)  in  modern  Confucian  discourse,  and  attempt  to  further  analyze  this  paradox  against  the 
background of the historically and socially specific condition of modernity. As I have tried to show in 
the above, this contradictory conception cuts through the (self-drawn) boundaries between spiritual and 
political  Confucianists.  The  philosophical  ramifications  of  and  problems  stemming  from  such 
contradictions or paradoxes were in my opinion more conceptually refined, and left considerably more 
traces,  in  the  work  of  spiritual  Confucians  such  as  Tang  and  Mou  than  in  that  of  most  of  the 
316Hall and Ames, 1987, p.12. Also see Roger T. Ames, “New Confucianism: a Native Response to Western Philosophy”, 
in Chinese Poltical Culture, 1989-2000, edited by Shiping Hua, London and New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2001, pp.87-94.
317See Fabian Heubel,  “Immanente Transzendenz im Spannungsfeld von europäische Sinologie,  kritische Theorie und 
zeitgenössischem  Konfuzianismus”,  polylog,  26,  2011,  p.91:  “Verabsolutierung  der  Immanenz  bedeutet  dabei 
Verabsolutierung von Widerstandslosigkeit  und Kritiklosigkeit:  Immanenz und Kritik schließen sich aus.” Heubel is 
specifically referring to the work of François Julien in this passage.
318Hegel, 1977, p.19.
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contemporary representatives of Confucian discourse, which often reads like a philosophically watered-
down or at least metaphysically neutered version of debates and discussions which had already been 
both systematically and incidentally broached in the work of these thinkers. That a propagation of the 
idea  of  a  Spirit  of  Chinese  culture  can  be  combined  with  almost  postmodern  concerns  over  the 
ontological model of substantialism is remarkable, and mostly not reflected on by those who see the 
influence of Hegel (and German Idealism in general) on Tang's and Mou's thought as fundamentally 
detrimental to their renewal of the Confucian tradition. For this and other reasons which will hopefully 
become clearer in what follows, it is they who will be at the center of the rest of my study. 
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Chapter 2: New Confucian Philosophy in the Context of Twentieth-Century 
Chinese Intellectual History and the Modern Recategorization of Knowledge
Man only exists insofar as he changes, [but] he only exists as himself insofar as he remains unchanged (Nur indem er sich 
verändert, existiert er; nur indem er unveränderlich bleibt, existiert er)
Friedrich Schiller1
It is as a movement from the past to the future that there is time […] Time, therefore, must be conceived as a continuity of  
rupture.
Nishida Kitarō2 
How could a cultured Chinaman not be reactionary?
Count Hermann Keyserling3
2.1 Introduction: the historical form of identity and difference as continuity and 
discontinuity
On the first pages of his Introduction to Philosophy, the professor of philosophy and Hegel specialist 
Zhang Shiying张世英 (b. 1921) makes a case for the continuing relevance and irreducible significance 
of  philosophical  thought  in  the  modern  world,  which  he  concludes  with  the  following  evocative 
passage:
In today's age of burgeoning markets and the daily increasing development of science and technology,
people are on the one hand focused on pursuing their [own] interests and striving for the possession of 
concrete things, while on the other hand they cannot but continue to inquire into the ultimate meaning of 
life  and pursue some of the greatest  problems of  universal  importance. Here we find an incredibly
wealthy person sighing over his personal sense of spiritual emptiness, as if he didn't have a thing in the
world. There we find an entrepreneur standing on the top floor of the Jin Mao Tower in Shanghai still
reciting verses  by the Tang dynasty poet  Chen Zi'ang [661-702]:  The  past  offers  no glimpse of  the
ancients / The future shows no sign of those still to come / When I contemplate the infinity of the world/ I  
1 Friedrich  Schiller,  Über  die  ästhetische  Erziehung  des  Menschen,  in  einer  Reihe  von  Briefen,  [1795] 
http://gutenberg.spiegel.de/buch/3355/2
2 Nishida Kitarō, Ontology of Production. 3 Essays, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2012, p.158.
3 Hermann Keyserling,  The Travel Diary of a Philosopher, translated by J. Holroyd Reece, New York: Harcourt, Brace 
and Company, vol. 2, 1925, p.56. 
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shed mournful tears in solitude. All of this goes to show that most people living in today's world also
engage in philosophical reflections.4
As is clear from this  excerpt and the context in which it figures, Zhang Shiying is making a general 
argument  for  the  importance  and  the  value  of  philosophy  in  the  modern  age,  an  argument  not 
particularly uncommon or original at a time when austerity policies are increasingly forcing the most 
ostensibly “useless” field in the human sciences and the humanities in general into a defensive position 
of  self-justification.5 Zhang  seems  to  claim  that  philosophical  reflection  should  not  be  seen  as 
completely detached from the daily routines  of  people in  their  everyday comings and goings,  but 
continues to have its place next to, and in a sense also inside of, the more pedestrian and utilitarian 
considerations  dominating  modern  life.  Still,  one can easily imagine  this  extract  being  invoked in 
support of claims of cultural continuity, more specifically a form of deep-level continuity obscured by 
an only apparent homogenization of the human and non-human life-world brought on by globalization. 
The idea that China does not (and will not, or more categorically, will never) become less Chinese in  
becoming modern and the notion that Chinese people continue to stay in touch with their tradition in 
spite of rapid modernization and the rise of China as an economic and geopolitical power within the 
global system of nation states, is very widespread and need not in itself necessarily be problematized.  
From a liberal point of view, it is enough to acknowledge that individuals have the right to describe 
themselves in whatever way they please, which would logically at least imply accepting the possibility 
of non-liberal, communitarian or culturalist forms of self-description that do not ultimately call upon 
4 在当今市场经济繁荣，科学技术日益发达的时代，人们一方面热衷于功利追求，热衷于对具体的东西的占有，
一方面也常常要追问人生的意义究竟何在，追问一些最大的普遍问题。有一位大富豪甚至感叹自己精神空虚，
一无所有，别有一位企业家站在上海金茂大厦的顶层还念着唐代诗人陈子昂诗句：‘前不见古人，后不见来者，
念天地之悠悠，独怆然而涕下’。这都说明生活在现实世界的人，大都也作哲学的思考。Zhang Shiying张世英, 
An Introduction to Philosophy (Zhexue daolun 哲学导论), Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2002, p.2. 
5 I am thinking of Martha Nussbaum's recent book,  Not for Profit! Why Democracy Needs the Humanities, Princeton 
(N.J.): Princeton University Press, 2010. There is a certain danger of getting caught in such a game of self-justification. 
Very broadly speaking, one can either attempt to prove that human and social sciences really are “useful” in a very  
performative, yet mediated and not directly obvious way. In doing so, one already gives in to a conception of usefulness  
(or  meaningfulness)  that  is  completely extrinsic  to  what  one  tries  to  defend.  Or,  conversely,  one  can  respond  by 
romantically rejecting the very notion of utility itself and celebrating “uselessness”. Both options are already inscribed in 
the form of the question, which they thus neither answer nor problematize in turn. If one chooses, following Nussbaum, 
to  present  education  and  democracy  as  bulwarks  against  the  logic  of  profit,  then  one  does  not  stop  to  ask  how 
representational democracy and the modern education system are supposed to inhibit the accumulation of surplus value 
in which they are already fully caught up. In practical terms, the solution will perhaps often consist in a joined effort of 
the resignation of, say a professor in the humanities, to lie about the professed usefulness of his particular discipline, and  
the willingness of an administrator responsible for allocating research funding to be lied to. I am echoing, hopefully 
somewhat accurately, some remarks on this subject made by Hans-Georg Moeller in his lecture “'Rambling without 
Destination': On Daoist 'Youing' in the World”, delivered at the 19 th Symposium of the Académie du Midi, 29 May 2012, 
Alet-les-Bains.
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the  individual  subject  to  describe  himself.  It  is  not  always  easy,  and  this  can  be  learned  through 
introspection or psychoanalytic counseling as well, to determine who is talking on behalf of whom, nor 
in what capacity and for what particular purpose, given the fact that not everyone is in a position to 
unreservedly “give an account of oneself” (Judith Butler) and seeing how many people do not speak or 
feel no need to speak (and why should they?), but are only spoken for. In any case, there are many  
anthropological and ethnographic studies that try to attest the survival and active reinvention of certain 
aspects of cultural and religious traditions in the daily practices of ordinary people. Sébastien Billioud 
and Joël Thoraval cite the case of a woman in contemporary mainland China who managed to integrate 
the notoriously obscure and cumbersome philosophical works of Mou Zongsan into her personal life 
and  everyday interactions  with  other  people  by participating  in  the  “reciting  classics  movement”, 
without being primarily academically interested in the Confucian philosopher's merits and defects.6 The 
fact  that  the  global  spread  of  modernity  does  not  automatically  result  in  cultural  and  social 
homogeneity  is  not  disputed  here.  If  anything,  globalization  is  probably  one  of  the  main  factors 
contributing to the appearance of various self-conscious affirmations of cultural and religious identity, 
affirmations which can in turn become crucial elements of the discourse on globalization. As Marshall 
Berman writes at the beginning of his study on modernity: 
Modern environments and experiences cut across all boundaries of geography and ethnicity, of class and
nationality, of religion and ideology: in this sense, modernity can be said to unite all mankind. But it is a
paradoxical unity, a unity of disunity: it pours us all into a maelstrom of perpetual disintegration and
renewal, of struggle and contradiction, of ambiguity and anguish.7
At the risk of unfairly overburdening the short and fairly simple passage from Zhang Shiying I just 
quoted with an exegetical diligence it was not designed to withstand, I would like to try and take it as a  
starting point for considering the broader problematic of cultural continuity and historical discontinuity 
and the relation between tradition and modernity in the case of New Confucianism. My impression that 
Zhang's  text  can  be  read  in  this  way is  reinforced  by the  image  it  presents  of  an  accomplished 
businessman standing on the top floor (a clear indication of his success) of what is at the time of  
writing (though probably not for long) the seventh largest building in mainland China, while reciting a 
6 Sébastien Billioud and Joël Thoraval, “The Contemporary Revival of Confucianism.  Anshen liming or the Religious 
Dimension of Confucianism”, China Perspectives, 3, 2008, pp.88-92.
7 Marshall Berman, All That Is Solid Melts into Air. The Experience of Modernity, New York: Penguin Books, 1988, p.15.
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well-known 1300-year-old poem. By reciting these celebrated Tang 唐 dynasty (618-907) verses that 
describe a sense of historical isolation from both past and future generations, the poetically minded 
entrepreneur in Zhang's example is paradoxically presented as becoming enabled to connect with the 
past  through  a  sense  of  connectedness  with  a  certain  tradition  of  disconnectedness.  Despite  the 
historical distance between the author of the poem On Climbing Youzhou Tower (Deng Youzhou tai ge  
登幽州台歌) and the businessman on top of the 88-story “Tower of Golden Prosperity”8 reciting these 
verses, the textual parallelism between the two towers in Zhang's text suggests that the feeling of being 
cut off from the past is implicitly assumed to be the same in both cases, so that we could speak of a  
“continuity of discontinuity” manifesting itself in a shared sense of historical isolation. Both the setting 
and the material features of the tower may have changed, but the time permeating it would appear to be 
part of the same historical continuum, close to an eternal present which is forever equidistant to both 
past and future. Furthermore, Zhang's contrastive juxtaposition of a focus on “concrete things” and 
considerations of “problems of a general nature” has a clear temporal dimension: in our day-to-day 
activities, we function as pragmatic agents governed by a purposive rationality in which the immediate 
interests of the present are most relevant and imposing. In contrast to this calculative-rational level, the 
meaningful dimension of life is marked by the possibility of relating to questions of a more durable and 
recurring nature, the “eternal” questions of a philosophia perennis.9 The underlying idea seems to be 
that  it  is  the  latter  dimension  of  an  eternal  recurrence  which  constitutes  a  veritable  repository of 
meaning,  as  opposed  to  inescapable,  but  ultimately  empty  concerns  about  immediate  usefulness. 
Moreover, the “eternal” would seem to have a privileged relation with the past: it is by connecting with  
the past that the eternal becomes accessible and tangible as something outlasting and surpassing the 
constraints of the fleeting time in which it can be experienced by a particular individual. Within this  
line of reasoning, it is in a sense the nature of the past itself which, through its inherent meaningfulness, 
guarantees a minimum of continuity between the past on the one hand and the present which is its 
8 Incidentally, the Jin Mao (金茂 jinmao: literally, “golden prosperity”) building is itself an architectural expression of a 
quest for continuity. The  American architect  Adrian D. Smith (the man behind the Burj Khalifa in Dubai) who was 
commissioned to design the building modeled it after the iconic East-Asian pagoda. See Thomas J. Campanella,  The 
Concrete Dragon: China's Urban Revolution and What it Means for the World, Princeton: Princeton Architectural Press, 
2008, pp.84-86.
9 A classic  case of what Durkheim called homo duplex, which Weigang Chen describes in the following way: “[...] the 
bourgeois as the privatized individual is actually two things in once:  bourgeois  and  homme.  One the one hand, the 
bourgeois as  the owner of goods is  profoundly caught up in the requirements of the market and thus subjected to  
empirical inclinations. On the other hand, however, the bourgeois as a human being is the subject of pure interiority that  
follows its own laws and not external purpose. This peculiar human subjectivity promises liberation from the constraints  
of what exists, whether it refers to the prescription of culture or the necessity of life.” Confucian Marxism: a Reflection  
on Religion and Global Justice, Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013, p.9.
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continuation  on  the  other.  In  this  way,  the  present  is  saved  from becoming  an  atomized  instance 
condemned to forever remain confined to itself in a state of detached suspension, precisely because it is 
part of a history and a tradition of such a suspension. 
In  a  much  more  explicit  fashion  than  Zhang  Shiying,  the  contemporary  political  philosopher  Bai 
Tongdong白彤东 (b.1970) has argued for such a paradoxical “continuity of rupture”, a contradictory 
continuity grounded in the assumption of a culturally formative period, which in effect annuls the very 
notion of the modern age being in  many respects  fundamentally discontinuous with tradition on a 
global scale. In his China: The Political Philosophy of the Middle Kingdom, Bai attempts to defend the 
contemporary relevance of traditional Chinese political conceptions by putting forward the idea that the 
Spring and Autumn (Chunqiu 春秋 ) (770-476 BCE) and Warring States (Zhanguo 戰國 ) (475-221 
BCE)  periods  constituted  a  “modernity before  its  time”,  or  a  “modernity before  modernity”.10 He 
claims  that  these  two  crucial  periods  in  ancient  Chinese  history  already  exhibited  many  of  the 
characteristics of modern societies. Bai lists the collapse of a “feudal structure”, important agricultural 
innovations, the preponderance of military conflicts, the “marketization of land”, and the emergence of 
a “plurality of beliefs” as some of the structural features which made the corresponding semantics of 
what is generally called “classical” Chinese (political) thought modern through and through. For Bai, 
“China had already experienced its own modernization of sorts, a few hundred years before the onset of 
the Common Era – that is, two thousand years before the West! […] Chinese thinkers during the SAWS 
[Spring and Autumn and Warring States] were already dealing with issues of modernity.”11 It seems to 
me that Bai Tondong's perspective is severely plagued by an intentional methodological anachronism 
and a form of historical consciousness that forgets itself in running back too far in time. If we were to 
take  it  as  our  starting  point,  there  would  not  be  much  left  to  inquire  into  and  it  would  become 
unnecessary to speak of “modern problems” or “the problem of modernity”: the past becomes both the 
object and the horizon of observation, so that the present can be bracketed out, only to be allowed back 
into the equation when the damage has already been done and the present has long been forgotten. But 
is such self-exclusion possible in the first place? One is reminded of what Husserl wrote concerning his 
phenomenological procedure of “bracketing”: “I, the ego carrying out the epochē, am not included in 
10 See Bai Tongdong,  China: The Political Philosophy of the Middle Kingdom,  London: Zed Books, 2012, chapter 1, 
pp.16-27. On Bai's own political ideas, see David Elstein, Democracy in Contemporary Confucian Philosophy, London 
and New York: Routledge, 2015, pp.167-196. 
11 Bai, 2012, p.20.
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the realm of objects [which are bracketed out] […] I am necessarily the one carrying it out.”12 Perhaps 
it  is  not  so easy to  escape this  Cartesian  certainty.  And why,  one  might  ask,  this  highly strategic 
procedure of putting the present out of play in the first place? Can one really overcome a break by 
projecting it back in time? Why is Bai Tongdong only one of the many and certainly not the first in a 
long line of thinkers who opted for such a conception? In this regard, I fully agree with Ding Yun 丁耘 
when  he  quips:  “Shouldn't  we  say  that  precisely  the  fact  that  modernity  itself  is  constantly 
problematized is one of the clearest features of modernity?”.13 
Of  course,  in  a  sense,  change  and  discontinuity  and  the  concomitant  acts  of  adaptation  and 
transformation are integral parts of any cultural tradition. As Niklas Luhmann once put it formulaically: 
“What is not utilized is stable and, by contrast, what is utilized is not stable.” 14 A perceived necessity to 
ward off the possibility of oblivion might well be perceived as intrinsic to historical consciousness as 
such.15 Perhaps it is even difficult to conceive of time itself without appealing to the notion of the 
discontinuous. After we have finished asking what time is, we are already no longer the same. Since it 
is hard to make a portrait of a subject that cannot stay put, we might be better off trying to capture its  
movements.  In some instances, it  might be very tricky to distinguish between a “traditional” and a 
“modern” sense of discontinuity, especially when traditional and culturally transmitted expressions of a 
sense of rupture are invoked by present day writers to express the “same” feeling of dislocation in time. 
Perhaps it is not very meaningful to do so. It would almost certainly remain impossible without placing 
a given semantics of temporal change in the context of its social  and historical structure. That the  
mental states and neurological processes accompanying the emotional experience of historical isolation 
might  possibly  be  transhistorically  identical  for  all  members  of  the  species  Homo  Sapiens  is  of 
secondary importance in this  regard,  or at  least  from this  point of view. When departing from the 
Luhmannian distinction between semantics and structure, it could be argued that two statements of an 
equally dramatic tone and stature drawing on a common cultural vocabulary can be the expressions of 
12 Edmund  Husserl, The  Crisis  of  European  Sciences  and  Transcendental  Phenomenology.  An  Introduction  to  
Phenomenological Philosophy, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970, p.77.
13 现代性本身不断地成为问题，这难道不是现代性最清楚的特征之一吗？ Ding Yun,  Confucianism and 
Enlightenment. Current Chinese Thought in the Perspective of Philosophical Encounters  (Ruxue yu qiming: zhexue  
huitong shiye xia de dangqian zhongguo sixiang 儒学与启蒙：哲学会同视野下的当前中国思想), Beijing: Sanlian 
shudian, 2011, p.77, footnote no.3. 
14 Niklas Luhmann, A Systems Theory of Religion, Stanford (Cal.): Stanford University Press, 2013a, pp.11-12.
15 Recall the famous opening lines of Herodotus's  Histories:  “These are the researches of Herodotus of Halicarnassus, 
which he publishes in the hope of thereby preserving from decay the remembrance of what men have done”. Herodotus,  
Histories, translated by George Rawlinson, Hertforshire: Wordsworth Editions, 1996, p.3. 
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two significantly different kinds of continuity or discontinuity. This would apply to the words Mou 
Zongsan is reported to have uttered on his deathbed as well: “There is no duality between past and 
present” (古今無兩 )16. What I mean is that a continuity of representations does not suffice to assume a 
similar continuity on the level of what is represented. If modernity is conceptualized as marking a 
relative but qualitatively significant structural break with the premodern past, this implies that it  is  
possible  to  establish  an  (at  least  heuristically)  meaningful  distinction  between  the  change  and 
discontinuity  internal  to  any  tradition  and  the  dynamic  underlying  and  driving  transformations 
effectuated  in  the  face  of  modernity.17 This  would  mean  that  the  traditional  dynamic  of  change 
conditioning such transformative acts has itself  undergone a change significant enough to speak of 
something like a “traditional discontinuity” and a “modern discontinuity”.  One would thus have to 
recognize a minimal but important difference between the state described by Hamlet's observation that 
“the time is out of joint”, a condition which is in a sense intrinsic to any time and to time as such, and 
the being “out of joint” of this “out-of-jointness” itself.18 
Anyone  even  remotely  familiar  with  classical  Chinese  texts  knows  how many of  them (not  only 
“philosophical” works, but also for example medical treatises) start with a dramatic observation of the 
decline of the Way (dao 道) and of a rupture in the succession of the Way (daotong 道統) that should 
serve to keep All-under-Heaven from falling into a seemingly ever-imminent disorder. In a famous text 
entitled On the Original Way (Yuandao 原道) by the Tang-dynasty poet and scholar Han Yu 韩愈 (768-
824), we find Han bemoaning the degeneration of the Way of Confucius in the following memorable 
manner: 
16 Quoted in  Wang Xingguo 王兴国 ,  “Alone,  yet  not  Alone:  Mou Zongsan and Three Famous Universities:  Peking 
University, National Southwestern Associated University, and Taiwan University” (Luomo er bu luomo – Mou Zongsan  
yu san suo zhuming daxue: Beijing daxue, Xinan lianhe daxue, Taiwan daxue落寞而不落寞——牟宗三与三所著名大
学: 北京大学、西南联合大学、台湾大学), Huanan shifan daxue xuebao 华南师范大学学报, 1, 2011, p.23.
17 David Gross writes that “for at least as long as there have been written records there have been complaints that tradition 
has not been given due respect. Some of the most ancient Egyptian and Near Eastern texts indicate a concern that the  
'old ways' were not being sufficiently honoured, or that ancestral values were not being treated with the piety they 
deserve. Charges like these continue to echo through the centuries, but one has to wait until relatively recent times to 
hear another, very different charge: that tradition itself is disappearing”. David Gross, The Past in Ruins: Tradition and  
the Critique of Modernity, Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1992, p.3.
18 The theme of “out-of-jointness” will be familiar to readers of Heidegger and Derrida. See Jacques Derrida, Spectres of  
Marx. The State of Debt, The Work of Mourning and the New International, New York: Routledge, 2006. Derrida speaks 
of the “non-contemporaneity with itself of the living present” (p.xviii) and “the disjointure in the very presence of the 
present” (p.29) in his attempt to arrive at an idea of justice which is not limited to the present (and to “presence”). I do 
not feel competent to judge Derrida's ideas at this instance. I do wonder whether his approach does not stop short at 
ascribing “out-of-jointness” to time and/or history as a permanent structure (again paradoxically of impermanence),  
without considering the possibility of a historically conditioned (qualitative) change in this ontologized impermanence. 
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The Zhou dynasty declined and Confucius passed away.  In the period that  followed,  there  was the
burning of the books in the Qin dynasty (221–206 B.C.E.), Daoism in the Han dynasty (206 B.C.E.–220
c.e.),  and Buddhism in the Jin (265–420 C.E.),  Wei (386–549), Liang (502–57),  and Sui (589–617)
dynasties; those who talked about the Way, Virtue, benevolence, and righteousness either followed the
teachings of Yang Zhu or Mozi or accepted the doctrines of Laozi or the Buddha. Those who accepted
these teachings had to reject Confucianism. They regarded the leaders of these schools as their lords and
Confucius as a slave; they adhered to the new and vilified the old. Is it not sad! Those living in later ages  
who want to learn about the Way, Virtue, benevolence, and righteousness—from whom can they hear
such things?19
周道衰，孔子沒。火于秦，黃老于漢，佛于晉、魏、梁、隋之間。其言道德仁義者，不入于楊，
則入于墨。不入于老，則入于佛。入于彼，必出于此。入者主之，出者奴之；入者附之，出者
汙之。噫！後之人其欲聞仁義道德之說，孰從而聽之？
The  twentieth  century Confucian  philosopher  Mou Zongsan enumerates  roughly the  same foes  of 
Confucianism we already encountered in the above excerpt to describe the disastrous fate he considers 
the Confucian tradition to have suffered at the hands of communist iconoclasm in a text from 1951, 
bearing the somewhat bewildering yet at the same time revealing title “Buddha, Laozi, Shen [Buhai], 
Han [Feizi] and the Communist Party” (Fo Lao Shen Han yu gongdang佛老申韓與共黨). From the 
title of Mou's essay alone, it would appear that the communists are nothing but a combined modern day 
version of the Legalist,  Daoists and Buddhists already condemned by Han Yu in his  Yuandao. The 
communist takeover of China would thus seem to be on a par with and of essentially the same nature as  
the influence exerted by these traditional non-Confucian currents of thought in imperial China, which 
Han saw as leading to a disastrous corruption of the Confucian order, this order being understood as the 
necessary condition for a benevolent and righteous governance of the empire. The inclusion of Daoism 
may  appear  a  bit  puzzling  at  first,  especially  seeing  how  Mou  would  later  present  the  Daoist 
perspective  of  “non-being”  (wu 無 )  as  an  effective  countermeasure  against  the  introduction  of 
oppositional  and distorting distinctions (particularly of class) into an essentially holistic  social  and 
ontological reality by communist ideology.20 “Utilitarianist” Mohism and the “hedonist” doctrines of 
19 Translation quoted from Philip J. Ivanhoe,  On Ethics and History: Essays and Letters of Zhang Xuecheng,  Stanford 
(California): Stanford University Press, 2009, p.134.
20 See “The Wisdom of Daoist 'Non-Being'  and Their Perspectival Metaphysics”  (Daojia de 'wu' de zhihui yu jingjie  
xingtai de xing'ershangxue 道家的「無」底智慧與境界形態的形而上學 ), [1975a] in WW, pp.223-234; Nineteen 
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Yang Zhu楊朱 (440–360 BCE), which Mou often added to his list of premodern communists on other 
occasions, are not explicitly mentioned or discussed in this essay.21 His usual suspect was the Legalist 
Qin 秦 dynasty, which he at one point put on a par with the CCP by modifying a quote attributed to 
Dong Zhongshu董仲舒 (179–104 BCE) in the Hanshu漢書, claiming that “never since ancient times 
has there been anything as damaging to the people of the whole world as the Communist Party” (自古
以來，大敗天下之民，未有如共黨者也).22 This is perhaps not so surprising seeing how Mao Zedong 
liked to compare himself with the first Chinese emperor, the latter having already been described by 
Bertrand Russell after his visit to China as “something of a Bolshevik”.23
Nowadays, the idea that there has always been a tradition of anti-traditionalism and even a radical form 
of iconoclasm in China has become fairly standard in contemporary Confucian discourse.24 However, a 
short look at an excerpt from the opening of Mou's text will suffice to make it clear that there are 
important differences between such rhetorically unifiable discontinuities:
Lectures on Chinese Philosophy (Zhongguo zhexue shijiu jiang 中国哲學十九講), [1983b] vol. 9 of MJ, p.92, pp.106-
107 and The Way of Political Authority and the Way of Governance (Zhengdao yu zhidao政道與治道), [1961] vol.10 of 
MJ, (preface), p.31.
21 See for example Mou's essay “The Responsibility is Heavy and the Road is Long” (Ren zhong er dao yuan任重而道遠) 
[1935c] in  ZW2, p.794. The  German Protestant missionary Ernst Faber (1839-1899) was perhaps the first to paint a 
picture of Mozi墨子 (ca.470 – 391BCE) as a socialist avant la lettre in his Die Grundgedanken des alten chinesischen  
Socialismus oder die Lehre des Philosophen Micius, Elberfeld: R.L. Friderichs, 1877. See Lixin Sun, Das Chinabild der  
deutschen protestantischen Missionare des 19. Jahrhunderts: eine Fallstudie zum Problem interkultureller Begegnung  
und Wahrnehmung, Marburg: Tectum Verlag, 2002, p.149. On Faber, also see the entry by Douglas Brent Whitefield in 
the online Biographical Dictionary of Chinese Christianity (Huaren jidujiao shi renwu cidian 华人基督教史人物词典): 
http://www.bdcconline.net/en/stories/f/ernst-faber.php.
22 Mou, “Cultural Consciousness” (Wenhua yishi 文化意識), [1952d] in SSXB, p.72. The original sentence in the Hanshu 
reads: “Never before since ancient times, has there been anything so damaging to all the people of the world as the Qin,  
who treated chaos with chaos” (自古以來，未甞有以亂濟亂，大敗天下之民如秦者也 ). See Dong Zhongshu's 
biography (liezhuan 列傳 ) in the  Hanshu  漢書 ,  juan  65. Consulted online: http://ctext.org/han-shu/dong-zhong-shu-
zhuan. Later, Mou would come to attribute a certain importance to the Legalists, as having established a functionally  
viable political (administrative) framework after the end of the feudal Zhou order, a framework in his view lasted until 
the end of the empire. See  Mou, [1983b], pp.175-199 and  Serina Chan,  The Thought of Mou Zongsan,  Leiden and 
Boston: Brill, 2011, pp.102-104. For Tang Junyi, the Qin dynasty had merely provided an “abstract formal unity” (抽象
的形式统一) which only became endowed with a concrete content during the Han, after which China truly became a  
cultural totality. See The Spiritual Values of Chinese Culture (Zhongguo wenhua zhi jingshen jiazhi 中國文化之精神價
值), Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, [1953b] 2005, pp.49-50.
23 Bertrand Russell, The Problem of China, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1922, p.25.
24 See for example  Luo, Yijun 罗义俊 ,  Living Existence and Cultural Consciousness:  Historical  Essays on Modern  
Confucianism (Shengming cunzai yu wenhua yishi: dangdai xin rujia shilun 生命存在与文化意识：当代新儒家史论), 
Shanghai: Xuelin chubanshe, 2009, p.28 and Tang Yijie汤一介, general preface (zongxu总序) to the History of Chinese  
Confucianism (Zhongguo ruxue shi 中国儒学史), Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2011, pp.16-17.
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The appearance of the Communist Party in China was certainly not the result of economic problems.
Even the appearance of that sinister and malicious thought of Marx in Europe was in no way the result of 
economic issues [...] Its appearance was purely a problem of thought, a problem of culture and a problem 
of the spirit  of the age. Other external conditions – political and economical ones – all  served as a
pretext. [But] this pretext certainly cannot hide what its [true] substance is. I claim that communism is a
great demon that is evidently not easy to oppose. I further claim that it is a universal heterodoxy, a
heresy of “pure negation”. What I mean by “universal” is the following: it comes forth from the darkest
side of the human temperament. This side is in no way limited to a certain nation, but is universally
present in the entire human race. Therefore, its appearance constitutes a universal heterodoxy within [the 
whole of] humanity. What I mean by “pure negation” is the following: all negations of human nature,
individuality,  the  level  of  values,  the  world,  the  human  personality  and  cultural  ideals  are  pure
negations.  In  China,  the  old  heterodox  schools  were  those  of  Buddhism,  Daoism  and  [the
Legalists] Shen [Buhai] and Han [Feizi]; nowadays we have the Communist Party.25
共黨出現於中國，決非由於經濟問題;甚至馬克思那一套陰險狠愎的思想之出現於歐洲，亦決非
由於經濟問題 [...] 它之出現，完全是一個思想問題、文化問題、時代精神問題。 其他外部的條
件，政治的與經濟的，俱是它的藉口。藉口之所在，並不能掩蔽了它的本質之何所是。我斷言
它是一個大魔，並不是容易對治的。我又斷言它是一個普遍的異端、「純否定」的異端。所謂
「普遍的」，乃是說: 它是發自人類脾性中陰暗之一面。此一面並不限於那個民族，乃是普遍於
人類之全體。故它的出現是人類中一個普遍的異端。所謂「純否定」者，意即 : 凡否定人性、
個性、價值層級、人格世界、文化理想者，即為純 否定。在中國，古之異端為佛、老、申、韓，
今日即為共產黨。 
Several things should be noted here. What is probably most striking about this text is the universalist 
thrust behind Mou's rejection of what he on another occasion called the “catastrophe of ideas” (觀念的
災害 ).26 For him, communism is a “universal heterodoxy” that not only goes against the essence of 
Chinese civilization (in his view, of course, Confucianism), but also runs counter to the very notion of 
civilization and culture as  such.  As is  already evident  from the first  sentence  of  this  passage,  his 
criticism of communism entails an uncompromising rejection of its main theoretical “heresy”, namely 
the historical materialist belief that it is (ultimately) the material, economic conditions of existence as a 
25 “Buddha, Laozi, Shen [Buhai], Han [Feizi] and the Communist Party” (Fo Lao Shen Han yu gongdang佛老申韓與共
黨), [1951a] in SSXB, pp.1-2. 
26 The name of an article from 1962, see SS, pp.27-40. 
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“base” which determines the “superstructure” of a society's ideas and beliefs.27 Mou degrades the base 
to the status of “external conditions” (see below) of secondary importance and goes on to ascribe a self-
sufficiency and a performative capacity to the level of ideas and values comparable to that of the forces 
and  relations  of  production  in  orthodox  Marxism.  He  shared  the  belief  with  many  of  his  fellow 
Confucian philosophers that the ordeal of modern China had its origin in a profound cultural crisis, and 
that  only cultural  renewal  could provide a  way out.  His  emphasis  on the “pure negativity” of the 
communist  idea28 is  developed further  on in  the text  in  order to  distinguish communism from the 
“negating” aspects of Buddhism and Daoism, which were according to Mou still integrated in a broader 
spiritual  practice29,  and as such did not  constitute  a  form of “positive destruction” that  affects  the 
totality of the subjective and objective world. He made the important qualification that the difference 
between Buddhist  and  communist  negation  is  one  of  a  relative  negation  functioning  in  a  broader 
spiritual project of self-cultivation aimed at a laudable detachment from the world on the one hand, and 
an absolute, pure and senseless negation that cannot be integrated into any overarching goal on the 
other. In other words, detachment from external or social reality in Buddhist and Daoist practice did not 
entail  a  complete  negation of all  values  as  was the case in  communism.30 Mou's  negative attitude 
towards Daoism and Buddhism expressed in this rhetoric of “guilt by association” was probably mainly 
inspired by polemical intentions. In any case, it is clear that his primary targets were communism and 
27 Mou called the Marxian formula according to which “being determines thought” Marx's “idol of [the] cave” (洞窟之蔽). 
(English included in the original), referring to Francis Bacon's theory of the idols inhibiting correct knowledge in his  
Novum Organum (1620), but using a term from Xunzi 荀子 instead of the usual偶像. See “The Meaning of the Practice 
of Idealism” (Lixiangzhuyi de shijian zhi hanyi 理想主義的實踐之含義), [1949c] in DY, p.70. 
28 Cf. “The Path of Philosophical Investigation” (Zhexue yanjiu de tujing 哲學研究的途徑), [1986] in WW, p.358. See 
“Moral Idealism and Theories of Human Nature” (Daode de lixiangzhuyi yu renxing lun 道德的理想主義與人性論), 
[1949a] in DY, pp.42-43 for the distinction Mou makes between predicative (指謂) and pure (純) negation in relation to 
Marx's historical materialism. Cf. Mou, “On Religion, Morality, and Culture” (Tan zongjiao, daode yu wenhua 談宗教、
道德、與文化), [1977] in SS, p.213. 
29 Tang Junyi distinguished Epicurean and Stoic materialism from modern scientific and historical materialism on very 
much the same grounds, arguing that the former still had a spiritual and moral dimension in serving to cultivate a sense  
of humility by enabling the subject to observe itself as a mere thing (自視如物). See “Evaluation of the Cultural Effects 
of Materialism as a World-View” (Yuzhouguan weiwulun zhi wenhua xiaoyong pinglun宇宙觀唯物論之文化效用評論),
 Minzhu pinglun 民主評論, vol.1, no.8, [1949c]. 
30 Mou,  [1951a],  pp.8-9.  Still,  Mou Zongsan's  negative  attitude  towards Buddhism and Daoism remains puzzling for 
someone  who  devoted  a  lot  of  his  writings  to  both  schools  of  thought.  Especially  his  engagement  with  Chinese 
Buddhism was pronounced and continuous. See Jason Clower,  The Unlikely Buddhologist: Tiantai Buddhism in Mou  
Zongsan’s New Confucianism, Leiden: Brill, 2010; Hans-Rudolf Kantor,  Die Heilslehre im Tiantai-Denken des Zhiyi  
(538-597) und der philosophische Begriff des "Unendlichen" bei Mou Zongsan, Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1999, pp.431-
452;  Hans-Rudolf  Kantor,  “Ontological  Indeterminacy  and  its  Soteriological  Relevance:  An  Assessment  of  Mou 
Zongsan's (1909-1995) Interpretation of Zhiyi's (538-597) Tiantai Buddhism”, Philosophy East and West, vol.56, no.1, 
2006, pp.16-68; Kwan Chun-Keung, “Mou Zongsan's Ontological Reading of Tiantai Buddhism”,  Journal of Chinese  
Philosophy, vol.38, no.2, 2011, pp.206-222. Also see my own tentative remarks in chapter 3, 3.1.5.
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the  historical  materialism  of  Karl  Marx,  and  not  the  teachings  of  Laozi  or  the  Buddha.  In his 
“Refutation of the Communist Treatise on Contradiction” (Pi gongchanzhuyizhe de 'Maodun lun' 闢共
產主義者的「矛盾論」)31, he further identifies the communist revolution as a complete negation of 
anything outside of the inconstant flux of discrete material things, which are only negatively united 
through their shared fate of being ephemeral, unsubstantial, and not meaningfully existent. He adds that 
such  a  form of  negation  cannot  even  be  wielded  and  put  to  good  use  as  a  political  strategy  of 
domination, because it must necessarily end up affecting the communists themselves: “Actually, the 
communist revolution itself is nothing but a nihilist process of destruction and self-destruction based on 
their complete nihilism. Their self-preservation is really nothing but the preservation of their own self-
destruction.” (實則共產黨的革命亦只是本其徹底的虛無主義而自毀毀人的虛無過程。其堅持守
住其自己實亦只是堅持自毀其自己).32 For Mou, the fundamental mistake of communist materialism 
consists in its fatal disregard for the permanent element that conditions change and is outside of and 
immune to change: it only knows the “changing Way” (biandao 變道), but cannot grasp the “constant 
Way” (hengdao 恒道 ).33 Still, the crucial differences Mou discerns between Buddhist or Daoist and 
communist strategies of negation do not cause him to abandon the idea that Chinese communism is part 
of  a  historically  continuous  challenge  to  Confucianism,  and  that  the  discontinuity  with  tradition 
constituted by communism can be placed in a more ancient and permanent historical continuum. 
However, Mou's arguments for a continuity which can only be described in the form of a paradox (to 
paraphrase  him,  time  as  a  “self-preservation  of  destruction”  or  “destruction  of  self-preservation”), 
already involve the implicit acknowledgment of a series of arguably very modern ideas concerning the 
nature  of  historical  time  that  differ  considerably  from  traditional  conceptions.  The  philosophical 
procedure of abstraction from historical specificity which allows him to equate the Qin dynasty and the 
People's Republic (as states opposed to the nation) will have to be accounted for in relation to the 
distinctiveness of the modern age instead of being left standing in a glaring and I think false self-
31 [1952b],  in  DY,  pp.89-117. The reference is of  course to  Mao Zedong's  Yan'an essay “On Contradiction”,  [1937], 
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-1/mswv1_17.htm. Mou's essay only contains a 
few direct quotations from Mao's text.
32 Mou, [1952b], p.102. Emphasis added. Cf. Tang Junyi, “The Creation Myth of the Human Race” (Renlei de chuangshiji
人類的創世紀), [1952a] in RJ, pp.181-182.
33 See Mou, [1952b], pp.100-110. Mou insisted that Confucianism was always the “constant way” (常道) in China, in the 
double sense of being omnipresent in all aspects of Chinese culture and of having been continuously (even if sometimes  
unconsciously) transmitted, everything else constituting “aberrant phenomena” (不正常的現象). See Mou, [1961], pp.3-
5.
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evidence.  It  is  worth  noting  that  Mou's  discursive  strategy also  has  clear  precedents  in  European 
philosophical discourse from an earlier period of modernity, specifically in the works of Hegel, who 
wrote at  a time when the structural features of modern societies were still  in the process of being 
violently exported through the colonialist expansion of the capitalist world-system.34 In this regard, it is 
interesting that  Mou's series of associations between “absolute negation”, nihilism, communism and 
Buddhism is reminiscent of the connection Hegel often made between the reign of Terror following the 
French Revolution on the one hand, and Hinduism or Buddhism (or India and the “Oriental world” in 
general) on the other.35 In the Philosophy of Right (§ 5) for example, commenting on his description of 
the “pure indeterminacy” of the individual will before it starts “willing some positive state of affairs”  
and only displays the “absolute possibility of abstraction from every determination”, Hegel writes:
This negative freedom, or freedom as the understanding [Verstand] conceives it, is one-sided [...] In
history, this form of freedom is a frequent phenomenon. Amongst the Hindus, for instance, the highest
life is held to entail persisting in the bare knowledge of one's simple identity with oneself, remaining in
this empty space of one's inner life, as light remains colourless in pure vision, and sacrificing every
activity in life, every aim, and every idea. In this way the human being becomes the Brahman; there is
no longer any distinction between the finite human being and Brahman. In fact in this universality, every 
difference has disappeared. This form of freedom appears more concretely in the active fanaticism of
both political and religious life. For instance, during the Terror in the French Revolution all differences
of talent and authority were supposed to have been superseded. Since fanaticism wills an abstraction
only, nothing articulated, it follows that, when distinctions appear, it finds them antagonistic to its own
indeterminacy and annuls them. For this reason, the people during the French Revolution destroyed once 
more the institutions which they had made themselves, since any institution whatever is antagonistic to
the abstract self-consciousness of equality.36 
The “negative freedom” and “abstract equality” of which Hegel speaks became standard figures of 
speech for Mou in denouncing communist policies and ideas and in defending his own vision of an 
34 According to Susan Buck-Morss, Hegel was inspired by the Haitian slave revolt in what was then the French colony of  
Saint-Domingue from 1794 to 1800 in writing the celebrated section on the dialectic of lordship and bondage in the  
Phenomenology. See her enthralling  Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
2009. Hegel's description of civil society (bürgerliche Gesellschaft) as a “system of needs” in his Philosophy of Right  
(§189-208), revealing his acquaintance with Adam Smith and David Ricardo's work on political economy, also clearly 
attest to his preoccupation with “comprehending time in thought”. Buck-Morss writes that in these passages, “Hegel is  
in fact describing the deterritorialized world market of the European colonial system, and he is the first philosopher to do 
so.” (pp.7-8).
35 See Roger-Pol Droit, Le culte du néant: les philosophes et le Bouddha, Paris: Seuil, 1997, pp.91-108. 
36 G.W.F. Hegel, Outlines of the Philosophy of Right, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp.29-30.
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ideal political order, which involved actively combating the Marxist-Leninist notion of the state as an 
instrument of class oppression that would eventually “wither away”. That is why he spoke of “building 
the nation by opposing communism” (fangong jianguo 反共建國 )37. With Hegel, Mou regarded the 
state as a necessary means for the realization of the good life, both on the level of the community as on 
that  of  the  individual.38 Hegel's  familiar  railing  against  the  “one-sided”  universality  in  which  all 
“difference  has  disappeared”  (calling  to  mind  his  criticism  of  what  he  took  to  be  Schelling's 
unmediated concept of the “Absolute” in the preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit as “the night in 
which all cows are black”39), is also one of the constantly recurring ontological baselines in both Mou's 
and Tang Junyi's philosophy. Remarkably enough, they often turned this very same criticism on Hegel 
himself, for example in arguing against the subsumption of natural family life under the category of the 
state.  All  of  this  implies  that  we  will  have  to  look  at  what  categories  such  as  universality  and 
particularity,  difference and identity,  concreteness and abstraction,  and continuity and discontinuity 
meant for thinkers like Mou and Tang, something which can only be done by situating their work in the 
broader context of the tense transition from tradition to modernity in modern China. 
A useful  clue  can  be  found  in  the  research  of  Zhang  Qing 章清 ,  who  proposes  to  grasp  the 
epistemological dimension of the break of modernity as a transformation of traditional “sources of 
knowledge” (zhishi ziyuan 知识资源 ) into “academic resources” (xueshu ziyuan 学术资源 ).40 This 
transition entails amongst others that traditional texts cease being self-sufficient sources of legitimacy, 
and  are  no  longer  assumed  to  immanently  provide  normative  criteria,  nor  to  furnish  the  criteria 
necessary to  determine  what  has  and  does  not  have  normative  validity.  Instead,  they  come  to  be 
weighed in a  different  set  of scales  which is  not  automatically inclined to  their  advantage.  Zhang 
stresses that this is even the case when traditional sources are invoked in support of the socio-political  
37 Quoted in Chan, 2011, p.80.
38 See Chan, 2011,  pp.73-74, p.81. For a discussion of Mou's conception of freedom within the framework of Isaiah  
Berlin's  distinction between positive and negative liberty,  see Tang Zhonggang 汤忠钢 ,  Morality and Politics: an  
Investigation into Mou Zongsan's New Confucian Political Philosophy  (Dexing yu zhengzhi: Mou Zongsan xinrujia  
zhengzhi zhexue yanjiu 德性与政治：牟宗三新儒家政治哲学研究 ), Beijing: Zhongguo yanshi chubanshe, 2007, 
pp.146-152.
39 G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977, p.9.
40 Zhang Qing,  “Tradition:  from 'Sources  of  Knowledge'  to  'Academic Resources'  – A Short  Analysis  of  the Loss  of 
Chinese Cultural Tradition in the Twentieth Century and its Causes” (Chuantong: you 'zhishi ziyuan' dao 'xueshu ziyuan'  
– jianxi ershi shiji zhongguo wenhua chuantong de shiluo ji qi chengyin 传统: 由“知识资源”到“学术资源”— 简
析 20 世纪中国文化传统的失落及其成因) Zhongguo shehui kexue 中国社会科学, 4, 2000, pp.190-203. Zhang bases 
his argument on the study of a corpus of articles published in the journal New Youth during the New Culture Movement 
(see below).
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legitimacy  of  a  modern  concept  (say  popular  sovereignty)  supposedly  attested  in  classical  and 
previously  authoritative  texts.  The  putative  occurrence  of  democratic  ideas  or  the  “germs”  of 
democracy in the Mengzi孟子 for example,  does not suffice to validate democracy, but precisely the 
other way around.41 Classical texts thus become a source of circumstantial instead of direct evidence. 
Perhaps even the underlying conception of tradition as a resource, as a standing reserve of endlessly 
adaptable ideas, is already a distinctly modern approach and points to its changed status.42 As tradition 
increasingly becomes the object of what David Gross has aptly called various “rescue operations”43, it 
is still constantly revisited and reinvented, perhaps even more than before, but always with the question 
as to what it can still contribute and what it has to offer in the present day in the back of the interpreter's 
mind,  if  not  already on the tip  of  his  tongue.  The relative break between tradition and modernity 
remained apparent in the constant efforts common to many modern Chinese intellectuals to reformulate 
and translate traditional concepts which have lost their self-evidence and direct communicability. These 
efforts had already begun in the late Qing period, as is clear from the famous case of Yan Fu 嚴復 
(1854-1921), who had managed to find or rather establish correspondences between the Darwinian and 
Spencerian concepts of evolution and certain hexagrams in the Yijing.44 Moreover, such endeavors were 
common  to  both  traditionalist  and  iconoclast  intellectuals  alike,  even  if  they  appeared  to  serve 
completely opposite goals. The continuity New Confucian thinkers desired to establish with tradition is 
evident from the countless, often heavily annotated, quotations from classical texts in their works. They 
may not hesitate to invoke the Book of Changes or the Analects to comment on a variety of modern day 
problems, but on the other hand it is rare for them to assume concepts such as yi 易 and ren 仁 to have 
maintained a self-evidence and self-sufficiency that would allow them to directly bypass or disregard 
translation and reformulation. The work of Xiong Shili 熊十力 (1885-1968), often considered to be the 
41 With reference to Mou Zongsan, Olf Lehmann observes: “Freilich handelt es sich bei Mous Befragungen der Tradition 
trotz mangelnder Trennschärfe eben nicht in erster Linie um philosophiehistorische Studien, sondern um die Profilierung 
eines eigenen philosophischen Ansatzes […] Das Wichtige ist: Der unmittelbare Referenzpunkt liegt nicht etwa in den  
Lunyu,  sondern  in  der  zeitgenössischen  Auseinandersetzung  um  die  Möglichkeit  einer  modernen  […]  und 
konfuzianischen Ethik. Mous Argumente funktionieren im Rahmen einer Systematik, die er in der Tradition nicht findet,  
sondern  herstellt.”  Olf  Lehmann,  Zur  moralmetaphysischen  Grundlegung  einer  konfuzianischen  Moderne:  
'Philosophisierung'  der  Tradition  und  'Konfuzianisierung'  der  Aufklärung  bei  Mou  Zongsan,  Leipzig:  Leipziger 
Universitätsverlag, 2003, p.51.
42 As Herbert Marcuse wrote, the transformation of canonical texts into “classics” makes them “come to life as other than  
themselves; they are deprived of the estrangement which was the very dimension of their truth.” One-Dimensional Man.  
Studies  in  the  Ideology  of  Advanced  Industrial  Society,  New  York:  Routledge,  2002,  p.67.  Also  see  Gan  Yang's 
comments quoted in the previous chapter.
43 Gross, 1992, p.78.
44 On Yan Fu's highly contested yet  influential  translations see Ko-wu Huang,  “The Chinese Reception of  Yan Fu in  
Twentieth-Century China”,  in  China Reconstructs,  edited  by Cindy Yik-yi  Chu and Ricardo  K.  S.  Mak,  Lanham: 
University Press of America, 2003, pp.27-34.
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first New Confucian philosopher in the strict sense of the word, is telling in this regard, if only from a  
“superficial” stylistic point of view. Even though Xiong continued writing in a style often virtually 
indistinguishable from classical Chinese, he developed the habit of adding in-text commentary set in a 
smaller font to the main body of the text, which, aside from providing the reader with commentary, 
digressions, and additional information, often included (bisyllabic) modern and more commonly used 
equivalents  to  the  (monosyllabic)  classical  terms  used  in  his  main  text.45 In  a  sense,  the  distance 
between tradition and modernity is thereby reconfirmed at the same time that it  is being denied or 
smoothened out. 
Emblematic of the transition from, with a negotiable distinction I adopt from Zhang Qing, sources to 
resources, is the case of an idea advocated by reformers during the Self-Strengthening (ziqiang 自强) 
or Yangwu 洋务Movement (1861-1895) following China's crushing defeat in the two Opium Wars, a 
movement which abruptly came to an end through the intervention of Empress Dowager Cixi 慈禧 . 
According to  this  “curious  thesis”46,  the  Western  learning which  had given the  European colonial 
invaders their military and technology supremacy originally stemmed from China. It was applied to 
“everything  from the  alarm clock  to  parliamentary political  systems.”47 As  Wang  Fansen 王汎森 
remarks, the idea that “Western learning originated in China” (xixue zhongyuan西學中源) could be 
seen as both conservative, since it entailed the idea that the empire could modernize through a renewal 
of the established traditions and sources of knowledge, as well as progressive, since it allowed modern 
technology and science to be adopted instead of being dismissed as “lesser learning” (xiaoxue 小學).48 
According to Leigh Jenco, the Chinese origin hypothesis should not be read “as a historical claim about 
actual  origins,  but  as  a  political  claim  intended  to  endow  foreign  knowledge  with  recognized 
“membership” in some existing practice”.49 For Jenco then, the Yangwu reforms were not really all that 
concerned about  actually proving the  Chinese  origins  of  Western  ideas,  but  rather  with  making it 
possible to use foreign knowledge politically by undercutting their perceived cultural difference from 
45 See Xiong's own comments on this procedure in his New Treatise on the Uniqueness of Consciousness (Xin weishi lun 
新唯識論), Changsha: Yuelu shushe, [1932] 2010, p.5 (preface).
46 Leigh K. Jenco, “Histories of Thought and Comparative Political Theory: The Curious Thesis of 'Chinese Origins of  
Western Knowledge', 1860-1895”, Political Theory, 2014, pp.1-24.
47 Jenco, 2014, p.4.
48 Wang Fansen王汎森 ,  A Genealogy of Chinese Modern Thought and Knowledge (Zhongguo jindai sixiang yu xueshu  
xipu 国近代思想与学术系谱), Shijiazhuang: Hebei jiaoyu chubanshe, 2001, p.92.
49 Jenco, 2014, p.2.
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China.  Although  this  may be  a  valid  interpretation,  it  is  questionable  whether  claims  concerning 
Chinese origins would have still carried the same political weight without the underlying assumption of 
historical validity (e.g. there really is proof for the validity of constitutional government in the Mengzi, 
or for the development of the principles of algebra and formal logic in the  Mozi  墨子 ). The related 
procedure through which such validity is established already presupposes a different attitude towards 
canonical texts and often, not coincidentally, an increased attention to their neglected or “repressed” 
aspects, or what the historian Luo Zhitian罗志田 has described as the “canonization of heterodoxies” 
(异端的正统化)50 . As Iwo Amelung notes, 
to make the Chinese and Western traditions comparable (or, more exactly, to relate pieces of the Chinese
tradition to modern Western knowledge), a common denominator was necessary. This in all cases was
Western knowledge, which meant that the Chinese sources related to science and technology had to
be reclassified along the lines of the Western sciences, as they became known in China.51
Leigh Jenco further claims that the Chinese-origins hypothesis entailed both a destabilization of “Sino-
centric  claims to  knowledge”52 as  well  as  a  simultaneous further  increase in  an inherited sense of 
cultural self-sufficiency, allowing reformers to pursue the task of “self-strengthening” by presenting 
Western science and technology as “always-already part of the Chinese past”.53 Remarkably enough, 
Jenco sees the predicament of the reformers who propagated this hypothesis as somehow akin to the 
position of contemporary political theorists who seek to integrate non-Western, marginalized forms of 
knowledges into the dominant discourse. She writes that political theorists today should equally “act as 
50 See Luo Zhitian罗志田, Inheriting within Rupture. Chinese Culture and Scholarship at the Beginning of the Twentieth  
Century (Liebian zhong de chuancheng – ershi shiji qianqi de Zhongguo wenhua yu xueshu裂变中的传承——20 世纪
前期的中国文化与学术), Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 2003, pp.1-32. According to Michael Lackner, “If the classics could 
only serve as spurious sources to legitimize the introduction of railroads, parliamentary constitutions, and chemistry,  
then we have here the  beginning of  a  history of  loss  that  characterizes  the  modern  phase,  and  perhaps the entire  
twentieth century in China.” Michael Lackner, “Ex Oriente Scientia? Reconsidering the Ideology of a Chinese Origin of 
Western Knowledge”, Asia Major, vol.21, no.1, 2006, p.196. 
51 Iwo Amelung, “Historiography of Science and Technology in China.  The First Phase”, in  Science and Technology in  
Modern China, 1880s-1940s, edited by Jing Tsu and Benjamin A. Elman, Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2014, p.45. Amelung 
adds: “It was precisely the search for parallels between Western scientific discoveries and technological inventions and 
references to science and technology in traditional Chinese literature that made a completely new view of China’s own 
tradition possible. Instead of making use of canonical epistemological approaches developed over hundreds of years, one 
now could employ theorems discovered in the Western sciences or descriptions of inventions, which in many cases gave  
a completely new meaning to traditional Chinese literature […] Chinese historiography on science and technology in  
this way acquired a strangely ahistorical nature, which can be observed in quite a number of related publications even  
today.” Amelung, 2014, pp.45-46. My italics.
52 Jenco, 2014, p.4.
53 Jenco, 2014, p.5.
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if such knowledge is part of our own heritage”54, instead of merely including it in their work as a 
reassuring signal of “difference” to ward off accusations of Eurocentrism or hollow universalism. The 
condescending tolerance of difference, Jenco claims, never allows non-Western knowledge to disrupt 
established “self/foreign  binaries”55 and thus  precludes  the possibility of  being  “disciplined by the 
standards of a differently sited conversation”56. In a sense, the procedure of assimilating what is “other” 
by reinterpreting it as “always-already” part of the “self” is not new or specific to the modern age. One 
need only think of the amusing but equally outlandish legend of “Laozi converting the barbarians” 
(Laozi huahu 老子化胡), a story which goes back at least to the second century CE, according to which 
Buddhism  was  actually  of  Daoist  origin  and  thus  a  Chinese  invention.57 This  already  raises  the 
suspicion  that  the  self/other  paradigm  which  has  gained  so  much  currency  in  postmodern  and 
postcolonialist studies is perhaps not the most adequate framework for what Jenco herself calls the 
important  task  of  “attending to  the  historically situated  discourse”58 of  non-Western  or  premodern 
forms of knowledge. 
What  is  different  then,  and it  is  a  temporal  form of  difference  we are  after,  is  not  so  much  the 
strategically motivated dialectic between self (identity) and other (difference), but what is at stake in 
the operation of finding the (present)  other in  the (past)  self  as such,  and the extent  to which the 
(present) self comes to be affected and transformed through this recognition of otherness in its (past) 
alter ego. The question thus arises whether one can really compare the situation of Yangwu reformers 
“destabilizing” the otherness of Western knowledge by inscribing it into their own heritage to that of a 
contemporary academic pursuing a career in comparative political philosophy, for whom, if he or she is 
postmodernly inclined  enough,  the  recognition  of  the  other  as  other  in  his  fundamental  otherness 
(without any covert Eurocentrism) is a supplementary yet substantial concern in its own right. The least 
one can say is  that  this  was probably the least  of the Yangwu reformers'  concerns.  Their  theories  
primarily  served  political  and  not  epistemological  ends.  Epistemological  “destabilization”  and 
“displacement” can at present serve as the desired outcome of a research project, instead of being a 
quality we are now in a position to recognize as the residual discursive effect of undertakings such as  
54 Jenco, 2014, p.3.
55 Jenco, 2014, p.1.
56 Jenco, 2014, p.3.
57 Michael Lackner gives this example in Lackner, 2006, p.185. On the Laozi story see, E. Zürcher, The Buddhist Conquest  
of China. The Spread and Adaption of Buddhism in Early Medieval China, Leiden: Brill, 2007, pp.288-320. 
58 Jenco, 2014, p.3.
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those pursued during the Self-Strengthening Movement, a movement for which the desire to “enable 
future knowledge production”59 was hardly an end in itself. Purely within the confines of an ahistorical 
self/other paradigm, it would also be hard to understand why later reformers and revolutionaries such 
as Liang Qichao 梁启超  (1873-1929), Zhang Taiyan 章太炎  (1868-1936) and Liu Shipei 劉師培 
(1884-1919), motivated by strong anti-Manchu sentiment and inspired by myths of an Aryan invasion 
of Europe en vogue in the 19th century, argued that the Chinese “race” had originally come from the 
West and had been led to the Yellow River basin by the Yellow Emperor.60 According to Tze-ki Hon, 
the popularity of the so-called “Sino-Babylonian hypothesis” can be understood from its function in the 
creation of racial nationalist  narratives, which were instrumental in criticizing the existing political 
system and promoting the adoption of a parliamentary system governance, based on the “historical” 
kinship between China and the West.61 What would be the benefit in pointing out that these attempts at 
rewriting racial history also involved a radical “blurring” of self/other distinctions? I think Jenco misses 
the point when she writes in the beginning of her essay that “Chinese reformers pose Chinese origins 
for Western knowledge not because they assume that historically situated difference is more easily or 
naturally negotiated than culturally situated difference”62. What is needed is a clearer account of the 
import  of  history  and  culture  as  entangled  distinctions  through  which  difference  and  identity  are 
negotiated  to  begin  with. The problem is  not  the  dialectical  and highly unstable  (deconstructable) 
distinction between self and other (which has only recently become a sociological tool) in general, but 
the difference and identity at stake in time at a specific point in history. In other words, the underlying 
and recurring problem is always that of historical  continuity  and  discontinuity, and not so much of 
identity and alterity in general. What Jenco calls a “ 'continuity of difference' that relies on disjunctures 
with the past to drive innovation in the future”63 is a highly specific way of reconciling this distinction. 
As I tried to show in the previous chapter, one of the most frequently encountered solutions today is 
still to overcome historical difference through culture as Spirit, the emergence of which I will attempt 
to further document indirectly in this chapter with reference to the complex case of New Confucianism. 
59 Jenco, 2014, p.20.
60 See Fa-ti Fan, “How Did the Chinese Become Native? Science and the Search for National Origins in the May Fourth  
Era”,  in  Beyond the May Fourth Paradigm: in  Search  of  Chinese  Modernity,  edited by Kai-wing Chow, Lanham: 
Lexington Books, 2008, pp.183-199.
61 See Tze-ki Hon,  Revolution as Restoration: Guocui xuebao and China’s Path to Modernity, 1905-1911, Leiden: Brill, 
2013, pp.47-68.
62 Jenco, 2014, p.2. 
63 Jenco, 2014, p.10.
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Similar observations could be made concerning the paradigm of “multiple modernities”, put forward by 
the sociologist S.N. Eisenstadt64, which attempts to defy what it takes to be the prevalent identification 
of modernization and westernization. Eisenstadt sees the latter identification (West=modernity) as the 
logical consequence of all unified accounts of modernity, in which cultural differences are understood 
as secondary to the basic structural unity underlying “superficially” diverse modernization processes. 
From the perspective of such a unified account of modernity however, it is highly ironic that discourses 
on (cultural or “civilizational”) difference owe much of their success to precisely this structural unity, 
allowing societies which have been dragged or which have jumped into the modern maelstrom to 
retroactively attribute their own (e.g. economic) “success” to these differences, instead of to the identity 
which conditions their mass mobilization. What is missing in Eisenstadt's account of modernity, which 
he  views as  a  “distinct  civilization”65,  is  a  theoretical  inquiry into  the  relation  between unity and 
multiplicity, or to put it in Hegelian terms, between identity and difference66, a relation which, again 
from a Hegelian point  of view,  can be speculatively,  but  from a sociological  point  of  view rather 
realistically, grasped as one of the “identity of identity and difference” (or even the “identity of the 
identity and non-identity of identity and difference”. Further variations are of course possible). The less 
confusing Neo-Confucian dictum that “the principle is one, the manifestations are many” (li yi fen shu 
理一分殊 ) could equally serve as a source of inspiration here. Of course, there is an urgent need to 
think  through the  multiple  manifestations  of  modernity.  I  have  no  real  problems with  Eisenstadt's 
assertion that “the appropriation by non-Western societies of specific themes and institutional patterns 
of  the  original  Western  modern  civilization  societies  [sic]  entailed  the  continuous  selection, 
reinterpretation, and reformulation of these imported ideas.”67 The undue neglect of and indifference to 
alternative  historical  trajectories  of  regions  of  the  world  which  have  economically  and politically 
emancipated themselves from Western dominance in the recent past is what gave rise to paradigms 
such as multiple modernities in the first place. But the potentially emancipatory call to take cultural 
specificity into account ignores the fact that culture itself is already a specific (and specifically modern) 
interpretative paradigm.
64 See  S.N.  Eisenstadt,  “Multiple  Modernities”,  Daedalus,  vol.129,  no.1,  2000,  pp.1-29  and  S.N.  Eisenstadt,  “Some 
Observations  on  Multiple  Modernities”,  in  Reflections  on  Multiple  Modernities.  European,  Chinese  and  Other  
Interpretations, edited by Dominic Sachsenmaier and Jens Riedel, Leiden: Brill, 2002, pp.27-41.
65 Eisenstadt, 2002, p.28.
66 See Christian Uhl,  “Translation and Time: A Memento of the Curvature of the Poststructuralist Plane”,  Frontiers of  
Philosophy in China, vol.6, no.3, 2012, pp.440-441.
67 Eisenstadt, 2000, p.15. 
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In this regard, I think it is evident that the equation of Westernization and modernization can only be 
presented as the logical and inevitable consequence of a unified approach to modernity when this unity 
is understood as cultural or civilizational in the first place. Dominic Sachsenmaier, who adheres to the 
paradigm of multiple modernities, is thus quite right to state that “even though the West has been at the  
epicenter of these revolutions and evolutions for a long time, it was equally transformed by them, 
which is why it is not too convincing to see these processes simply as Westernization”68, but does not 
make  a  very  strong  case  for  his  view  that  this  unconvincing  assumption  –  or  worse,  the  self-
congratulating prophesies preached by the likes of Francis Fukuyama (“the end of history”) and Milton 
Friedman (“the world is flat”) – is inherent to, say certain Marxist or Luhmannian, unified theories of 
modernity. Additionally, but just as importantly, one should also ask where the “proof” for the existence 
and persistence of culturally grounded multiple modernities comes from, and exactly how and precisely 
which facts are selected in the process. Especially when culture is viewed as a kind of “collective 
unconsciousness”, one must be able to rely on more than what is explicitly avowed by the agents of the 
culture in question, who may very well not (be able to) live up to or even (not willing to) accept the 
standards their culture sets them through the intermediary of those who claim to be its proponents and 
representatives, be they intellectuals, clerics, or a combination of both. If the multiplicity of modernity 
is  understood  as  essentially  cultural,  as  being  determined  by a  historically  evolving  interpretative 
framework which is reconstructed through creative adaption in response to the problems and issues on 
which it is made to bear, the question also becomes: who is doing what here, who is the principal agent 
of historical change and “self-transformation”? I have the impression that priority is often given to 
what is in reality structurally confined to a very specific and restricted domain of human activity, that is  
to say, of professional salaried intellectuals and academics, whose importance is then rather naively 
overinflated.69 There is the additional risk that even through an empiricist (“fact-based”) reference to 
“popular opinion” in testing the validity of cultural  self-descriptions (e.g. how Confucian does the 
average Chinese feel?), one ends up reading off nothing but the success and the appeal of certain (often 
educationally enforced or highly mediatized) representations which already leave out a host of other 
determinations influencing perceptions of personal or group identity. Everybody knows that the very 
68 Dominic Sachsenmaier, “Multiple Modernities: the Concept and its Potential”, in Sachsenmaier and Riedel, 2002, p.43.
69 Dominic Sachsenmaier writes: “Much of the future of the world order will depend on the gaps of power and living 
standards in the world and the way the privileged deal with them.  For the purpose of setting a common agenda, the  
existence of a global elite is a prime requirement: not an identityless elite defining itself through privileges, but an elite 
driven by a spirit of responsibility that is rooted in divergent cultural and sociopolitical frameworks. Much will depend 
on intellectuals across the world developing a shared vision that may in turn trickle down to other circles. Their theories 
are theories, but they have an influence on reality.” Sachsenmaier, 2002, pp.63-64. Emphasis added.
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way questions are posed in opinion polls already narrows the range of possible answers down to the 
barest minimum. Luckily, those who have a problem with the question itself or with the manner in 
which  it  is  formulated  can  usually  opt  for  expressing  the  fact  that  they  have  no  opinion  on  that 
particular  matter.  Questionnaires,  very much  like  elections,  live  off  the  indifference  of  those  they 
address. If one does not have an opinion on a certain matter, or does not feel obligated to cast a vote of 
confidence in one of the political parties currently available on the market, one “chooses” (because one 
cannot not choose) to join the unrepresentable majority whose silence is interpreted as a forfeiture of 
the right to participate or to complain. Epistemologically speaking, the impossibility of knowing what 
other  people  “really  think”  comes  down  to  the  familiar  Kantian  conundrum  of  being  unable  to 
empirically access the object of inquiry as it is in itself, without constantly encountering what one has 
already put into the object beforehand and without, so to speak, standing in one's own light. As Hegel 
once put it jokingly, one cannot simply sneak up on the object from behind.70 Of course, the other also 
often acts and speaks in a way which takes the fact that he or she is being observed into account. Thus,  
the (empirical) insufficiency of the species in face of the (ideal) genus, the fact that one does not often 
bump into cultural archetypes on the street, practically forces observers of a multiplicity paradoxically 
grounded in the unity of different cultures into a transcendental account of cultural specificity. Again, 
are indications of cultural difference not often arrived at through a very specific procedure, that is to 
say, by trying to salvage the past through questioning its very being past, by smoothing over if not 
wiping out the difference between past and present through a recourse to culture as Spirit? As Prasenjit 
Duara explains in his contribution to a volume dedicated to multiple modernities: “The subject enables 
history to be the living essence of the past, but also simultaneously to be free from the hold of the past: 
that which evolves is that which remains, even as it changes.”71
It is hard to miss the fact that the notion of cultural continuity is often mobilized against the teleological 
claims sometimes considered to be inherent deficiencies in many narratives of modernization. In his 
bestselling  When China Rules the World  (which was especially well-received in the PRC)72, Martin 
Jacques goes to great lengths to counter the snug, Eurocentric assumption that China will become more 
and  more  Westernized  (economically  and  politically  liberal)  as  a  result  of  its  economic  growth. 
Jacques's  antipathy towards such unilinear assumptions is  certainly justified and shared by a great 
70 See Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude. An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, London and New York: Continuum, 
2008, p.4.
71 Prasenjit Duara, “Civilizations and Nations in a Globalizing World”, in Sachsenmaier and Riedel, 2002, p.93.
72 It would be interesting to consider the reactions this book elicited in Taiwan.
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number of scholars without and within Chinese studies. However, in his idea that it is the essence of the 
Chinese “civilization state” and the corresponding “Middle Kingdom mentality” which logically and in 
an a priori manner preclude the Westernization of China, there is a considerable tendency to formally 
reproduce what is structurally speaking an equally teleological argument, in which culture instead of 
“the  West”  takes  the  position  of  the  telos.  Instead  of  presenting  a  typical  Western-style  liberal 
democracy  with  a  free-market  economy  as  the  inevitable  end-point  of  all  previous  historical 
development, Jacques adheres to a highly problematic view of an autotelic culture, reducible to a few 
“essential  characteristics”  that  constitute  the  core  of  a  dynamic,  but  essentially  eternal  and 
unchangeable  “spirit  of  Chinese  culture”.73 Liang  Shuming's 梁 漱 溟 (1893-1988)  subversive 
appropriation  of  Auguste  Comte's  (1798-1857)  “law”  of  the  three  stages  of  human  progress 
(religious/theological, metaphysical, scientific) is a direct precursor to Jacques's approach. According 
to  Thierry  Meynard,  Liang  Shuming,  who  was  once  described  as  the  “last  Confucian”74,  but  is 
nowadays more often portrayed as one of the father figures of New Confucianism75, “fully accepted the 
idea of evolution, which he applied to the realm of culture […] Liang even accepted Comte's three 
stages,  but  he  completely  reversed  their  order”76,  by  positing  religion  (specifically,  Yogācāra 
Buddhism) instead of positivist science as the highest stage of human evolution. Liang formulated a 
typology of what he took to be the three main cultural patterns in the world (Chinese, Indian, and 
Western)  in  his  highly influential  The Cultures  of  East  and West  and their  Philosophies (Dongxi  
wenhua jiqi zhexue東西文化及其哲學) from 1921. In this work (originally a series lectures held at 
Peking University), he combined Schopenhauer and Bergson in defining cultural differences as the 
result of three different orientations of the human will (yiyu 意欲), the latter in turn being an expression 
of life (sheng 生) itself. In doing so, Liang characterized China (Confucianism) as accommodationist, 
oriented towards balance, stability and harmony; India (Buddhism) as escapist, favoring detachment 
and renunciation; and the Christian West as dynamic, striving for an active conquest and transformation 
of the world. He further assumed, echoing Oswald Spengler77,  that “the three cultures would have 
73 See Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World: the End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order, 
London: Penguin Books, 2012, especially chapters 7 and 8, pp.241-341. 
74 Guy Alitto,  The Last  Confucian: Liang Shu-ming and the Chinese Dilemma of Modernity,  Berkeley:  University of 
California Press, 1976.
75 According to Liu Shuxian, Liang's lectures on Eastern and Western culture “marked the beginning of the Contemporary 
Neo-Confucian Movement.” Essentials of Contemporary Neo-Confucian Philosophy, Wesport: Praeger, 2003, p.16.
76 Thierry Meynard,  The Religious Philosophy of Liang Shuming: the Hidden Buddhist, Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010, 
p.41. For Meynard, “Liang's theory seems more advanced than what we see today in a Chinese academic discourse  
dominated by a dualistic vision consisting only of China and the West.” (p.35). 
77 On the global impact of Spengler's Untergang des Abendlandes [1918], see Duara, 2002, pp.82-88.
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followed their own specific path indefinitely”78 would they not have (accidentally) encountered one 
another in recent history. In his opposition to Herbert Spencer's social Darwinism and Marx's historical 
materialism, Liang employed a distinction (derived from Buddhist terminology) between neiyin 内因 
(“root-causes”) and waiyuan 外緣 (“external conditions”)79 in a quasi-transcendental manner in order to 
distinguish cultural sufficient causes from the secondary contingencies of natural and social history. 
The distinction between “spirit” (jingshen 精神) and “consciousness” (yishi 意識), which we already 
encountered in the previous chapter, came to be matched onto that between neiyin and waiyuan. Liang 
viewed consciousness  as  susceptible  to the influence of  conditioning by the external  environment, 
thereby imprisoned in the strict necessity of natural causal relationships, while reserving the capacity to 
actively overcome such constraints and indeed in a sense create a world in its own image for spirit.80 
Kant's antinomy between freedom and necessity was thus resolved through another opposition, perhaps 
equally in need of reconciliation.  For Liang Shuming, as for Martin Jacques,  cultures,  as veritable 
causa sui,  have  fixed  trajectories,  leading to  an  organic  development  predetermined by their  own 
essence.81 
There  are  sufficient  indications  in  the  intellectual  history  of  twentieth  century  China  that  such  a 
conception has not only been used by traditionalists such as Liang, but also by intellectuals who stood 
for a wholesale rejection of the Chinese tradition as an “organism” of which they argued the natural-
cultural  life-cycle  had  ended  for  good,  since  the  moral  or  social  “principle”  from  which  it  had 
developed had lost its viability and validity.82 Both revolutionaries and conservatives shared this basic 
organicist  outlook  on  cultural  development,  even  when  the  fundamental  principles  which  were 
supposed to have governed a society in its “formative period” were arrived at in an empirical fashion,  
that  is  to  say,  by referring to  geographical  factors,  the importance of agriculture and close family 
relations and so on. The resulting “spirit”, once out of the formative period, becomes detached from 
such empirically approachable conditions and can no longer be constrained by them or explained in 
78 Meynard, 2010, p.37. Also see Alitto, 1976, pp.82-85.
79 因 =  hetu,緣 =  pratyaya.  See  William  Edward  Soothill,  A Dictionary  of  Chinese  Buddhist  Terms,  Delhi:  Motilal 
Banarsidass, 2003, p.206.
80 See Meynard, 2010, pp.28-29. 
81 I therefore find Meynard's contention that “Liang's evolutionary scheme should not be considered to be deterministic”  
(Meynard, 2010, p.37) rather puzzling. 
82 See Charlotte Furth, Ting Wen-chiang: Science and China's New Culture, Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 
1970, p.4.  Also see Lin Yu-Sheng (The Crisis of  Chinese Consciousness.  Iconoclasm in the May Fourth Era,  Phd 
Dissertation, Chicago, 1970, p.158) for the example of Chen Duxiu. 
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terms of them alone.83 A linear conception of historical evolution often accompanied the analysis of 
societies  in  terms  of  their  purported  spiritual  principles.84 “Progressiveness”  and  “conservatism” 
certainly  did  not  overlap  with  the  categories  of  “materialism”  and  “idealism”  respectively,  as  is 
routinely  suggested  in  the  more  vulgar  examples  of  intellectual  historiography  in  the  PRC.  As 
Benjamin Schwartz emphasizes, “the problem of the relationship of modern articulate Chinese to the 
total cultural heritage cannot simply be equated with the conservatism/radicalism problem […],  one 
cannot  predict  whether  traditional  or  antitraditional  views  will  necessarily  have  radical  or  
conservative consequences within a given historic context.”85 Of course, the fact that Jacques's ideas are 
part of a specific discourse with historical vicissitudes of its own, does not automatically invalidate his 
ideas as such. But it puts them into a context he is either not aware of or unwilling to acknowledge.  
There is nothing new or remarkable about such ideas, suggesting that they could benefit from being 
infused with a healthy dose of historical self-consciousness by placing them in the broader context of 
Chinese intellectual history. In this way, the origin and the implications of the idea of Spirit, which sees 
the whole world only as a reflection of itself, can be contextualized and clarified more effectively.
83 See for example Tang [1953b], pp.1-11, where he discusses the “external conditions on the formation of the spirit of 
Chinese and Western culture” (中西文化精神形成之外缘 ). According to Zhang Yixin, Tang considered “external 
conditions” such as social structures and the political and economical system to have a “regulating” (guiding 规定 ) 
instead of a “determining” (jueding 决定 ) effect. See Zhang, 2011, p.480. Also see  Wang Xueqing 王雪卿  and Liao 
Junyu 廖俊裕 , “On Tang Junyi's Cultural Philosophy of “Diversity in Oneness”- Basing Oneself on Virtue to Fully 
Develop a Humanistic World” (Lun Tang Junyi 'yiben duoyuan de wenhua zhexue – yi dexing wei zhongxin er quanfu  
kaizhan de renwen shijie 论唐君毅“一本多元”的文化哲學－以德性爲中心而全幅開展的人文世界), Daye daxue 
tongshi jiaoyu xuebao大葉大學通識教育學報, 1, 2008, pp.45-46. Benjamin Elman points to the strong influence of the 
19th century European Geistesgeschichte approach on early twentieth-century Chinese intellectual history (on Hu Shi and 
Liang Qichao in particular). See Benjamin A. Elman, “The Failures of Contemporary Chinese Intellectual History”, 
Eighteenth-Century Studies, vol. 43, no.3, 2010, pp.376-379.
84 See Wang Fan-sen, “The Impact of the Linear Model of History on Modern Chinese Historiography”, in Transforming 
History: The Making of a Modern Academic Discipline in Twentieth-Century China, edited by Brian Moloughney and 
Peter Zarrow, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2011, pp.135-168.
85 Benjamin I. Schwartz, “Notes on Conservatism in General and in China in Particular”, in The Limits of Change. Essays  
on Conservative Alternatives in Republican China, edited by Charlotte Furth, Cambridge (Mass.) and London: Harvard 
University Press, 1976, p.20. Emphasis added. 
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2.2 New Confucianism and May Fourth: Spirit against discontinuity
2.2.1 The May Fourth/New Culture Movement: events and ideas in change
In the intellectual history of modern China, the irreversible but complexly mediated break between 
tradition and modernity is commonly identified with the New Culture Movement (xin wenhua yundong
新文化运动 ). This term is generally used interchangeably with the more often invoked name of the 
May Fourth Movement (wusi yundong五四运动), and I will stick to this convention in what follows. 
In the more restricted sense of the word however, the latter was mainly a political movement, which 
started on the fourth of May 1919 with student protests in Beijing against highly charged decisions 
reached at the Paris Peace Conference after the First World War. The Versailles Treaty, agreed upon 
here by the allied victors, did not return German colonial areas (in Shandong山东86) back to China as 
was generally expected. Given China's substantial support for the war effort (which involved sending 
over 200.000 Chinese laborers to Europe to provide material assistance, e.g. in digging trenches), this  
expectation was far from unfounded. Instead, the treaty ceded them to Japan on the basis of a prior 
agreement secretly made with the Japanese by the Allied Forces in order to gain their support against 
Germany in the Pacific. The jubilant enthusiasm with which the end of the war had been greeted in  
China quickly turned sour.87 The Chinese delegation at the Peace Conference refused to sign the Treaty, 
but the outcome strengthened the impression both within and outside of China that the Republican 
government was unable to properly defend the nation's interests. The news from Versailles reached 
China in no time through newspapers and telegraphs which were increasingly connecting the whole 
globe. Soon, the tidings from Versailles led to demonstrations and strikes uniting students, workers, 
merchants and clerks which the Chinese government proved incapable to suppress, and calls for the 
boycotting of Japanese goods. These events first started in Beijing and swiftly spread to all of China's 
major cities throughout the following days.88 
86 “The 'Holy Land' of China, where Confucius and Mencius were born, taught, and died”,  Chow Tse-tsung,  The May 
Fourth Movement. Intellectual Revolution in Modern China, Stanford (Cal.): Stanford University Press, 1960, p.84.
87 See Chow, 1960, p.85. On the global (disillusioning) impact of the Paris Peace Conference see Pankaj Mishra, From the 
Ruins of Empire. The Revolt against the West and the Remaking of Asia, London: Penguin Books, 2013, pp.187-209. I 
thank Hans-Georg Moeller for drawing my attention to this work.
88 My short account is based on Rana Mitter, A Bitter Revolution. China's Struggle with the Modern World, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press,  2004,  pp.3-12;  Peter  Zarrow,  China in War  and Revolution,  1895-1949,  New York  and London: 
Routledge, 2005, pp.149-189; Chow, 1960, pp.84-196 and Y.C. Wang, Chinese Intellectuals and the West, 1872-1949, 
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1966, pp.306-361.
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Some historians insist on clearly distinguishing May Fourth from the New Culture Movement, pointing 
out that the latter had begun much earlier (mid 1910s) and was broader in scope than the patriotic and 
anti-imperialist calls to political action which characterized the post-May Fourth student protests and 
mass mobilizations. For communist historians in pre-Deng China on the other hand, the transition from 
New Culture to May Fourth marked a broadening of revolutionary aspirations and demands to include 
larger parts of the population besides the rising urban bourgeoisie.89 The New Culture Movement, when 
taken as denoting a primarily cultural phenomenon, mainly refers to the intellectual reverberations of 
what was and had already been happening both in China and on a global scale since the collapse of the 
empire  and the  disintegration  of  its  whole  institutional  structure.  The abolishment  of  the  Imperial 
examination system, which had been in use for the recruitment of government officials since the Tang 
dynasty, in 1905 and the closure of the famous Hanlin翰林 Academy after the Xinhai辛亥 Revolution 
of  1911,  were two events  symbolizing the end of the old order,  leading to a  complete  disconnect 
between the intelligentsia and the state.90 This disconnect fed into the demands for radical social and 
political change voiced in the New Culture Movement. Some of the most often mentioned phenomena 
include the fall from grace of the “essay in eight sections” (baguwen八股文) and of classical literary 
Chinese (wenyan 文言 ) in general in favor of a movement promoting the vernacular (baihua 白话 ) 
spearheaded by Hu Shi, the opposition to patriarchal family relations subjugating individual freedom 
associated with filial piety (xiao孝), and last but not least a general criticism of traditional customs and 
norms, specifically of the Confucian “religion of rites” (lijiao 禮教 ). All these developments often 
harked back to the efforts of earlier  reformist and revolutionary intellectuals91,  actually predate the 
dramatic events of 4 May 1919 and were closely linked to the failure of the newly founded Republic to 
prevent  general  Yuan  Shikai 袁世凯  from restoring  the  monarchy in  1915  and  to  the  “national 
humiliation” (國恥) of being forced to accept Japan's “Twenty-one Demands” in the same year.92 
89 See Joseph T. Chen, “The May Fourth Movement Redefined”,  Modern Asian Studies, vol.4, no.1, 1970, pp.63-81. As 
Rana Mitter emphasizes, “the largest area that remains in the  shadows in the story told here is what the pre-eminent 
sociologist of Republican China, Fei Xiaotong [费孝通], called ‘China of the native soil’ (Xiangtu Zhongguo [乡土中
国]), the vast rural hinterland which contained the overwhelming majority of China’s population in the early twentieth  
century, as it does today. This is a book about urban ideas.” Mittter, 2004, pp.24-25. Cf. Zarrow, 2005, pp.24-25.
90 See Wang Fansen, 2001, p.221-222. 
91 See Li Zehou李泽厚, “The Double Rhythm of Enlightenment and National Salvation” (Qimeng yu jiuwang shuangcong 
bianzou启蒙与救亡的双重变奏 ), in Historical Essays on Twentieth-Century Chinese Thought (Ershi shiji zhongguo 
sixiang shi 二十世纪中国思想史论 ), edited by Xu Jilin 许纪霖 , Shanghai: Dongfang chubanshe zhongxin, 2000, 
pp.71-111. 
92 See Chen, 1970, pp.64-65; Zarrow, 2005, pp.128-143 and Chow, 1960, pp.41-83, pp.291-293.
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As an intellectual movement in which “all that is sacred is profaned” and a complete “transvaluation of 
all values”93 was called for, the beginning of May Fourth is often marked by the launch of the journal  
New Youth (Xin qingnian 新青年) in Shanghai in 1915, in which some of the most famous literary and 
theoretical texts associated with May Fourth would appear.94 In one of the perhaps somewhat lesser 
known pieces published in this renowned periodical,  the  strong sense of historical discontinuity that 
pervaded and animated the late Qing and early Republican period in China is cogently expressed in a  
simple sentence by Wang Shuqian汪淑潜95 in a brief essay entitled “The Problem of the New and the 
Old” (Xinjiu wenti 新舊問題 ), published in the very first issue of New Youth: “There is not a single 
thing or matter”, Wang wrote, “that does not manifest itself in the two aspects of new and old” (無物無
事不呈新舊之二象 ).96 A possible interpretation of this short but suggestive sentence would be that 
historical change has effectively brought on a bifurcation of every conceivable phenomenon into two 
temporally distinct entities, thereby splitting everything subject to historical time into two non-identical 
and not immediately reconcilable aspects. It is interesting that Wang Shuqian used the term xiang象 to 
describe this  temporal  bifurcation distinctive of modernity:  in  classical  texts,  the two “aspects” or 
“images” of the Way (dao 道 ) are none other than the cosmic polarity of  yin陰 and yang陽 , which 
engender the myriad things (wanwu 萬物) through their unceasing intermingling and interaction. On a 
semantic  level,  it  would  certainly  be  wrong  to  speak  of  a  complete  effacement  of  the  traditional 
coordinates of meaning. However, in Wang's text, the yin and yang polarity has become fundamentally 
temporalized,  whereas  time  was  but  one  of  the  possible  dimensions  of  the  two  aspects  of  the 
cosmological and political order.97 Li Dazhao李大钊 (1888-1927) expressed a similar sentiment in an 
93 See Wang, 1966, p.311. Hu Shi for one embraced this Nietzschean term. See Vera Schwarcz, “No Solace from Lethe: 
History, Memory, and Cultural Identity in Twentieth-Century China”,  Daedalus, vol.120, no.2,  The Living Tree: The  
Changing Meaning of Being Chinese, 1991, p.93.
94 On the establishment of the journal  New Youth, see Chow, 1960, pp.41-48 and Charlotte Furth, “Intellectual Change: 
From the Reform Movement to the May Fourth Movement, 1895-1920”, in  An Intellectual History of Modern China, 
edited by Merle Goldman and Leo Ou-Fan Lee, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp.87-96. The end of 
the movement is usually made to coincide with the start of the war with Japan in 1937. See Mitter, 2004, p.19. 
95 Not much seems to be known about Wang's identity. He is usually only mentioned in connection to the article from 
which I am quoting here. I have not been able to find any other information concerning either his life or works. 
96 In Chen Duxiu 陈独秀  et.al.,  Selection of  Texts from New Youth (Xin qingnian jingxuan  新青年精选 ),  Beijing: 
Zhongguo shudian, 2012, vol.1, p.21.
97 The integration of historical change into this cosmological polarity can also be found in a more elaborate form in the 
essay “The Fundamental Differences between Eastern and Western Civilizations” (Dongxi wenming genben zhi yidian
東西文明根本之異點) from 1917 by the Marxist Li Dazhao李大钊 (1888-1927), who would be most readily classified 
as an iconoclast thinker. This particular essay predates his conversion to Marxism. For the full text see  Collection of  
Texts in the History of Modern Chinese Philosophy, first series, volume 5: the Debate on Eastern and Western Cultures  
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article published a year later in the same journal, by characterizing the whole of Chinese society as 
being  run  through  with  the  contradiction  between  the  new and  the  old.98 From the  rest  of  Wang 
Shuqian's  text,  it  is  all  too clear  that  he saw this  temporal split  as inevitable and irreversible.  His 
iconoclast stance expressed itself in an unconditional rejection of the old in favor of the new. Such an 
attitude is also exemplified by the founder of  New Youth  and pioneer of Chinese communism Chen 
Duxiu, in his “Treatise on the Destruction of Idols” (Ouxiang pohuai lun偶像破坏論) from 1918.99 
But even this essay, for all its radical and uncompromising condemnation of the “idols” of tradition, 
reveals that the attitude of Chinese intellectuals was more complicated than a simple opposition or 
choice between iconoclasm and traditionalism. This much at least is suggested by the fact that Chen 
lists the modern state alongside all the great religions of the world as an idol that needs to be destroyed 
in  order  to  save  China  from destruction.  From  the  fact  that  the  attack  on  Confucianism  by  the  
revolutionary  and  liberal  thinkers  at  the  forefront  of  the  movement  for  a  new  culture  led  to  the 
paradoxical embrace of traditionally non-canonical schools of thought opposed to Confucian ideals 
such as Legalism and Mohism by iconoclast  intellectuals,  one can already glean something of the 
complexity of the relation between tradition and modernity in modern China.100 It also makes it easier 
to understand why Mou Zongsan saw Legalism and communism as basically convertible terms.101 As 
Benjamin Schwartz remarks, “it is possible to speak of conservative modernizers in twentieth-century 
China”.102 A number  of  prominent  intellectuals  affiliated  with the  promotion  of  “national  essence” 
(guocui 國粹) in late Qing and early Republican China who are usually portrayed as the most staunch 
traditionalists  and  reactionaries,  saw no  problem in  presenting  “revolution  as  restoration”.103 With 
reference to the May Fourth Movement in particular, Kai-Wing Chow remarks: 
(Zhongguo xiandai zhexue ziliao huibian, diyi ji diwu ce: Dongxi wenhua lunzhan 中国现代哲学史资料汇编,第 1集第
5册:东西文化论战), edited by Zhong Limeng钟离蒙 and Yang Fenglin杨凤麟, Shenyang: Liaoning daxue zhexue xi, 
1981, pp.1-7. Li's essay “Spring” (Qingchun青春), also written before his embrace of Marxism, is equally interesting in 
this regard. See Maurice Meisner,  Li  Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism,  Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1967, pp.26-28, pp.64-66 and Claudia Pozzana, “Spring, Temporality, and History in Li Dazhao”, positions, vol.3, 
no.2, 1995, pp.283-305.
98 “A life of contradiction is a life in which the new and the old are not in balance” (矛盾生活即新舊不調和之生活 ), 
quoted in Wang Fansen, 2001, p.228.
99 See Chen, 2012, vol.2, pp.94-95.
100See Ding, 2011, pp.79-80 and Furth, 2002, pp.15-16.
101Scholars in post-'49 China however were hardly unanimously decided on whether Han Feizi (and Mozi) should be  
praised  as  precursors  to  communism and materialism.  See  Kam Louie,  Inheriting Tradition.  Interpretations of  the  
Classical Philosophers in Communist China, 1949-1966, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986, pp.129-154, pp.178-
188.
102Benjamin I. Schwartz, “Notes on Conservatism in General and in China in Particular”, in Furth, 1976, p.18.
103See Hon, 2013.
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[N]on-May Fourth historical agents, including May Fourth's competitors, contributed to the emergence
of May Fourth. Across time, the May Fourth historical actors drew significantly on and even combined
previous quests for modernity [...] Across discursive space, May Fourth fed on the ideas, decisions, and
actions of those who were far from sympathetic to vehement iconoclasm.104 
In order not to lose this complexity out of sight, the historian Peter Zarrow cautions that one must be 
careful in using the notion of a generalized “cultural crisis” to describe the atmosphere of the early 
modern period.  Zarrow emphasizes:  “Cultural  crisis  there may have been,  but  it  did not  affect  all 
persons equally, and even those affected by it found ways to adjust to the new world. For many [...] 
cultural  crisis  was  welcome,  for  it  was  part  of  the  process  of  seeking  inclusion  [in  the  modern 
world]”.105 
The  anarchist  (and  later  Guomindang  supporter)  Wu  Zhihui 吴稚晖 (1865-1953)106 for  example, 
certainly did not display much sense of nostalgia or regret when he suggested “flushing all thread-
bound [i.e. traditional] books down the toilet” (將線裝書丟在毛廁裡).107 Wu warmly welcomed the 
advent  of  industrialization  and  the  invention  of  machines  and  systems  of  automation,  celebrating 
technology and science as solutions to all ethical and spiritual problems, much like the Italian Futurists 
of the first decade of the twentieth century. Wu famously suggested that the nation could be saved 
through the power of engines (motuo jiuguo摩托救國), which would herald the dawn of a world where 
“each  can  take  according  to  his  need  [and]  every  human  being  will  have  an  exalted,  pure,  and 
exemplary character.”108 One of his texts is revealingly called “On the Advancement of the Great Unity 
through Machines” (Jiqi cujin datong shuo機器促進大同說).109 Kang Youwei himself, in the original 
104Kai-Wing Chow et al., “Introduction”, in Chow, 2008, p.15. 
105Peter Zarrow, After Empire: The Conceptual Transformations of the Chinese State, 1885-1924, Stanford (Cal.): Stanford 
University Press, 2012, p.7. 
106See Qin Yingjun 秦英君 , “Comments on Wu Zhihui's Scientism in the Early 20 th Century (Ershi zaoqi Wu Zhihui  
xiansheng de weikexuezhuyi pingshu 20 世纪早期吴稚晖的唯科学主义评述), Xin shiye 新视野, 2006, 6, pp.88-91 and 
Arif  Dirlik,  “The Revolution that  Never Was: Anarchism in the Guomindang”,  Modern China,  vol.15, no.4,  1989, 
pp.419-462.
107Actually, even Wu's case is a little more complicated. According to D.W.Y. Kwok, he celebrated Confucius and Mencius 
as  the  first  “urban people”  in  Chinese history who had a healthy this-wordly focus,  which  only came to be  truly 
corrupted  by  the  Neo-Confucian  Zhu  Xi's 朱 熹 supposed  adoption  of  Daoist  and  Buddhist  ideas  (through  the 
canonization of Zhou Dunyi 周敦頤 as restarter of the datong 道統). See D.W.Y. Kwok, Scientism in Chinese Thought.  
1900-1950, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965, pp.47-48.
108Quoted in Kwok, 1965, p.39.
109Published in New Youth, vol.5, no.2, 1918, pp.158-160. 
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formulation  of  his  Utopian  society  of  Great  Unity,  had  already  placed  considerable  trust  in  the 
possibilities of technology and automation for reaching the goal he envisaged.110 The tragic dimension 
of the May Fourth Movement's onslaught on tradition now often retrospectively stressed in accounts of 
the intellectual history of modern China was thus certainly not obvious to all its participants. It is also 
important to bear in mind that both the selection of precisely which (aspects of) traditions were to be 
left  behind as well  the motivations for these selective rejections differed considerably.111 For Chen 
Duxiu, who in the eyes of Lin Yu-Sheng exemplifies what he calls modern China's trend of “totalistic 
anti-traditionalism”112, the most important incentive for rejecting Confucianism as incompatible with 
modern life was the idea that modern life is governed by the economy, which is in turn based on the 
expenditure  of  individual  labor  power.  Chen  considered  the  traditional  relational  model  of  the 
individual  as embedded in a web of social  (familial)  relations  associated with Confucianism to be 
incompatible with the principle of individualism, which he called “the great principle of production in 
the study of economics” (乃為經濟學生產之大則 ) necessary for the efficient functioning of the 
modern economy.113 According to Edmund Fung, Chen's radical iconoclasm has to be understood as an 
expression of his “fervent nationalism”, a nationalism which, as we saw above, could still at a certain 
point in his career coexist with the rejection of the modern state as a proper instrument to ensure the  
political future of China. Chen believed total Westernization and an uncompromising rejection of (the 
Confucian) tradition to be the only way to avoid China from falling prey to Western imperialism. What 
he  took  be  the  legacy  of  imperial  China's  “pacifism”  had  to  be  rooted  out  through  voluntary 
Westernization.114 The latter paradoxically served as a means for ensuring national independence, since 
he  assumed  that  the  failure  to  Westernize  would  inevitably  lead  to  the  foreign  powers  forcefully 
imposing a perhaps even more radical form of Westernization,  enslaving the Chinese nation in the 
110See Kang Youwei,  Book of the Great Unity  (Datongshu 大同書 ), Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, [1902] 2009, 
pp.188-204  and  pp.237-244.  Partial  English  translation  in  Laurence  G.  Thompson,  Ta  T'ung  Shu.  The  One-World  
Philosophy of K'ang Yu-wei, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1958, pp.210-229 and pp.271-278. The current global 
anti-capitalist “Zeitgeist Movement”, influenced by the futurist and social “engineer” Jacque Fresco (founder of the 
“Venus Project”), actually has a similar confidence in the potential of automation for overcoming the logic of surplus 
value. 
111Fung, 2010, p.31: “Westernized radicalism was not total antitraditionalism. It targeted Chinese traditions strategically,  
that is, only aspects of them.” 
112See Lin Yu-Sheng, The Crisis of Chinese Consciousness. Radical Antitraditionalism in the May Fourth Era. Wisconsin: 
The University of Wisconsin Press, 1979.
113See Chen Duxiu, “Confucius and Modern Life” (Kongzi yu xiandai shenghuo 孔子與现代生活), quoted in Ding, 2011, 
pp.87-88. Also see Lin, 1979, pp.73-74 and Chow, 1960, p.302.
114Guo  Moruo 郭沫若  (1892-1978)  shared  this  vision  of  premodern  China  as  (hopelessly)  pacifist  and  prone  to 
assimilation and reconciliation. See his article “The Truth about National Revival” (Fuxing minzu de zhendi復興民族的
真諦) from 1938. Quoted in Zhao, 2013.
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process.115 What ultimately mattered then for Chen was not culture, but the autonomy of the nation as 
the necessary condition for any cultural form of self-determination. 
Perhaps Lin Yu-Sheng is justified in claiming that it was first and foremost nationalism which both fed 
and justified the demand for socio-political and institutional change.116 But by the same token, it can be 
argued that it remained possible to redefine tradition as actually conductive to modernization and state-
formation, or as in some sense providing the resources to overcome perceived pathologies of Euro-
American modernity.117 Nationalism appeared both in the form of a rejection of a tradition which was 
seen as inhibiting the success of the Chinese state in “catching up” with the Western powers, and in the  
idea that national emancipation could and should be achieved through a reinvigoration of tradition, the 
loss of which could then be presented as the root cause of China's demise. Nationalism could come 
both in the form of allegiance to and rejection of tradition. In other words, for some, the state (as a 
“territorial-juridical unit”118) had to be saved from the nation (when conceived of in terms of cultural 
and historical continuity), whereas others thought it was only possible to build a state through a quasi a 
priori unity of the nation in its culture.119 The possibility of conceiving of a mismatch between nation 
and state  (the state being either too national,  or no longer  national)  also implied that cultural  and 
temporal  distinctions  did not  always neatly overlap.  The past  was not  necessarily conceived of as 
Chinese, nor was the West always identified with the future. Jiang Qing was not yet there to make the 
totalizing series of equations according to which state = nation = history = culture (= Confucianism). 
From a retrospective point of view, the strong nationalist strain among both revolutionaries, liberals and 
conservatives active during May Fourth has been a reason for some commentators to see the potential 
for social and political emancipation displayed and articulated in the movement as essentially, echoing 
115See Edmund S.K. Fung,  The Intellectual Foundations of Chinese Modernity. Cultural and Political Thought in the  
Republican Era, Cambridge (New York): Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp.53-54.
116See Lin, 1979, p.11.
117See Xu Jilin许纪霖, “Republican Patriotism and Cultural Nationalism – A View on Two Types of National Identity in  
Modern China” (Gonghe aiguozhuyi yu wenhua minzuzhuyi – Xiandai zhongguo liang zhong minzuzhuyi rentongguan
共和爱国主义与文化民族主义—现代中国两种民族主义认同观 ), in The Central Concepts of Modern Chinese  
Thought  (Xiandai zhongguo sixiang de hexin guannian 现代中国思想的核心观念 ), edited by Xu Jilin, Shanghai: 
Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 2010, pp.282-301.
118Yingjie Guo,  Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary China: the Search for National Identity Under Reform, London: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2004, p.10.
119Vera  Schwarcz,  The  Chinese  Enlightenment.  Intellectuals  and  the  Legacy  of  the  May  Fourth  Movement  of  1919 , 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986, p.4: “ 'Destructive' and 'dangerous' were accusations quite familiar to 
Chinese admirers of the European enlightenment. In the context of a nationalist revolution however, they also faced an 
added charge: that of being 'un-Chinese'. Therefore, it was more difficult for them to persevere in the project of cultural 
criticism than it had been for European philosophers.” Cf. pp.288-291. 
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Habermas,  an  “unfinished  project”.120 What  is  specifically  regretted  in  such  interpretations  is  that 
concerns over democracy and individual freedom ended up being overridden by the cause of national 
independence and “national salvation”, thereby impeding the development of “critical reflection”.121 
Needless to say that such observations take the emergence of the People's Republic as an undemocratic 
authoritarian state and the ideal of liberal democracy as their point of reference.122 There is certainly 
something to be said for this view. That emancipatory ideals can quickly revert into their immediate 
opposite should, sadly enough, no longer come as a surprise to anyone who has lived long enough to 
have noticed that cynicism is often a good fortuneteller. For a recent example, one need only think of 
the bewildering trajectory from the massive demonstrations on Tahrir Square to the repressive military 
regime in present day Egypt. Much depends, however, on how one understands the word “critical”. 
From my limited  understanding of  the May Fourth Movement,  I  think  it  could  be argued that  an 
overwhelming majority of the ideas developed against the background of the threat of imperialism, 
internal  political  and  military  chaos,  unprecedented  social  transformations,  and  the  factual 
disappearance of tradition as a straightforwardly accessible source can be seen as instances of critical 
historical consciousness, as long as one agrees to place them against (and in a sense keep them in) this 
background,  without  unfairly  expecting  them to  be  able  to  emancipate  themselves  from the  same 
condition to which a present day interpreter remains subjugated. In this case, the obvious catch would 
120See Merle Goldman and Leo Ou-Fan Lee, “Introduction: the Intellectual History of Modern China”, in An Intellectual  
History of Modern China, edited by Merle Goldman and Leo Ou-Fan Lee, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2002, p.5. According to the authors, “the ideological manifestation of Chinese modernity was nationalism” (p.6).
121Goldman and Lee, 2002, p.7. Also see Li Zehou, 2000, pp.87-100, who notes the gradual pragmatically motivated 
abandonment of anarchist ideals for Leninist Marxism by many leading revolutionary intellectuals. Cf. Zhang Hao张灏, 
“Revisiting  May  Fourth  –  On  the  Ambiguity  of  May  Fourth  Thought”  (Chongfang  wusi  –  lun  wusi  sixiang  de  
liangqixing 重访五四 — 论“五四”思想的两歧性), in Xu, 2000, pp.21-27. The idea that the pursuit of national 
“wealth and power” trumped concerns over individual  liberty also plays an important  role in Benjamin Schwartz's  
classic study of Yan Fu. See his  In Search of Wealth and Power. Yen Fu and The West , Cambridge (Mass.): Belknap 
Press, 1964.
122Edward C. Gu, positioning himself against the influential interpretations of Tse-tsung Chow and Vera Schwarcz, draws  
attention to the fact that the conception of democracy of many May Fourth agents was generally not  liberal at all, but 
romantic  and indebted to  Jean-Jacques Rousseau,  in  that  they stood for  an unlimited form of  popular  sovereignty 
without seeing the need for constraint or mediation (representation). Economically, it was mostly socialism which was  
taken  as  an  incarnation  of  democratic  equality.  See  Edward  C.  Gu,  “Who was  Mr  Democracy?  The  May Fourth 
Discourse of Populist Democracy and the Radicalization of Chinese Intellectuals (1915-1922)”, Modern Asian Studies, 
vol.35, no.3, 2001, pp.589-621. It his highly ironic that certain liberal intellectuals see the unconscious persistence of  
Confucian  ideals  in  Chinese  Marxism,  which  for  a  long  time  rejected  Confucianism  as  an  ideology  of  imperial 
feudalism, as preventing the democratization and the extension of individual rights. They thus assume the disavowed 
Confucianism of the CCP to prevent the emergence of liberal democracy. See Li Minghui's 李明辉 comments on the 
work of Bao Zunxin包遵信 and Jin Guantao金观涛 in “On the So-Called 'Confucianization of Marxism' ”(Lun suowei  
'Makesizhuyi de rujiahua'论所谓「马克思主义的儒家化」 ), 1991,  http://www.confucius2000.com/admin/list.asp?
id=3934. Also see  Song Xianlin, “Reconstructing the Confucian Ideal in 1980s China: the “Culture Craze” and New 
Confucianism”, in  Confucianism: a Critical Examination, edited by John Makeham, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2003, pp.89-90.
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be that one allows for the possibility of an irreflexive, or unconscious critique, which would involve 
admitting that discourses are not so much in themselves critical, but require the passing of time and the  
occurrence of second-order observations (the observation of observations) to attribute this quality to 
them.123 A first-order observer can never know for sure whether his critique is perhaps feeding into the 
object of his criticism, or will do so in the future.124 Given the constantly shifting boundaries of what 
counts as emancipatory and critical, and the sheer impossibility of completely overseeing how what 
one says is already implicated in what one talks about, this is perhaps not so strange. One would also 
have to take into account that “functional mechanisms remain stable even when their genesis and their 
mode of functioning have been revealed.”125 There is the additional danger of critical consciousness 
degenerating into a form of desperate wishful thinking Hegel already exposed as the conundrum of the 
“beautiful soul” in the Phenomenology of Spirit.126 This would also imply that even ideas which may 
strike us (depending on who, where and when “we” are) as undesirable today, such as xenophobic 
forms of nationalism or the prospect of an alienating automated society, have to be, not “excused” or 
brushed aside, but simply taken for what they are, namely expressions of a historical experience of 
radical, “continuous” change to which we have perhaps gotten too much used over time. In the context 
of May Fourth as well, it is crucial to remember that “men make their own history, but they do not  
make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances 
existing already, given and transmitted from the past.”127 
2.2.2 Observations on May Fourth
Wang Hui has argued that one would look in vain for a common theoretical method or framework 
underlying the attempts of the May Fourth Movement's iconoclast participants to overcome tradition in 
the context of the burden of the present. Since a considerable heterogeneity of both newly imported 
Western and reinterpreted Chinese ideas and theories can be found even in the work of individual  
123See Niklas Luhmann,  Theories of Distinction: Redescribing the Descriptions of Modernity, Stanford (Cal.): Stanford 
University Press, 2002 on the distinction between first- and second-order observations.
124How could Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari possibly have foreseen that some of the concepts employed by them in  
Milles  Plateaux  (“inverse  geometry”,  “rhizomatic  structures”,  “fractal  maneuvers”,  “swarming”) in  formulating 
strategies of opposition to capitalism would one day be appropriated by the Israeli Defense Forces in the promotion of 
new forms of military tactics against Palestinian insurgents in the Gaza strip? See Eyal Weizman, “The Art of War”, May 
2006, Frieze. http://www.frieze.com/issue/article/the_art_of_war/.
125Niklas Luhmann, The Reality of the Mass Media, Stanford (Cal.): Stanford University Press, 2000, p.1.
126Hegel, 1977, pp.383ff.
127Karl Marx,  The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte,  [1852],  https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1852/18th-
brumaire/ch01.htm.
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thinkers (who often did not see themselves as primarily thinkers at all), it is hard to draw up anything 
more than a fluid typology held together by distant family resemblances. For Wang, any commonality 
must  be  looked  for  in  a  certain  attitude  ( 态度 )  stemming  from a  shared  horizon  of  historical 
experience.128 Indeed,  “May Fourth”  continues  up  to  this  day to  denote  a  specific  stance  towards 
tradition and a  certain socio-political  “spirit”  in  general,  which was actively “re-remembered” and 
reinvoked in the spring of 1989 in the weeks of protest leading up to the massacre on Tiananmen 
square.129 Vera Schwarcz speaks of the May Fourth Movement as “the Chinese Enlightenment”.130 The 
term “Chinese Renaissance” was already enthusiastically used by liberal champions of the movement 
such as Hu Shi.131 This is not the way May Fourth has been remembered by those close to the New 
Confucian  cause  however.  Taking  a  quite  different  take  on  this  phenomenon,  someone  like  Mou 
Zongsan was rather inclined to see the tragedy of Tiananmen as more or less the direct result of the 
movement's  assault  on  tradition,  which  had  helped  lead  to  the  birth  of  Chinese  communism.132 
Commenting on modernization as an “enlightenment” which,  in  its  Marxist  guise,  leads to  “being 
blinded by material things without knowing human beings” (蔽於物而不知人)133, he wrote: 
Enlightenment is essentially a return from Heaven to the human world and means setting out on the path
towards human self-awareness. But is it not obvious that we avert ourselves from man and turn back to a
Heaven [as something transcendent] where there is not a single sense of humanity when we no longer
recognize  human  beings  and  see  nothing  but  material  things?  From  the  original  search  for
Enlightenment,  one  thus  relapses  into  ignorance.  This  form  of  unenlightenment  is  not  Medieval
superstition, but a blindness following after enlightenment.134
128See Wang Hui汪晖, “The May Fourth Enlightenment Movement in Modern Chinese History (Zhongguo xiandai shili  
de “wusi” qimeng yundong 中国现代历史的“五四”启蒙运动), in Xu, 2000, pp.31-70. Cf. Fung, 2010, pp.15-16.
129See Mitter, 2004, p.24, pp.272-280.
130Schwarcz, 1986.
131See Chow, 1960, pp.338-342.
132See “May Fourth and Modernization”  (Wusi  yu  xiandaihua 五四與现代化 ),  [1979d]  in  SSXB,  pp.251-274 and 
Autobiography at Fifty (Wushi zishu五十自述), [1957c], vol.32 of MJ, pp.84-85.
133“Exhaustively Investigating Heaven and Man” (Jiu tianren 究天人), [1939a] in ZW2, p.921. Mou takes this sentence, 
which originally read “being blinded by heaven without knowing man” (蔽於天而不知人) from Xunzi荀子 (312–230 
BCE),  in  a  passage  (21.4)  where  the  latter  criticizes  Zhuangzi.  English  translation  in  John  Knoblock,  Xunzi.  A 
Translation and Study of the Complete Works, Stanford (Cal.): Stanford University Press, 1990, vol.3, p.102.
134Mou, [1939a], p.924. In many of the essays collected in Impressions of the Times (Shidai yu ganshou 時代與感受), Mou 
speaks of the modern age as one of “great unenlightenment” (大無明). Tang Junyi went even further: “The biggest error 
in recent times has been to replace the divine by the human. Human beings want to be at the center of the universe  
themselves, but the result has been the degradation of man.” (近代之大錯誤，即以人代神。人自己要成為宇宙的中
心，而結果則是人自身之墮落). “Humanism of the World and Chinese Humanism” (Shijie renwenzhuyi yu zhongguo  
renwenzhuyi 世界人文主義與中國人文主義 ), [1959] in ZJ, p.447. This why he claimed that, “man must strive for 
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開明本是從天上回到人間，即向人的自覺的路上走。孰知走到只認物不認人的時候，則又從人間
回到天上，直成得毫無人味存在。本求開明，如今又回到不開明。這種不開明不是中世紀的迷信，
乃是開明而後的盲目。
Tang Junyi would later speak of May Fourth as the emblem of the “spiritual affliction” (精神病痛)135 
of his own generation and the generation of his teachers which had incapacitated them to “spiritually 
direct themselves towards the internal and the higher” (精神不能向内向上).136 Unlike for those who 
advocated thoroughgoing change and saw themselves as politically engaged instructors of the people 
who were fortunate enough to be “the first to know and the first to become enlightened” (先知先覺悟
者 )137, for many traditionalists, the May Fourth “enlightenment” signified the unbalanced victory of 
what Chen Duxiu had  famously called “Mister Democracy” (De xiangsheng 德先生 ) and “Mister 
Science” (Sai xiansheng賽先生)138 over “Miss Morality” (De guniang 德姑娘). In its antitraditional 
May Fourth  guise,  enlightenment  –  defined  by Kant  as  “man's  emergence  from his  self-incurred 
immaturity [selbstverschuldeten Unmündigkeit]”139 – would come to be seen as, in the words of Tu 
Weiming,  an  “externally  imposed yet  self-inflicted  malaise”140 at  the  beginning of  the  twenty-first 
century. For thinkers faithful to the Confucian tradition such as Tu, the problem is not the fact that 
“everything must submit to criticism”141 as such, but that tradition is no longer employed to directly 
provide the categories and criteria in which such criticism is conducted. Yu Yingshi 余英时, who, not 
without  cause,  rejects  the  whole  metaphor  of  a  “Chinese  Enlightenment”,  sees  the  New  Culture 
deification in order to oppose the trend towards reification” (人應求神化，以反物化之趨向), “Description of the Spirit 
of the Journal  Ideals and Culture and a Discussion of the Prospects of Human Culture” (Shu ben kan zhi jingshen  
jianlun renlei wenhua zhi qiantu述本刊之精神兼論人類文化之前途), [1950b] in ZJ, p.586.
135See chapter 11 of Tang Junyi's The Development of the Chinese Humanist Spirit (Zhongguo renwen jingshen zhi fazhan
中國人文精神之發展), [1957], vol.6 of TJ, pp.233-260.
136Tang, [1957], p.239.
137Schwarcz, 1986, p.9. Perhaps Deng Xiaoping’s dictum that proposes to “let some people get rich first” (让一部分人先
富起来) is a contemporary variant of this idea, stripped of its scholarly arrogance and replaced by the bare equality of all 
before the laws of economic development. The highest bodhisattva ideal is now that of the entrepreneur who, instead of 
wallowing in his pure land of riches, decides to stay among the less fortunate and invests his hard-earned money in  
boosting the economy and creating jobs. 
138See Chow, 1960, p.59. 
139Immanuel Kant, Political Writings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p.54.
140Tu Wei-ming, “Implications of the Rise of 'Confucian' East Asia”, in Multiple Modernities, edited by S.N. Eisenstadt, 
New Brunswick/London: Transaction Publishers, 2002, p.202. It is interesting that both expressions are reflexive, and 
look in the same direction for assigning blame. 
141See Immanuel Kant,  Critique of Pure Reason, London: Penguin Books, 2007, preface to the first edition, p.7 (Axii, 
footnote).
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Movement  as  a paradigmatic  change  of  Chinese  “radicalism”142 in  its  contempt  for  tradition,  the 
emergence of which he traces back to the first Sino-Japanese War: 
From this time on, whether in criticizing the tradition or advocating changes, Chinese intellectuals would 
almost invariably invoke some Western ideas, values, or institutions as ultimate grounds for justification. 
It was now neither necessary nor possible to disguise discovery as interpretation […] The idea of total
demolition of tradition as a precondition for the building of a new society was wholly inconceivable
to the traditional Chinese imagination, but it was one of the absolute preconditions of the May Fourth
iconoclastic antitraditionalism.143
Yu scorns the attitude of iconoclasts such as Hu Shi, and believes that the outlook displayed in their 
writings after periods of study in “civilized countries” abroad betrayed that they saw themselves as one 
of the few (un)lucky prisoners to have escaped from Plato's cave, who now had to turn their back on 
the sunlight and retreat again into their dim cell of illusions to join its deluded inmates.144 For Yu, this 
trend of radicalism paved the way for the acceptance of Marxism, which inherited the worst of May 
Fourth antitraditionalism, and ultimately culminated in Mao's Cultural Revolution.145 I doubt though, 
whether he would want to see the “Council  for Chinese Cultural Renaissance” (Zhongguo wenhua 
fuxing weiyuanhui 中國文化復興委員會 ) founded by the Taiwan Guomindang government in 1967 
(and presided over by Chiang Kai-shek) in response to  the events  in the PRC and the subsequent 
restoration of Confucian temples and monuments as a genuine countercurrent to the mainland tide of 
violent radicalism.146 Rather, these opposed political phenomena seem to belong to the same chain of 
events  as  two  sides  of  the  same  coin.147 What Yu  Yingshi  diagnosed  as  a  form of  radicalization 
ultimately springing from anti-imperialist nationalism, is in the eyes of Thomas Metzger  “to a large 
extent, […] the indigenous, intense, centuries-old desire to escape from a metaphysical, psychological, 
political, and economic predicament which led many Chinese enthusiastically to devote their lives to 
142According to the Marxist thinker Liu Kang, what Yu calls “Radicalism is but a coded term for the revolutionary legacy, 
which  in  the  present  circumstances  can  only  be  labeled  euphemistically.”  Liu  Kang,  “Is  There  an  Alternative  to 
(Capitalist) Globalization? The Debate about Modernity in China”, boundary 2, vol.23, no.3, 1996, p.208.
143Ying-Shih  Yü,  “The  Radicalization  of  China  in  the  Twentieth  Century”,  Daedalus,  vol.122,  no.2,  China  in  
Transformation, 1993, p.130, p.133.
144Yü, 1993, p.131.
145Yü, 1993, pp.134-135.
146See Christian  Jochim, “Carrying Confucianism into the  Modern  World:  the Taiwan Case”,  in  Religion in  Modern 
Taiwan.  Tradition  and Innovation  in  a  Changing  Society, edited  by Philip  Clart  and  Charles  B.  Jones,  Honolulu: 
University of Hawai'i Press, 2003, pp.56-60.
147See  Lee  Seung-hwan,  A  Topography  of  Confucian  Discourse.  Politico-philosophical  Reflections  on  Confucian  
Discourse since Modernity, New Yersey: Homa & Sekey Books, 2004, pp.40-50.
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the overthrow of traditionally revered institutions and the adoption of strange and foreign ways.”148 
Peter  Zarrow has  rightly criticized Metzger's  culturalist  take on the New Culture and May Fourth 
Movement, pointing out that “[l]ike the literati of old, the modern Chinese intelligentsia sought order, 
but  it  was  a  very  different  order.  Nationalism,  citizenship  (political  participation  of  the  masses), 
progress  and  evolutionism,  egalitarianism,  the  glorification  of  struggle:  such  goals  present  major 
discontinuity with the past.”149 For the intellectual historian Zhang Hao张灏, “the scope of their moral 
iconoclasm is perhaps unique in the modern world; no other historical civilization outside the West 
undergoing modern transformation has witnessed such a phoenix-like impulse to see its own cultural 
tradition so completely neglected.”150 However, what is missing in Zhang Hao's account is a broader 
perspective which puts the events and the discourses surrounding May Fourth in a global context, since 
very similar processes can be observed all over the world at the same historical juncture.151 One clear 
indication for this is that the semantic schemes adopted in the face of the unprecedented transformation 
of Chinese society were not specifically Chinese at all. Even among tradition-minded thinkers, it did 
not always prove so difficult to interpret the generalized cultural crisis they saw around them as an 
intermediary stage in a larger historical movement, thereby already ascribing a certain necessity to this 
crisis as a possible mode of “purification” of tradition, paving the way for its rebirth. He Lin賀麟, who 
is credited with having been the first to use the expression “New Confucianism” (xin ruxue 新儒学) 
with reference to himself and his contemporaries152, sounds remarkably similar to Chen Duxiu's famous 
eulogy on the purifying dimension of youth and novelty in the first issue of  New Youth153 when he 
writes that
148Thomas A. Metzger, Escape from Predicament: Neo-Confucianism and China's Evolving Political Culture, New York: 
Columbia  University  Press,  1977,  p.17.  Cf.  p.223:  “[T]he  Chinese  have  traditionally  regarded  humiliating  and 
convulsive disasters as an normal part of their history and indeed as serving to define the moral-political missions to be 
undertaken by succeeding generations.”
149Zarrow, 2005, p.172. 
150Chang Hao, “New Confucianism and the Intellectual Crisis of Contemporary China”, in The Limits of Change. Essays  
on Conservative Alternatives in Republican China, edited by Charlotte Furth, Cambridge (Mass.) and London: Harvard 
University Press, 1976, p.281.
151See Mishra, 2013. Peter Zarrow notes that “the dislocation experienced by China was not unique. Indeed, it was one of a 
number of  revolutionary societies  in  the  early twentieth  century.  By the  1890s,  most  late-developing nations were  
experiencing tremendous disruptions as they were drawn, under varying degrees of imperialist pressure, into the world 
economy.” Zarrow, 2005, p.132.
152See John Makeham, “The Retrospective Creation of New Confucianism”, in Makeham, 2003, pp.25-26 and Bresciani, 
2001, pp.216-218.
153Quoted in Chow, 1960, pp.45-46:”Youth is like early spring, like the rising sun, like trees and grass in bud, like a newly  
sharpened blade […] The function of youth in society is the same as that of a fresh and vital cell in a human body. In the  
process of metabolism, the old and the rotten are incessantly eliminated to be replaced by the fresh and the living.”
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one could say that the New Culture Movement of the May Fourth period was an important turning point
for encouraging the development of Confucian thought. On the surface, the New Culture Movement was 
one big movement to “smash the Confucian shop” and to overturn Confucian thought. [...] The greatest
contribution of the New Culture Movement lies in its having destroyed and cleansed away the petrified
elements in the details of the formal constitution of Confucianism and those traditional putrefied parts
that fetter individuality.154
五四時代的新文化運動，可以說是促進儒家思想新發展的一格大轉機。匾面上，新文化運動是個
打孔子店，推翻儒學思想的一個大運動。 [...] 新文化運動的最大貢獻在於破壞和掃除儒家的僵
化部分的軀殼的形式末節，及束縛個性的傳統腐化部分。
In an article from 1953, Mou Zongsan invokes the Romantic poet Hölderlin's idea of “the withdrawal 
of God”155, with which he was familiar through Heidegger (through the intermediary of Tang Junyi), in 
an argument where the same logic of “purification” is employed even more dramatically: 
His withdrawal156 is a temporary separation he establishes between himself and the human world. He 
wants to uphold his own purity and return to himself as a “pure subject”. Only in this way can he truly
establish himself and uphold himself and avoid being washed away. [...] When he returns to his own
pure  subjectivity,  then  the  cruelty and ignorance of  the  Middle  Ages and the  vulgarity and trifling
attitude of the modern age all become a process of self-destruction on the side of the human world. At
the same time, the obstinacy of people towards God which causes them to fall into darkness and makes
their life and their spirit unable to open up and change is not something in which God takes pleasure.
That  is  why he must  take a  step back in  order to allow the life and the mind of human beings to
transform itself so that they may temper themselves in this process of transformation and so that they can 
find out whether they are able to become awakened and free of delusions to attain the region where they
circulate and interconnect with God [...] Therefore, the retreat of God is not only that through which he
purifies himself, but also that by which he cleanses the human world.157
他的歸寂是他自己暫時與人間及世界隔離。他要保持他的純淨性﹐歸於他的「粹純主體性」之
自己。這樣﹐他才真能建立其自己﹐保持其自己﹐而不流失。 [...] 他歸於他的純粹主體性之自
154He Lin, Culture and Human Life (Wenhua yu rensheng 文化與人生), Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan, [1947] 1996, p.12. 
Cf. Tang, [1957], pp.166-167.
155“On 'the Withdrawal of God' ” (Lun 'shangdi yintui' 論「上帝隱退」), [1953c] in DY, p.241-262.
156Literally, “return to loneliness”. Guiji 歸寂 is a Buddhist term for death or a synonym for parinirvāna. See Foguang da 
cidian佛光大辭典, edited by Ci Yi慈怡 et al., Gaoxiong: Foguang chubanshe, 1989, p.5406 and p.6569.
157Mou, [1953c], p.243. 
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己﹐則人間方面中世的殘忍愚昧與近世的庸俗玩忽都是自己毀滅之過程。同時﹐人膠固於上帝
而陷於幽冥﹐其生命心靈不能開拓變化﹐亦非上帝之所喜﹐所以上帝要退一步﹐讓人的生命心靈
自己活轉一下﹐讓它在自己的活轉過程中磨練其自己﹐看它是否能清醒自在而達到與上帝周流感
通的境地 [...] 所以上帝歸寂﹐既所以澄清他自己﹐亦所以釐清人間世也。
The distance between the ideal (God) and the real (a world from which God has retreated) is thereby 
reinterpreted as a constitutive property of the ideal itself, which needs this temporary withdrawal from 
the world (to which it must ultimately return in order to come to full, objective existence) in order to 
sustain its ideality as a “pure subject”. It is also through this very same retreat of the ideal that the real 
world and the subjects in this world from which it has distanced itself are dialectically stimulated, or 
one could even say forced, to turn towards the ideal and strive to attain a state of interconnection with 
the transcendent. Tang Junyi too, in a text from 1949, evaluating the “cultural effects of materialism as 
a worldview” (Yuzhouguan weiwulun zhi wenhua xiaoyong pinglun宇宙觀唯物論之文化效用評論), 
had already taken on an equally heavily Christian jargon to make his case against Marx's historical 
materialism: 
Most of humanity's other intellectual theories had an effect on human culture because they were true,
Marx's theory however had an effect [precisely] because of its erroneous nature. This is because Marx
made a false prediction and thereby spurred people on to prevent this prediction from coming true, so
that they came to attach more importance to social, political and cultural forces outside of economic
factors. This then has been Marx's contribution to human culture. God sent Jesus to take on our sins and
relieve us of them. He also sent a multitude of scholars to take on errors so that future generations might
attain the truth. When people took Marx's errors for the truth and failed to continue to search for a higher 
truth, they failed to live up to the will of God and as a consequence could not understand the true value
of Marx's historical materialism for human culture.158
人類其他的思想學說常是因其真而對人類文化有效用，馬氏之學說則是因其錯誤而對人類文化有
效用。因為馬氏說了一個應當錯的預言，於是反而激發人去阻止此預 言之實現盡量求應當真者
之實現，而更重視經濟力量以外之社會政治文化之力量。這就是馬氏對於人類文化之貢獻。上帝
使耶穌承擔罪惡，以為人贖罪，亦使許多學者，承擔錯誤以使後人獨得真理。而後人以馬氏之錯
誤為真理，而不能進而求更高之真理，則辜負上帝之意旨，亦將不能了解馬氏之唯物史觀對人類
文化之真效用在何處了。
158Tang, [1949c], no pagination. 
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One of the most important functions the concept of culture (“the God of the Chinese people”) as Spirit 
fulfills  in  Mou's  and Tang's  thought  is  identifying  the  qualitatively unprecedented discontinuity of 
modernity as part of a continuous trajectory that is not outside of the inner principle of mobility of this 
substantial subject. Yingjie Guo is certainly justified in raising the following question: “Confucians 
have been trying to reinterpret, reinvent or 'modernize' Confucianism in order to make it more relevant 
and  appealing  to  contemporary  Chinese.  The  question  is  whether  or  not  Confucianism  can  be  
modernized without losing its self-identity.”159 But obviously, the threat of a loss of self-identity can be 
warded off by inscribing non-identity and discontinuity (in the form of self-negation) into the same 
dynamic which allows Spirit to realize its “innermost self”. This in my view is one of the primary 
functions of dialectical logic in the works of Tang and Mou. It is not merely a “magic trick” they use to  
violate common sense and obfuscate problems of a determinate historical and social origin.160 Wang 
Xueqing 王雪卿  and Liao Junyu 廖俊裕 are I think right to stress that  the fundamental difference 
between Tang's idea of the moral self (daode ziwo 道德自我 ) and the traditional Confucian idea of 
morality is that Tang proposes that the moral subject must first go through a form of what Wang and 
Liao call “self-disintegration” (ziwo bengjie 自我崩解)”.161 It is through such a form of strategic self-
negation  that  difference  is  grasped  as  a  modality  of  sameness.  In  Hegelian  terms,  immediate, 
unreflective self-identity must be subjected to a process of negation, after which the initial identity can 
be sublated (Aufgehoben) at a higher level by including non-identity into the identical. Zhang Yixin张
怡 心 believes  that  Tang's  highly  selective  use  of  Hegel  becomes  apparent  in  his  intentional 
abandonment of the historical character of Spirit (Geist).  According to Zhang, the moral self Tang 
endowed with the qualities of the Hegelian Geist is an atemporal entity purified of external historical 
determinations.162 But  she  does  not  stop  to  consider  the  possibility  that  this  (far  from complete) 
159Yingjie Guo,  Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary China: the Search for National Identity under Reform, London: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2004, p.90. Emphasis added.
160See  Yiu-ming Fung [Feng  Yaoming 馮耀明 ],  “Three  Dogmas  of  New Confucianism:  A Perspective  of  Analytic 
Philosophy,” in  Two Roads to Wisdom? Chinese and Analytic Philosophical Traditions, edited by  Bo Mou, Chicago: 
Open Court, 2001, pp.245-266. Fung's analytic denunciation of the various violations of formal logic he finds in the 
work of New Confucian philosophers cannot really go beyond denunciation, nor can it even begin to account for what it 
denounces. Similarly, the mainland scholar  Deng Xiaomang 邓晓芒 , a specialist of German Idealist philosophy, has 
extensively occupied himself with correcting Mou's various misinterpretations of Kant. See the second part of his A New 
Critique of Confucian Ethics (Rujia lunli xin pipan 儒家伦理新批判), Chongqing: Chongqing daxue chubanshe, 2010. 
161Wang and Liao, 2008, p.43.
162Zhang Yixin张怡心, “Tang Junyi's Theory of the Mind Permeating the Nine Horizons” (Tang Junyi de xin tong jiujing  
lun 唐君毅的心通九境论), in A History of Chinese Confucianism – the Modern Age (Zhongguo ruxue shi, xiandai juan
中国儒学史- 现代卷), edited by Hu Jun 胡军, Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2011, p.443. Cf. Shan Bo单波, The 
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purification from history is itself historically conditioned, in the sense that Tang's immunization of the 
moral  mind  against  historical  change  can  be  understood  as  being  directed  against  a  particular 
developmental logic of history in which the tradition he wanted to uphold and safeguard had become to 
a  great  extent  institutionally  effaced  and  had  to  be  incorporated  into  the  modern  coordinates  of 
knowledge in order to survive. As Stephan Schmidt writes: 
[T]he only thing to do for  a Confucian living under these circumstances was to make sure  that  an
intellectual tradition of Confucianism be saved from collapse — an intellectual tradition that one day
might launch the reestablishment of institutions in which a more wholesale Confucianism could live
again  [...]  The first  thing  that  is  required is  the  independence  of  the  intellectual  tradition from the
institutions that no longer exist.163
Clearly, thinkers who wanted to reaffirm the value of tradition as a “scare resource”164 in the face of 
unprecedented structural changes in history and in the semantics available for comprehending these 
changes,  were  in  no  way  foreign  or  immune  to  modernization  discourses.  “Modern  Chinese 
conservatism”,  Edmund  Fung  judges  summarily,  “served  the  purposes  of  modernization.”165 As 
Sébastien Billioud writes in relation to Mou Zongsan: “Mou Zongsan, far from being an opponent of 
modernity, is also an heir of the May Fourth spirit and its values of science and democracy. In brief, he 
embraces modernity while attempting to articulate it within a Chinese cultural tradition that should not 
be thrown into the dustbin of history.”166 Mou did not conceive of the relation between Confucianism 
and modernity as a problem of compatibility and adaptation (shiying 適應 ) but as one of realization 
(shixian 實現).167 Tang Junyi too tried to present the development of science and democracy in modern 
China as the fulfillment of the internal requirements of Chinese culture168, which he assumed to have 
always been affected and influenced by other cultures “purely out of its inner yearning and demands” 
Nine Horizons of the Mind: The Place for Spirit in Tang Junyi's Philosophy 心通九境 :  唐君毅哲学的精神空间 ), 
Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2011, p.22.
163Stephan Schmidt, “Mou Zongsan, Hegel, and Kant: The Quest for Confucian Modernity”,  Philosophy East and West, 
vol.61, no.2, 2011, p.276.
164Arjun Appadurai, “The Past as a Scarce Resource”, Man, vol.16, no.2, 1981, pp.201-219.
165Fung, 2010, p.21. Cf. Lin, 1979, p.17: “Those who wanted to uphold or defend traditional ideas and values were forced 
to look for new justifications.”
166Sébastien Billioud,  Thinking through Confucian Modernity: A Study of Mou Zongsan's Moral Metaphysics,  Leiden: 
Brill, 2012, p.8.
167See Mou, [1961], p.6. Cf. “Discussing the Modern Meaning of Chinese Culture from the Contemporary Mission of 
Confucians” (Cong rujia de dangqian shiming shuo Zhongguo wenhua de dangdai yiyi 從儒家的當前使命說中國文化
的當代意義), [1979a] in SS, p.326.
168See for example Tang, [1957], pp.143-145.
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(純出內心之向往要求 ).169 In this way, transformation essentially comes to be understood as self-
transformation.170 What still remains to be thought through is how the culturally mediated articulations 
of modernity by twentieth-century Confucian philosophers such as Mou and Tang were in themselves 
already substantially modified by, and to a certain extent products of, modernization and its confused 
chorus of discourses. In order to interpret adaptation as realization, that which is realized has to be 
already adapted beforehand in order to be observed as realizing itself.  Aware of their  fundamental 
novelty and the often uneasy fit with traditional coordinates of knowledge, they consciously reflected 
on categories such as modernity, culture, philosophy, and science (as well as other subdivisions). As we 
will soon see in more detail, the expression “anti-modern theories of modernization” (fanxiandaixing 
de xiandaixing 反现代的现代性理论 ) coined by Wang Hui171 could be taken as a particularly apt 
description of what later came to be known as the movement of New Confucianism. The epochal 1923 
debate on science and metaphysics will serve as a point of entry in addressing these issues. Before 
dealing with the import  of  this  debate  in  relation  to  New Confucian  philosophy,  I  will  devote  an 
extensive section to the general issue of philosophy as a modern category of knowledge by starting out 
from a number of ideas developed by Feng Youlan. Some of the elements we have encountered so far  
will hopefully converge here in a manner which allows us to contextualize them and carry them over 
into what follows.
169Tang, [1953b], p.2.
170Li Minghui李明辉, The Self-Transformation of Contemporary Confucianism (Dangdai ruxue de ziwo zhuanhua当代儒
学的自我转化), Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2001.
171See Wang Hui, “Contemporary Chinese Thought and the Question of Modernity”, Social Text, 55, 1998, p.14. 
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2.3 Modernity, philosophy, and the inheritance of abstraction
2.3.1 Feng Youlan's Xin shi lun and his method of abstract inheritance
Feng Youlan's馮友蘭 (1895-1990) New Treatise on Current Practical Affairs (Xin shi lun 新事論)172, 
subtitled  China's Road to Freedom  (Zhongguo dao ziyou zhi lu 中國到自由之路 ), from 1939 is 
interesting in the context of the problem of modernity and discontinuity which became a focal point of 
discussion during the New Culture period. Although technically speaking Feng's New Treatise does not 
belong to the May Fourth era, it can be useful and relevant for our understanding of this period and its 
relation  to  later  history  nonetheless.  That  Feng  is  often  excluded  from  the  category  of  New 
Confucianists need not concern us here. In general, many of the concerns first articulated during May 
Fourth were continued in the work of a whole generation of thinkers who had come of age in the 
atmosphere of the New Culture epoch and its various heated intellectual debates. Inspired by historical 
materialism173, and in clear opposition to Liang Shuming's typology of cultures, Feng Youlan declared 
himself in favor of replacing the prevalent opposition between China and the West (zhongxi zhi fen 中
西之分) used in diagnosing China's position in the modern world with the distinction between past and 
present (gujin zhi fen古今之分). He did not see these two distinctions as mutually overlapping, since 
from his point of view, the difference between the old and the new is just as applicable to and abrasive 
of the experience of temporal uniformity in Western countries. Both China and the West can be divided 
into a tensely related and often conflictual opposition of past and present.174 This acultural distinction 
between past and present enabled Feng to attribute the “backwardness” of China, not to its culture, of 
which he tended to downplay the importance in relation to modernization, but to what he considered to 
172I follow the translation suggested by Derong Chen, Metaphorical Metaphysics in Chinese Philosophy: Illustrated with  
Feng Youlan's New Metaphysics, Lanham: Lexington Books, 2011, pp.xii-xiv.
173See Zhang Sanping 张三萍 ,  An Investigation into the Contemporary New Confucian View of Marxism, (Xiandai xin  
ruxue de Makesizhuyiguan yan jiu 现代新儒学的马克思主义观研究), Wuhan: Hubei renmin chubanshe, 2011, pp.104-
108 and Umberto Bresciani, Reinventing Confucianism: the New Confucian Movement, Taipei: Taipei Ricci Institute for 
Chinese Studies, 2001, p.189.
174Feng Youlan, New Treatise on Practical Affairs (Xin shi lun 新事論), Shanghai: Shanghai shudian, [1939] 1998, pp.13-
15. According to Chen Lai, Feng Youlan's views on culture and modernity are a neglected dimension of his oeuvre,  
partly because Feng insisted on describing himself as the “most philosophical philosopher”, whereas, as Chen tries to  
show, his work is run through with historical concerns. See Chen Lai陈来, The Search for Modern Chinese Philosophy  
– New Learning of Principle and of the Heart-Mind (Xiandai Zhongguo zhexue de zhuiqiu – xin lixue yu xin xinxue 现代
中国哲学的追求—新理学与新心学), Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2001, pp.70-107. Also see Chen Lai, Tradition and 
Modernity: a Humanist View, Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2009, pp.163-185 and Li Zhonghua, “Feng Youlan's Views on 
Chinese and Western Culture”, Journal of Chinese Philosophy, vol.21, no.4, 1994, pp.255-262.
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be  a  culturally  neutral  technical  and  technological  gap,  which  could  be  bridged  through  active 
industrialization without necessarily having to sacrifice culture. “From our of point view”, Feng writes, 
“what is meant in propagating that which has a so-called national essence [or nature] is in reality not at 
all a question of essence, but one of habit.” (照我們的看法，主張有所謂民族性者所說底民族性，
實則並不是性而是習).175 Simply put, for Feng, China did not need to Westernize, but industrialize, in 
order to become modern. As he had already stated unequivocally in a speech from 1939, “so-called 
Western culture is the type which represents industrial culture and anything in it related to industrial 
culture is relevant. All the rest is irrelevant.”176 Feng thought it possible to build a modern industrial 
state  without  recourse to  the nation as  a  culturally continuous  community.  Starting from the third 
chapter177, Feng latches the distinction between present and past onto the difference between city (城) 
and countryside (鄉) and projects this difference onto a global and broader historical scale. He argues 
that before the end of the Qing dynasty,  China was an “urban country”,  in the sense that it  could 
consider itself to be a civilized city surrounded by the coarse countryside of a world of tributary states. 
It was a center of consumption, not one of production. For Feng, the collapse of the imperial order and 
China's  weakness  as  a  young nation-state  had  turned it  into  the  countryside  (or  backyard)  of  the 
Western  colonial  nations  (specifically  England,  France,  Germany  and  America)  who  had  become 
“global cities” in the meantime. He adds that a large part  of the “global countryside” has become 
colonized  by  the  Western  “cities”  which  effectively  rely  on  the  global  countryside's  exploitable 
economic backwardness to maintain their own supremacy.178 These Marxist-sounding views and the 
enormous importance Feng attached to the economy are not, as one might expect, developed into an 
argument  against,  but  precisely  for  full-blown industrialization  and  the  advancement  of  industrial 
productivity in China. Restoring China's “urban” status on a world-scale will lead to the production of 
the necessary welfare and material  wealth which are the prerequisites for any future political  (e.g. 
democratic) revolution.179 In the fourth chapter of his treatise, entitled “On the State” (Shuo guojia說國
家)180, Feng discusses what he takes to be the unprecedented revolution achieved in the transition from 
a mode of production centered around direct family ties to a large scale industrial mode of production 
involving  the  functional  division  of  labor  and  resulting  in  what  Feng  calls  “the  socialization  of  
175Feng, [1939] 1998, p.160.
176Quoted in Chen, 2009, p.179.
177Feng, [1939], pp.38-55.
178See Feng, [1939], pp.191-193.
179See Feng, [1939], pp.184-185.
180Feng, [1939], pp.59-73.
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production” (生產的社會化).181 Punning on the modern Chinese word for state (guojia 國家), he writes 
that “what we used to call a state [guo] was actually still a family [jia]” (舊所謂國者，實則還是家).182 
In a series of vivid tableaux not lacking in literary appeal, he describes the far-reaching consequences 
of this transition.183 Feng explicitly states that the change from family-centered to “socialized” (i.e. 
industrialized) production is far from (culturally) unique to China184, but should be seen as the result of 
a global change in the “type” (see below) of production and social organization, with the modern state 
as  a  result  of  this  transformation.  The  whole  chapter  on  the  state  is  actually  about  the  industrial 
revolution, with the state figuring as a derivative by-product of economic development. Feng also uses 
the metaphors of society and family to distinguish socialism from capitalism: socialism (shehuizhuyi社
会主義) essentially means the distribution of socially (industrially) produced commodities according to 
the old family model, whereas capitalism (ziben zhuyi資本主義) comes down to the socially organized 
distribution  of  socially  (industrially)  produced  goods,  without  any  mediation  of  natural  family 
relations.185 Refusing to directly take sides, Feng chooses instead to heap lavish praise on large-scale 
industrialization itself, which needs no “isms” (zhuyi 主義 )186 to fulfill its modernizing function:  all 
required  political,  educational  and  social  transformations  will  follow from industrialization  as  the 
socialization of labor. Feng's  New Philosophy of Humanity  (Xin Yuanren 新原人 ) from 1943 is also 
worth considering in this respect. His theory of the different “horizons” (jingjie 境界)187 of human life 
articulated here can be seen as a conceptual device through which what the German sociologist Niklas 
Luhmann  analyzed  as  the  functional  differentiation  characteristic  of  modern  societies  is 
accommodated.188 Feng stresses that the jingjie “are not in any way self-sufficient entities external to 
everyday activities” (並不是於日常行事外獨立存在者).189 From his descriptions of what he takes to 
be the four horizons of perception corresponding to certain modes of being and behaving (natural, 
181Feng, [1939], p.60.
182Feng, [1939], p.68.
183Feng, [1939], pp.57-65.
184See Feng, [1939], p.67.
185Feng, [1939], p.71.
186In 1919, an article by Hu Shi strongly influenced by pragmatism had already led to a short but lively debate with the 
Marxist Li Dazhao concerning the matter of “problems” (wenti 問题 ) versus “isms”. See Lin Yusheng 林毓生 , “The 
Historical Significance of the Debate on 'Problems and Isms' ” (“Wenti yu zhiyu” lunbian de lishi yiyi “问题与主义”
论辩的历史意义), in Xu, 2000, pp.296-303. 
187See Wu Jiang吴疆, “What is Jingjie? Defining Confucian Spirituality in the Modern Chinese Intellectual Context”, in 
Monumenta Serica, 50, 2002, pp.441-462.
188See Feng Youlan, Xin yuan ren 新原人, Shanghai: Shanghai shudian, [1943] 1998, pp.30-42, Bresciani, 2001, pp.192-
194 and Chen, 2001, pp.174-177, pp.287-291. 
189Feng, [1943] 1998, p.40.
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utilitarian, moral, cosmic)190, it is clear that these are not so much ontological (denoting a discrete and 
fixed  domain  of  pregiven  objects),  but  are  primarily  social  in  nature  and  correspond  to  different 
subjective perspectives coupled to spheres of human activity in modern society, where these attitudes 
and modes of behavior are in a a sense presupposed and required. The moral and the religious horizons 
which have a strong continuity with the past thus do not “belong” in domains of activity which are 
intrinsically dominated by the present, and vice versa. 
From the above account, one can already infer that Feng Youlan clearly had a completely different 
approach  to  the  relation  between  culture  and  modernity  (which  for  him  essentially  meant 
industrialization) than most other members of the “New Confucian movement”, his status among which 
has always been a matter of dispute.191 His replacement of cultural by temporal distinctions would be 
anathema to more holistically (and dialectically) oriented thinkers like Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan192, 
who explicitly  attempted  to  ground modern  institutions  and  practices  in  Confucian  thought.  Feng 
thought that it was possible for Chinese culture to change from one universal “type” (lei類) to another 
(i.e. from a familial to an industrial type of production), without a substantial cultural basis, all while 
leaving its individual cultural specificity untouched and intact. The modernization of China would not 
entail  a transition from one “particular” (teshu 特殊 ) culture to another (from Chinese to Western 
culture), but signify a change from one “type” to the next without corroding its individual specificity. It 
is no wonder then that Feng's treatise on practical affairs starts with a properly theoretical discussion on 
“distinguishing  the  universal  from  the  concrete”  (Bie  gong  shu 别 共 殊 ).193 According  to  the 
190The first horizon denotes a “natural” (ziran 自然), irreflexive attitude towards everyday life and seems to describe the 
subjective  constitution  of  the  proletarian  worker  who  does  not  control  or  reflect  on  his  actions  as  a  producer  of 
commodities. The second sphere of utility (gongli 功利 ) refers to an attitude in which the subject pursues his own 
interests, even to the extent that personal well-being comes to be sacrificed for the sake of profit. Marx's description of 
the venture-capitalist as a “rational miser” comes to mind here. In the third horizon, of morality (daode 道德), political 
activity can overcome the exclusive pursuit of “personal” interest and benefits through a devotion to the greater good of  
society. In the cosmic or religious sphere (tiandi 天地) finally, the unmediated natural identity of subject and object from 
the first  horizon is sublated into a higher unity with the extra-social universe as a whole. However, even this later  
horizon  remains  inside  of  society,  since  it  continues  to  have  a  determinate  place  and  function,  and  would not  be 
appropriate for most non-religious activities. 
191See Hans-Georg Moeller, “Daoism as Academic Philosophy: Feng Youlan's New Metaphysics (Xin lixue)”, in Learning 
to Emulate the Wise: the Genesis of Chinese Philosophy as an Academic Discipline in Twentieth-Century China , edited 
by John Makeham, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2012, p.219 and Lauren F. Pfister, “A Modern Chinese 
Philosophy Built upon Critically Received Traditions: Feng Youlan’s New Principle-Centered Learning and the Question 
of  its  Relationship  to  Contemporary  New  Ruist  (“Confucian”)  Philosophies”,  in  New  Confucianism:  a  Critical  
Examination, edited by John Makeham, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, pp.165-184.
192See Zheng Jiadong郑家栋, “New Confucians and Chinese Modernization” (Xin rujia yu Zhongguo xiandaihua 新儒家
与中国现代化), in Xu, 2000, p.196.
193Feng,  [1939],  pp.1-18.  See  Lauren  Pfister,  “Feng  Youlan's  New Principle  Learning  and  His  Histories  of  Chinese 
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philosophical presuppositions he articulates here, and contrary to Mou's and Tang's basic anti-dualist 
ontological outlook, the particular does not need to incarnate the universal, nor does the universal have 
to manifest itself as a “concrete universal”. For Mou on the other hand, “from a metaphysical point of 
view, it is only when a universal principle is realized in a particular thing that it becomes an 'individual 
entity' ” (從形而上學方面講﹐普遍的理實現於特殊的東西中﹐方能成「個體」).194 In other words, 
“essential reality” (benti 本體) must always be “embodied” (tixian 體現).195 On a political level, Mou 
took the family and the state to be such actualizing embodiments.196 Within the framework of Feng 
Youlan's metaphysics, “a principle is not a thing at all, but “subsists” (qiancun [潜存]) as ontologically 
prior and metaphysically connected to [that is to say factually disconnected from] the dimension of 
actuality and any actual thing.”197 As Jana Rošker remarks: 
Because he understood li [理, principle] as a logical maxim unburdened by space/time coordinates, this
historically limited materialism in no way contradicted his historically undetermined metaphysics. For
him, the process of changing factual actuality had no connection whatsoever with the metaphysical state
of  principle  and  could  therefore  be  interpreted  and  evaluated  within  the  scope  of  materialist
assumptions.198 
Philosophy”,  in  Contemporary  Chinese  Philosophy,  edited  by  Chung-Ying  Cheng  and  Nicholas  Bunnin,  Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2002, p.171.
194“The Meaning of the Practice of Idealism” (Lixiangzhuyi de shijian zhi hanyi 理想主義的實踐之含義), [1949c] in DY 
p.76. Cf. Mou, [1983b], p.37: “Only a particular which has been universalized is something truly particular, or a truly 
concrete particular.” (普遍化了的特殊才是真正的特殊，這才是真正具體的特殊). Mou Zongsan saw the concept of 
the concrete universal as rare in Western philosophy, but omnipresent in Chinese thought. For him, Hegel was thus 
something of an exception in the whole Western tradition. See Mou, [1983b], p.35. According to Joël Thoraval, Feng 
was Mou's “anti-modèle par excellence”. See “Introduction: idéal du sage, stratégie du philosophe”, introduction to 
Spécifités de la philosophie chinoise, French translation of  Zhongguo zhexue de tezhi 中國哲學的特質 by Ivan P. 
Kamenarovic and Jean-Claude Pastor, Paris: CERF, 2003, pp.14-15. Feng based his reinvented Song-Ming metaphysics 
on the “rationalist” Zhu Xi朱熹 (1130-1200), who for Mou constituted a “side-branch” (pangzhi旁支) of the genuine 
Confucian  daotong 道統 represented  by Cheng  Hao 程顥 (1032–1085)  and  Lu  Xiangshan 陸象山 (1139–1192). 
Additionally, Mou could not forgive Feng for having “capitulated” to mainland Chinese communism. Mou recounts a  
famous exchange between Feng Youlan and Xiong Shili – in which the latter had vocally expressed his outrage at Feng's 
suggestion that  “innate knowing” (liangzhi 良知 ) was merely a “hypothesis” (jiading 假定 )  instead of an “active 
manifestation” (chengxian呈現) – in his Autobiography at Fifty (Wushi zishu五十自述), 1957, MJ, vol.32, pp.78-79. 
According to  Thoraval,  “derrière  l'opposition  classique  d'un  Lu Xiangshan et  d'un  Zhu Xi,  il  faut  aussi  et  encore  
percevoir le débat entre Feng Youlan et Xiong Shili.” Thoraval, 2003, p.33.
195Mou, [1983b], p.237.
196Mou, [1949c], p.78.
197Pfister, 2002, p.166. Cf. p.169: “Principles are the metaphysical  ground for the existence of actual things, and while 
things flow in and out of temporal and spatial existence, which Feng called the dimension of actuality, principles remain 
fixedly “present” as subsistent metaphysical patterns, the ontologically prior foundations for the existence of all these 
various things.”
198Jana Rošker, Searching for the Way: Theory of Knowledge in Pre-Modern and Modern China, Hong Kong: The Chinese 
University Press, 2008, p.165. 
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Although I largely agree with  Rošker, it has to be borne in mind that Feng developed the ideas later 
brought together in his New Treatise on Current Practical Affairs already before the publication of his 
major  work  on  metaphysics.199 His  materialist  assumptions  in  describing  social  reality  probably 
influenced his approach of metaphysics just as much as the other way around. It is noteworthy that in 
relation to the problem of how contemporary thinkers should orient themselves towards the Chinese 
tradition and potentially maintain a certain continuity with its philosophical heritage, Feng spoke of a 
“method of abstract inheritance” (chouxiang jicheng fa 抽象繼承法). Having already “converted”200 to 
Marxism when he  articulated  his  views on this  subject  in  the latter  half  of  the  1950s,  Feng took 
advantage of the relative relaxation of restrictions on intellectual activity during the Hundred Flowers 
Campaign  (Baihua  yundong 百花运动 ,  1956  –  1957)  to  propose  using  his  method  of  abstract 
inheritance to partially liberate traditional “philosophy” from the suspicion of being completely run 
through with ideology and class-based bias, that is to say, to ensure a certain autonomy of philosophy 
from  politics.201 The  separation  of  the  meaning  of  philosophical  propositions  into  a  concrete, 
historically determinate and socially conditioned meaning (juti de yiyi 具體的意義 ) and an abstract 
meaning (chouxiang de yiyi抽象的意義) freed from this historical determinacy and specificity allowed 
Feng  to  detach  the  truth  of  traditional  ideas  from  the  untruth  of  their  ideological  prejudice  as 
“reflections” of class consciousness.202 As such, it could be put to good use in keeping something like 
the famous injunction in the Analects “not to do unto others what one does not want them to do onto 
oneself” (己所不欲，勿施於人) from being seen as nothing more than the reactionary attempt of a 
199See Chen, 2009, pp.180-181.
200According to Pfister (2003, p.173) “Feng was forced to undergo more than one hundred self-criticisms.” Zhang Sanping 
is a bit cynical in attributing this change of heart to what she calls the “success of Marxism in China”. See Zhang, 2011,  
pp.117-118.
201A conference on the inheritance of the Chinese philosophical tradition was organized at Peking University, the only 
university which still had a department of philosophy at that time, in January 1957. See Louie, 1986, pp.6-7, pp.33-34.
202Feng published two articles on the topic of abstract inheritance in 1957: “On the Problem of the Inheritance of the 
Chinese Philosophical Heritage” (Lun Zhongguo zhexue yichan de jicheng wenti 論中國哲學遺產的繼承問題 ) 
published in Guangming ribao光明日报, 8 January 1957; and “More on the Problem of the Inheritance of the Chinese 
Philosophical Heritage” (Zai lun Zhongguo zhexue yichan de jicheng wenti再論中國哲學遺產的繼承問題), published 
in Zhexue yanjiu 哲學研究, 5, 1957. In the second article, Feng used the conceptual pair of “general” (yiban 一般) and 
“particular/specific” (teshu 特殊 ),  which he took over from Engels's  Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of  Classical  
German Philosophy [1886], instead of “abstract” (chouxiang抽象) and “concrete” (juti具體) in order to defend himself 
against accusations of “idealism”.  See Louie, 1986,  pp.41-61 and  Gao Xiuchang 高秀昌 , “Feng Youlan's 'Method of 
Abstract Inheritance' Reconsidered” (Feng Youlan “chouxiang jicheng fa” de zai renshi冯友兰“抽象继承法”的再认
识), 8 July 2013, http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2013/0708/c40531-22114982.html.
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feudal ideologue to cover up social  antagonisms and attenuate class struggle.203 Feng also believed 
abstract  inheritance  had already been used  throughout  the  whole  of  Chinese  intellectual  history.204 
Unsurprisingly, Feng's method was severely criticized by more orthodox Marxists, who accused him of 
revisionism and of relapsing into his pre-Marxist “idealist” system of philosophy elaborated in his New 
Metaphysics (Xin lixue 新理學) from 1939, and condemned his distinction between abstract (general) 
and concrete (particular) as hopelessly “metaphysical”. For these critics, ideas and propositions had to 
be  grasped  in  the  concrete  context  of  their  political  dimension  instead  of  the  other  way around, 
something which they thought to be possible only through a rigorously “scientific” Marxism.205 Feng's 
essays on abstract inheritance even invited a rebuttal from Mao's personal secretary Chen Boda陳伯達 
(1904–1989), who suggested that Feng should stick to “critical inheritance” (批判的繼承) instead of 
propagating “restorationism” (fuguzhuyi 復古主義 ).206 When reflecting on the controversy from the 
1950s in his autobiography, Feng stresses that he did not consider the method of abstract inheritance to 
be anything exceptional or specifically metaphysical at all, and insists that much of the criticism voiced 
against his ideas stemmed from an incorrect grasp of what he meant by the term “abstract”. In his 
defense, he cites the case of Marx's and Engel's “abstract inheritance” of Hegelian dialectics as an 
example  of  how the abstract  must  always  be liberated  from the concrete.  The method of  abstract 
inheritance  was  thus  simply  a  standard  philosophical  procedure  for  all  conceivable  acts  of 
inheritance.207 “If we emphasize the concrete meaning too much”, Feng wrote, “there will be very little  
to inherit”.208 In this sense, even the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin, which he was not in a position  
to accuse of being ideological, needed to be submitted to the procedure of abstract inheritance, since 
their ideas were also elaborated in the context of concrete social conditions that were no longer at hand 
and did not need to be carried over into the present.209 There could be no inheritance for Feng without 
extracting the universal from the particular. In the end, he opted for saying that genuinely philosophical 
propositions only have an abstract, i.e. universal meaning, which due to the constraints of facticity, 
203See Gao, 2013.
204See Louie, 1986, p.43.
205See Gao, 2013 and Louie, 1986, pp.44-47. His most vocal critics were Ai Siqi 艾思奇  (1910-1966), Guan Feng关锋 
(1919-2005) and Zhang Dainian张岱年 (1909-2004). Zhang Dainian would later rather faithfully inherit Feng's method 
of “abstract inheritance”. See his Key Concepts of Chinese Philosophy, Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 2002.
206See  Yang  Disheng,  “Mourning  Professor  Feng Youlan:  Method  of  “Abstract  Inheriting”  Should  Not  Be  Denied”, 
Journal of Chinese Philosophy, vol.21, no.4, 1994, pp.408-409.
207See Feng Youlan, The Hall of Three Pines. An Account of My Life, Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 2000, p.289.
208Feng, 2000, p.290.
209Feng, 2000, p.293.
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“must rest on concrete situations” and is always “lodged within the particular”.210 
2.3.2 Moishe Postone's reinterpretation of Marx and the New Confucian critique of communist 
modernity
2.3.2.1 Postone on traditional Marxism
I  have  no  intention  of  defending  Feng  Youlan's  views  on  modernity  and  his  method  of  abstract 
inheritance from a normative point of view.211 Instead, I think it might be more interesting to try to 
approach them, as Peter Zarrow writes concerning Zhang Zhidong's ti-yong formula, as “expression[s] 
of a lived historical process.”212 In order to do so, I will draw on the challenging Marxist perspective 
developed two decades ago by Moishe Postone in his  Time, Labor, and Social Domination,213 which 
can  provide  a  possible  way  of  tackling  the  highly  complex  and  entwined  issues  of  abstraction, 
philosophy as a specific mode of communication, and time, not in the least because it offers an outlook 
in which these issues can be grasped as related to one another in the first place. Since Postone's work  
reaches conceptually high levels of abstraction and complexity, my only ambition is to provide the 
essentials  necessary to  return  with  a  different  perspective  to  Feng Youlan's  ideas  and  the  general 
problematic treated in this chapter. 
Postone's  reinterpretation  of  Marx departs  from both  a  distinction  and a  restriction.  According  to 
Postone, what he calls “traditional Marxism” has consistently mistaken Marx's immanent criticism of 
the position of labor in modern capitalist societies for a normative and universally applicable account. 
Specifically, such standard interpretations assume that Marx considered labor to be a “natural” form of 
210Feng, 2000, p.294.
211For an example of such an apologetic for abstract inheritance, see Yang, 1994.
212Zarrow, 2012, p.119.
213Moishe Postone, Time, Labor, and Social Domination. A Reinterpretation of Marx's Critical Theory, Cambridge (N.Y.): 
Cambridge University Press, 1993. Also see History and Heteronomy. Critical Essays, Tokyo: The University of Tokyo 
Center for Philosophy, 2009a. I am certainly not the first to do so. I am personally very much indebted to  professor 
Christian Uhl, who provides a much more robust outlook in his “Translation and Time: A Memento of the Curvature of  
the Poststructuralist Plane”,  Frontiers of Philosophy in China, vol.6, no.3, 2012, pp.426-468 and “Fukuzawa Yukichi 
and Miyazaki Tōten: A Double Portrait in Black and White of an Odd Couple in the Age of Globalizing Capitalism”,  
Critical Historical Studies, vol.1, no.1, 2014, pp.47-84. Viren Murthy has also drawn on Postonian ideas in his research 
on Zhang Taiyan and Tan Sitong譚嗣同 (1865-1898), see his The Political Philosophy of Zhang Taiyan. The Resistance  
of Consciousness, Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2011 and “Ontological Optimism, Cosmological Confusion, and Unstable 
Evolution: Tang Sitong's Renxue and Zhang Taiyan's Response”, in The Challenge of Linear Time. Nationhood and the  
Politics of History in East Asia, edited by Viren Murthy and Axel Schneider, Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2014, pp.49-82.
150
mediation between the human and the natural world aimed at  the satisfaction of human needs and 
constituting the source of wealth in all human societies, instead of being a specific historical formation 
distinctive  of  the  modern  era.  Marx's  critique  is  taken  to  be  basically  directed  at  the  unequal 
distribution  of  socially  produced  wealth.  As  such,  the  proletarian  class  of  laborers  comes  to  be 
presented as the world-forming Subject of history214, which has the millennial task of reappropriating 
the material wealth from which it has been disowned. It can do so by overcoming the exploitative 
capitalist  relations  of  production  through  seizing  control  over  the  means  of  production  and  the 
unchecked distributive mechanisms of the market. Logically,  this  implies that capitalist domination 
would come to an end once the proletariat has abolished private ownership, seized political power, or is 
represented by a vanguard political party along Leninist lines which can further oversee the “withering 
away” of the state.215 In his critique of the failures of communism in Soviet Russia, Zhang Junmai張君
勱 (1886–1969) already made the following apposite observations: 
What the Soviet Union proudly flaunts in the world are “the dictatorship of the proletariat”, “a classless
society”, and “the fading away of the state”. But let us have a look at the results of the past forty years.
In the beginning, money was abolished, only for a currency system to be reinstalled shortly afterwards.
Originally, there was talk of “from each according to his means, to each according to his needs”, now
this has been changed into “renumeration based on competence”. There was the enthusiastic promotion
of free love, now they have prohibited abortion while rewarding marriage and childbirth. They said:
“workers have no motherland”, but after the war with Germany broke out, they began singing the praise
of patriotism.216
今蘇聯之所以誇耀於世界者曰無產階級專政曰無產階級的社會曰國家消逝。然試問四十年來之成
就如何始也廢止貨幣，不久而幣制恢復，始也呼號各盡所能，各取所需，今則改之曰「因能得
酬」。始也鼓吹戀愛自由，今又禁止墮胎，獎勵結婚與子女生育。始則曰工人無祖國，及對德國
戰爭起後，又高唱祖國之愛。
What Postone calls traditional Marxism is thus inherently unable to account for and to set itself apart 
from the catastrophe of twentieth-century socialism, which is probably the first task for any reinvention 
214See Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, London: Merlin Press, 1971.
215According to Chen Weigang, the absence of a native bourgeoisie as a revolutionary class in peripheral regions of the  
capitalist world-system led to state-centered nationalism organized by a vanguard party.  See Confucian Marxism: a 
Reflection on Religion and Global Justice, Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013, pp.72-75. 
216Refutation of Dialectical Materialism (Bianzheng weiwu zhuyi bolun 辯證唯物主義駁論 ), Taibei: Taiwan shangwu 
yinshuguan, [1958] 1967, p.127.
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of Marxism today.217 The traditional idea of a  universal  and  transhistorical nature of labor and the 
proletariat  which disposes over labor power as its  only commodity as the corresponding universal 
world-forming class, attempts to make Marx's analysis applicable to all societal forms throughout both 
space and time. The only differences allowed for would then be the position of various societies within 
a  unilinear  process,  located  at  different  “stages”  of  the  same  development.218 Postone  makes  the 
following distinction in order to counter this traditional misunderstanding of Marx, a distinction which 
he mainly extracts from a rereading of Marx's Capital in the light of the Grundrisse219 and twentieth-
century  developments  in  critical  theory:  what  Marx  offered  in  his  work  was  not  “a  critique  of 
capitalism  from the  standpoint  of  labor”,  but  “a  critique  of  labor  in  capitalism”.220 Marx  did  not 
celebrate labor and the laboring class as the motor of history, fettered by unequal class relations, but 
instead saw the specific nature of labor in capitalism as a source of surplus value as a “quasi-objective 
form of social mediation”.221 What is specific to capitalism then, is not the existence of private property, 
class-based  relations  of  exploitation,  or  a  competitive  “free”  market  in  which  goods  are  unfairly 
distributed without the control of its producers, but a mode of production which is normally taken for 
217Alain Badiou has made it somewhat easy on himself by reverting to communism as an “idea”. Postone's theory has the 
distinct advantage of being able to account for Badiou's approach, which is hardly the case the other way around. See 
below, section 2.3.3.
218“[A]ny theory that  posits  an  intrinsic  developmental  logic  to  history as  such,  whether  dialectical  or  evolutionary,  
projects  what is  the case for  capitalism onto history in general.”  Postone,  2009,  p.44.  Postone's  reinterpretation of 
Marxism bears a certain resemblance to the distinction Willy Coolsaet makes internal to Marx's own oeuvre. Coolsaet  
distinguishes (not chronologically) between a teleological “Marx II”, who believed that capitalism was a historically 
necessary stage in which the productive forces and the antagonisms intrinsic to bourgeois society are to be fully realized 
in order to dialectically enable the proletariat to lead the world into the future of communism (the logic of the “negation 
of  the  negation”)  and  a  critical  “Marx  I”,  who grasped  the  logic  of  capitalism as  an  endless  process  of  the  self-
valorzation of surplus value (M-M') which does not directly condition its own demise and is not, sadly enough, its own 
gravedigger. See Willy Coolsaet, Produceren om the produceren. Het kapitalisme en de ontwikkeling van de produktieve  
krachten volgens Marx  [Producing for  the Sake of  Production.  Capitalism and the Development of  the Productive  
Forces  according  to  Marx],  Gent:  Kritiek, no.28,  1996.  The much  more  well-known  approach  of  Althusser,  who 
discerned an epistemological break (located around 1845) between a young, humanist, ideological Marx (of the 1844 
Paris Manuscripts) and an older “scientific” Marx who had discovered the “continent of history” is related to Postone's  
approach in sofar as their common theoretical anti-humanism is concerned. Postone however is not interested in drawing 
such  a  clear-cut  distinction,  as  he  thinks  it  is  possible  to  interpret  Marx's  theory of  alienation  in  the  light  of  his  
reconstructed  “mature  theory”  without  having to  presuppose  an absolute  break  between two different  Marxes.  See 
Postone, 1993, pp.158-166. Additionally, Postone does not share Althusser's aversion to conceptual residues of Hegelian 
philosophy in Marx (remember Althusser's long analysis of the “reversal” of the Hegelian dialectic, which is equally an  
“extraction”, his rejection of Hegelian contradiction in the elaboration of his theory of overdetermination, and his idea of 
history as a “process without a subject”) since he thinks what Hegel meant by  Spirit  is a pretty good philosophical 
metaphor  for  Marx's  idea  of  capital  as  a  quasi-autonomous  (albeit  blind  instead  of  knowing)  Subject.  See  Louis 
Althusser, For Marx, London and New York: Verso, 2005. For Postone's take on the Hegel-Marx relation see Postone, 
1993, pp.71-83.
219The  Grundrisse der Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie  (Outlines of the Critique of Political Economy) is an extensive 
manuscript written between 1857 and 1858. 
220Postone, 1993, p.5.
221Postone, 1993, p.6.
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granted and left unproblematized in traditional Marxist accounts.222 Such accounts envisage the end of 
capitalism not as the end, but as the successful realization of industrial labor by a proletariat which will 
thereby “come into its own”.223 Postone proposes to reinvigorate the Marxist critique by restricting its 
validity  to  the  historical  condition  of  which  it  is  in  his  view  an  immanent  analysis,  as  what  he 
succinctly calls a “critical ethnography of capitalist society.”224 At the same time, this restriction has the 
effect of expanding its applicability within the object of critique. The distinction between “actually 
existing  socialism”  and  “free-market  capitalist”  countries  is  radically  undermined  by conceptually 
reducing capitalism to industrial production, which is not specific to so-called liberal countries at all.225 
After all, was something like the archetypally “socialist” Great Leap Forward (1958-1961) not based 
on the idea of overtaking America and the Soviet Union in terms of productivity (of coal, iron, steel, 
and so on)? It was not only a specific ideological outlook which allowed an article that appeared in The 
Economist a few years back to describe China's post '78 economic trajectory under Deng Xiaoping and 
Jiang Zemin as “the real Great Leap Forward”.226 Even more so today, it is hard to see, even on the 
level of political rhetorics, what constitutes the real difference between the so-called American and the 
Chinese dream (Zhongguo meng 中国梦 ) recently voiced by Xi Jinping. That the dreamers disagree 
over what the dream implies for the currency intervention policies of both countries?227 
222Thomas Piketty's recent best-selling critique of capitalism (Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Cambridge (Mass.): 
Harvard University Press, 2014) also proposes retaining the capitalist mode of production while drastically changing the 
mode of income distribution through measures such as a globally enforced form of progressive income taxation.
223Postone, 1993, p.10.
224Postone, 1993, p.18. 
225“The Marxian categories, as traditionally interpreted, are of little use in formulating a social critique of a society that is  
regulated  and  dominated  by the  state.”  Postone,  1993,  p.11.  What  the  economist  Yanis  Varoufakis  has  called  the 
“controlled disintegration of the world economy” (see his The Global Minotaur. America, Europe and the Future of the  
Global Economy, London and New York: Zed Books, 2013) leading up to the 2008 (– 20??) economic crisis and the 
globally enforced austerity measures following the meltdown are simply impossible to understand when abstracting 
from the role of  interventionist  nation-states,  which have proven their  peculiar  sense of  humor by presenting their 
putative powerlessness in the face of unbridled corporate “greed” as the principal cause behind the crisis, the latter of 
course being only over when the international organizations in which they are represented declare it to be so, something 
the international markets will then possibly observe with a sense of disbelief. 
226“The Real Great Leap Forward”, The Economist, 30 September 2004, http://www.economist.com/node/3219418.
227In the 1976 satirical movie Network, it is surprisingly enough the head of a media corporation who explains the logic of 
abstract equivalence best in a speech chiding his baffled employ Howard Beale, the anchor of an evening news show 
who had dared criticize the purchase of the network he works for by a large Saudi-Arabian investment group on live TV:  
“You have meddled with the primal forces of nature, Mr. Beale, and I won't have it! Is that clear? You think you've  
merely stopped a business deal. That is not the case! The Arabs have taken billions of dollars out of this country, and 
now they must put it back! It is ebb and flow, tidal gravity! It is ecological balance! You are an old man who thinks in  
terms of nations and peoples. There are no nations. There are no peoples. There are no Russians. There are no Arabs.  
There are no third worlds.  There is  no West.  There is  only one holistic  system of systems, one vast  and immune,  
interwoven,  interacting,  multivariate,  multinational  dominion  of  dollars.  Petro-dollars,  electro-dollars,  multi-dollars,  
reichmarks, rins, rubles, pounds, and shekels. It is the international system of currency which determines the totality of  
life on this planet. That is the natural order of things today. That is the atomic and subatomic and galactic structure of 
things today! […] Am I getting through to you, Mr. Beale? You get up on your little twenty-one inch screen and howl 
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2.3.2.2 Tang and Mou with and against Marx
More important in the context of the present study is that Postone's perspective on the “speculative 
identity” of capitalism and socialism on the level of industrial  production allows us to grasp Tang 
Junyi's and Mou Zongsan's criticisms of communism and historical materialism as being directed at the 
historically  universalized  structural  mechanisms underlying  modernity in  general,  instead  of  being 
limited to  their  socialist  form of  appearance.  That  they employed Marxist-sounding terms such as 
“reification”  (wuhua 物 化 ),  “quantification”  (lianghua 量化 ),  “alienation”  (shuwai 疏外 )  and 
“commodification” (shangpinhua 商品化)228 and denounced “purely quantitative universality” (純量的
普 遍 性 )229 in  criticizing  what  they  took  to  be  Marx's  philosophically  and  socially  disastrous 
materialism, of which they considered Chinese communism to be the diabolical but faithful realization, 
is remarkable enough and would seem to constitute something of a paradox. Of course, the paradox 
soon disappears when we remember that Marxism was not only a critique of capitalist modernity, but 
itself became one of the dominant modes and ideologies of modernization in the twentieth century, 
favoring  state-regulated,  collectively  organized  industrialization  above  liberal,  laissez-faire, “free 
market” capitalism.230 Indeed, Tang Junyi often writes as if, in Postone's words, “Marx had written a 
political economy rather than a critique of political economy”.231 At one point Tang even suggested that 
about America and democracy. There is no America. There is no democracy. There is only IBM, and ITT, and AT&T, 
and DuPont, Dow, Union Carbide, and Exxon. Those are the nations of the world today. What do you think the Russians 
talk about  in their  councils  of state,  Karl  Marx?  They get  out their  linear  programming charts,  statistical  decision  
theories, minimax solutions, and compute the price-cost probabilities of their transactions and investments, just like we  
do. We no longer live in a world of nations and ideologies, Mr. Beale. The world is a college of corporations, inexorably 
determined by the immutable bylaws of business.”
228See for example Tang, “The World of Science and the World of Humanism” (Kexue shijie yu renwen shijie科學世界與
人文世界 ), [1949a] in  RJ, pp.48-51 for a quasi-Marxist and Weberian critique of modern science, technology and 
industrialization.
229Record of Lectures at the Humanist Society (Renwen jiangxi lu 人文講習錄), [1954b] vol.28 of MJ, p.76. Mou saw the 
work of Zhang Taiyan (specifically his Buddhist-inspired commentary on Zhuangzi's idea of the “equalization of things” 
(齊物) and Kang Youwei as exemplifying the communist tendency towards a nihilist denunciation of the universal and 
the propagation of merely quantitative equivalence. Significantly, both Zhang and Kang rejected the state as either a 
false construct or an impediment to “great unity” (大同). See Mou, [1954b], p.75 and “Upon Reading 'A Reply to Xie 
Shilin' ” (Du 'da Xie Shilin' 讀〈答謝石麟〉), [1935a] in ZW1, pp.507-510.
230See Arif Dirlik, Culture & History in Post-Revolutionary China. The Perspective of Global Modernity, Hong Kong: The 
Chinese University Press, 2011, pp.91-92. Wang Hui characterizes (Chinese) Marxism as another “anti-modern theory of 
modernization”, “a critique of Euro-American capitalist modernization”, but one equipped with a historical teleology of 
its own (including the subsumption of society under the party-led state). See Wang, 1998, pp.13-17.
231Postone, 1993, p.26. 
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Marx had composed Das Kapital in order to promote economic growth.232 “Marx” and “Marxism” thus 
often  functioned  as  mere  signifiers  for  industrialization  and  the  consequences  of  economic 
development.  I do not mean to claim that Tang and Mou were actually covert communists instead of 
card-carrying  Confucianists.  But  I  do think  it  can  be argued that  the  true  object  behind the  New 
Confucian  denunciation  of  economic  determinism as  a  conceptual  framework  (described  by John 
Dewey  as  a  form of  “theoretical  absolutism”233)  is  in  fact  the  “real  abstraction”  effected  by  the 
historical  process  of  modernization  in  the  guise  of  large-scale,  state-regulated  industrialization  in 
communist China.234 
In  the  following  passage,  Tang  attacks  Marx's  historical  materialism  and  putative  economic 
determinism by insisting that all objects resulting from human labor have an intrinsically dual nature 
which prevents them from being reduced to their material and utilitarian dimension. But in doing so, he 
clearly mistakes Marx's critical analysis of the double nature of the commodity in capitalism as both 
incarnating use value and exchange value and veiling the relations which condition their production for 
a transhistorically normative one:
The sacrificial cauldrons and vessels we just mentioned are utensils and cultural relics, but they are
at the same time ritual objects. Ritual objects are instruments that display moral and religious feelings
of interpersonal love and respect. Any utensil that is a product of human labor can become something
to entertain guests and to be offered to ancestral spirits, which means that all material instruments have
a cultural, religious and moral meaning and spirit. From this it can be seen that the real human world is
a humanistic world, a world of human character or of ethical bonds, in which the personalities of all
human beings are entwined in ethical relations. It is not just, as Marx claims, a world of material and
economic  life  in  which  people  strive  to  satisfy their  natural  needs  through laboring  on  nature  and
through production and economic relations.235 
232See Tang [1949c], no pagination.
233John Dewey, Freedom and Culture, New York: Capricorn, 1963, p.76.
234Many of the most influential Marxists in China were not economic determinists at all, but displayed a very voluntaristic 
outlook. For the examples of Qu Qiubai瞿秋白 (1899-1935) and Mao Zedong, see Nick Knight, Marxist Philosophy in  
China:  From Qu Qiubai to Mao Zedong,  1923—1945,  Dordrecht: Springer, 2005, pp.53-69 and pp.173-185. Knight 
remarks that “many of the versions of Marxist philosophy and social theory to have reached China from the early 1920s 
[Lenin, Plekhanov, Motoyuki Takabatake 高畠素之 , Hajime Kawakami 肇河上 ] had repudiated the notion of an 
economist and deterministic interpretation of Marxism.” Knight, 2005, p.178.
235“The Original Spirit of Chinese Culture and its Development” (Zhongguo wenhua zhi yuanshi jingshen jiqi fazhan 中國
文化之原始精神及其發展), [1973b] in ZJ, p.692. Cf. “Cultural Problems in Today's World” (Dangqian shijie wenhua 
wenti 當前世界文化問題), [1961b] in ZJ, p.415.
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方才說到之鼎彝，為器物，為文物，即同時為禮器。禮器即表現人與人間、道德性宗教性愛靜之
情感的器物。世界之任何勞動生產之器物，無不可以待賓客，事鬼神，而此一切物質性的器物，
即無不有文化性、宗教性、道德性的意義與精神。由此而真實的人間世界，即一人文的世界，個
個人格結成人倫關系的人格世界，或人倫世界。而非如馬克思之所說為一唯物的，只有人對自然
之勞動生產，人與人之經濟關系，以滿足人之自然需要之物質生活經濟生活的世界。
Similarly,  in an early article entitled ““Establishing the Basic  Principles of Society” (Shehui  jiben 
yuanze zhi queli社會基本原則之確立)236 from 1933, which probably constitutes his most extensive 
and still relatively phlegmatic engagement with historical materialism237, Mou Zongsan criticizes the 
fact that Marx takes the commodity as a starting point for his analysis of capitalist society in Capital. 
What Mou primarily objects to is that Marx, in his view at least, mistakes the commodity for something 
concrete and objective, immediately given and straightforwardly analyzable in the same way as the 
objects  of  the  natural  sciences,  since  these  are  simply  “out  there”  unmediated  by  socio-cultural 
determinations. Remarkably enough, the naive perspective Mou attributes to Marx is precisely what the 
latter  himself  criticized  in  the  work  of  earlier  political  economists,  namely  that  they  ignored  the 
historical specificity of even the most elementary aspects of the capitalist economy. As Marx stressed, 
the deceptively simple commodity is “full of metaphysical subtleties and theological niceties”.238 For 
Marx,  the  outward  appearance  of  capitalism  as  an  “immense  accumulation  of  commodities”239 is 
already fundamentally mediated by social relations and determined by a specific rhythm of production 
and consumption which can be conceptually unfolded by taking the commodity as an analytical starting 
point.  Mou however  thinks  that  by departing from the commodity as something simply externally 
“given”  and  as  a  mere  “thing”,  Marx  fails  to  “interrelate  it  to  the  broader  process  of  its  overall  
development”  (渾融於發展 的大流中 ).240 He  disputes  the  compatibility  of  materialism  as  a 
philosophical outlook and the analytical goals Marx sets himself, and argues that it is nonsensical to 
conceive of commodities  and the economy in general  as  something purely material,  objective and 
236Mou, [1933b] in ZW2, pp.631-679.
237Mou mainly refers to Marx's (indeed highly economist) preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy  
from  1859.  This  text  had  become  available  to  Chinese  intellectuals  in  translation  in  1931.  See  Timothy  Brook,  
“Capitalism and the Unity of Modern History in China”, in China and Historical Capitalism. Genealogies of Sinological  
Knowledge, edited by Timothy Brook and Gregory Blue, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, p.131, note 36. 
The Theses on Feuerbach and a few sections from Capital are also briefly invoked. 
238Capital. A New Abridgement, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p.42.
239Marx, 2008, p.13.
240Mou, [1933b], p.647.
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concrete.241 Since the Grundrisse was not yet available to Chinese readers at that time, Mou could not 
have been aware of Marx's much more Hegelian take on the concept of the concrete, which, as he 
specifies  there,  should  be  seen  as  “the  concentration  of  many determinations,  hence  unity  of  the 
diverse. It appears in the process of thinking, therefore, as a process of concentration, as a result, not as 
a point of departure, even though it is the point of departure in reality and hence also the point of  
departure  for  observation  and  conception.”242 As  such,  the  commodity  already  contains  anterior 
determinations and is thus a conceptual starting point that stands at the end of a whole social process of 
development which conditions its existence as a seemingly isolated and particular thing.243 Mou further 
voices his (rather mistaken) impression that Marx presents the final form of value (value as money) as 
a natural state which one can almost inductively derive from experience and historical observations as a 
quasi-objective natural law by studying the development of value from the elementary form to the 
modern  money  form  as  the  general  equivalent  for  exchange.244 However,  in  claiming  that  Marx 
overlooks the fact that money can only function as a bearer of exchange value because it is a social 
construct and an intersubjective convention, and in arguing that historical materialism “takes the object 
for a subject and turns everything upside down” (以客體為主體，本末倒置)245 by making human 
beings dependent on the dynamic between objective structures which surpass their will and control, 
Mou is actually condemning what Marx himself criticized in his analysis of capitalism as a specific 
form of  social  domination  that  only appears  to  be  “natural”  and  given.  After  all,  Marx  does  not 
normatively uphold the objectivity and operational autonomy of the capitalist economy, but critically 
analyzes capital as “an independent substance, endowed with a motion of its own, passing through a 
life-process of its own, in which money and commodities are mere forms which it assumes and casts 
off in turn”, thereby entering “so to say, into private relations with itself.”246 Had he been familiar with 
the 1844 Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, which were discovered in 1927 and only became an 
241Mou, [1933b], p.640.
242Grundrisse, London: Penguin Books, 1993, p.101.
243See Lukács, 1971, pp.83-92.
244See Mou [1933b], p.642, p.647, pp.662-665.
245“Religion and the Teaching of Ritual Propriety” (Zongjiao yu lijiao 宗教與禮教 ), [1940] in  ZW2, p.961. Cf. Mou, 
[1959b], p.98: “The economic structure formed by the forces and relations of production cannot in any way be placed 
outside of human practice, as if we were dealing with “external nature”, but can only be located within “human practice” 
and is not simply a material concept [..] Practice is something that only belongs to human beings, and since it cannot be 
ascribed to God, it does not belong to animals, let alone to natural phenomena.” (生產力與生產關係所成的經濟結構
亦決不能如「外在自然」一樣﹐擺在那裡而外於人的實踐﹐亦必是內於「人的實踐」﹐而不只是物質的概念 
[…] 實踐單是屬於人的: 既不屬於上帝﹐亦不屬於動物﹐自然現象更說不上).
246Marx, 2008, p.99.
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important source for Marxist thought much later with the rise of humanist Marxism247, Mou would, I 
think, have concurred with Marx's observation that 
the worker is related to the product of his labor as to an alien object. For on this premise it is clear that
the more the worker spends himself, the more powerful the alien objective world becomes which he
creates over and against himself, the poorer he himself – his inner world – becomes, the less belongs to
him as his own. It is the same in religion. The more man puts into God, the less he retains in himself.
The worker puts his life into the object; but now his life no longer belongs to him but to the object […]
The alienation of the worker in his product means not only that his labor becomes an object, an external 
existence,  but  that  it  exists  outside  him,  independently,  as  something  alien  to  him,  and  that  it
becomes a power on its own confronting him. It means that the life which he has conferred on the object
confronts him as something hostile and alien.248 
Interestingly enough, the alternative economic order which emerges from Mou's criticism of Marx in a 
follow-up  article249 can  perhaps  best  be  described  as  a  form  of  state-led  socialism,  with  an 
interventionist but non-authoritarian welfare-state functioning as a middle way between capitalism and 
communism. In this text from 1934, he provides further arguments against  the applicability of the 
concepts  of  class  struggle  and  the  proletarian  revolution  to  both  premodern  and  modern  China, 
arguments which must be placed in the context of the so-called “social history controversy” (shehui shi  
lunzhan社會史論戰). This controversy, which started in 1928 and lasted until the beginning of the war 
with Japan in 1937, revolved around the application of Marxist periodization schemes of economic, 
political,  and social  development  to  Chinese  history,  but  was primarily motivated  by the  practical 
concern of how to transform Chinese society on the basis  of a  correct  (and as some would claim 
“scientific”)  understanding  of  its  historical  past.250 The  same  concern  obviously  motivated  Mou's 
interest in the whole issue. The most influential and soon to be canonical periodization turned out to be 
247“The philosophical writings of the young Marx were virtually abandoned by Marxists, and did not become available 
until the late 1920s and early 1930s, by which time the formalisation of a Soviet Marxist philosophy based on Engels’ 
philosophy was well advanced. Indeed, it was not until the renaissance in Marxist theory in Western Europe during the 
1960s and 1970s that Marx’s early philosophical writings were to gain a wide and sympathetic audience.” Knight, 2005, 
p.16.
248Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/labour.htm. 
249“Transforming Current Society from the Development of Social Patterns” (Cong shehui xingtai de fazhan fangmian  
gaizao xian shehui 從社會形態的發展方面改造現社會), [1934a] in ZW2, pp.681-739.
250See Arif Dirlik, Revolution and History. Origins of Marxist Historiography in China, 1919-1937, Berkeley: University 
of California Press,  1978, pp.17-20 and the whole of part  2, pp.57-227, Brook, 1999, pp.132-136 and Benjamin I. 
Schwartz, “A Marxist Controversy in China”, in The Far Eastern Quarterly, vol.13, no.2, 1954, pp.143-153.
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the one provided by Guo Moruo 郭沫若  (1892-1978) in his  Researches on Ancient Chinese Society  
(Zhongguo gudai shehui yanjiu 中國古代社會研究) from 1930.251 In their comments on Guo Moruo's 
pioneering endeavors, Arif Dirlik, Kam Louie, and Timothy Brook all emphasize that the great appeal 
of Guo's periodization did not lie so much in its historical accuracy, but in the fact that it put forward 
(his  own  idiosyncratic  version  of)  historical  materialism252 as  a  universally  valid  interpretative 
framework and thereby historically placed China in the same developmental trajectory which had led to 
the rise of the West as an imperialist global power. According to Louie, after the publication of Guo's 
Researches, “the word 'feudal' was no longer automatically a term of abuse, but could imply progress in 
the Marxist sense”, as part of a universal scheme built on necessary transitions.253 In other words, it 
allowed for an equivalence of past and future in China and the West. Mou Zongsan however took issue 
with  Guo's  periodization  and its  intrinsic  teleology,  arguing that  there had been no clear-cut  class 
divisions in imperial China, and certainly no economic classes in the Marxist sense. At best, there had 
been classes resulting from what he too considered to have been a dictatorial political system where 
individuals had neither freedom nor rights. This was the only sense the term “feudal” had for Mou 
when applied to the Chinese past.254 He further claimed that the period from the Qin and the Han 
dynasties up to the beginning of the twentieth-century, which had fundamentally been one and the same 
age (一個時代)255, could be most accurately characterized as one of “merchant capitalism” (shangye 
zibenzhuyi 商業資本主義). In this form of “merchant capitalism”, there had been no separate class of 
people exclusively concerned with the production and marketing of commodities, since merchants had 
taken on the role of workers, farmers, artisans, salesmen, and venture capitalists.256 As such, China had 
failed to develop both democracy and capitalism in the modern sense. The absence of the latter was 
251See Dirlik, 1978, pp.137-179, Louie, 1986, pp.16-23 and Brook, 1999, pp.134-135. This work was first published as a 
series of articles between 1928-1229. Guo divided Chinese history into five phases: 1) primitive communism, 2) ancient 
slavery (the late Yin殷 and the Zhou dynasties according to Guo), 3) feudalism (since the Qin), 4) capitalism (since the 
end of the Qing) and socialism (the future). See Researches on Ancient Chinese Society (Zhongguo gudai shehui yanjiu
中 国古代社会 研 究 ),  in  The  Complete  Works  of  Guo  Moruo  (Guo  Moruo  quanji 郭沫若全 集 ),  Beijing: 
Renminchubanshe, 1982, vol.1, pp.13-31.
252Following the American anthropologist Lewis Henry Morgan (1818–1881) and Friedrich Engels's account in The Origin 
of the Family, Private Property, and the State influenced by Morgan, Guo attributed a supreme importance to the role of 
technological innovation for social evolution, and not so much to the economy in itself. See Dirlik, 1978, pp.141-146.
253Louie, 1986, p.17. “In the preface to his book, Guo Moruo explained that he had written the books to repudiate those 
who believed China had a unique 'national essence' and consequently a different pattern of development from other 
countries.” Ibid., pp.19-20. Also see Mou's “In Praise of Feudalism” (Zan fengjian贊封建), [1939c] in ZW2, pp.897-
904.
254Mou, [1934a], p.721. 
255Mou, [1933b], p.659.
256See Mou, [1934a], pp.719-723.
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crucial for Mou in repudiating the need or the use for a proletarian revolution in China: “One should be 
clear about the fact that today's Shanghai and Tianjin are marketplaces for imperialism, their prestige is 
that of other people, and since we cannot even boycott Japanese goods [because China produces none 
of its own], pray, where is there capitalism [in China]?” (現在的上海、天津，你要知這是帝國主義
的商場，體面是人家的，連日本貨不能抵制，資本主義在那裡？).257 Of course, it is clear that 
Mou did not stop to consider the possibility entertained by Feng Youlan that China's non-inclusion in 
the capitalist world-system, as a peripheral region with a weak government providing a source of cheap 
labor and ample opportunities for unequal treaties and “free trade”, already constituted a paradoxical 
form of integration into the logic of imperialist expansion. Unlike Zhang Dongsun 張東蓀  (1886–
1973),  who  defended  the  viability  of  capitalism  by  distinguishing  between  foreign  and  domestic 
capitalism, arguing that developing the latter could help to alleviate the socio-economic difficulties 
created by the imperialist expansion of the former, and insisted that capitalism was a stage China would 
have to go through in order to one day realize socialism258, Mou did not advocate the adoption of 
capitalism. Quite to the contrary: 
Since up to the present day,  there has never been capitalism in Chinese society,  the question for us
becomes whether or not we should still be obliged to follow the capitalist path. I say: not necessarily. If
today, China is [in any sense] a capitalist society, then it is surely in its initial stage, and if that is the
case, then according to Marx's own estimate, China still has to go down the path of capitalism, and the
so-called  proletarian  revolution  is  completely futile.  At  present,  we  have  no  need  for  a  proletarian
revolution, nor are we obliged to follow the capitalist path […] If we do not have a capitalist society,
then  we have  no  use  for  a  proletarian  revolution,  and  also  no  need  to  walk  the  capitalist  path,  if
[however] we were to be in capitalism, then we are still in an early stage, and a proletarian revolution
would remain futile. In any case,  we  can  conclude  that  a  proletarian  revolution  has  no  meaning  in
China.259
中國的社會至現在既未有資本主義，則我們要問是否還需要非走資本主義一路不可？曰：不必。
復次，如果中國現在為資本主義社會，其為資本主義必在初期；如是，接著馬克思的推測，則中
國還需要走資本主義之路，而所謂無產革命是枉然的了。現在既用不著無產革命，又用不著走資
本主義之路 [...] 如果不是資本主義社會，則無產革命用不著，而也用不著走資本主義之路；
257Mou, [1934a], p.723. Cf. “The Condition of the Chinese Rural Economy and Social Patterns” (Zhongguo nongcun jingji  
jumian yu shehui xingtai 中國農村經濟局面與社會形態), [1935d] in ZW2, p.822.
258Fung, 2010, pp.201-203.
259Mou, [1934a], p.723.
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如果是資本主義社會，則早期的資本主義社會，無產革命仍是枉然的。結果，無產革命在中國沒
有意義。
Mou  considered  the  establishment  of  a  strong,  independent  and  politically  stable  state  with  an 
independent government free from the coercive and repressive forces of imperialism to be the most 
urgent task for China.260 Because of this stance, he opposed any form of revolution which would in his 
view  further  destabilize  China  as  a  political  and  territorial  entity.261 Simply  put,  China  needed 
politicians, not revolutionaries.262 Mou thought that China should be able to choose its own path in a 
tightrope walk between capitalism and communism, and would only be able to do so by finding a way 
to  promote  large-scale  industrial  development,  improve  the  overall  material  living  conditions  and 
become self-sufficient in the production of the most elementary and necessary goods and services.263 To 
achieve this goal, Mou proposed a planned economy (計劃經濟 ) as the economic side to a form of 
government he termed “national socialism” (guojia shehuizhuyi 國家社會主義).264 In this respect, he 
was close to Zhang Dongsun and Zhang Junmai, who had founded the Chinese State Socialist Party 
(Zhongguo guojia shehui dang 中國國家社會黨)265 in 1932. It had originally been called the “National 
Socialist  Party”,  but  changed  its  name  in  order  to  dissociate  itself  from  Nazism  and  ward  off 
accusations of preaching fascist solutions. The Chinese State Socialist Party was to remain a minor 
political fraction during the Republican period that sought to offer a third way between the Communist 
and the Nationalist parties but eventually aligned itself with the Guomindang for both ideological and 
pragmatic reasons.266 The two Zhangs' party advocated the building of a strong, but non-authoritarian 
state  with  a  multi-party  parliamentary  system  of  rule  and  a  depoliticized  civil  service.267 On  an 
economic level, Zhang Junmai stressed the importance of planning under the influence of Roosevelt's 
New Deal  following the Great  Depression.268 Like Feng Youlan and similar  to  what  Postone calls 
260Mou, [1934a], p.734, pp.738-739.
261See “Where is the Path to a Revival of the Countryside?” (Fuxing noncun de chulu he zai?復興農村的出路何？ ), 
[1934b] in ZW2, pp.741-776.
262See Mou, [1937b].
263Mou, [1934a], p.735.
264Mou, [1934a], pp.736-739. Cf. He Lin's “Economy and Morality” (Jingji yu daode 经济与道德), in He, [1947] 1996, 
pp.24-31.
265See Fung, 2010, p.226 and Roger B. Jeans,  Democracy and Socialism in Republican China. The Politics of Zhang  
Junmai (Carsun Chang), 1900-1941, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997, pp.201-221.
266Fung, 2010, p.109. Jason Clower notes that Mou served as editor for the party's publications for a while after finishing 
university, ending his involvement in 1939 due to a personal conflicts with Zhang Junmai. See Clower, 2010, p.51, note 
95 and Chan, 2011, p.65.
267Fung, 2010, p.169. Also see Bresciani, 2001, p.152.
268Fung, 2010, pp.228-231.
161
traditional Marxism, Mou Zongsan assumed that industrial production was a neutral mechanism for the 
generation of material wealth, which could be combined with a politically either socialist or capitalist  
system in terms of distribution and ownership: “Both capitalism and socialism alike always take the 
independent and autonomous [i.e. efficient] development of the economy as their goal.” (無論資本主
義或社會主義，總期以達到經濟獨立自行發展為目的).269 “Of course”, Mou wrote, “we do not need 
to go down the capitalist road in building our nation today, but we must absolutely set out on the road 
of production” (我們現在著手建國，當然用不著再走資本主義之路。但中國又必須走到生產的路
子上才可).270 His arguments for the development of large-scale industrial production under supervision 
of the state instead of following from the initiative of individual capitalist entrepreneurs was not so 
much based on political motivations (the collective should be placed above the individual), as it was on 
the idea that the supervision and intervention of the state in the operations of the economy would lead 
to a more efficient and “scientific” mode of production which would gradually and automatically usher 
in the painless disappearance of inefficient small-scale types of private production.271 He argued that 
capitalism had produced a “scientific” system of production which was in itself  fully rational  and 
logical for the efficient generation of material wealth, but could not but lead to irrational results when 
left unchecked and unconstrained by a socialist state.272 
This  perspective  on  a  kind  of  mutually  balancing  “cooperation”  ( 合 作 )  between  socialism  and 
capitalism273 foreshadows his later more dialectical take on the relationship between liberal capitalism 
and the historical emergence of communism, an approach which he shared in common with Tang Junyi. 
A little further on in the text on the irreducible duality of material objects from which I quoted in the 
above, Tang refers to individualist capitalism and collectivist communism as “mutually neutralizing 
forces” (互相抵消力量) engaged in a struggle between “false Buddhas” (假佛)274 that will eventually 
lead to them canceling each other out and paving the way for their mutual overcoming. Mou Zongsan, 
who no longer had either the will or the patience to theoretically engage with Marx's works after the 
establishment  of  the  People's  Republic275,  was  generally  less  optimistic  on  the  outcome  of  this 
269Mou, [1935d], p.823.
270Mou, [1934a], p.735.
271See Mou, [1934a], p.737. Also see “A Comparison of Two Trends of Thought in China” (Guonei liang da sichao zhi  
duibi 國內兩大思潮之對比), [1935b] in ZW2, pp.837-840.
272See Mou, [1934b], pp.773-775.
273Mou, [1934b], p.775.
274Tang, [1973b], p.702.
275As late as 1937, Mou still maintained a minimal distinction between the theories of Marx and actually existing socialism 
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dialectical entanglement:
The  modern  spirit  has  declined  step  by  step  and  further  degrades  with  every  passing  day.  From
naturalism emerged a successful current of individualism, liberty, equality and fraternity, from which the
modern political democracies of England and America were born. But if individualism and liberalism
remain  unchecked  by a  transcendent  rationality  which  can  provide  a  place  of  stability  for  human
existence, then the individual will only be a bodily individual and liberty will only be the liberty of
physical  desires.  This will  lead to blind deviations and outbursts  of  madness that  can no longer be
controlled, so that in the end it will forcefully give rise to communist parties which will in turn destroy
this [form of liberal individualism]. The communist parties call upon each other through the proletarian
revolution,  oppose  bodily individualism with  a  collectivism which  destroys  human  nature,  and  put
forward a system of mechanical reification to counter a liberalism of physical desires. If this is not a
gradual degradation and a complete reification leading to destruction then what is?276 
近代精神﹐乃步步下降﹐日趨墮落。由個人主義而自然主義﹐自由平等博愛之思潮興。近代英美
之政治民主﹐即由此而孕育。然個人主義自由主義﹐如不獲一超越理性根據為其生命之安頓﹐
則個人必只為軀殼之個人﹐自由必只為情欲之自由。因以盲爽發狂﹐而不能自持﹐終必逼出
共產黨之反動而毀滅之。共產黨以無產階級革命相號召﹐以泯滅人性之集體主義對治軀殼之
個人主義﹐以機械之物化系統對治情欲之自由主義。豈非步步墮落﹐非全部物化而毀滅之不可而
何耶?
Mou's and Tang's dialectical take on the relation between capitalism and communism, which they saw 
as fighting out their conflict on the unfortunate battleground of China, bears a striking resemblance to 
Heidegger's idea expressed in the controversial lectures of his Introduction to Metaphysics delivered in 
1935, a work Mou for one was familiar with277 : “Europe […] lies today in the great pincers between 
Russia on the one side and America on the other”, Russia and America being for him metaphysically 
and communism, in clear contrast to his later vitriolic and rather repetitive attacks on Marxism and communism as  
fundamentally identical. See “Revolutionaries and Responsibility” (Gemingjia yu zeren 革命家與責任 ), [1937a] in 
ZW2, pp.885-887. Apart from Mao's On Contradiction and On Practice, he would not feel the need to directly engage 
with Marxist  texts  anymore  after  the  '50s.  As Peng Guoxiang stresses,  Mou's  injunction  to  his  students  to  ignore 
everything he had written before he was 50 years  old applied mainly to his  “theoretical  works” and research into 
Chinese philosophy, not to his socio-political ideas which remained very much unchanged. See “Mou Zongsan's Critique 
of Communism” (Mou Zongsan de gongchanzhuyi pipan 牟宗三的共產主義批判), Zhongguo wenzhe yanjiu tongxun
中國文哲研究通訊, vol.19, no.3, 2009, p.48.
276“The Development of Confucian Learning and its Mission” (Ruxue xueshu zhi fazhan ji qi shiming 儒學學術之發展及
其使命), [1949d] in DY, p.5.
277See Intellectual Intuition and Chinese Philosophy (Zhi de zhijue yu Zhongguo zhexye智的直覺與中國哲學), [1971], 
vol.20 of MJ, p.6 (preface).
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identical insofar as they come down to “the same hopeless frenzy of unchained technology and the 
rootless organization of the average man”278.  For Heidegger,  the Germans were “the people of the 
center of the West”279 caught in the battle of technology with itself, an “onslaught of what we call the 
demonic”280 leading to the “darkening of the world”281. In a way similar to Mou and Tang, Heidegger 
protested  against  what  he  called  the  various  “misinterpretations  of  spirit”282,  with  Marxism  and 
positivist  science  being  singled  out  for  special  blame  in  the  global  reduction  of  time  to  “speed, 
instantaneity, simultaneity”, with the catastrophic result that “time as history has vanished from all  
Dasein of all peoples”283. 
2.3.2.3 Modernity and time 
Let us retrace our steps and clarify a few more aspects of Postone's reinterpretation of Marxism before 
proceeding any further. What then, is so particular to labor in capitalism and to industrial production 
according  to  Postone?  Here  the  distinction  between  abstract  and  concrete  labor  and  abstract  and 
concrete time derived from Marx's theory of the double nature of the commodity, the analysis of which 
opens Capital, comes to the fore: the difference between the particular use value of a commodity (e.g. a 
lighter can be used for lighting cigarettes) and its exchange value (a lighter can be exchanged for/has 
the same value as four cigarettes)284 corresponds to that between the double character of modern labor 
as a physiological expenditure of concrete labor power on the one hand285, and abstract labor, as the 
amount of quantifiable labor time it takes for a (not a specific, but any) laborer to perform a certain task 
in the production process of commodities on the other.286 Postone stresses that the category of abstract 
278Introduction to Metaphysics, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000, p.40.
279Heidegger, 2000, p.52.
280Mou Zongsan reserved the expression “Demonic Way” (modao魔道) for communism. 
281Heidegger, 2000, p.48.
282See Heidegger,  2000,  pp.49-53: 1)  spirit  as  “intelligence” or  “ingenuity”,  2) spirit  as  a  “powerless  superstructure” 
(Marxism), 3) spirit  as a mere instrument, or alternatively as the inconsequential concern of “culture” and “values” 
(which  contrary to  the  New Confucians,  Heidegger  does  not  see  as  proper  embodiments  of  spirit),  4)  spirit  as  a  
“showpiece” and “spectacle”
283Heidegger, 2000, p.40. 
284Depending on the relative production costs of tobacco, paper, plastic, gas, the amount of water and electricity it takes to 
produce the raw materials needed for the production of these specific commodities, the availability of said materials, the  
taxes levied on tobacco products and so on, one is tempted to say, ad infinitum. 
285Let us say, elementarily, the amount of calories a given person with an “average” (which is hardly a natural given as  
such) physical constitution needs to perform the action of harvesting X tobacco plants, which is qualitatively highly  
specific given the extent of empirical contingencies and conditions involved. Of course, one would also have to take into 
account that “man does not live by bread alone.”
286See Postone, 1993, p.144.
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labor  denotes  a  “real  social  process  of  abstraction”287,  and  is  not  simply  the  result  of  a  notional 
abstraction which allows one to ignore the specific differences between the labor necessary for the 
production  of  cigarettes  and  that  required  for  making  lighters.  The  category  of  abstract  labor  is 
fundamentally related to abstract, qualitatively undifferentiated, uniform and homogeneous time, on the 
basis of which alone the productivity of concrete labor in producing exchange value has come to be 
assessed. Heidegger's condemnation of modern technology and a time reduced to speed can also be 
read in this light.288 In the most empirically oriented part of his work, Postone draws on the research of 
historians such as Jacques Le Goff, which attests to a transition in the experience of time accompanying 
the birth pangs of capitalism in Western Europe.289 Opposed to abstract time is “concrete time”, which 
is always the “function of events” and is thus not a constant and uniform, but a “dependent variable”290, 
often interpreted as linked to  recursive natural  events  such as  lunar  cycles  and planetary motions. 
Postone sees the transformation of temporal experience and the social  domination of abstract time 
dictated by the clock as fundamentally connected with the emergence of capitalism in central urban 
areas in fourteenth century Western Europe from the cloth-making industry, only becoming generalized 
much later in the wake of increasing industrialization.291 According to Postone, the expansion of the 
capitalist  economy,  where  exchange value  is  determined according to  (socially necessary)  abstract 
labor time, has led to a general form of “abstract social domination”, in which social structures begin to 
appear to people (as producers and buyers of commodities) as pregiven objective forces over which 
they have no control.292 In short, it leads to “the domination of people by time”293. Of crucial importance 
is that Postone thinks that the basic categories Marx used in his analysis are not merely economic 
287Postone, 1993, p.152.
288See  Moishe  Postone  and  Timothy Brennan,  “Labor  and  the  Logic  of  Abstraction:  An  Interview”, South  Atlantic  
Quarterly, vol.108, no.2, 2009b, pp.326-327.
289Postone, 1993, pp.200-216. In his classic  study of nationalism,  Benedict  Anderson equally emphasizes (borrowing an 
expression from Walter Benjamin), the social effects of “homogeneous, empty time”, which Anderson mainly sees as the 
result  of  the  growth  of  print  capitalism.  See  Imagined  Communities.  Reflections  on  the  Origin  and  Spread  of  
Nationalism, London and New York: Verso, 1991, pp.22-36. Also see Gross, 1992, p.48.
290Postone, 1993, p.201. For Postone, the distinction between abstract and concrete time is broader than that between linear 
and cyclical  time,  which is often used in  (philosophical)  characterizations of  differences in traditional  and modern 
temporal experience. Giorgio Agamben for example focuses his critique of time in modernity on the distinction between 
a cyclical “Greek experience of time” (initiated by Aristotle in his Physics) with the “Christian experience of time” as its 
“antithesis” which has been “secularized” in the modern age by being sanctioned by science, resulting in a “dead time 
abstracted from experience”. See “Time and History. Critique of the Instant and the Continuum”, in History and Infancy.  
The Destruction of Experience, London and New York: Verso, 2007, pp.99-116.
291Postone stresses that the historically rather recent preponderance of abstract time must not be understood as a purely  
technical question, since the availability of the technological means for constructing time-keeping devices according to  
invariable units (especially in China) predates the emergence of abstract time as a dominant means for the organization 
and regulation of social life by centuries. See Postone, 1993, pp.203-207.
292Postone, 1993, p.125.
293Postone, 2009a, p.41.
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categories,  but  constitute  what  the  Grundrisse calls  the  “forms  of  being  [Daseinsformen]”  or 
“determinations of existence [Existenzbestimmungen]” of modern social and cultural life in general.294 
As Postone writes: “[S]ocial domination in capitalism does not, on its most fundamental level, consist 
in  the  domination  of  people  by  other  people,  but  in  the  domination  of  people  by  abstract  social 
structures that people themselves constitute.”295 He explains:
In his discussion of the magnitude of value in terms of socially-necessary labor-time, Marx points to a
peculiarity of  value as  a  social  form of  wealth whose measure  is  temporal:  increasing productivity
increases the amount of use-values produced per unit time. But it results only in short term increases in
the  magnitude  of  value  created  per  unit  time.  Once  that  productive  increase  becomes  general,  the
magnitude of value falls to its base level. The result is a sort of treadmill dynamic. On the one hand,
increased  levels  of  productivity  result  in  great  increases  in  use-value  production.  Yet  increased
productivity does not result in long-term proportional increases in [exchange] value, the social form of
wealth in capitalism [...]  The temporality of this dynamic is not  only abstract.  Although changes in
productivity, in the use-value dimension, do not change the amount of value produced per unit time, they 
do change the determination of what counts as a given unit of time. The unit of (abstract) time remains
constant—and, yet, it is pushed forward, as it were, in (historical) time. The movement here is not the
movement  in  (abstract)  time,  but  the  movement  of  time.  Both abstract  time  and historical  time  are
constituted historically as structures of domination.296
In Yan Fu's  essay “On the Speed of Change in the World” (Lun shibian zhi ji 論世變之亟) from 
1895297,  there is  the following interesting passage which can be linked up with some of Postone's 
theoretical insights which I have tried to outline in the above:
Nobody knows where the changes in the world come from. Using forced language we could speak of a
294Postone, 1993, p.18. Cf. p.44, p.142. 
295Postone, 1993, p.30. Similarly, for the sociologist Anthony Giddens, the discontinuity of modernity can be summarized 
in  three  factors:  1)  the  pace  of  change,  2)  the  scope  of  change,  and  3)  the  intrinsically  novel  nature  of  modern  
institutions. These derive their dynamism from 1) “time-space distanciation” and the universalization of a homogeneous  
temporal order of abstract calendar time, 2) the development of “disembedding mechanisms” (such as “expert systems” 
and “symbolic tokens” which replace direct personal trust) and 3) the “reflexive appropriation of knowledge” which 
causes social life to be influenced by information coming in from (self-descriptions of) society. See Anthony Giddens,  
The Consequences of Modernity, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991. 
296Postone, 2009a, p.40, p.42. Perhaps it would have to be further analyzed how (“free”, “leisure”) time itself has become  
one of the most valuable commodities in light of the complex dynamic of abstract, concrete and historical time. 
297Reprinted in Collected Writings of Yan Fu (Yan Fu ji严复集), edited by Hu Weixi 胡伟希, Shengyang: Liaoning renmin 
chubanshe, 1994, pp.1-6.
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process of  incessant change298.  Once such a process has been instigated, even sages have no power
over it, simply because the sage is also but another thing within this process. To say that they can take
hold of it and influence  it  is groundless. The sage's role is merely to know its origins and foresee its
movements […] The Western peoples surpass the old through the new, whereas the Chinese people take
the alternation of order and chaos and of rise and decline to be the natural order of both heavenly and
human affairs [...]299
夫世之變也，莫知其所由然，強而名之曰運會。運會既成，雖聖人無所為力，蓋聖人亦運會中之
一物。既為其中之一物，謂能取運會而轉移之，無是理也。彼聖人者，特知運會之所由趨，而逆
睹其流極 […] 西之人力今以勝古；中之人以一治一亂、一盛一衰為天行人事之自然 [...]
Although Yan Fu generally had a much more voluntaristic  belief  in  the capacity of (civilized and 
educated)300 human beings to shape their social environment301, the emphasis this passage places on the 
quasi-objective, uncontrollable nature of historical change, which even the sage can at best accurately 
anticipate  and observe,  is  revealing  in  the  light  of  Postone's  reinterpretation  of  Marxism.  Equally 
present in this extract is the opposition between a form of time grounded in the drive of capital towards  
the transvaluation of value leading to a constant revolutionization of production in which the old must 
give way to the new, and a form of concrete, in this case, cyclical time, governing both the social and 
natural order. That Yan Fu identifies the rendering obsolete of the old by the new with the West is not to 
be  wondered  at,  seeing  how  the  treadmill  effect  Postone  describes  necessitated  the  imperialist 
expansion of Western nation-states, “cheap prices of commodities” serving as “the heavy artillery with 
which it batters down all Chinese walls”302 in order to keep the rate of profit from falling.303 
298Yan adapted the term yunhui 運會, denoting a cosmological process of change, from the Neo-Confucian Shao Yong 邵
雍 (1011–1077). It was used by a considerable number of late Qing reformers to refer to the current state of the world.  
See  Huang,  2003,  pp.33-34,  p.36  and  Hao  Yen-p'ing  and  Wang  Erh-min,  “Changing  Chinese  Views  of  Western 
Relations, 1840-95”, in  The Cambridge History of China, vol.11: Late Ch'ing, 1800-1911, part 2, edited by John K. 
Fairbank and Kwang-Ching Liu, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980, pp.160-161.
299Translation partly based on Furth, 2002, p.17. My italics. Furth makes the following related observation concerning 
Kang Youwei's work: “K'ang's adaptation of Confucian metaphysics shifted the balance between sage and cosmos: as a  
teleological force K'ang's external cosmos had more purposeful dynamism than the traditional view easily allowed; as a  
limited foreknower of the process of change, the sage had correspondingly less.” Ibid., p.22. Compare with the examples 
Viren Murthy gives from the work of Tan Sitong, in Murthy, 2014, pp.63-68.
300See Huang, 2003, pp.29-30.
301See Furth, 2002, p.27.
302Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, [1848], 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/ch01.htm#007. 
303In the first of his Addresses to the German Nation, delivered after Napoleon's defeat of Prussia in 1808, Fichte expresses 
the resulting conundrum in romantic nationalist terms: “Whatever has lost its self-sufficiency has simultaneously lost its 
capacity to intervene in the stream of time and freely to determine the content thereof. If it persists in this state, its age,  
and itself with the age, are dispatched by the alien power that commands its fate; henceforth it no longer has any time of  
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Of course, what Yan Fu offered was not a critique of the dynamic of capitalism, intent as he was in the 
eyes of Benjamin Schwartz on providing China with “wealth and power”.304 The same applies to Feng 
Youlan. Feng saw industrialization in a completely different, that is to say wholly positive light, as a 
process  which  contains  the  solutions  for  what,  from a  Postonian-Marxist  perspective  at  least,  are 
fundamentally  problems  of  its  own making.  When  positively  appreciated,  “industrial  civilization” 
becomes  something  which  allows  for  the  production  of  commodities  that  serve  to  alleviate  and 
facilitate the social conditions of life resulting from the very nature of the production process that 
enables these commodities to exist in the first place. Buying a car can save time when going to work, 
but one first needs to invest a considerable amount of (labor) time in order to be able to make this 
purchase (or pledge future payment to a bank which tries to ensure its own solvency by speculating on,  
say, the commercial prospects of perhaps a different automobile producer), convert one's own time into 
money to pay the mechanic in the meantime, make time to overcome the daily post-traffic jam disorder 
when coming home, and take into account the fact that society at large saves (if only a marginal amount 
of) time by driving to work, which influences the average demands an employer can make in expecting 
his employees to show up “on time”. Perhaps this is what Derrida expressed obliquely with the notion 
of the  pharmakon he found in Plato, which can mean both a poison and a remedy, an illness and its 
cure.305 Still, in a basic sense, Postone would probably agree with Feng Youlan's equation of modernity 
and industrialization. Even Feng's rudimentary definitions of socialism and capitalism as two different 
forms of distribution (respectively mediated and unmediated by community bonds in the state) of the 
same form of industrial production performatively accord with Postone's characterization of the defects 
its own, but reckons its years according to the events and epochs of foreign peoples and empires.” J.G. Fichte, Addresses  
to the German Nation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008, p.10. Emphasis added. Fichte's  Addresses were 
translated into Chinese by Zhang Junmai in 1933 and published in subsequent editions of his journal Zaisheng 再生. See 
Fung, 2010, pp.108-109. The Addresses  are an important document in the history of nationalist discourse and carried 
great appeal for Chinese intellectuals who saw parallels between the Napoleonic occupation of Prussia and the growing 
threat of Japanese imperialism, especially after the invasion of Manchuria in 1931. See Zhang Kerong张可荣, “Fichte's 
'Addresses to the German Nation' and the Current of Thought Concerning National Revival after the Mukden Incident”  
(Feixite 'dui Deyizhi minzu de yanjiang' yu 'jiu yi ba' hou minzu fuxing sichao 费希特《对德意志民族的演讲》与
“九·一八”后民族复兴思潮), Changsha ligong daxue xuebao长沙理工大学学报, vol.25, no.2, 2010, pp.81-86. 
Liang Qichao, who discovered Fichte (through the intermediary of Japanese works) in the beginning of the Republican  
period, devoted significant attention to introducing him to a Chinese audience. See Joachim Kurtz, “Translating the 
Vocation of Man: Liang Qichao (1873–1929), J.G. Fichte, and the Body Politic in Early Republican China”, in  Why 
Concepts Matter. Translating Social and Political Thought, edited by Martin Burke and Melvin Richter, Leiden: Brill, 
2012, pp.153-175. Joachim Kurtz has also assembled a bibliography of Chinese material on Fichte: “Johann Gottlieb 
Fichte  in  China:  Eine  Bibliographie,  1914–2005”,  2006,  available  at:  http://www.zo.uni-
heidelberg.de/sinologie/institute/staff/kurtz/publications.html.
304Schwartz, 1964.
305Jacques Derrida, “Plato's Pharmacy”, in Dissemination, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981 pp.63-171.
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of traditional Marxism. From Feng's  ideas,  it  becomes clear that what Postone considers to be the 
underlying structural logic of social transformation can be semantically expressed as an ideal to which 
modernizing societies must devote themselves if they want to become modern. One should bear in 
mind though, that it can only come to be put forward as a normative ideal in response to the historical 
condition actually affected by this logic. In any case, the least one can say is that the time in which  
Feng locates both China and the West and in which they occupy a different place is not just any time, 
but  a  historically  specific  regime  of  temporality  governed  by abstract  time,  operatively  empty  of 
cultural  determinations,  to which,  following the globalization of the capitalist  mode of production, 
societies all over the world have been subjected, irrespective of their cultural background or the ”isms” 
its intellectuals and politicians wave around. For Feng, the time that divides China from the West is the 
same time which separates the old from the new in both China and the West. Such a time is no longer a  
modality of the nation as a cultural Subject. If industrialization and industrial technology were still a 
“function” (yong用) for Feng, then it was one without a corresponding essential “substance” (ti  體). 
Nothing  could  be  further  from  Heidegger's  romantic  condemnation  of  modern  technology  as  an 
“enframing” (Gestell), of which the essence is “by no means anything technological”, and which leaves 
nothing (least of all Being itself) unaffected in the extension of its planetary dominance.306 The implicit 
irony in Feng Youlan's approach is that he can only “save” culture by in a sense depriving it of its  
efficacy and relevance for modernity, following his idiosyncratic historical materialist assumption that 
the industrial base functions without, detached from, and indifferent to culture, the latter apparently 
being  not  so  much  its  corresponding  superstructure  as  it  is  an  autonomous  dimension  of  human 
existence which is neither conductive to nor impinges on the logic of modernization, at least not as a 
final  cause.307 What  Feng  does  is  to  place  culture  outside  of  the  historical  time  intrinsic  to 
industrialization in which China needs to position itself as a nation, while assuming Chinese culture to 
remain  unaffected  by  the  “road  to  freedom”  paved  by  industrialization.  His  approach  is  thus  an 
unabashedly accomodationist one. Jumping ahead a little, we can say that the New Confucians did the 
same, except that it is much clearer where what they uplifted from the restless dynamic of historical  
306See Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, New York: Harper & Row, 1977, pp.3-
35. For an excellent study see Michael E. Zimmerman, Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, Politics,  
Art, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990.
307Chen Lai indicates the contemporary relevance of Feng's views for an analysis of the intricate relation between cultural  
differences and temporal/historical differences inscribed in the dynamic of modernization, since the latter has not only 
changed China, but its own “place of birth” to the same extent. At the same time, he criticizes Feng's implicit idea that 
the  effects  of  “instrumental  rationality”  on  traditional  culture  and  morality  would  remain  negligible,  and  that 
modernization would not impinge on the status of tradition once the latter had been relieved of the impossible duty of 
either adapting to modernization or providing the normative resources for it. See Chen, 2001, p.121. 
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time was placed and ended up; namely, in eternity, in the timeless, or more precisely in what (in the  
words of Mou Zongsan) “does not have the nature of time or space” (無時間性與空間性).308 Contrary 
to Feng Youlan, the New Confucians usually do not start by distinguishing, but precisely by identifying 
the universal with particular. Their basic philosophical assumptions cannot tolerate an externality of the 
universal to the particular, which must not be simply “lodged”, but truly realized and manifested in the 
particular.  Consider  the  following  passage  by  Mou,  where  the  relation  between  universality  and 
particularity is couched in theological language: 
Human beings are not 'pure spirit'  or 'pure form'.  Therefore, the spiritual life of human beings must
necessarily appear within the limitations of the material world which it at the same time transforms […]
The development of culture must proceed by the limitations imposed on ideals or spirit (the universal)
by reality and moreover realize itself within reality; if it were to divorce itself from reality and from
realization in reality, it would not be culture at all in any sense. God is spirit or the ideal itself, but one
cannot speak of culture in the case of God. God must also manifest himself in reality, and in order to do
so he must rely on man. Human beings on the other hand must seek to fully develop their spiritual nature 
and their spirit to become equal to God, that is to say to their ideal or spiritual self. This implies the
following: God must be substantiated in the spiritual nature and the spirit of human beings, while at the
same time becoming a purely spiritual subject [through humanity]. Therefore, the realization of God is
culture, culture which is formed by passing through the limitation to and realization of human ideals and
the human spirit in reality.309 
人不是「純靈」(Pure Spirit) ﹐不是純理純型 (Pure form) 。故人的精神生活必須在限於氣
質而又改變氣質之中表現 […] 文化的發展必須是理想或精神(普遍的) 受限於現實而且實現於
現實﹔離開在現實中而且實現於現實﹐不能有文化。上帝是精神或理想之自己﹐而他本身無所謂
文化。他亦須實現於現實中﹐而他之實現於現 實﹐必須靠人。人之神性及精神性必須返而充其
極而上齊於上帝﹐即理想或精神之自已。此義即函說: 上帝必須由人之神性或精神性來證實﹐而
上帝亦必須轉為一個純精神的主體。由此﹐他的實現即是文化﹐經過人之受限於現實而且又實現
於現實之理想或精神而形成 之文化。
This approach leads to the additional difficulty that thinkers like Mou have to account for the relation 
between  the  atemporal  and  the  time  of  perpetual  transformation  specific  to  modernity,  all  while 
308Appearance and Thing-in-itself (Xianxiang yu wuzishen現象與物自身), [1975d] vol.21 of MJ, p.18.
309Mou, [1949c], p.74.
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somehow making sure that eternity (God) does not lose itself in the process of realizing itself through 
the medium of time (humanity). It is also from this perspective that the methodological importance of a 
form of dialectical logic in their work can be accounted for. 
In  a  different  way,  Xiong Shili's writings  also testify to  the  modern  tension  between abstract  and 
concrete time, specifically in his attempt to distinguish the Buddhist temporal concept of kṣaṇa 刹那310 
from “the worldly concept of time, in which time is ultimately a changing manifestation of space. 
Space as well as time [in this sense] are divided into parts” (世俗所謂時間，畢竟是空間的變相。空
間是有分段的，時間也是有分段的 ).311 Xiong notes that “there were no time-keeping devices in 
antiquity, but still one cannot calculate the measure of kṣaṇa using modern clocks” (古代無計時之具，
即現代鐘表猶不能定剎那量).312 Although the term kṣaṇa is often taken to simply denote the smallest 
possible unit of time which cannot be analyzed any further, it is not, as Xiong stresses, to be taken as a  
quantifiable constant unit, but as a fundamentally dependent, insofar as it can be identified with the 
time of “one thought” or “a single concentration of the mind” (yi nian一念)313. In this way, time is not 
understood “spatially”,  but remains intrinsically bound up with experience.  Time and space,  in the 
“worldly” or “vulgar” (shisu世俗 ) sense of being divisible into identical units, are both “existential 
forms of the material universe” (物質宇宙存的在形式)314, matter in turn being only one of the aspects 
of a world which is characterized by constant transformation.  For Xiong, the constant perishing and 
coming into being of all entities from one kṣaṇa to the next (insofar as one can apply a sequential and 
“spatializing”  conception  of  this  sort  to  the  notion  of  kṣaṇa)  should  be  viewed  as  a  process  of 
“ceaseless creation” (shengsheng bu xi 生生不息).315 The permanent change of ceaseless creation is an 
ontological “function” (yong)  of the essential  reality or substance (ti)  of both the human and non-
human universe. His whole work revolves around bringing this fundamental identity (permanence) of 
what is different (changing) to the surface. That which causes a particular thing to be what it is and to 
remain itself, is for Xiong essentially one and the same as its appearance and functioning in reality. 
310Defined in Soothill's Dictionary of Buddhist Terms as “the shortest space of time, a moment, the 90 th part of a thought, 
and 4500th part of a minute, during which 90 or 100 are born and as many die.” Soothill, 2003, p.4. “According to 
another definition 60 kṣaṇa equal one finger-snap […] In each kṣaṇa 900 persons are born and die”. Ibid., pp.250-251.
311New Treatise on the Uniqueness of Consciousness (Xin weishi lun 新唯識論), Changsha: Yuelu shushe, [1932] 2010, 
p.80.
312Treatise on Substance and Function (Tiyong lun體用論), Shanghai: Shanghai shudian chubanshe, [1958], 2009, p.18.
313Soothill, 2003, p.6: “The time of a thought of which there are varying measurements from 60 kṣaṇa upwards.”
314Xiong, [1932], p.80.
315Xiong, [1932], p.85 and Xiong, [1958], p.21, p.59.
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There is, in other words, no strict boundary which one could draw through reality in order to separate a 
substance from its function. In Xiong's own words: “What is called substance does not rise up above 
mind, matter, and the countless phenomena, nor is it hidden behind their back. Be aware that substance 
is nothing else than mind, matter and the countless phenomena themselves” (所謂實體不是高出於心
物萬象之上，不是潛隱於心物萬象背後，當知實體即是心物萬象的自身).316 Xiong repeatedly 
uses the metaphor of the sea and the drops of water which make up the sea to illustrate what he means. 
The sea (substance) is nothing but particles of water (function), there is nothing above or beyond these 
particles which one could separate from them and call “sea”. Conversely, the countless drops of water 
are not separate from the sea and have no inherent, self-sufficient existence in a state of separation. The 
world is conceived as a self-enclosed, unending process of change which permits no outside and is 
identical with its own becoming. At the same time, Xiong Shili clearly remained wary of completely 
dissolving the permanent aspect of the unity of permanence and change into the contingency of the 
changeable.  The  unity  of  consciousness  and  its  various  object-horizons  remains  constituted  and 
guaranteed by consciousness, and it alone can join together what it has put asunder. The identity of 
being and the observer can only be misconstrued or reaffirmed through observation. Contrary to what 
some  commentators  seem  to  suggest,  Xiong  Shili  was  not  Gilles  Deleuze,  for  whom  “without 
consciousness the transcendental field would be defined as a pure plane of immanence since it escapes 
every transcendence of the subject as well as of the object. Absolute immanence is in itself: it is not in 
something, not to something: it does not depend on an object and does not belong to a subject.”317 
Xiong's rejection of a one-sided immanence of the objective, material sides of the various unities he 
defends  was  motivated  by  the  tendency  he  discerned  in  “recent  philosophy  to  remain  silent  on 
substance, and without exception to negate the great origin of transformations, the essential nature of 
316Xiong, [1958], p.72.
317 Gilles Deleuze, Pure Immanence. A Life, New York: Zone Book, 2001, p.26. Deleuze adds: “Immanence does not relate 
to a Something that is a unity superior to everything, nor to a Subject that is an act operating the synthesis of things: it is 
when immanence is no longer immanence to anything other than itself that we can talk of a plane of immanence.”  Ibid. 
According to Chen Yun 陈赟 , Xiong's later thought constituted a definite move away from his former “reduction of 
function to substance” (摄用归体) or “reduction of characteristics to essence” (摄相归性) towards a much more radical 
insistence on the complete immanence and self-sufficiency of a phenomenal world where there is only “a plurality of 
free singularities” (复数的自由个体). See Chen Yun, “The Transformation of Xiong Shili's Later Ontology” (Wannian 
Xiong  Shili  de  bentilun  zhuanbian 晚 年 熊 十 力 的 本 体 论 转 变 ),  2002 
http://www.confucius2000.com/confucian/wnxslbtlzb.htm. I think it would be more cautious to speak of contradictory 
tendencies and a tension between transcendence and immanence which run through his whole oeuvre. See the next  
chapter,  section  3.1.3.  Chen's  claim  that  this  supposed  move  from  oppositional  transcendence  to  full  immanence 
coincides with a final retreat from the “escapist” (chushi出世) ontology of Buddhism to the “existential freedom” (存在
的自由性) of Confucianism is much more disputable.
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human life and the root of morality” (近世哲學不談本體，則將萬化太原、人生本性、道德根底一
概否認 ).318 Particularly Western philosophies, in both their idealist and materialist forms, as well as 
modern science, were for Xiong, “theories devoid of substance” (無體之論).319 Mou Zongsan would 
later echo this outlook in terms taken over from Huayan 華嚴 Buddhism by claiming that in modern 
times, the “dharma-sphere of principles” (lifa jie 理法界) had been collapsed into that of “the dharma-
sphere of concrete entities” (shifa jie 事法界)320 through reductionist forms of modern philosophy and 
science.321 He further argued that true universality cannot be thought apart from “substance” (benti 本
體), the disregard of which can only lead to the “abstract universality” (抽象的普遍性 )322 or “false 
universality”  (假的普遍性 )323 of  communism,  in  which  all  differences  of  quality  (zhi質 )  are 
eradicated324, resulting in an “invasive unity” (侵略的同) instead of a “unity within difference” (異中
之同 ).325 As Tang Junyi wrote: “In abstract philosophical terms, in our conceptual thinking we must 
emphasize the level of value and quality, focus on the concept of the in-itself, and substitute these for  
the uneven focus on superficial existence, quantity and efficiency” (抽象的哲學的說，則我們要以注
重“價值”之層級，注重“質”，注重“本身”之思想觀念，代替只注重平面之存在，只注重
“數量”，只注重“效用”之思想觀點).326 As I will argue in more detail in the third chapter, the 
unity of permanence and change is thus essentially formulated as biased in favor of the substantial and 
the permanent.  Xiong's  theoretical arguments too,  which have been mostly subjected to  ahistorical 
318Xiong, [1932], 2010, p.6 (preface).
319Xiong, [1958], 2009, p.92. Cf. Mou, Record of Lectures on Aristotle's Theory of the Four Causes (Siyin shuo jiangxi lu  
四因說講習錄 ) [1997], vol.31 of  MJ, p.24: “This age and our modern civilization are without substance, without 
substance meaning that they lack an essential metaphysical reality” (這個時代，現代文明就是無體的文明，無體就
是沒有形而上的實體).
320Fajie 法界= dharmadhātu = “sphere/realm of reality”. See The Princeton Dictionary of Buddhism, edited by Robert E. 
Buswell Jr. and Donald S. Lopez Jr., Princeton (New Jersey): Princeton University Press, 2013, p.244.  The other two 
spheres distinguished in Huayan thought are the “dharma-sphere of the [mutual] non-obstruction of concrete entities and  
principles” (理事無礙法界) and “the dharma-sphere of the [mutual] non-obstruction of concrete entities” (事事無礙法
界). 
321See Mou, [1953c], pp.244-249 and Critique of the Cognitive Mind (Renshixin zhi pipan 認識心之批判), [1956b], vol.18 
of MJ, p.11.
322Mou, [1997], pp.9-12.
323Mou, [1954b], p.149. Cf. Mou, “Freedom and Ideals” (Ziyou yu lixiang 自由與理想), [1953d] in DY, pp.188-190.
324Also see Mou's  “Critique of  the Communist  International  and the Chinese Communist  Party” (Gongchan guoji  yu  
zhonggong pipan 共產國際與中共批判), [1952a] in Zhongguo wenzhe yanjiu tongxun 中國文哲研究通訊, vol.19, 
no.3, 2009, pp.5-26; “Hegel and Wang Chuanshan” (Heige'er yu Wang Chuanshan黑格爾與王船山), [1954a] in SW, 
pp.201-202 and Mou, [1961] pp.34-35.
325Mou, [1949c], p.83.
326“Description of the Spirit of the Journal “Ideals and Culture” and a Discussion of the Prospect of Human Culture” (Shu 
ben kan zhi jingshen jianlun renlei wenhua zhi qiantu述本刊之精神兼論人類文化之前途), [1950b] in ZB, p.586.
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readings  in  available  studies  of  his  thought327,  can  be  seen  in  the  context  of  the  complex 
interdependency of the modern world, in which individuals and communities all over the globe came to 
be connected in a wholly novel form of what is known in Buddhist thought as “co-dependent arising” 
(pratītyasamutpāda, yuanqi 緣起).328 
2.3.3 Philosophy and the inheritance of abstraction
I will elaborate a little more on the issues of philosophy, modernity, and abstraction before bringing this 
section to a close.329 The dilemmas resulting from the destabilization of tradition and the associated 
philosophical assault on foundational substance following in the wake of the modern transformation of 
time  may  have  been  troublesome  for  Xiong  and  his  fellow  New  Confucians,  but  more  recently, 
philosophers have found other, one is tempted to say more devious, ways to accommodate the logic of  
modernization and to recognize “the rose in the cross of the present”330.  The contemporary French 
philosopher  Alain  Badiou  (b.  1937)  for  example,  departing  from  a  rejection  of  Heidegger's 
condemnation  of  modern  technological  “nihilism”,  proposes  to  positively  interpret  the  “abstract 
potency  of  Capital”  as  having  liberated  modern  philosophy  and  human  subjectivity  from  “the 
traditional figure of the bond”.331 Commenting and building on the celebration of the historical role 
played by the bourgeoisie in the Communist Manifesto, Badiou describes capitalism as
the  general  dissolvent  of  sacralizing  representations,  which  postulate  the  existence  of  intrinsic  and
essential relations […] Yet, for Marx, and for us, desacralization is not in the least nihilistic, insofar
as “nihilistic” must  signify that which declares that  access to being and truth is  impossible. On the
contrary, desacralization is a  necessary condition for the disclosing of such an approach to truth. It is
obviously the only thing we can and must welcome within Capital: it exposes the pure multiple as the
foundation of presentation, it denounces every effect of One as a simple precarious configuration […]
327Tu Weiming goes so far as to say that “Hsiung's rejection of the Wei-shih [“consciousness-only”, vijnaptimatra] theory 
of causation can probably be interpreted as a conflict within the Buddhism realm of intellectual discourse.” Tu Weiming, 
“Hsiung Shih-li's Quest for Authentic Existence”, in Furth, 1976, p.269.
328For Li Zehou at least it was clear that the underlying object in Xiong's critique of Buddhism was actually (Western) 
modernity. See Historical Essays on Chinese Modern Thought (Zhongguo xiandai sixiang shilun 中国现代思想史论), 
Beijing: Dongfang chubanshe, 1987, p.270.
329The next few pages were largely inspired by Christian Uhl's “What is Philosophy? On Globalizing Capitalism, the  
Modern Order of Knowledge,  and Nishida Kitarô”,  forthcoming. I  thank Professor Uhl for  having shared an early 
version of this essay with me.
330Hegel, 2008, p.15.
331Alain Badiou, Manifesto for Philosophy, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999, p.55.
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That this destitution operates in the most complete barbarity must not conceal its properly ontological
virtue. To whom must  we be grateful to be delivered from the myth of Presence […] if  not to the
roaming automaticity of Capital? […] We must still have as a  departure point what is has revealed:
Being is essentially multiple, sacred presence is a pure semblance and truth […] is not a revelation […]
Philosophy has not known until quite recently how to think in level terms with Capital, since it has left
the field open […] to vain nostalgia for the sacred, to obsession with Presence.332
Badiou's argument poses some terminological and conceptual difficulties which cannot be resolved 
here,  but  I  will  attempt  to  engage  with  what  I  take  to  be  its  basic  underlying  idea  nonetheless. 
Obviously,  Badiou,  who  is  a  self-avowed  proponent  of  “the  idea  of  communism”,  appraises  the 
operational dynamic of capitalism in a highly qualified and peculiar manner. He stresses that in spite of  
the fact that the logic of abstract equivalence underlying capital accumulation “operates in the most 
complete  barbarity”,  one  should  still  recognize  its  “ontological  virtue”,  which  consists  in  having 
emancipated the figure of the philosopher from a certain way of conceiving of the world and of a 
particular conception of the relation between being and truth. The philosophical equivalent of the social 
process  by which  “all  that  is  solid  melts  into  air,  all  that  is  holy is  profaned,  and man is  at  last 
compelled to face with sober senses his real conditions of life”333 is the disclosure of being as a bare 
multiplicity of “bodies and language”334, which can no longer be assumed to be a priori held together in 
a  unity  transcending  the  multiple.  Whereas  the  Communist  Manifesto  would  seem  to  discern  a 
historically motivated turn towards social and material reality, Badiou interprets this turn in ontological 
terms:  any transcendent  unity  is  imposed  on  and  not  discovered  in  what  Badiou  calls  the  “pure 
multiple”,  and  consequently does  not  preexist  the  operation  of  “precarious  configuration”  through 
which it is constituted. Unity is thus fundamentally a result, and not an origin. As he writes elsewhere,  
the point of departure for a philosophical thought capable of “thinking in level terms with Capital” 
332Badiou, 1999, pp.56-58. Badiou seems to position himself in what the later Althusser identified as an “undercurrent of  
materialism”, grouping together  thinkers as diverse as  Epicurus,  Machiavelli,  Spinoza, Rousseau, Marx, Heidegger,  
Derrida,  and  Deleuze.  See  “The Underground Current  of  the Materialism of  the  Encounter”,  in  Philosophy of  the  
Encounter.  Later Writings, 1978-87,  London and New York: Verso, 2006, 163-207. Althusser stresses that  the term 
“materialist” only has the provisional function of setting this undercurrent off against an “idealism” which believes in  
the existence of Origins and Final Goals, a trend which Hegelian teleology exemplifies for him: “The world may be  
called  the accomplished fact  [fait accompli] in which, once fact has been accomplished, is established the reign of 
Reason, Meaning, Necessity, and End. But the accomplishment of the fact is just a pure effect of contingency, since it 
depends on the aleatory encounter of the atoms due to the swerve of the clinamen” (pp.169-170). “The materialism of 
the encounter turns on a certain interpretation of the single proposition there is (es gibt, Heidegger) and its developments 
or  implications,  namely:  'there  is'  = 'there is  nothing';  'there  is'  =  'there has always-already  [again  a  Heidegerrian 
expression] been nothing' ” (p.189).
333Marx and Engels, [1848].
334See Alain Badiou, Second Manifesto for Philosophy, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011, pp.15-25.
175
must  henceforth  be  that  “the  one  is  not”  and  that  “there  is  no  structure  of  being”. 335 What  is 
philosophically positive then for Badiou in what has otherwise been the socially disastrous “roaming 
automaticity” of capitalism, is that the existence of pregiven substantial bonds in an ontological sense 
has come to be exposed as mere vain pretense. To use Xiong Shili's metaphor of choice: it has become 
clear, at a specific point in history, that there are only waves and drops of water (“pure multiple”), and 
that there is no guaranteed totality called the sea in which this multiplicity is intrinsically held together. 
A further exposition of Badiou's ideas, which have a much more extensive and complex conceptual 
background than I do justice to here, would lead us too far astray. Let us instead try to simplify his line 
of reasoning to the utmost for our own purposes: what Badiou seems to mean is that the historical 
effects of capitalist modernization have made a certain way of conceiving of being (and truth) as such 
increasingly improbable and anachronistic. If understood in this way, a few problems with Badiou's 
overall approach can begin to be signaled. First of all, it is doubtful whether he really has Marx on his 
side in his philosophical celebration of capitalism as he seems to claim. If anything was jubilantly 
received by Marx, it was not the conceptual consequences of capitalist modernity,  but the growing 
possibilities for the creation of material wealth, as distinct from, and as a by-product of, exchange 
value. The potential for an increase in material well-being which he saw as having undeniably resulted 
from industrialization and the connected development of science and technology is  not realized in 
capitalism, but continues to exists side by side and entangled with the problems resulting from the way 
in which material wealth is created, namely as value.336 The material, tangible side of commodities as 
use-values serving a particular purpose in a sense becomes secondary and ephemeral in contrast to their 
function as “mere organs”337 for the expansion of exchange value. People can live in a house, but the 
latter is constructed and bought first and foremost as “real estate”. Of course, what Badiou offers is not 
a historical, but a philosophical argument, and I am afraid that is where the problems begin. If we take 
what he calls “myth of Presence” to refer to the idea of a continued presence of tradition in modernity,  
it seems obvious from what we have seen so far in the case of modern China that precisely this idea, 
this “myth” of a tradition which inherently ensures a minimum framework of meaning and order, and 
which continues to persists even as it is rendered doubtful, denounced, and attacked from all sides, has 
335Being and Event, London and New York: Continuum, 2005, pp.23-30. Cf. Alberto Toscano, “The Open Secret of Real 
Abstraction”,  Rethinking  Marxism,  vol.20,  no.2,  p.276:  “[T]he  void  at  the  heart  of  Capital  […]  is  its  absence  of 
determinations, the fact that it has no historical or cultural content per se.” 
336See Postone, 1993, pp.193-200.
337See Postone, 1993, p.192.
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been just as much a beneficiary as it has been the victim of what Badiou calls the “desacralization” 
resulting from modernization. Additionally, it is always a question of what has become “desacralized” 
for whom, for what reasons, in which manner, and to what extent. It seems to me that Badiou does not 
take what Adorno and Horkheimer described as the “dialectics of enlightenment” enough into account. 
One should therefore entertain the possibility that the very idea of tradition as a substantial “presence”, 
constituting a paradoxical “continuity of discontinuity”, only emerged as a result at a specific historical 
juncture, when something like the academic discipline of philosophy came to be used in defense of 
tradition in the first place. In other words: the idea of tradition as a substantial bond is a specific self-
understanding which emerges after  the perceived end of  tradition,  and which does  not  necessarily 
predate the latter as an origin. 
For Mou Zongsan for example, perhaps the most philosophical of all New Confucian philosophers338, 
the recognition of Chinese culture at large essentially came to hinge on the recognition of the existence 
of Chinese philosophy. As he states unambiguously in one of his lectures: “Every cultural system has 
its own philosophy. Otherwise, it could not have become a cultural system [to begin with]” (任何一個
文化體系，都有它的哲學。否則，它便不成其為文化體系).339 From the text of the 1958 Manifesto  
it is clear that its signatories all saw philosophy as that particular field of knowledge which opens up 
onto  the  “single-stemmedness”  (yibenxing 一 本性 )  of  Chinese  culture  and  thus  isomorphically 
embodies the traditional unity and common origin of philosophy, religion,  morality and politics in 
Chinese learning.340 For Liang Shuming as well, the putative essential traits of different cultures had to 
be approached by investigating their philosophies, as privileged repositories of Spirit where the age-
long  development  of  civilizations  had  been  deposited.341 Unsurprisingly,  the  broader  goal  of  this 
recognition had the following logic for Mou: “East and West should mutually respect each other as 
equals, and make use of [their encounter] to re-balance, replenish and revitalize each other's cultural 
lives. Failing this, there will be nothing to overcome the tribulations of the communist calamity.” (東西
方都應互相尊重平視，藉以調整、充實、並滋潤其文化生命。否則無以克共禍之魔難).342 The 
338For Joël Thoraval, Mou incarnates the “becoming-philosophy” (devenir-philosophie) of Confucianism in the modern 
age. Thoraval, 2003, p.9.
339The Specificities of Chinese Philosophy (Zhongguo zhexue de tezhi 中國哲學的特質), [1973] vol.28 of MJ, pp.3-4. Cf. 
Mou, [1997], pp.1-2.
340See Tang et.al., [1958a] in ZJ, pp.875-878.
341See Meynard, 2010, pp.28-29.
342Mou, [1973], p.4.
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active introduction of the category of philosophy as a transcultural and universal category where East 
and West could finally meet was from the onset equally an enterprise where cultural difference could be 
both read off and reconstituted. That the construction of a philosophical identity for Chinese thought 
often  went  hand in  hand with  a  renegotiation  of  newly adopted  modern  categories  of  knowledge 
(philosophy,  religion,  science,  wisdom,  critique)  forces  us  to  adopt  a  much  more  complex  and 
diversified approach to this whole phenomenon. As Hans Georg-Moeller observes:
To become part of a global society, non-Western regions had not only to change their social structure, but 
also their semantics. Traditional vocabularies had to be recoded […] To establish academic philosophy, it  
was therefore not only necessary to institutionalize philosophy at universities, but also to create a new
philosophical language.343
Chinese  intellectuals  were  often  keen  to  claim  the  proud  name  of  philosophy  for  Confucianism, 
Buddhism and Daoism, but at the same time distinctions between China and the West were drawn in 
order to specify and contextualize the assumed universality of the philosophical. This allowed Mou to 
present Chinese thought as a form of philosophy not concerned with the accumulation of theoretical 
knowledge (zhishi 知識 ) and with objective “nature” (ziran 自然 ), which he understood as “non-
existential”  or  “not  concerned with  existence”  (非存在的 )344,  but  with the subject  and with life 
(shengming 生命). Life can be called the “object” of a moral practice and a mode of existence, but this 
“object”  is  the  human subject  itself.345 Consequently,  being  and existence  are  not  conceived of  in 
“static” (jingtai靜態) but in “dynamic” (dongtai 動態) terms, meaning that to be (shi 是) is essentially 
to emerge and to become (sheng 生).346 Mou saw Western philosophy as “averse to the subject” (討厭
主體) because of the deep-seated influence of Christianity.347 He believed that in the Christian religion, 
343Moeller, 2012, p.218.
344As we saw in the previous chapter, it was the communist victory on the mainland which made Mou experience, in the 
words of Kierkegaard, a “sickness onto death” (病至于死 ) and prompted him to turn away from his work on formal 
logic and epistemology (which had led him to “the gate of the knowing subject” (認識主體之門), see Mou, [1957c], 
Autobiography, p.65). Mou would come to view his earlier work as “not concerned with existence” (非存在的). See 
“Existentialism” (Cunzaizhuyi 存在主義), [1964] in WW, pp.179-181.
345See Mou, [1973], pp.5-6. A little further (p.11), Mou writes: “By starting out from the approach of practicing moral  
nature, one takes one's own life as an object, which has nothing to do with how the Greek philosophers took the natural 
world outside of their own life as an object” (從德性實踐的態度出發，是以自己的生命本身為對象，絕不是如希腊
哲人之以自己生命以外的自然為對象). Cf. Mou, [1997], pp.17-34.
346See the appendix “Notes on the Term 'Ontology' ” ('Cunyoulun' yi ci zhi fuzhu「存有論」一詞之附注) to Treatise on 
the Supreme Good (Yuanshan lun圓善論), [1985] vol.22 of MJ, pp.327-330.
347Mou, [1983b], p.434. Translation quoted from Billioud, 2012, p.27.
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the individual subject is completely overrun and overpowered by a transcendent absolute appearing in 
the form of an “objective” God forever out of reach for the individual believer. For Mou, the Christian 
God was a kind of self-contained absolute leaving everything outside of itself in darkness:
Now, that the human race has brought forth an “absolute” is in itself not a bad thing, but if one stops at
positing an absolute and thus comes to be inversely suspended in this absolute, then this is ultimately not 
adequate. It would be as if a blind man were to open his eyes and become stunned by the light coming
from the outside, [causing him to] skip from one subject to the next and utter all sorts of peculiar things
which really have nothing to do with himself. Even if he were to momentarily get a grip on himself and
come to tacitly sense the external [source of] light itself, he would still not have advanced a single step
in his own life. Even if we can say that there is a guiding light which can be followed to progress in life,
one is still hauled in this direction by something external, so that the internal radiance of one's own life
stays undisclosed and remains a place of darkness […] Now why is this the case? Because one never
turns back [to observe oneself]. Turning back [onto oneself] is the crucial turning point for illuminating
the self. And this teaching of turning back is precisely what was initiated by the Confucian Sages […] It
is  only  through  the  illumination  of  the  self  by  means  of  moral  practice  that  the  absolute  can  be
illuminated.348
夫人類能冒出一「絕對」本非壞事，但冒出一絕對，停止於此，而倒懸於絕對，則非究竟。此猶
如盲而睜眼者為一外在之光所眩惑，指東畫西，說出許多奇特事， 而與自己究不相干；即使一
時定下來，而默識那外在之光自己，然於自己之生命仍未起動一步也；即使說我已有光指導矣，
我之生命即順此前進可也，然而即如此， 亦仍為外所牽引，而吾自己內部之光仍未透出也，是
則自己生命仍是一黑暗點 […] 此何以故？終不回頭之故也。回頭是光明自己之契機。這一
回頭之教正是儒聖所開辟 […] 通過道德實踐以光明自己，始能光明絕對。
Passages  like  these  can  be  read  in  the  light  of  the  undertaking of  simultaneously identifying  and 
distinguishing Chinese thought from the categories of religion and philosophy.349 Following Postone's 
348“Explanation of the Meaning of the Term 'the Universe of Cultural Consciousness' ” ( 'Wenhua yishi yuzhou' yi ci zhi  
shiyi「文化意識宇宙」一詞之釋義), [1979c] in SS, pp.306-307. Cf. Mou, [1949c], p.52: “The practice of Jesus was 
detached, his lesson was one of detachment. The practice of Confucius was fully real, and his instructions were those of  
reality.  In  the case of a teaching of detachment, there is an opposition between the earthly and paradise,  without a 
perfectly integrated synthesis [of the two]. This has determined the particular form of development of the history of the  
West.” (耶穌的實踐是離的﹐他的教訓是離教﹐而孔子的實踐則是盈的﹐他的教訓是盈教。因為是離教﹐所以俗
世與天國是對立的﹐而不是圓融的綜和的。由此決定西方歷史的發展形態之特性 ). For Mou's critique of an 
anthropomorphic conception of God, see his Treatise on the Supreme Good (Yuanshan lun圓善論 ), [1985] vol.22 of 
MJ, pp.237-248.
349“It is not that Chinese culture has no religion, but that religion is reconciled with humanism.” (中國文化非無宗教，而
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suggestions, the philosophical opposition to an exterior Absolute appearing as an inverted world in 
which  the subject  no longer  recognizes  itself,  a  world  which  it  can perhaps believe  to  have  once 
constituted  but  can  now no longer  control,  can be  interpreted as  a  conceptual  transcription  of  the 
experience of the emergence of autonomously operating social  structures in modernizing societies. 
Similarly, for the historian Qian Mu 錢穆 (1895-1990), an absolute dichotomy between the human and 
the divine formed the basis for various forms of cultural  and social  alienation.350 Appealing to the 
Daoist notion of “not acting yet leaving nothing undone” (wu wei er wu suo bu wei無為而無所不為), 
he rejected the very idea of creation and the concomitant opposition between Deus and ens creatum, 
and preferred seeing existence as a self-sustaining and ontologically undivided process without a first 
cause.  In  Qian's  case,  the  appraisal  of  a  putatively  typically  Chinese  “this-wordliness”  and  the 
condemnation of the alienation between God and human beings in monotheism (what Hegel already 
analyzed as the “unhappy consciousness” in the Phenomenology of Spirit351) was closely connected to 
his dissatisfaction with perceived social oppositions, most importantly between rural (“natural”) and 
urban (“cultural”) areas.352 He saw the religious hope for divine redemption as both related to and 
feeding into the ideological success of political utopias far removed from social reality. For Qian Mu, 
this religious aspect of modern politics had the very real effect of turning “present existence into a mere 
transient [transitional and transitory] stage.”353 His and Mou's criticism of “heaven” (religion) was thus 
also one of the “earth” (politics).354 
In the double process of philosophizing Confucianism and Confucianizing philosophy355, distinctions 
(sometimes  in  the  form of  downright  dichotomies)  were  constantly  introduced  only to  be  almost 
是宗教融攝於人文). Tang, [1953b], p.4. 
350See Gad C. Isay, “Qian Mu's Criticism of Monotheism and Alienation in Modern Life”, Zhongguo zhexue yu wenhua 中
国哲学与文化 , 6, 2009, pp.1-19. Qian did not speak of alienation as such, but used “terms such as gebiede [各别的] 
and  weili  [違離 ] that convey separation and difference.” Isay, 2009, p.8. Isay focuses on one of the historian's more 
philosophical texts, Record of Leisurely Thoughts at the Lake (Hu shang xiansi lu 湖上閑思錄 ) from 1948. Also see 
Zheng Jiadong郑家栋, Ontology and Method – From Xiong Shili to Mou Zongsan (Benti yu fangfa – cong Xiong Shili  
dao Mou Zongsan 本体与方法 — 从熊十力到牟宗三), Shenyang: Liaoning daxue chubanshe, 1992, p.312.
351Hegel, 1977, pp.126-138. Also see Tang Junyi's  Life, Existence, and the Horizons of the Mind (Shengming cunzai yu  
xinling jingjie 生命存在與心靈境界), Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, [1977] 2006, pp.396-438.
352See Gad C. Isay, “Qian Mu and the Modern Transformation of Filial Piety”,  Journal of Chinese Philosophy, vol.32, 
no.3, 2005, p.447.
353Isay, 2009, p.13.
354See  Karl  Marx,  A  Contribution  to  the  Critique  of  Hegel’s  Philosophy  of  Right  (Introduction),  [1844], 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1843/critique-hpr/intro.htm.
355Olf  Lehmann,  Zur  moralmetaphysischen  Grundlegung  einer  konfuzianischen  Moderne:  'Philosophisierung'  der  
Tradition und 'Konfuzianisierung' der Aufklärung bei Mou Zongsan, Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2003.
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immediately negated, reconciled or sublated, in order to define the specificity of Chinese philosophy. If 
Hans-Jörg  Rheinberger  is  justified  in  discerning  a  distinct  trend  towards  the  historicization  of 
epistemology in twentieth-century European thought356,  one could speak of a (perhaps dialectically 
related) turn towards the historically decontextualized culturalization of theories of knowledge in the 
case of modern Chinese traditionalism. In the process, certain self-descriptions and self-understandings 
of Western philosophers proved useful in grounding the particularity of Chinese philosophy. It seems to 
me  that  the  emphasis  many New Confucian  thinkers  placed  on the  ability  of  Chinese  thought  to  
transcend various perceived dualisms and dichotomies of Western thought for example, owed much to 
the  way  in  which  post-Kantians  such  as  Fichte,  Schelling,  and  Hegel  understood  their  task  of 
overcoming  the  oppositions  between  sensibility  and  understanding,  necessity  and  freedom,  and 
individual and society in thought. With reference to the example of Xiong Shili, the complexity of the 
Chinese situation becomes clear when we realize that his “myth of Presence” is formulated precisely in 
terms of a fundamental identity of the multiple and the one. The reality of substance can be accessed by 
observing that it  does not preexist or exist outside of its various functions. The conceptual tension 
between transcendence and immanence in the works of Tang and Mou is another such example which 
cannot be adequately approached on a purely philosophical level without taking the stakes behind this 
problem in the specific context of their work into account. Perhaps not everything in philosophy can be  
philosophically resolved. 
Instead of following Badiou in conceiving of the notional impact of capitalist modernization in terms of 
a paradoxical revelation that “truth is not a revelation”, it might be more advisable and nuanced to 
speak with the sociologist Niklas Luhmann of a shift in the self-descriptions of societies under pressure 
to  adjust  to  a  changed  structural  social  constellation,  leading  to  the  increased  doubtfulness  of 
ontological approaches to reality, and even of generally binding representations of society as such.357 
This  would  make  some  of  Badiou's  observations  more  sociologically  relevant,  though  perhaps 
philosophically less interesting. Doing so would shift the focus from ontology and the question of being 
in  general,  to  what  at  first  sight  would  seem  to  be  a  much  more  restricted  “regional  ontology” 
(Heidegger's expression) of society, which does not concern itself with being and truth as such, but with 
the way in which ontological claims are generated and with the meaning they have in relation to the 
356Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, On Historicizing Epistemology. An Essay, Stanford (Cal.): Stanford University Press, 2010.
357See Niklas  Luhmann,  Observations on Modernity,  Stanford:  Stanford University Press,  1998 and Niklas  Luhmann, 
Theory of Society, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013b, vol.2, chapter 5: “Self-Descriptions”, pp.167-349.
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broader socio-historical condition in which they are formulated. The question of being would thus be 
bracketed out to a considerable extent and subordinated to the question of what questions concerning 
being mean when explicitly related to their covert object, that is to say, to modern society. We would 
not ask “what is being?”, but “what is the meaning of 'what is being'?”. If other questions are asked by 
different philosophers, the same reflexive procedure could be employed. Following the logician and 
mathematician Alfred Tarski's principle that no semantic system is capable of fully explaining itself358, 
we could apply what Sartre says as a philosopher to philosophy itself: “Being apprehends itself as not 
being its own foundation.”359 From this perspective, the properly philosophical question concerning 
being as such would actually appear to be the narrower and more regional one. After all, truth and 
being  are  but  specific  instances  of  meaning.  As  Peter  L.  Berger  and  Thomas  Luckmann  stress, 
“theoretical thought,  ideas,  Weltanschauungen  are not that important in society […] only a limited 
group of people in any society engages in theorizing, in the business of ideas”.360 Still, what remains 
interesting about philosophical reflexion, tainted as it may be by “intellectualistic misapprehension”361, 
is  that it  often does,  in highly indirect and perhaps largely metaphorical ways,  attests  to how it  is 
embedded in society and history, simply because philosophy has made the relation between thought 
and being one of its privileged objects. To paraphrase Feng Youlan, who compared the metaphysical 
mode  of  exposition  to  the  artistic  technique  of  “bringing  out  the  moon  by darkening  the  clouds” 
(hongyun tuoyue烘雲托月), one can also talk about what one does not talk about by not talking about 
it (講其所不講亦是講 ).362 From a Luhmannian point of view, this makes it possible to approach 
philosophical discourse as a highly specific, and often very technical and mediated form of societal 
self-description. It would become necessary to look at how the categories of philosophy and its various 
subdivisions (ontology, epistemology, etc.) are constituted, by philosophers and in philosophical works 
of course (where else?), but within a horizon which exceeds the gaze of the philosopher, and which 
places his own observational stance (his Standortgebundenheit) between himself and his direct object 
of  inquiry.  In  this  specific  sense,  Deleuze and Guattari,  who famously defined philosophy as  “the 
creation of concepts”, are right in saying that “every concept leads back to a problem […] a concept 
358See Edgar Morin, La méthode 4. Les idées. Leur habitat, leur vie, leurs moeurs, leur organisation , Paris: Seuil, 1991, 
p.19.
359Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness. A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology, New York: Washington Square Press, 
1984, p.127.
360Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality. A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge , 
London: Penguin Books, 1991, p.26.
361Berger and Luckmann, 1991, p.27.
362New Methodology (Xin zhiyan 新知言) [1946], in vol.5 of Complete Work from the Hall of Three Pines (San song tang 
quanji 三松堂全集), Zhengzhou: Henan renmin cubanshe, 2001, p.150.
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always has the truth which belongs to it in function of the conditions in which it was created” 363, but do 
not  really  seem  to  pursue  this  insight  in  their  own  exposition.  What  Badiou  calls  the  “generic 
conditions” of philosophy (art, love, poetry, politics) are not historical at all, but constitute highly fluid 
and malleable categories which appear to be strictly philosophical in their own right.364 I agree with 
Christian Uhl when he writes that philosophy generally suffers from an “incapability to acknowledge as 
such the historical and social conditions of one’s own possibility”.365 One could go on to ask whether 
the mode of communication known as philosophy does not almost automatically impose the problem of 
what Feng Youlan called abstract inheritance. Philosophy, which often if not always disavows its own 
Seinsgebundenheit  (“existential determination”), would seem to be an almost ideal candidate for the 
inheritance of tradition abstracted from its concrete dimension, when it is this concreteness which has 
become problematic or has come to be seen as standing in the way of modernization. 
In an article discussing the problem of cultural continuity, Mou argued that modernity had reduced 
Chinese culture to a state of “pure potentiality” (純粹的潛伏性 ),  as an indeterminate totality of 
“materials/resources” (cailiao材料) without a self-determined form (xingshi 形式) of their own.366 In 
this  regard,  Mou was actually not  so far  removed from his  philosophical  opposite  and rival  Feng 
Youlan,  for whose work he clearly had nothing but contempt.367 In his famous  History of Chinese  
Philosophy, Feng claimed that Chinese philosophy may have lacked a “formal system” [形式上的系
統], but did constitute a “real system” [實質上的系統] of philosophical thought nonetheless; “form” 
being that which can be retroactively applied to a historically unsystematic “reality”, as an organically 
related  but  ultimately unrealized  potential,  by subjecting  it  to  the  abstract  requirements  of  formal 
363Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?, Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1991, p.22, p.32.
364See Badiou, 1999, pp.33-45, pp.61-67. One would have to look at how these terms are historically interpreted and  
redefined before evaluating the import of philosophy being “sutured” to one of them. 
365Uhl,  forthcoming.  Uhl adds:  “In  philosophical  historiography,  philosophy figures as  the protagonist,  producing and 
reproducing itself as the “overarching subject of its own movement” [Marx's Hegelian description of Capital] from the  
Pre-Socratics  to  the  post-moderns.  All  historical  discontinuities  are  ultimately  aufgehoben in  the  apparently trans-
historical life of 'philosophy' ”.
366“The Problem of Discontinuity and Continuity in Chinese Culture” (Zhongguo wenhua de duanxu wenti 中國文化的斷
續問題 ), [1980c] in  SS, p.111. Cf. p.105.  In his preface to Hu Shi's pioneering  Outline of the History of Chinese  
Philosophy (Zhongguo zhexue shi dagang 中國哲學史大綱) from 1919, Cai Yuanpei 蔡元培 had already formulated the 
project  for  a  historical  study and  presentation  of  Chinese  philosophy as  consisting in  supplying  available  Chinese 
“material” with a systematic, Western “form”. See Zheng Jiadong郑家栋, “The Problem of the Legitimacy of Chinese 
Philosophy”  (Zhongguo  zhexue  de  hefaxing  wenti 中 国 哲 学 的 合 法 性 问 题 ),  2001, 
http://www.confucius2000.com/poetry/zgzxdhfxwt.htm. 
367See  for  example  Mou,  [1973],  pp.2-3  and  “Objective  Understanding  and  the  Reconstruction  of  Chinese  Culture” 
(Keguan de liaojie yu Zhongguo wenhua zhi zaizao 客觀的了解與中國文化之再造), [1991] in WW, pp.422-423. His 
relation with Hu Shi was equally troubled by mutual animosity. See Wang Xingguo, 2011, pp.19-23.
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systematicity.368 Philosophy as a modern discipline and field of knowledge would seem to offer a way 
of taking advantage of this historical abstraction by endowing what has been abstracted into a resource 
with a discrete  form and thus giving a  form to reality.  This does not  mean that  distance between 
philosophical conceptions and the world in which they are grounded cannot be internally bridged, for 
example by positing a fundamental unity of subject and object – as an idea, as an origin, as the result of 
practice (gongfu工夫) and so on – but even in that case one can continue to keep the extra-discursive 
environment,  the  “objective”  proper,  at  bay  as  something  factical  (“ontic”),  contingent  and 
inconsequential. It is clear that something happens to problematic social phenomena once they have 
been transformed into philosophical problems, the “solution” of which often hinges on the introduction 
of additional side-problems and further conceptual distinctions which are deemed necessary for the 
problem to be stated in a more adequate or resolvable way. The academic production of philosophical 
knowledge, which obviously has many other constraints, is fundamentally dependent on the continuous 
reformulation, complication and creation of such problems, and would run the risk of undermining its 
own validity by considering a too great amount of cases to be closed, or foreclosed to philosophy.  
Simply put, problems of a determinate social origin can only be “solved” under the condition that the 
solution  arrived  at  can  qualify  as  philosophically  wholesome  and  can  lead  to  the  successful 
continuation of philosophical communication. As such, the category of what is “interesting” is perhaps 
of greater importance than that of what is “true”. As Luhmann never tired of repeating concerning 
social systems in general, their primary goal is the “continuation of autopoiesis [self-creation] without 
any concern for the environment”369. In the case of comparative philosophy, the need for constant self-
justification and self-preservation is perhaps even stronger than in what was traditionally categorized as 
philosophy  (i.e.  exclusively  Western  thought),  since  everything  “Asian”  often  continues  to  be 
commodified as “different” and “new” (vis-à-vis the “Graeco-Judeo-Christian” tradition), a novelty 
that strangely enough often hinges on the supposed cultural homogeneity and temporal continuity of 
different  Asian  world-views.  “Traditional  Chinese  philosophy”  for  example,  is  often  called  on  to 
account for its own validity by specifying how it can function as a sort of conceptual blood transfusion 
in order to serve the generation of “new” ideas and to keep the cancer of European rationality from 
metastasizing any further. It is thus faced with the contradictory demands of having to be both identical  
and different, new as well as old, eternal as well as forever changing. Perhaps ontology is not wholly 
368See Fung Yu-Lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy. Volume 1: The Period of the Philosophers (from the beginnings to  
circa 1000 BC), Princeton: Princeton University Press, [1953] 1983, pp.3-4.
369Niklas Luhmann, Ecological Communication, London: Polity Press, 1989, p.14.
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averse to the temptation of internalizing such demands.  From Jiang Qing's  opposition to “spiritual 
Confucianism” however, it is obvious that philosophy has hardly been an uncontroversial vehicle for 
preserving sources of knowledge which have been forced to become resourceful.370 The adoption of 
originally Western disciplines such as philosophy are sometimes seen as causing Chinese thought to 
become estranged from itself and to end up “speaking Western languages in Chinese” (汉话胡说).371 
Calls for a turn to endogenous forms of knowledge and to the indigenization of research into traditional 
thought  which  accompanied  the  rise  of  modern  disciplines  in  early twentieth  century  China  have 
recently become more and more widespread.372 The problem then becomes one of establishing a full 
“subjectivity” (zhutixing 主体性) for Chinese philosophy that is both linguistically373 and conceptually 
unique and determinate.374 Underlying such attempts is the idea that the object of inquiry (traditional 
thought) must be taken on its own terms, and in a sense through itself. The risk I see here, as I already 
observed with reference to Zhao Tingyang in the previous chapter, is that of trading in the undeniably 
distorting  influence  of  Western  categories  for  a  deceptive  sense  of  self-transparency in  which  all 
370One of the most trenchant critics of the application of the category of philosophy to Chinese thought was the historian  
Fu Sinian傅斯年  (1896-1950). See Carine Defoort, “Fu Sinian's Views on Philosophy, Ancient Chinese Masters, and 
Chinese Philosophy”, in Makeham, 2012, pp.275-310. Meanwhile, subcategories such as “morality” and “ethics” have 
also come under attack. See for example Tang Wenming 唐文明, Secret Subversion: Mou Zongsan, Kant, and Originary  
Confucians (Yinmi de diandao: Mou Zongsan, Kangde yu yuanshi rujia 隐秘的颠倒：牟宗三，康德与原始儒家 ), 
Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 2012.
371Peng Yongjie 彭永捷 ,  “Some Reflections on the  Problem of  the  “Legitimacy”  of  Chinese  Philosophy”  (Guanyu 
Zhongguo  zhexue  'hefaxing'  wenti  de  ji  dian  sikao 关于 中 国 哲 学“合 法性”问题的几点思考 ),  2004, 
http://www.confucius2000.com/scholar/zgsssyjtx/gyzgzxhfxwtdjdsk.htm.
372See  John  Makeham,  “Epilogue:  Inner  Logic,  Indigenous  Grammars,  and  the  Identity  of  Zhongguo  zhexue”,  in 
Makeham, 2012, pp.347-372 and Arif Dirlik, “Zhongguohua: Worlding China, The Case of Sociology and Anthropology 
in  20th-Century  China”,  in  Sociology  and  Anthropology  in  Twentieth-Century  China:  Between  Universalism  and  
Indigenism, edited by Arif Dirlik, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2012, pp.15-39.
373Appealing to a misguided reading of Derrida, attempts are now even made to present the Chinese language as marked  
by a positive absence of “logocentrism” due to the relative sparsity of phonetic indications in the Chinese script. See  
Chu Xiaoquan, “Identité de la langue, identité de la Chine”, in La pensée en Chine aujourd'hui, edited by Anne Cheng, 
Paris: Gallimard, 2007, p.297. In clear contrast to such culturalist and particularizing approaches, second generation 
Confucian theories of language and linguistic meaning were set in an overwhelmingly universalist framework. See for 
example Tang, [1977],  pp.257-266. In  general,  thinkers like Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan tried to ground cultural  
particularity inside of, and not over and against, the epistemological hegemony of originally Western categorizations of  
knowledge. On a linguistic level, this universalist stance can be understood as a reaction against the particularizing 
claims made by a considerable number of Western philosophers, Orientalists, and Sinologists (such as Hegel, Wilhelm  
Von  Humboldt,  and  Marcel  Granet)  who  presupposed  that  the  Chinese  language  did  not  allow  for  a  form  of 
“hypothetical  thinking” necessary for  the  emergence of  philosophical  reasoning.  See Heiner  Roetz,  “Philosophy in 
China? Notes on a Debate”, Extrême-Orient, Extrême Occident, 2007, 25, pp.53-57.
374Peng Guoxiang彭国翔 stresses the need for the construction of such a subjective identity for Chinese philosophy to be 
established comparatively, without an exaggerated postcolonial paranoia of being “contaminated” by Western concepts 
and categories. See his “Legitimacy, Perspective, and Subjectivity – Reflections and Prospects of Contemporary Chinese 
Philosophical Research” (Hefaxing, shiyu yu zhutixing – dangqian Zhongguo zhexue yanjiu de fansheng yu qianzhan 合
法 性 、 视 域 与 主 体 性  —  当 前 中 国 哲 学 研 究 的 反 省 与 前 瞻 )  2003, 
http://www.confucius2000.com/poetry/hfxsyyztxdqzgzxyjdfxyqz.ht.
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constructions come to be presented as discoveries, or as what Kant called analytic judgments, in which 
the predicates (characteristics of Chinese/Confucian thinking) are assumed to be already contained in 
the subject as Spirit and merely await being unfolded from the self-sameness of the subject. It is only 
by taking the determination of concepts by time as history into account that these judgments could be 
made critical,  or  in  Kant's  terminology,  expansive  and synthetic.375 Often,  the  identity  of  Chinese 
thought is still  defined  ex negativo  (“not philosophy but still  philosophical”,  “beyond philosophy”, 
“something  between  philosophy,  politics  and  religion”)  or  through  a  recourse  to  paradoxical 
formulations (such as “immanent transcendence”376), and, even more frequently, by contrasting it with a 
totalizing conception of Western philosophy as a caricatural form of dualist Platonism. It suffices to 
have a look at the Parmenides to see that even Plato himself hardly fits this picture. Still, continental 
philosophers too routinely indulge in a similar form of “self-occidentalization” when they try to present 
certain  thinkers  (notably  Spinoza)  as  positively  “heretical”  and  transformative  exceptions  to  the 
catastrophic  logos  and  nomos  of  the  West.  New distinctions,  such as  that  between  abstract  social 
structures or high culture on the one hand and “everyday life” (le quotidien) and pretheoretical practice 
on the other377, can cast suspicion on the now largely accomplished recognition of cultures through 
their academic emancipation as alternative philosophies which Mou fought for in the case of Chinese 
thought. Debates about the legitimacy of Chinese philosophy have hardly come to an end.378 
Actually,  one  can  at  times  detect  a  certain  mistrust  of  philosophy  in  Mou's  own  defenses  of 
Confucianism, as when he states that “Confucius was not a philosopher at all, he had already surpassed 
375See Kant, 2007, pp.43-45 (B10-14).
376See Zheng Jiadong, “ 'Transcendence' and 'Immanent Transcendence' – Between Mou Zongsan and Kant ” ( 'Chaoyue yu 
neizai chayue' – Mou Zongsan yu Kangde zhi jian“超越”与“内在超越”——牟宗三与康德之间), in Zhongguo 
shehui kexue 中国社会科学 ,  4,  2001, pp.43-53. For an interesting reflection on the significance of the trope of 
“immanent  transcendence”,  see  Fabian  Heubel,  “Immanente  Transzendenz  im  Spannungsfeld  von  europäische 
Sinologie, kritische Theorie und zeitgenössischem Konfuzianismus”, polylog, 26, 2011, pp.91-114.
377For Yu Yingshi, the Neo-Confucian Wang Yangming 王陽明  (1472–1529), in his emphasis on the ability of ordinary 
people (愚夫愚妇) to become sages and worthies, embodies what Yu takes to be the increased orientation of Confucian 
learning towards everyday life (日常生活化 ) ever since the Ming dynasty.  He opposes this trend to an approach 
represented by the more “metaphysically” inclined Zhu Xi to ally Confucian thought with those highest in the hierarchy  
of political power. See “Confucian Thought and Everyday Life” (Rujia sixiang yu richang rensheng 儒家思想与日常人
生 ), in Yu Yingshi,  Essays on Modern Confucianism (Xiandai ruxue lun 现代儒学论 ), Shanghai: Shanghai renmin 
chubanshe, 1998, pp.244-245.
378For a concise descriptive overview based on an extensive corpus of over 80 texts published during the first decade of the  
21st century, see Hu Wenhui 胡文会, “General Description of Research into the Problem of the Legitimacy of Chinese 
Philosophy” (Zhongguo zhexue hefaxing wenti yanjiu zongshu 中国哲学合法性问题研究综述), Hubei minzuxueyuan 
xuebao湖北民族学院学报, vol.4, no.26, 2008, pp.139-148.
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the philosophers” (孔子並不是哲學家，他已經超過了哲學家).379 Still, this surpassing is assumed to 
have occurred in what Bai Tongdong would call a “modernity before modernity”. The “liberation” from 
historical specificity which is normatively encouraged in Feng Youlan's method is in a sense already 
accomplished before the philosopher can begin his rescue operation, since what he wants to save is 
already radically transformed once it has been resuscitated as philosophy. The resulting timelessness 
with which philosophical discourse understands itself and treats its objects can thus be grasped as a 
specific inflection of time in response to the consequences of historical time. Interestingly enough, the 
abstraction which from Postone's perspective structurally underlies the temporal dynamic of modernity 
has been successfully mobilized semantically against  the effects of this dynamic.  Whether one can 
really  speak  of  the  same  form of  abstraction  in  both  cases,  that  is  to  say,  whether  there  can  be 
“abstraction other than by thought”380 is a question which we must leave to the philosophers. What will 
have to be further clarified instead, is how philosophy as a category of knowledge allowing for perhaps 
the largest degree of abstraction from history and society while at the same time reserving the right to 
make  pronouncements  on  historical  and  social  matters  for  itself,  came  to  be  constituted  and 
renegotiated against the background of a fundamentally novel order of knowledge. I will try to do so in 
the next section by situating the specific case of New Confucian philosophy in the context of one of the 
most important intellectual debates in early twentieth-century China. 
379“Confucius and 'Humanist Religion' ” (Kongzi yu renwen jiao 孔子與人文教), [1957a] in SSXB, p.143.
380Alfred Sohn-Rethel, Intellectual and Manual Labour: A Critique of Epistemology, London: Macmillan Press, 1978.
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2.4 New Confucianism and the modern recategorization of knowledge: the 
differentiation of science and philosophy in the 1923 debate on science and 
metaphysics and its New Confucian aftermath
One of the most important distinctions which helped mold the identity of modern Chinese philosophy 
in general and of New Confucian thought in particular was the one between science and philosophy.381 
Needless to say, both of these terms were new to the traditional Chinese taxonomy of knowledge. One 
would look in vain for their equivalents in imperial collections of books categorized by means of a 
fourfold division (sibu四部 or siku四庫) into “classics” (jing 經), “histories” (shi 史), “masters” (zi
子 )  and “collections” (ji 集 ).  The fourfold system of classification would not  seem to be strictly 
epistemologically oriented towards  the distinction of principally or  operationally different  kinds  of 
knowledge, the category of  zi 子 for example containing anything ranging from the “philosophical” 
works  of  the  great  masters  of  Chinese  thought,  to  books  on  warfare,  medicine,  agriculture,  and 
cooking.382 For Tang Junyi, even the very act of categorizing (類別) instead of integrating (統) different 
disciplines of knowledge and forms of what he called “cultural activity” (文化活動) would come to be 
experienced as novel, or rather in his view, as emblematic of the cultural difference between China and 
the West, as analytically and synthetically oriented respectively.383 As is well known, the Chinese terms 
for “science” and “philosophy”,  kexue 科學  (kagaku) and zhexue 哲学  (tetsugaku), were both taken 
over from Japanese translations, made by the scholar of Dutch Learning (rangaku蘭學) Nishi Amane
西周  (1829-1897). Nishi had dealt extensively with the new variety of Western disciplines and their 
mutual demarcation and interrelations in his  Hyakugaku renkan 百學連環  (Encyclopedia), a work 
inspired by the 18th century French encyclopedists and by the positivism of Auguste Comte.384 Other 
translations  for  the  word  science  (such  as  like 理科 )  remained  in  use  until  standardization  was 
381Qin Yingjun秦英君, “The Differentiation of Science and Philosophy in Modern China”, Beijing daxue xuebao 北京大
学学报, vol.44, no.3, 2007, pp.92-100.
382See Endymion Wilkinson, Chinese History. A Manual, Harvard: Harvard-Yenching Institute, 2000, p.270.
383See Tang, [1953b], pp.12-15, p.46.
384See Barry D. Steben, “Nishi Amane and the Birth of 'Philosophy' and 'Chinese Philosophy' ”, in Makeham, 2012, pp.39-
72. Nishi referred to Zhou Dunyi's idea of “aspiring to the teachings of the wise” (xi zhexue希哲學) in justifying his 
translation of  philosophia as  zhexue. See Antonia S. Cua, “The Emergence of the History of Chinese Philosophy”, in  
History of Chinese Philosophy, edited by Bo Mou, London and New York: Routledge, 2009, pp.44-45. In China, the first 
fully independent department of philosophy was formally established at Peking University in 1919. See Xiaoqing Diana 
Lin, “Developing the Academic Discipline of Chinese Philosophy: The Departments of Philosophy at Peking, Tsinghua, 
and Yenching Universities (1910s-1930s)”, in Makeham, 2012, p.133.
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achieved, not due to some intrinsic suitability of the neologism kexue as a translation of course, but 
because of the active intervention of the state in the rationalization of knowledge production, given the 
instrumental  function  science  had  in  the  construction  of  a  modern  political  body  and  in  the 
advancement of technology and industrial production.385 Already in the writings of Yan Fu, composed 
at a time when some scholars still sought a neat overlap between modern science and the traditional 
Confucian idea of “the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge” (gewu zhizhi格物致
知)386, the concern over science was intimately linked with what Yan called qunxue群學, literally “the 
study of groups”387, or as the now more familiar term goes, “sociology”.388 Sociology in Yan Fu's sense 
however must not be understood as the investigation of society and social behavior for the sake of the 
accumulation of knowledge and the improvement of academic insight, but as a tool for the attainment 
of social  progress and the effective governance of a Chinese state caught up in the internationally 
orchestrated “survival of the fittest”.389 Science thus served a much broader function as, in the words of 
Wang Hui, “a new social model and a new principle of morality”.390 Similarly, Tang Junyi would later 
advocate the need for China to adopt science and a scientific attitude with very much the same sense of 
urgency  as  unabashed  modernizers  such  as  Hu  Shi,  who  propagated  wholehearted  or  “full-scale 
Westernization” (quanpan xifanghua 全盘西方化 )391, at least on a methodological level, in what Hu 
called “rearranging the national heritage” (zhengli guogu 整理國故 ). Tang argued that the need for 
science stemmed from a “lack of order, irregularity and intellectual confusion in the life of the Chinese 
people, and the absence of organization and systematicity in scholarly learning” (中國人生活之無秩序，
無條理，思想之混亂紊雜，學術之無組織、無系統), all of which desperately necessitated a form of 
“scientific discipline” (科學之訓練)392. Wang Hui is thus quite justified in claiming that the rise of the 
385Wang  Hui,  “Scientific  Worldview,  Culture  Debates,  and  the  Reclassification  of  Knowledge  in  Twentieth-Century 
China”, in The End of the Revolution. China and the Limits of Modernity, London and New York: Verso, 2011b, pp.139-
144.
386See Benjamin A. Elman, “Toward a History of Modern Science in Republican China”, in Jing and Elman, 2014, pp.15-
38.
387Xunzi荀子 had already defined the distinctiveness of human beings in terms of their ability to form groups (能群). See 
Xunzi 9.16a, English translation in Knoblock, 1990, vol.2, pp.103-105.
388Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao also used this term before shehuixue 社会学 became current. See Dirlik, 2012, p.3.
389See Wang Hui, “The Concept of ‘‘Science’’ in Modern Chinese Thought”,  Journal of Modern Chinese History, vol.5, 
no.1, 2011a, pp.45-67
390Wang, 2011a, p.50.
391The expression “total Westernization” was coined by the sociologist Chen Xujing陈序经 (1903-1967). See Fung, 2010, 
pp.46-58. 
392“Western Thought which Should Henceforth be Introduced into China” (Zhongguo jinhou suo xuyao jieshao zhi xiyang  
sixiang 中国今后所需要介绍之西洋思想), [1934] in ZB, p.549.
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scientific worldview was intricately linked to a new type of sovereignty.393 The concept of science 
continued  to  have  an  important  political  import;  connoting  order,  control  and  regularity  over  and 
against chaos, disorder and aberrance. Such a political dimension remains present in the slogan calling 
for a “scientific outlook on development” (kexue fazhan guan 科学发展观 ) formulated by the Hu 
Jintao 胡锦涛 administration (2003-2012) in the recent past. 
As is commonly known, the traditional notion of “the investigation of things and the extension of 
knowledge”, a phrase from the canonical Great Learning (Daxue大學), was also embedded in a much 
broader context, extending from the cultivation of the self (xiushen修身) and the regulation of family 
bonds (qijia齊家), all the way up to the pacification of All-under-Heaven (ping tianxia 平天下). But 
the things subjected to investigation and the way knowledge was meant to be extended acquired totally 
different meanings in modern times. Most crucially perhaps, the nodal, and in a sense fractal, point in 
the series described in the  Daxue  (“investigating things, extending knowledge, rectifying the mind, 
making the will sincere, cultivating the self, regulating the family, bringing order to the state, pacifying 
the world” 格物致知正心誠意修身齊家治國平天下)394, namely self-cultivation, lost its importance as 
a guarantee for the continuity between the different isomorphically linked practices in general, and as 
necessary for the extension of knowledge in a scientific sense in particular. Of course, it is not as if  
Confucian thinkers in premodern China took the continuum outlined in the  Daxue for granted and 
slavishly assumed the transitions from one “step” to the next (or back to the former) to be self-evident. 
The need for elaborate commentaries stemmed precisely from this lack of self-evidence. Rather, the 
continuity had now been ruptured functionally and structurally. The different actions described in the 
linked series  do not  have to  be holistically realized  (by the ruler  whom the  Daxue  was meant  to 
instruct) anymore, but only by particular persons in specific (professional) capacities. Perhaps one can 
393Wang, 2011b, p.142.
394The full text of the famous section in the Daxue condensed in these 17 characters reads: “The ancients who wished to 
manifest their clear character to the world would first bring order to their states. Those who wished to bring order to 
their states would first regulate their families. Those who wished to regulate their families would first cultivate their  
personal lives. Those who wished to cultivate their personal lives would first rectify their minds. Those who wished to 
rectify their minds would first make their wills sincere. Those who wished to make their wills sincere would first extend  
their knowledge. The extension of knowledge consists in the investigation of things.  When things are investigated,  
knowledge is extended; when knowledge is extended, the will becomes sincere; when the will is sincere, the mind is  
rectified; when the mind is rectified, the personal life is cultivated; when the personal life is cultivated, the family will be  
regulated; when the family is regulated, the state will be in order; and when the state is in order, there will be peace  
throughout  the world.”  Wing-tsit Chan,  A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton (N.J.): Princeton University 
Pres, 1963, pp.86-87. Emphasis added.
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see the continuous series presented in the Daxue as becoming broken down into at least three different 
parts: “science”/”philosophy” (格物致知), “morality”/“religion” (正心誠意修身), and “politics” (齊家
治國平天下 ).  I  do not mean to suggest that these familiar  yet in a traditional context extremely 
awkward divisions are even in the least helpful in understanding the text of the Great Learning itself. 
The only thing one gains from using them in this context is what Yong Chen has called “semantic 
untidiness”.395 Something like the legal system and the economy are novel structural formations that 
would be very hard to include into the notion of “politics” when projecting this category back onto the 
Daxue,  since  they  fundamentally  corrode  the  unified  continuum  of  governance  described  there. 
Everything depends on how one,  or  rather  how a certain society,  delineates the boundaries  of the 
scientific, the philosophical, the religious, the political, and so on. During the Cultural Revolution for 
example, it was not possible to write a philosophical article without committing a political act. Those 
who sought to uphold the distinction between politics and philosophy nonetheless had to learn how to 
detect  their  own  disavowed  political  unconsciousness  through  self-criticism.  Obviously,  such 
boundaries can only be negotiated against the background of societal processes, meaning that they are 
never given in a clear-cut or definitive manner. Any ideal continuous unity of, to use Feng Youlan's  
term, these “horizons” of activity and meaning has to be constantly reconstructed in the face of their 
real division. Whether we like it or not, these classifications  are characteristic structural divisions of 
modern societies, and it would not have been all too far-fetched for early modern Chinese thinkers, at 
least if they still thought it useful to consult the Great Learning at all, to approach the text in this way. 
Even internal to the “political” subdivisions of the series, questions of continuity could now arise, such 
as whether the effective governance of one country is conductive to global peace at large. The logic of 
modern nation-states described (or rather prescribed) by Carl Schmitt, in which political sovereignty 
cannot persist in the absence of enemies (hostis), would seem to have made this highly doubtful.396 A 
telling example of the extent to which functional adaptation in the political domain and (what first had 
to be described as) the differentiation of politics from morality came to be internalized can be found in 
Mou Zongsan's conviction that if a Confucian sage were to take on the post of president, he would still 
have  to  abide  by  the  requirements  of  the  presidential  office,  which  are  not  direct  extensions  or 
395Yong Chen, Confucianism as Religion. Controversies and Consequences, Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013, p.35.
396Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, [1927] 2007, pp.53-55: “As long 
as the state exists, there will always be more than just one state […] Humanity as such cannot wage war because it has 
no  enemy,  at  least  not  on  this  planet  […]  Universality  at  any  prize  would  necessarily  have  to  mean  total  
depoliticalization and with it particularly, the nonexistence of states.” On the Platonic distinction between hostis (“public 
enemy”) and inimicus (“private enemy”), the latter being the one we are called upon in the Gospels to love, see pp.28-
29.
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manifestations of his sageliness: “Being a sage is not the same as being president; if a sage wants to be 
president, then even he has to abandon his identity as a sage and comply with the norms and laws 
which come with holding the political office of president. This is what I mean by the “self-negation” of  
the sage.” (作聖人不同於作總統，聖人若要作總統，也必須離開聖人的身份而遵守作總統辦政事
的軌則法度。這就是聖人的「自我坎陷」).397 In the case of science, different demands came to 
replace a sincerity of the will and a rectification of the mind, such as objectivity, reasoning according to 
correct laws of induction and deduction where necessary, the rational selection and verification of facts 
and the distinction of objective facts from subjective intuitions.398 That being said, nothing prevented 
scholars, who had to reposition themselves as intelligentsia, from describing the scientific enterprise in 
moral  terms,  as  having  an  ethical  dimension  and  edifying  function  in  society  at  large.  If  the 
construction and survival of the nation-state comes to be predicated on its ability to rapidly acquire and 
efficiently apply scientific insights, then it becomes easy to slander anyone opposed to the adoption of 
science as backwards, immoral, and standing in the way of something indisputably “good”.399 
The growth of science in China, as elsewhere in the world, went hand in hand with the construction of 
a self-understanding of the scientific community, with members ranging from the devoted laboratory 
assistant patiently observing the movements of ants, to the politically connected social engineer who 
wonders  whether  his  fellow citizens  could  perhaps be studied  and understood in  the same way.400 
Science  thus  acquired  a  territory  where  it  encountered  politicians,  educators,  businessmen,  and 
scholars, all with agendas, interests and, possibly, suspicions of their own. The much older wisdom that 
knowledge is power became more visible and plausible in everyday environments and situations, even 
if to the detriment of traditional forms of knowledge which came to be seen as having a “philosophical” 
or “religious” flavor. Let us not forget that Kang Youwei's writings already attest to the heavy influence 
of  eugenics,  one  of  the  most  drastic  forms  of  what  Michel  Foucault  analyzed  as  disciplinary 
397Mou, [1983b], p.279. Quoted in Stephen Angle,  Contemporary Confucian Political Philosophy. Towards Progressive  
Confucianism, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012, p.28. On the theme of self-negation (ziwo kanxian), see chapter 3. 
398For  Wang Hui,  the  introduction  of  science  signified  the  end  of  a  Neo-Confucian  outlook based  on  the  idea  of  a 
“heavenly principle” (tianli 天理 ), governing the natural and social  world alike, and the rise of “public or general 
principle” (gongli 公理), a shift which Wang sees as entailing an increased orientation of historical consciousness to a  
future understood in terms of evolution and progress. Interesting from a Postonian perspective is that Wang discerns a  
connected transformation in the conception of time, gongli being linked to what he calls a “straightforward conception 
of time”, or a time which is no longer a function of events. See Wang, 2011a, p.55.
399See below for the example of Ding Wenjiang.
400See  Tang's  “The  Chinese  Cultural  Background  of  the  Chaos  in  Present-day  China”  (Zhongguo  jinri  zhi  luan  de  
Zhongguo wenhua beijing 中國今日之亂的中國文化背景), [1950c] in ZJ, p.261.
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“biopower”. This is evident from a chapter entitled  “Removing Racial  Boundaries and Uniting the 
Human Race” (Qu zhongjie tong renlei去种界同人類) in his Book of the Great Unity. In these pages, 
Kang  proposes  a  series  of  rather  disturbing  techniques  for  the  abolishment  of  the  differences, 
oppositions and conflicts between the races, the existence of which he saw as constituting one of the 
main causes of suffering in the world.401 Along with the possibility of defining science as having an 
ethical dimension, in attaining social order, increasing industrial productivity, and improving human 
living conditions, comes the possibility that science is instrumentalized for the wrong ends. Science and 
modern technology were obviously not naively embraced by all Chinese as synonymous with progress. 
A few years  before  making  a  noted  appearance  in  the  debate  on  science  and metaphysics,  Liang 
Qichao, who was an informal member of the Chinese delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, had 
already questioned the omnipotence of science in his  Reflections from a Voyage to Europe  (Ouyou 
xinying lu歐遊心影錄) from 1919, impressed by Western self-condemnations of cultural bankruptcy 
and  the  Orientalist  admiration  expressed  for  the  wisdom of  Chinese  traditions. If  one  wanted  to 
continue to see science as continuous with the traditional idea of the “investigation of things”, one had 
to take into account the difficulty that a moral observational stance must be developed which can no 
longer be assumed to stem from the investigation of things, but has to be autonomously completed 
beforehand, so that one can observe whether or not particular forms of investigation and application of 
knowledge are themselves in line with or detrimental to self-cultivation. In order to ascertain whether 
science is moral, or whether morality is scientific, one first has to establish the scientific nature of  
science and the morality of ethics. Both disciplines, science and ethics, can contest each other's self-
descriptions, or even claim to be better equipped to realize the goals they set themselves with their own 
means. But one cannot understand, let alone eradicate, a disease by calling it evil, nor is there any point 
in trying to observe sageliness or Buddhahood by staring through a microscope.402 Either of the two 
sides can still consider themselves to be on the winning side, no matter what has happened in factual 
history. It is all too easy to say that moral (or religious) beliefs have been rendered superfluous by the 
401See Kang, [1902] 2009, pp.92-98, English translation in Thompson, 1958, pp.140-148. Kang proposed four methods to 
assimilate “inferior races” to the “superior” white and yellow ones: 1) moving populations (遷地), 2) mixed marriages 
(雜婚 ),  3) altering dietary habits ( 改食 )  and 4)  for  “hopeless cases”,  elimination through selection (沙汰 ),  i.e. 
sterilization. Also see Tang Junyi's comments on this shadowy aspect of Kang's work in  “Reflections on the Cultural 
Spirit of Learning since the Qing Dynasty in China” (Zhongguo qingdai yilai xueshu wenhua jingshen zhi shengcha 中
國清代以來學術文化精神之省察), [1950d] in RJ, p.117.
402Then again, what is nowadays known as “new age” science/philosophy is often predicated on comparable ideas. The 
category of “new age” is something both science and philosophy can finally agree to be nonsensical. This “nonsense” in 
turn serves as a means for the category of alternative or new age science/philosophy to define itself, as filling in a space  
of “meaninglessness” in modern existence. 
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impartial objectivity of science and its overpowering battalion of facts, or conversely, to claim that 
science has proven its bankruptcy by leading to environmental pollution and the creation of the atomic 
bomb. In both cases, one relies on criteria internal to the discipline one wants to defend, and anything 
else would probably be perceived as both unscientific and immoral. None of this however, will prevent 
the laboratory assistant from morally judging his colleagues or reflecting on the ethical consequences 
of his research, nor will it keep the virtue ethicist from running to the doctor to have x-rays taken when 
he starts coughing up blood. This does not mean that conflicts over epistemological territory do not 
occur, or cannot be actively created by “contaminating” one of the fields of knowledge by the other. 
Disciplines such as bioethics exist because of such contamination, and there is nothing “wrong” with 
that. One can only say that  the so-called “two cultures” jealously sharing the name of science have 
drifted apart and have stopped communicating if one is already on one of either sides, since “culture” is 
usually not taken to be an object of science (anymore) and can only be applied to scientific research 
metaphorically. 
If  any common ground can  still  be assumed to  exist  between these  operationally closed forms of 
knowledge, it is probably to be looked for in the discipline of philosophy. Of course, morality is, for 
philosophy at least, one of its privileged objects, so that the common ground is not located in a neutral 
zone, but on one of the two sides' home turf. Still,  there seems to be no way around this, since a  
chemist for example, cannot reflect on or explain the broader (social) implications of his specialized 
research in the language of chemistry. To do so, he is obliged to stoop to the level of those uninitiated  
in the finer mysteries of the periodic table. Alan Sokal did not resort to mathematical formula and 
quantum  physics  to  prove  how  postmodern  philosophers  had  abused  science  in  the  creation  of 
“fashionable nonsense”403. A different form of communication is called for, or at least used, here, and 
that this form of communication goes by the name of philosophy is historically not so strange or even 
new. Philosophy might have been the dutiful handmaiden of theology in Medieval Europe, but it lent an 
attentive ear to science as well,  even at the risk of heresy. The role philosophy in Western Europe 
claimed for itself was, at least for Kant, that of a general supervisor of reason in all its operations 
(rational, moral, and aesthetic). Fichte, who saw himself as having to ground the domain of knowledge 
opened  up  (and  restricted)  by  Kantian  philosophy  in  one  fundamental  (self-positing)  principle 
(Grundsatz) instead of in an unreconciled number of distinct faculties, could still call his philosophy a 
403Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont, Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals' Abuse of Science, New York: Picador, 
1998.
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Wissenschaftslehre.404 Hegel too spoke of the road to absolute knowledge as one of  Science  and of a 
Wissenschaft der Logik. His and Schelling's infamous (philosophically interesting405 but scientifically 
useless)  ventures  into the  philosophication  of  what  had already become the  increasingly exclusive 
objects of the natural sciences notwithstanding406, one should withstand the temptation to interpret these 
German Idealist efforts as expressing nothing but the vain pretense of speculative philosophers out of 
touch with  the  advances  in  the  hard,  fact-based sciences  in  trying to  swallow up everything non-
philosophical in monstrously hybrid systems. Rather, their efforts indicate a point in intellectual history 
when it was still assumed to be possible to attain a fully integrated order of knowing. Even as late as  
1911, Husserl could still aspire to formulate his phenomenology as a realization of the age-old dream of 
turning philosophy into a “rigorous science”.407 What is  nowadays known as analytical philosophy 
would seem to be based on the idea that philosophy can be best realized in and as science, at least if it  
is willing to temper its claims and dispose of most of its traditional questions. For the logical positivist  
Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970) and the early Wittgenstein, the rational elimination of metaphysics would 
have to come about by recognizing these questions to be not wrong but simply meaningless.  This 
implied  a  shift  from the  message  to  the  medium,  that  is  to  say,  to  language.408 Working  from a 
completely  opposite  direction409,  Heidegger  was  led  to  reject  the  traditional  lore  of  philosophical 
inquiries as “ontotheological”, as well as to a further attempt to overcome the conception of language 
as a mere medium or tool. Everything has to be put “under erasure”, not in the least Being itself, but 
one must speak and write to do so nonetheless. The later Husserl's concept of the concrete life-world 
(Lebenswelt)410,  as  the  disavowed  pretheoretical  origin  of  science  which  the  latter  forgets  in  the 
construction of its mathematized world of objects, signified a comparable turn from the conditioned 
(particular  facts,  propositions  and even  specific  modes  of  knowing)  to  what  is  conceived  of  as  a 
condition  of  possibility.  The  problem  then  became  how  to  uphold  the  privileged  position  of 
404See Fichte's  Concerning the Concept of the Wissenschaftslehre  (Ueber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre), [1749] in 
Fichte: Early Philosophical Writings, translated and edited by Daniel Breazeale, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993, 
pp.87-136.
405See Alison Stone,  Petrified Intelligence. Nature in Hegel's Philosophy, Albany (N.Y.): State University of New York 
Press, 2005.
406Tang  Junyi  took  Hegel's  philosophy  of  nature  as  something  to  be  ruthlessly  discarded  on  both  scientific  and 
philosophical grounds. See  Introduction to Philosophy  (Zhexue gailun 哲學概論 ),  Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue 
chubanshe, [1961e] 2005, vol.2, pp.847-850.
407“Philosophy as a Rigorous Science”, in Edmund  Husserl,  Shorter Works, Notre Dame (Indiana): University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1981, pp.166-196. 
408Rudolf Carnap, “The Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language” [1932], in Logical Positivism, 
edited by A.J. Ayer, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1966, pp.60-81.
409In the above-mentioned text, Carnap uses a few sentences from Heidegger's Introduction to Metaphysics (such as “das 
Nichts nichtet”) to make his case against the metaphysical abuse of the laws of logic and language.
410See Husserl, 1970.
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consciousness within a much broader and complex socially and historically variable environment, in 
which the intentionally predisposed stream of consciousness is not so much an organic “part” as it is 
but one of the many constructors of possible horizons of perception and meaning.411 This leads to the 
question of how transcendental one can still call the subjectivity resulting from the phenomenological 
epochē,  when the environment which it puts out of play but in which it  continues to function can 
bracket out the subject  on its  own terms and with no regard for the latter's  purity from empirical  
determinations. Transcendental subjectivity cannot do groceries and does not have to pay taxes. At the 
point in time when Husserl still tried to present his phenomenology as in some sense a rigorous science, 
other determinations had already set in to distinguish philosophy from both science and wisdom, which 
are closer to the Chinese context which we will consider now.
The symbolic event in which the distinction between science and philosophy was (according to some 
interpreters, definitively) established in Chinese intellectual history, is the “debate over science and 
metaphysics” (kexuan lunzhan科玄論戰).412 This debate started with a lecture given by Zhang Junmai 
at Qinghua University on 14 February 1923, which was published in the  Qinghua Weekly  (Qinghua 
zhoukan清華周刊) a few days later.413 Zhang's relatively short and highly condensed article contested 
the omnipotence of science (kexue wanneng 科學萬能) and put forward the enduring importance of 
what  he called  renshengguan 人生觀 ,  a  Chinese equivalent  for  the terms  Lebensanschauung  and 
Weltanschauung.414 Renshengguan specifically denoted an outlook both on and from the standpoint of 
human life. In doing so, Zhang found inspiration in the work of European vitalist philosophers such as 
Rudolf Eucken (1846-1926) and Henri Bergson (1859-1941) who had already acquired a reputation in 
China as prominent opponents of scientism and positivism.415 It is has to be made clear from the onset 
that Zhang Junmai did not dispute the validity of the experimental scientific method and its results as  
411See Hans-Georg Moeller, Luhmann Explained. From Souls to Systems, Chicago and La Salle: Open Court, 2003, p.182.
412For two good general overviews of the 1923 debate and its subsequent evaluations by both participants and thinkers  
influenced by the debate, see Kwok, 1965, pp.135-168 and Ye Qizhong葉其忠 ,  “The 1923 Debate over Science and 
Metaphysics: an Evaluation of the Evaluations” (1923 nian 'kexuan lunzhan': pingjia zhi pingjia 1923年「科玄論戰」:
 評價之評價), Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiu suo jikan 中央研究院近代史研究所季刊 , 26, 1996, pp.181-
234. The primary sources for my own short account have been drawn from a concise selection of texts generated during  
the debate: Zhang Junmai et.al.,  Science and the Outlook on Human Life  (Kexue yu renshengguan 科學與人生觀 ), 
Changha: Jilin shushe, 2011.
413See Gad C. Isay, The Philosophy of the View of Life in Modern Chinese Thought, Wiesbaden: Harrosowitz Verlag, 2013 
p.76. 
414Isay, 2013, p.1.
415Isay, 2013, p.58. Isay notes that their “counter-positivist thought was marked by dualistic conceptions”. (Ibid.)
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such, but argued for a limitation of its applicability and thus of what he took to be its overinflated 
pretense: science, which he saw as centered around the objective, the theoretical and the analytic and 
which investigated composite phenomena subject to strict  laws of causality,  could not  in his  view 
completely explain nor account for the problem of human existence. The latter had to be approached 
from the  standpoint  of  the  subjective,  the  intuitive and the  synthetic  in  order  to  do justice to  the 
irreducible singularity of free human individuality as a totality.416 Corresponding to the singularity of 
human existence for Zhang was the innumerable diversity of views on how the self (wo 我) relates to 
the non-self (feiwo非我), a diversity which he believed could not be unified into a totalizing scientific 
account.417 He employed this general polar opposition between self (the “spiritual” or the “internal”) 
and  various  forms  of  (“external”,  “material”)  non-self  (which  could  denote  anything  from family 
members, the opposite sex, property, and the social system, to matter, totality, the future, and so on) as 
a basic mechanism for the generation of world-views (the relation between the self and property can 
result in a support of either private or public ownership and so on), which are always centered on the  
relation of the I to the non-I.418 The overextension of science into domains where it does not belong (i.e. 
into domains that cannot be objectified into a unified account) would result in an effacement of the 
sheer endless variety of outlooks on existence which result from the basic polarity between self and 
non-self. Zhang Junmai's original argument then, did not revolve around the opposition of science and 
metaphysics as the name of the debate suggests, but provided a rough sketch for an extensive typology 
of subject-object relations which he saw as irreducible to the empirical givenness of objects, that is to  
say,  impossible  to  constitute  in  a  scientific,  objective manner.419 Autonomy from science was thus 
bargained for with epistemological distinctions.  Liang Qichao,  who was one of the few influential 
figures to come to Zhang's support in the controversy following his lecture at Qinghua, agreed that “the 
majority of the problems of human life can and furthermore should be solved through the scientific  
method. However, a small, or rather the most important part of these problems transcends science” (人
生問題，有大部分是可以 — 而且必要用科學方法來解決的。卻有一小部分 — 或者還是最重
416See Zhang Junmai, “Outlook on Human Life” (Renshengguan 人生觀)), in Zhang et.al., 2011, pp.1-7.
417Zhang, 2011, p.1: “That which has always been and is still least unified in the whole world are the outlooks on human 
life.” (天下古今之罪不統一者，莫若人參觀). 
418Zhang,  2011,  pp.2-3,  cf.  p.44.  Zhang Yixin sees  Tang Junyi's  concept  of  the  moral  self  (daode ziwo 道德自我 ) 
expressing and realizing itself in the realm of culture as basically built around this paradigm of self and non-self. See  
Zhang, 2011, p.441, p.483.
419Wang, 2011a, p.58: “Science itself or “science” as a vocabulary item became closely associated with the objective or the 
concept of objectivity.”
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要的部分是超科學的).420 We can already see that restricting the scope of science went hand in hand 
with a considerable limitation of the outside of science and was combined with a positive appraisal of 
the resulting exceptions to the scientific rule as “indivisible remainders”. Science could speak up about 
anything, but should remain silent on what matters most. Voicing a familiar romantic argument, Liang 
proposed that human emotions and aesthetic experiences could not be accounted for scientifically or 
reduced to their objective (biological, physical) conditions.421 What we have here in a germinal state is 
the now very widespread trope appearing in everything ranging from literature, cinema, fashion and 
advertising,  to  psychology,  psychoanalysis,  political  theory,  and  philosophy,  which  grounds  the 
irreducibility of human existence, of beauty, style, and even the possibility of political protest, in the 
emotional, the irrational, the “flawed”, the subversive, the disjunctive, the aleatory, and the aberrant.422 
Altogether, these tropes designate what might be called a certain semantics of the exception and of 
exceptionality in  which,  to paraphrase Derrida,  the supplement becomes the source.  As such, they 
symmetrically reverse Leibniz in the idea that everything derives its essence from its imperfections. 423 
Although  this  semantics  of  the  exception  has  a  long  conceptual  history (e.g.  in  various  forms  of 
religious experience), it seems to me that it would be necessary to give an account of it in relation to 
the  ruling  structural  features  of  modern  society  in  order  to  grasp  and  clarify  its  contemporary 
significance.424
420“The Outlook on Human Life and Science” (Renshengguan yu kexue 人生觀與科學), in Zhang et.al., 2011, p.101. In an 
essay from 1924, Liang would argue that truth cannot be grasped in terms of “only […] isms” (唯 […] 主義) such as 
materialism (唯物義主 ) or idealism (唯心主義 ). See “Not Only” (Feiwei非唯), in Collected Writings from the Ice  
Drinker's Studio (Yinbingshi heji飲冰室合集), Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju, 1941, pp.81-84.
421See Tang Yue's 唐钺  (1891-1987) “A Madman Explaining a Dream” (Yi ge chiren shuo meng 一個痴人說夢 )  for a 
rebuttal of Liang's stance, Zhang et.al., 2011, pp.222-227. Tang Yue was one of the founders of psychology in China. 
422See for example Alfred Sohn-Rethel, Das Ideal des Kaputten, Bremen: Wassmann, 1990.
423In the Monadology, Leibniz writes that “created things derive their perfections through the influence of God, but their 
imperfections  come  from  their  own  natures,  which  cannot  exist  without  limits.  It  is  in  this  latter  that  they  are 
distinguished from God.” G.W. Leibniz,  Discourse on Metaphysics  and The Monadology,  New York: Dover,  2005, 
pp.53-54.
424The example of the modern semantics of “madness” and “insanity” would be an instructive starting point for such an  
endeavor.  Traditionally, in cultures all over the world, insanity has often been linked to a particular kind of (religious,  
mystical, ecstatic) “wisdom”. The link between “wisdom” and “folly” is clearly present in the text of the  Zhuangzi, 
which is populated by a whole host of “mad” figures that tell the truth by subverting accepted standards of what counts  
as true and good. Shakespeare's plays too, to give a completely different example, are full of such characters as well, and 
it is certainly not by accident that it is a madman who manages to see through the “cannibalistic” (吃人) nature of the 
Confucian virtues in Lu Xun's鲁迅 (1881-1936) famous story. Typically, the figure of the madman is that of somebody 
who cannot tell the difference between what is real and what is not, and who takes his own delusions and hallucinations  
for normal observations or even privileged insights. In this sense, the madman is someone who is caught in his own 
interiority only has an inner, subjective world, thereby involuntarily turning back on himself in all his dealings with the  
outside world. It is only in modern times however, that the madman becomes a veritable subject in the strict sense of the 
word, and is turned into a figure that  provides insight  into human subjectivity as such.  In  his classical  History of  
Madness, Michel Foucault claims that before the beginning of what he dramatically describes as the “great confinement” 
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(grand renfermement) of the mentally ill with the rise of psychiatry as a new branch of medical science and a modern  
form of knowledge and power from the 17th century onwards, folly and insanity were still seen as a potential form of 
quasi-religious or mystical, and yet at the same time “commonsensical”, insight into the vanity of worldly existence  
(exemplified by the motif of a humanity finally united in the posthumous joy of the danse macabre of death prevalent in 
Medieval art) and in the meaninglessness of all (including even religious) truth. See Michel Foucault, Histoire de la folie  
à  l'âge  classique,  Paris:  Gallimard,  1972 and  Psychiatric  Power:  Lectures  at  the  Collège  de  France,  1973-1974, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. According to Foucault, the unprecedented physical exclusion of the insane 
from public  life through the construction of specialized asylums went hand in hand with a process through which  
insanity became an object of disciplinary scrutiny and control through the combined efforts of judicial and psychiatric  
power. For Foucault, the point is not that the mentally ill  were treated more “humanely” before this historical  turn  
(which was hardly the case), but that to a certain extent, abstracting from the grievous maltreatment the insane were  
undoubtedly subjected to before the “classical age”, madness as a signifier still had a positive function as a potential 
source of truth concerning the earthly life of mortal human beings in general. However, the idea that there is a certain 
wisdom or insight to be found in madness is not done away with after insanity becomes and is transformed by becoming  
an object of psychiatric power, but takes on a wholly different form. Madness is no longer a limit on the pretensions of  
secular knowledge, worldly wisdom, and religious promises of redemption, but becomes both an object and a source of  
scientific truth concerning the human being as an object medical scrutiny and of what Foucault calls the physician's  
“gaze”. The social medicalization and containment of mental illness goes hand in hand with what could be described as  
an  essentialization of the aberrant inside the discipline of psychiatry, in which the truth of “normality” comes to be 
sought for in the exception. It is only then that one can begin to find statements such the following, made by the 18 th 
century French psychiatrist Jean-Étienne Dominique Esquirol (1772-1840) in the introduction to his encyclopedic work 
on mental illnesses: “Que de méditations pour le philosophe qui, se dérobant au tumulte du monde, parcourt une maison 
d'aliénés! Il y retrouve les mêmes idées, les mêmes erreurs, les mêmes passions, les mêmes infortunes: c'est le même 
monde; mais dans une semblable maison, le traits sont plus forts, les nuances plus marquées, les couleurs plus vives, les 
effets plus heurtés, parce que l'homme s'y montre dans toute sa nudité, parce qu'il ne dissimule pas sa pensée, parce qu'il 
ne cache pas ses défauts.”  Des maladies mentales considérées sous le rapport médical, hygiénique, et médico-légal , 
Paris: J.-B. Baillière, 1838, p.1, emphasis added. Already in a highly sarcastic and ironic text entitled Versuch über die  
Krankheiten des Kopfes  [1764]  authored by Kant, insanity had even become a counterintuitive mark of civilization:  
“The human being in the state of nature can only be subject to a few follies and hardly any foolishness. His need always  
keeps him close to experience and provides his sound understanding with such easy occupation that he hardly notices  
that he needs understanding for his actions […] Had the brain of the savage sustained some shock, I do not know where 
the fantastic mania should come from to displace the ordinary sensations that alone occupy him incessantly. Which  
dementia can well befall him since he never has cause to venture far in his judgment? Insanity, however, is surely wholly 
and entirely beyond his capacity.” Immanuel Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime and Other  
Writings,Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  2011,  pp.214-215.  Before  long,  the  liberating  potential  of  this 
aberrance from the bounds of civilization and rationality would escape the confines of psychiatry to become a much 
more widespread trope and became aligned with what Liang Qichao wanted to preserve as that “small part” of which the  
fundamental irrationality ensures that it will stay beyond the reach of science. The process I metaphorically describe as 
the  essentialization  of  the  aberrant  could  be  seen  as  further  developing  and  culminating  in  the  invention  of  
psychoanalysis,  where insanity becomes a mode of truth-telling again,  that  is  to say,  a fugitive state  or permanent  
condition in which the patient (“analysand”) reveals something about those who are not in any way “sick” or “abnormal” 
and provides insight into the functioning of an everyday day life which can equally become an object of what Freud 
called  psychopathology  (see  Freud's  Zur  Psychopathologie des  Alltagslebens  from  1904).  In  psychoanalysis, 
psychological pathologies in a sense cease being pathological as such, in the sense that there is nothing “abnormal”  
about being, at least potentially, insane anymore. From a Freudian point of view, it is those who believe themselves to be 
sane that  are truly delusional.  With the advent of  modern psychiatry,  specifically in the form of psychoanalysis or  
cognitive behavioral  therapy,  the patient  is  no longer simply  subject  to  “external” nefarious influences causing his 
afflictions (as was usually assumed to be the case both in Western as well as Chinese medicine, were insanity was often  
associated with demonic possession), but rather becomes a subject who has to “give an account of himself” in order to 
be cured. Formerly, it was the physician's gaze that had to directly decipher the underlying pathological mechanisms,  
whether in the form of the Hyppocratic-Galenian “humors” (the four humores: blood, phlegm, yellow bile, black bile 
corresponding to  four different  temperaments:  sanguine,  phlegmatic,  choleric,  and  melancholic),  or  in  the guise of 
afflictions caused by the nefarious influence of wind (feng風, hence the expression fengkuang 瘋狂), actually leading to 
the illness. Now it is the patient who is called upon as a subject to mediate between his own illness and the physicians 
treating him by actively meditating and reflecting on his own states of mind in order to somehow change the way he  
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Zhang's  assault  on what he took to  be the exaggerated extension of the scientific  perspective into 
human life quickly elicited a response from the geologist Ding Wenjiang丁文江 (1887-1936), who was 
joined by Hu Shi, Chen Duxiu, Wu Zhihui, and many others in denouncing the insulation of existential 
problems in the broadest sense of the word from science as a relapse into a metaphysics which had 
already  disappeared  from Europe  under  the  enlightening  influence  of  scientific  rationalism.  Ding 
sarcastically wrote that 
metaphysics really is a scoundrel of a ghost. After having bummed around aimlessly in Europe for more
than two thousand years, it has in recent times gradually run out of places where it can scrape a living
together, suddenly assuming a false cover and putting up a new shop sign, [after which] it has swaggered 
into China, treacherously posing as someone important.425 
玄學真是個無賴鬼，在歐洲鬼混了二千多年，到近來漸漸沒有地方混飯吃，忽然裝起假幌子，掛
起新招牌，大搖大擺的跑到中國來招搖撞騙。
For Ding Wenjiang, “the scientific method is nothing but the division into classes of facts in the world 
and the search for their order” (科學方法，不外將世界上的事實分起類來，求他們的秩序).426 Ding 
believed that  “everything which  cannot  be critically investigated  through logical  study is  not  true 
knowledge” (凡不可以用論理學批評研究的，不是真知識).427 He further claimed that only a logical 
and critical scientific method could provide a valid, rationally grounded plurality of perspectives. These 
observes his own line of reasoning and emotional states. The psychiatric patient comes to be seen as being the key to his  
own illness: he has to divulge and narrate the mental content of representations, desires, fantasies, delusions, urges,  
which  have  to  be  either  accepted,  altered,  or  reinterpreted  in  order  to  ensure  mental  well-being.  Additionally,  the 
personal identity of the subject as a patient  is  something that has to be actively remembered. Consequently,  in the  
immanence of subjective psychic life the unconsciousness opens up a space where memories can be repressed, forgotten, 
or stored. In the Jungian variant of psychoanalysis, such memories do not even have to qualify as strictly “personal” 
anymore, but can serve as depository for a supra-individual cultural (un)consciousness containing various “archetypes”. 
In Freud's own idea of the death drive, the unconsciousness becomes a space where urges and desires that are more 
cosmic than they are individual are located and wreak havoc on the individual patient. These provisional observations  
already indicate that insanity as a form of “wisdom”, “knowledge” or rather “self-knowledge” is as much a product and 
a result of scientific knowledge and the emergence of specialized techniques for dealing with psychic or psychological  
disorders, as it is semantically an exception called upon as a subversive form of conduct and being which can potentially  
serve as a negative guarantee of  freedom against a world which is perceived as being too organized, functional, and 
rationalized. The prospect of a complete malleability of human beings offered by revolutions in biotechnology makes it  
very understandable that error and not goodness or perfection becomes a sign of human being, thus reviving the much 
older Romantic idea of human beings as essentially Mangelwesen. The semantic celebration of the “irrational” in general 
is thus linked to what Habermas called the colonization of the life-world by science, a process which is fundamentally 
structural in nature.
425Ding Wenjiang, “Science and Metaphysics” (Kexue yu xuanxue科學與玄學), in Zhang et.al., 2011, p.8.
426Ding, 2011, p.9.
427Ding, 2011, p.16.
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perspectives would be united in their common adherence to the methodological principles of science 
and would share the same (set  of)  objects  insofar as the latter  appertain to the domain of what is 
immediately accessible through sense perception (覺官的感觸), the reach of which is constantly being 
amplified and extended through new technological inventions. This perceptual unity invalidated the 
distinction  Zhang  Junmai  tried  to  uphold  between  matter  and  spirit  as  respectively  objective  and 
subjective.428 What Zhang considered to be beyond the reach of science were simply the dreamed up 
objects  of  the  malingering  ghost  of  metaphysics  for  which  there  would  never  be  any objectively 
ascertainable correlates.429 For Ding, it was science, and not metaphysics, which was able to ensure 
social order, economic wealth, and individual health and happiness. Liang Qichao had been wrong to 
declare the bankruptcy of European science in the wake of the Second World War, which Ding thought 
had to be grasped instead as the result of a lack of scientific training among politicians and educators 
and as an alarming sign of the fact that European politics was not yet nearly scientific enough. Ding 
believed that only science could provide the rational resources for a robust social critique.430 Zhang 
Junmai and his fellow “metaphysical ghosts” (xuanxue gui玄學鬼) as they were disparagingly called, 
were not slow to respond. A fierce and protracted debate ensued which soon expanded the scope set by 
the initial polemical exchanges between Zhang and Ding. Intellectuals allied with Zhang clearly saw it 
as their duty to become or remain “functionaries of mankind”, to invoke the lofty term used by the later 
Husserl  in his  Crisis of  European Sciences431,  whose mission it  was to resist  the “decapitation” of 
philosophy by positivism.432 In the  Crisis, Husserl also dealt with what he considered to be a loss of 
meaning of science for life, science ultimately having nothing of any significance to say about the 
implications of what it still does choose to talk about. The issues touched upon in the 1923 debate on 
science and metaphysics were certainly not unique or confined to the case of China. The situation in 
China was arguably even more complicated, since the field of knowledge defined in opposition to 
science, i.e. “philosophy” and “metaphysics”, was itself new to the Chinese context. A philosophical or 
metaphysical  revolt  against  science  already involved and presupposed a  process  of  redefining  and 
reinterpreting forms of knowledge and practice such as Buddhism, Daoism, and Confucianism, which 
had to be incorporated into a new field in order to be opposed to the hegemony of science to begin  
with. Needless to say, not all those who were accused of being possessed by the ghost of metaphysics 
428Ding, 2011, pp.12-13.
429Ding, 2011, p.17.
430Ding, 2011, pp.21-23
431Husserl, 1970, p.17. The Crisis was originally a series of lectures delivered in Vienna in 1935.
432Husserl, 1970, p.9. 
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were happy with the equation of philosophy and metaphysics, or with the identification of a perspective 
from and on human life as “metaphysical”. 
I am not able to give a comprehensive overview of the arguments put forward by both sides in the 
discussions surrounding science and metaphysics at this instance.433 In their prefaces to a collection of 
texts produced during the debate434 (prefaces which in turn gave rise to another polemical exchange), 
Chen Duxiu (who by that time had a “scientific” historical materialist agenda of his own) and Hu Shi 
already admitted to not being able to get a clear view on the bewildering variety of discussions centered 
around, but sometimes gravitating far away from, the topic of science and metaphysics in a limited 
sense. The basic problem was precisely determining their respective limitations. What I would like to 
do instead of attempting a general survey, which would necessitate a study in its own right, is to try and 
relate the debate on science and metaphysics to the emergence of New Confucianism as a current of 
thought. No forced interpretations are needed for this. Various scholars have already pointed out the 
importance of the 1923 debate for the reinvention of Confucianism in twentieth-century China. The 
intellectual  historian  Wang Hui has  to  my knowledge provided the  most  extensive,  elaborate,  and 
powerful  argument  for  this  historical  connection,  and  I  will  draw  heavily  on  his  views  in  what 
follows.435 For  Zhang  Hao  as  well,  “the  revolt  against  scientism  marked  the  emergence  of  New 
Confucianism as  an  identifiable  trend  of  thought.”436 This  does  not  mean  however  that  all  those 
opposed to scientism were necessarily self-avowed Confucianists  or exclusively sympathetic to the 
cause of traditional Chinese philosophy. Zhang Junmai may have invoked the enduring relevance of 
Song-Ming Confucianism as an outlook on human existence, but only as one of the many possible 
perspectives (of the subject on itself) in a whole spectrum of non-objectifying approaches.437 Zhang 
Dongsun, who sided with his namesake438, would not readily be classified as a Confucian philosopher 
because of his overall eclecticism and epistemological pluralism, and more importantly because he is 
433For a recent study of the “metaphysicians' ” arguments, see Isay, 2013.
434See Zhang et.al., 2011, pp.1-24.
435See Wang Hui,  The Rise of Modern Chinese Thought  (Xiandai Zhongguo sixiang de xingqi 现代中国思想的兴起 . 
Beijing: Sanlian chubanshe, 2008, vol.4, pp.1280-1329 and “The Fate of 'Mr. Science' in China: the Concept of Science 
and its Application in Modern Chinese Thought”, in Formations of Colonial Modernity in East Asia, edited by Tani E. 
Barlow, Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1997, pp.21-82. 
436Hao,  1976,  p.283,  p.277.  Also  see  Furth,  2002,  pp.63-64  and  Zheng  Jiadong 郑家栋 ,  Outline  of  Modern  New 
Confucianism (Xiandai xinruxue gailun 现代新儒学概论), Guangxi: Guangxi renmin chubanshe, 1990, pp.37-38.
437See Zhang, “Further Discussion on Science and the Outlook on Human Life, Including a Response to Ding Zaijun 
[Wenjiang]” (Zai lun renshengguan yu kexue bing da Ding Zaijun 再論人生觀與科學並答丁在君 ), in Zhang et.al., 
2011, pp.75-81.
438Zhang Dongsun had translated Bergson's Evolution créatrice and Matière et mémoire into Chinese. 
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quite simply not included in any lineage of the various New Confucian orthodoxies.439 One could even 
say that  few of  those  in  the  “metaphysical”  camp were  strictly  speaking  metaphysicians,  or  even 
primarily concerned with philosophical  inquiries.  Notably absent  as  direct  participants  were  Liang 
Shuming and Xiong Shili,  but  both were influenced by and to  some extent  influential  in  the way 
discussions concerning the relations between science, philosophy, and culture were carried out.440 The 
same goes for defenders of the extensive or unlimited authority of science. As Fa-ti Fan observes, “it 
was really a debate among intellectuals about the ideology and cultural authority of science”, since 
apart  from  Ding  Wenjiang,  not  that  many  professionally  trained  scientists  took  part  in  the 
discussions.441 This is what has prompted Wang Hui to draw a helpful distinction between the Chinese 
scientific community on the one hand, and what he calls a “community of scientific discourse” (kexue 
huayu gongtongti 科学话语共同体) on the other.442 The latter designates something much broader than 
the relatively limited number of individuals engaged in specialized scientific and experimental research 
in the narrow sense of the word, and as such encompasses all intellectuals who used the language of 
science  and  concepts  rooted  in  scientific  discourse,  both  in  conducting  academic  research  and  in 
commenting on socio-political and cultural problems.443 Because thinkers who opposed the infiltration 
of science into the domain of “value” and “meaning” employed scientific concepts or methods resulting 
from a principle of division derived from science to make their case against the omnipotence of the 
scientific  outlook,  they  were  in  a  sense  equally  part  of  this  “community  of  scientific  discourse”. 
Moreover, according to Wang Hui, the contestation of the omnipotence of science by Zhang Junmai 
and his affiliates ultimately resulted in the acceptation of a new, “scientific” division of labor, and thus 
439His  radically anti-ontological  stance might  have had something to do with this non-inclusion as  well.  Xiong Shili 
mentions Zhang's opposition to his plea for a Confucian ontology in a letter to Tang Junyi. See “Scientific Truth and 
Metaphysical Truth (A Reply to Tang Junyi)” (Kexue zhenli yu xuanxue zhenli (da Tang Junyi) 科學真理與玄學真理
（答唐君毅）), [1936] in The Complete Works of Xiong Shili (Xiong Shili quanji 熊十力全集), Wuhan: Hubei jiaoyu 
chubanshe,  2001,  vol.8,  p.145.  On  Zhang's  own  philosophy,  see  Rošker,  2008,  pp.227–263,  Jana  Rošker,  “The 
Abolishment  of  Substance  and  Ontology:  A New Interpretation  of  Zhang Dongsun’s  Pluralistic  Epistemology”,  in 
Synthesis Philosophica,  vol.47, no.1, 2009a, pp.153–165  and  Xinyan Jiang, “Zhang Dongsun: Pluralist Epistemology 
and Chinese Philosophy”, in Cheng and Bunnin (eds.), 2002, pp.57-81.
440Edward  F.  Connelly,  Xiong  Shili  and  His  Critique  of  Yogācāra  Buddhism,  Phd  Dissertation,  Australian  National 
University, 1978, p.31: “Although Xiong took no active part in the debate on science and metaphysics, he quite clearly  
aligned himself with the metaphysicians in opposition to the scientists.” Also see Isay, 2013, pp.110-113. 
441Fa-ti Fan, “The Controversy over Spontaneous Generation in Republican China. Science, Authority, and the Public”, in 
Jing and Elman, 2014, p.210.
442See Wang, 2008, pp.1107-1125, Wang, 2011b, pp.150-151 and “Discursive Community and the Genealogy of Scientific 
Categories”,  in  Everyday  Modernity  in  China,  edited  by  Madeline  Yue  Dong  and  Joshua  L.  Goldstein,  Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 2006, pp.80-120.
443On the connection between the spread of scientific vocabulary and the movement for the promotion of the vernacular 
(by Hu Shi and others),  see Wang,  2008,  pp.1134-114 and Wang,  2006,  pp.90-97.  Wang basically argues that  this 
movement  did  not  simply  hinge  on  an  elevation  of  baihua  above  wenyan,  but  also  involved  a  far-reaching 
transformation of everyday language through the influence of scientific discourse. 
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of epistemological separation and recategorization instead of integration.444 Wang explains:
Intellectual  orientations  that  questioned  the  absolutely  dominant  position  of  science  were  also
incorporated into a rationalized knowledge system […] efforts to preserve the independence of the fields  
of ethics, aesthetics, or affection were all transformed by their incorporation into an institutionalized,
rationalized,  and  scientific  framework  of  knowledge  classification  and  institutions  […] There  were
changes inside the knowledge system, but the rationalized principle of classification and its process of
institutionalization did not  change at  all  […] The activity of  the  scientific community445 included a
double principle of generalization and specialization. Intellectuals and humanistic scholars who claimed
to limit the scope of application of science adopted the basic standpoint of using the principle of division  
to attack the principle of generalization.  They argued that the fields of social life,  such as morality,
belief, and aesthetics, should be seperated from the universal field of scientific knowledge in order to
develop their own autonomy. If we take the subjective turn [exemplified by the metaphysicians] as the
birth of modern Chinese humanities, then the so-called humanities were not born from an understanding  
of  human  beings […]  but  from the  definition  and  distinction  of  fields  that  cannot  be  explained  or
regulated by economic rules, political rights, and scientific practices. In this sense, the humanities are not  
the discovery of human beings, but rather the discovery of fields (individual or collective) of morality,
aesthetics, and unconsciousness.  Modern humanities represent the disintegration of the human being
instead of a reconstruction of the integrity of the human being.446
This  outcome is  the paradoxical,  but logical  result  of  the reaffirmation of  “the universality of  the 
principle of division on which the scientific community is built”.447 The metaphysicians' reactive turn to 
a subject constitutive of various subject-object relations as fields of knowledge irreducible to scientific 
objectivity (understood as a form of observation where it  is crucial  that the observer does not see 
himself or includes himself in what he observes insofar as this inhibits correct, unbiased and reliable 
observations) and the attempt to delineate the spheres of the objective and the subjective as respectively 
the domains of the natural and human sciences, forces us to inquire into exactly which kind of subject 
emerged from the debate on science and metaphysics. That the rather simplistic distinction between the 
subjective and the objective (which can form a matrix for enormous complexity precisely because of its 
444This would eventually be the case for Tang Junyi as well. See his “Discussion of the Thought of Zhang Junmai from the 
Debate on Science and Metaphysics” (Cong kexue yu xuanxue lunzhan tan Zhang Junmai de sixiang從科學與玄學論戰
談君勱先生的思想), [1976] in ZB, pp.987-993. 
445Actually, Wang Hui is referring to what he himself calls the community of scientific discourse.
446Wang, 2011b, p.140, p.147, p.151. Emphasis added. Cf. Wang, 2008, pp.1403-1410.
447Wang, 2011b, p.152. My italics.
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simplicity) sits uneasily with the difference between philosophy and science is already obvious from 
the fact that certain types of philosophical thought developed in the aftermath of the debate presented 
themselves as capable of or at least poised towards the overcoming of precisely this distinction as an 
absolute opposition. One can relegate the study of the material and the objective to science, but any 
philosophical  unity of  subject  and object  is  thereby restricted to  the field resulting from the prior 
distinction between science and philosophy, where the “exceptions” or the leftovers of science can be 
reinstated in a unitary form. There is unity then  within the field of philosophy, but not  between  the 
fields of science (subject-object duality) and philosophy (subject-object identity). As I will show further 
on, this is a problem which New Confucians such as Tang and Mou clearly struggled with and, at risk 
of already giving the ending away, were not able to resolve without recourse to the principle of division 
in a highly dialectical form. Their views on the specificity of Chinese thought in comparison to Western 
theology and philosophy, and the uniqueness of Confucian thought vis-à-vis Buddhism and Daoism 
played  an  important  role  here.  Clearly,  the  cultural  differentials  introduced  during  the  debates 
concerning the “spiritual”  divergence of China and the West  which intensified in  the wake of the 
publication of Liang Shuming's 1921 The Cultures of East and West and their Philosophies (Dongxi  
wenhua jiqi zhexue東西文化及其哲學) were not simply abandoned, but carried over into the debate 
on science and metaphysics and its prolonged aftermath.448 As we already noted with reference to Liang 
Qichao, the self-scrutiny and soul-searching of a considerable number of European intellectuals after 
the  first  World  War  played  an  important  role  in  this.449 The  metaphysicians  agreed  with  Bertrand 
448See Wang, 2008, p.1281. The debate between scientists and metaphysicians was “repeated” in Taiwan in the 1950s in  
lively exchanges between liberals like Yin Haiguang殷海光 (1919-1969) of a more positivist bent and New Confucians 
such as Xu Fuguan徐復觀  (1903–1982) along much the same lines. Ruelin Chen contends that the debate in Taiwan 
added a new element to the discourse on the putative contrast between Chinese and Western culture in the form of an  
opposition between moral humanism and positivist science, but this opposition was already an integral part of the 1923 
debate. See Ruelin Chen, “Morality Versus Science: The Two Cultures Discourse in 1950s Taiwan”, East Asian Science,  
Technology and Society, 4, 2010, pp.99-121. 
449As D.W.Y. Kwok notes: “It must be held in mind that the designation of spiritual civilization as belonging to the East  
and material civilization as belonging to the West was originated by growing numbers of Western thinkers who, after 
World War I, praised the superiority of Eastern spirituality over the Western preoccupation with material things.” Kwok,  
1965,  pp.46-47.  Cf.  Isay,  2013 pp.58-59:  “After  the war ended the negative  effects  of  modern life  were fervently 
discussed in European intellectual circles; stressing the pace of life, social exploitation, emptiness, and desperation.  
Dichotomous contrasts […] surfaced, such as spirituality vs. materiality; humanism vs. mechanism, subjectivism vs. 
objectivism, intuition vs. intellect […] Once the “East vs. West” dichotomy joined the scene one member of these pairs 
was associated with the East and its opposite with the West.” Also see Zheng Dahua郑大华, “The First World War and 
the Postwar Rise of Chinese Cultural Conservatism” (Di yi ci shijie dazhan yu zhanhou Zhongguo wenhuabaoshouzhuyi  
sixchao de xingqi第一次世界大战与战后中国文化保守主义思潮的兴起 ),  Zhejiang xuekan 浙江学刊 , 5, 2002, 
pp.38-50 and Yu Shilin 余仕麟, The Transcendence of the Living Mind: the Confucian Theory of the Heart-Mind and  
Nature and Tang Junyi's Moral Metaphysics  (Shengming xinling de chaoyue: rujia xinxing lun yu Tang Junyi daode  
xingshangxue 生命心灵的超越：儒家心性论与唐君毅道德形上学), 2010, pp.12-13.
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Russel, who had toured China from 1920 to 1921, that “it is science that makes the difference between 
our intellectual outlook and that of the Chinese intelligentsia […] What we have to teach the Chinese is 
not morals, or ethical maxims about government,  but science and technical skill.  The realm of the 
Chinese intellectuals is to acquire Western knowledge without acquiring the mechanistic outlook”.450 In 
other words, they did not want science to become a general cultural and socio-political perspective. 
Even so, cultural differences were established not through the reinstatement of traditional divisions of 
knowledge,  but  on  the  basis  of  what  came  to  be  employed  as  a  universally  and  transhistorically 
applicable order. This allowed someone like Tang Junyi to define the West as “scientific and religious” 
as opposed to an “artistic and moral”  China,  while at  the same time internally applying the same 
generalized distinctions to the Chinese past: “the culture of the Han dynasty was focused on politics, 
the Wei and Jin periods were dominated by literature and art, and during the Sui and Tang religion 
thrived” (漢代文化以政治為主，魏晉以文學藝術為主，隋唐宗教之盛).451 In any case, the subject 
that  was  protected  from the  hegemony of  scientific  objectivity  through  what  Wang  Hui  calls  the 
principle  of  division  was  certainly  not  the  isolated,  empirical,  psychological  subject,  but  rather  a 
subject integrated in a larger cultural and historical continuum, the latter understood as forming the 
condition of the possibility for meaningful individual subjective being.452 Wang explains:
What is known as the “turn towards the subject” in modern Chinese thought was not merely a transition
from knowledge concerning the objective (natural and social) world to an investigation of the interior
world of the individual subject, but also entailed a turn towards culture, in which reflections on Western
modernity were taken as an opportunity for a renewed discovery of the value and meaning of Chinese
culture.  The  problem of  subjectivity  in  this  context  is  certainly  not  just  a  question  of  individual
subjectivity, but also one of the subjectivity of national culture.453
450Bertrand Russell,  The Problem of China, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1922, p.81. Writing, in an Orientalist 
streak of admiration for China, Russel expressed the wish “that China, in return for our scientific knowledge, may give  
us something of her large tolerance and contemplative peace of mind.” (p.198).
451“A Comparison of the Cultural Spirit of China and the West” (Zhongxi wenhua jingshen zhi bijiao 中西文化精神之比
較), [1947] in RJ, p.83.
452“The subject, as it is understood in this context, is practical, moral, and, above all, communicating and assimilated with 
a higher ontological order.” Billioud, 2012, p.28.
453中国现代思想中的所谓“主体性转向”，并不仅仅是从对客观世界（自然和社会）的认识转向对个体的内在世
界的体察，而且是一种文化的转向，即以反思西方现代性为契机，重新发现中国文化的价值与意义。主体性问
题在这里决不仅仅是个人主体性的问题，而且是民族文化的主体性的问题. Wang, 2008, p.1328.
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For  someone  like  the  logician  and  epistemologist  Jin  Yuelin 金岳霖 (1895–1984),  the  successful 
development of philosophy would enable the latter  to acquire  a universality comparable to  that  of 
science, implying that the more “scientific” philosophy would become, the less it would be bound and 
constrained by national, cultural or historical specificities.454 Scientific and philosophical objectivity 
would  thus  be  gained  through  abstracting  both  from the  concrete  subject  and  its  cultural  genus. 
Contrary to Jin, even the “rationalist” Feng Youlan stressed the positive dependence of philosophy on 
history.  Echoing Hegel,  Feng argued that  unlike science,  which leaves its  historical  variations and 
vicissitudes  behind  as  either  pioneering  stepping  stones  or  errors  which  have  been  definitively 
surpassed, philosophy cannot be considered apart from its history.455 For those thinkers who wanted to 
uphold the role of history and culture as horizons of meaning which would have to either withstand or 
internalize the demand of universality, the subject which was meant to dispose over a rich plurality of 
cognitive and perceptual fields became a thoroughly relational one. The subject in this sense observes 
the world through history and culture and not merely in the immanence and factual givenness of sense 
perception.  That any knowledge of the external,  “objective” world always has to pass through the 
temporal  density  of  a  culturally  constituted  moral  subject  is  not  understood  as  undermining  the 
objective validity of knowledge, but as the very condition of possibility for cognition at a deeper level. 
Especially in New Confucian thought, the subject can only have a substantial existence and access to 
truth because of its relation to a more continuous “objective” subject, surpassing both the empirical ego 
and the intellectual cogito, which can additionally ensure the identity of factually different subjects. In 
other words: the identity of the subject (as a particular individual) is mediated through its relation to 
Spirit.456 As such, subjectivity was brought into a privileged relation with the past, the latter serving as a 
repository of value and meaning against a perceived emptiness in the immanence of “vulgar” time. This 
454See Yvonne Schulz Zinda, Jin Yuelin's Ontology. Perspectives on the Problem of Induction, Leiden: Brill, 2012, pp.15-
16.
455See “On National Philosophy” (Lun minzu zhexue 論民族哲學), [1937] in Collection from a Journey South (Nandu ji南
渡集), in vol.5 of Complete Works from the Hall of Three Pines (San song tang quanji 三松堂全集), Zhengzhou: Henan 
renmin chubanshe, 2001, pp.270-280. Employing a a grammatical distinction between two possessive modifiers which 
largely fell into disuse after the 1950s, Feng differentiated 中国的哲学 from 中国底哲学. In the former, “Chinese” has a 
descriptive/attributive function,  whereas  in the latter  phrase,  “Chinese” denotes  an intrinsic,  substantial  bond. Feng 
considered  the  distinction  between  “Chinese”  (contingent/neutral/geographical)”  ( 中 国 的 )  and  “of  China” 
(substantial/cultural)  ( 中国底 )  to  be  most  marked  in  the  opposition  between science  on  the one  hand,  which  is  
completely devoid of cultural characteristics, and literature, as fully determined by culture, on the other. Feng aligned 
philosophy more closely to science than to literature. This distinction would later come to be replaced by “philosophy in 
China” (哲学在中国) and “Chinese philosophy” (中国的哲学). See Chen Lai, 2001, pp.1-19, p.95.
456I do not agree with Gad Isay's contention that “after 1923, the 'view of life' based on metaphysics was […] undervalued  
because of uncritical support for nationalist concerns.” Isay, 2013, p.126. I do not see any proof for the idea that those 
opposed to scientism were any less nationalistic.
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implies that the turn towards the subject as a reaction against modern scientism involved an internal 
axial turn of the subject towards the past. As I have tried to show throughout this chapter, in the case of  
Tang  Junyi  and  Mou  Zongsan,  it  was  the  dialectical  paradigm  of  Spirit  which  allowed  for  an 
accommodation of difference as a difference in time of what was still assumed to be the same, not only 
in spite of, but precisely through its developmental diversity.
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2.5 Concluding remarks
In this chapter, I have attempted to give a reasonably extensive overview of some of the issues involved 
in the complex genesis of New Confucian philosophy in twentieth-century Chinese intellectual history. 
Needless to say that my treatment of this problematic has hardly been exhaustive and can only appear 
as somewhat impressionistic. I have not, to name only two omissions, found the time to consider the 
categories of aesthetics and religion in relation to the development of New Confucian thought. As far as 
the former is concerned, this incompleteness partly stems from my impression that at least in the work 
of the recurring protagonists of my study, Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan, aesthetics is not really given 
its due, and all in all simply appears as a field in which the spirit and worldview of Chinese culture is 
assumed to express itself through the medium of sensibility.457 Especially in the case of Tang, this 
meant that art was essentially but one particular, and certainly not the highest, manifestation of moral 
reason.458 The works of Xu Fuguan 徐復觀  (1903-1982) and Li Zehou 李泽厚  (b. 1930) would 
certainly be more interesting to consider from this point of view. The question concerning the religious 
nature of Confucianism already received a more elaborate treatment in Mou's and Tang's writings, but 
remained largely subordinated to the ambitious undertaking of providing the Confucian tradition with a 
distinct philosophical identity. As such, the issues of religion and religiosity were mainly approached 
through the paradoxical entanglement of transcendence and immanence, that is to say, with reference to 
general  ontological  and  epistemological  problems.  In  this  sense,  religion  served  as  a  mediating 
category in the comparison and combination of Chinese and Western philosophy. Of course, that Tang 
thought the ultimate goal of philosophy was to become a “teaching” (jiao教)459 and believed that “true 
knowledge must always lead back to truthful actions” (真實知必歸真實行)460 tells us something about 
the  fluid  boundaries  between  the  categories  of  philosophy  and  religion,  even  if  Tang  himself 
consistently focused on the philosophical aspects of what he saw as the three most important religious 
orientations, i.e. Christian monotheism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. 
457See Tang, [1953b], pp.213-264. 
458Serina Chan notes Mou's dismissive attitude towards literature as leading to “unenlightenment”, since it “dwells on  
human passions”. Chan, 2011, p.173.
459See Life, Existence, and the Horizons of the Mind (Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie 生命存在與心靈境界), Beijing: 
Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, [1977] 2006, pp.14-16.
460Tang, [1977], p.9.
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Let me connect what I have been discussing in this chapter to the contemporary situation outlined in 
the first one in order to reiterate my underlying concerns. In the course of the above discussion, I  
generally limited myself to what one might call the “formative period” of what is now an increasingly 
influential and discursively prominent current of thought, both for practical as well as methodological 
reasons. It is not by accident that most accounts of the demise and revival of Confucianism in modern 
China start with the May Fourth era and the intellectual debates which occurred in its wake. Needless  
to say, it is not as if history came to end after this contested period of social turmoil and intellectual 
“enlightenment”.  But  as  the  reactions  invited  by  Feng  Youlan's  qualified  plea  for  an  “abstract 
inheritance” of Chinese philosophy make clear, it was hardly evident anymore after 1949 for mainland 
scholars to refer to traditional thought without employing either denunciatory or highly euphemistic 
terms. The idea of philosophy as an autonomous discipline distinct from the “science” of historical 
materialism itself being looked upon with a great deal of mistrust,  even far-reaching procedures of 
abstraction did not always suffice to clear appeals to tradition of the suspicion of ideological prejudice. 
In the first chapter of my study, I already indicated that contemporary discourse on the social  and 
political position and function of Confucianism in response to the post-revolutionary condition in the 
People's  Republic is  greatly indebted to the endeavors of those who Jiang Qing rather deceptively 
labels as “spiritual Confucians”. Working outside of the PRC, these philosophers already had other 
notions (such as concrete universality and the atemporality of the noumenal) at their disposal for the 
transformation and continuation of tradition. The latter were in my view much more sensitive (if not 
consciously,  then  at  least  performatively)  to  the  conceptual  repercussions  of  the  nowadays  largely 
discredited, or rather, disavowed paradigm of Spirit than many present-day intellectuals supporting the 
Confucian cause. Postmodern-inspired accusations of essentialism and identity thinking, often uneasily 
accompanied by a strongly totalizing nationalism, have now come to replace the simplistic condemning 
epithet of “bourgeois idealism” routinely applied to traditionalist thinkers in revolutionary times. Given 
the current lack a social obligation to continuously relate the study of traditional thought and the act of 
philosophizing to what were once the overriding exigencies of permanent class struggle and social 
antagonisms in order to prove or renew one's allegiance to the correct political line (which is in itself 
not  something  to  be  nostalgic  about  at  all),  it  is  at  present  probably  an  analysis  of  the  actual, 
empirically approachable conditions of present mainland Chinese society instead of a transcendental 
inquiry  into  forgotten  or  repressed  cultural  roots  in  the  ancient  past  which  has  become  the  most 
subversive and risky enterprise for Chinese intellectuals. Consequently, this has made nationalism more 
210
flexible. Nationalism is no longer constrained by an obligatory adherence to the principles of Marxism-
Leninism and Mao Zedong thought and can afford to appear in a whole range of different guises, as 
long as these do not explicitly contest the legitimacy of CCP rule.461 In this sense, a contestation of the 
theoretical feasibility of communism would in itself remain harmless and even apolitical, were it not 
that this is still likely to be perceived as implying a contestation of the Party's rightful sovereignty. Mou 
Zongsan's most acerbic texts on Chinese communism and Marxism, especially those collected in Moral  
Idealism, remain available to mainland readers only in a heavily censored form.462 Still, in the current 
constellation, the poetically inclined businessman from Zhang Shiying's text does not necessarily need 
to be able to recite either Tang poetry or the  Quotations of Chairman Mao in order to qualify as a 
patriot, his contributions to boosting the national GDP surely counting as a better sign of his love of 
country. 
From the many retrospective writings of the second generation of New Confucians, it is clear that the 
decades from May Fourth up to the establishment of the People's Republic came to be interpreted as a 
definitive downward turn in the tragic fate of Confucianism and as the beginning of the end of its 
relatively continuous history, or at least as the start of a temporary, almost strategic “withdrawal” in 
response to the growth of the “universal heterodoxy” of historical materialism. Both Mou and Tang 
took the founding of the PRC to be the logical but disastrous outcome of May Fourth iconoclasm, 
which eventually forced them, and in their view Chinese culture as a whole, into an indefinite exile in 
the peripheral regions of Hong Kong and Taiwan. They saw their own “loneliness”463 as coinciding 
with the forced retreat of Chinese culture from its native soil and its roots in the “divine province” 
(shenzhou 神州). In a sense, the epistemological discontinuity and “semantic untidiness” resulting from 
the creative adaptation of new categories such as philosophy and science in response to the factual 
disappearance of tradition was as much a problem as it was a chance for these thinkers to reposition 
and reinterpret traditional sources of knowledge in the light of the requirements stemming from a new 
social and historical environment. The universality of the rupture introduced into societies all over the 
461See Yingjie Guo, 2004, pp.44-45.
462See Moral Idealism (Daode de lixiangzhuyi 道德的理想主义), Changchun: Jilin shushe, 2010. Two texts which criticize 
Mao's tracts “On Contradiction” and “On Practice”, as well as a text revealingly entitled “A Cultural Consciousness to 
Oppose Communism and Save the Nation” (Fangong jiuguo de wenhua yishi反共救國的文化意識) have been left out. 
Most  of  Mou's  direct  criticism of Chinese communism and the CCP has been carefully edited away,  while  purely 
theoretical objections to Marxism appear to have been left standing.
463Lin Zhenguo 林鎮國 ,  “The Lonely New Confucians – Contemporary Chinese Moral Idealists” (Jimo de xin rujia -  
dangdai Zhongguo daodelixiangzhuyizhe寂寞的新儒家——當代中國的道德理想主義者), Ehu yuekan 鹅湖月刊, 34, 
1978, pp.1-3.
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world by an intrinsically global modernity allows us to observe, in retrospect at least, that they had no 
reason to feel alone in this respect. I believe I have already given an initial series of indications for the 
fact that the problems and dilemmas they faced were, to put it in Marxist terms, part of a common 
struggle. The intention of the next chapter is to further clarify in a more determinate manner precisely 
what consequences this structurally conditioned semantic struggle had in the formulation, elaboration, 
and application of some of their most crucial philosophical concepts. 
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Chapter 3: The Philosophical Consequences of Modernity: 
Conceptual Tensions in the Thought of Xiong Shili, Tang Junyi, and Mou Zongsan
[The philosopher] must never ask “What consequences will this have?”1
Fichte
Paradoxes […] are not barriers to communication. On the contrary, they can be formulated. They even have a high level of  
expressive content […] Of course, the question poses itself of what can be done with such paradoxes. It is not a problem to  
be solved by means of logic. Nor is it a problem whose solution could be calculated. For the problem/solution distinction  
would be sublated in that case, and both the problem and its solution would disappear.2
Luhmann
3.1 The thought of Xiong Shili and Tang Junyi in the horizon of modernity
3.1.1 Husserl on science, philosophy, and wisdom
Edmund Husserl's programmatic text entitled  Philosophy as a Rigorous Science from 19113 offers a 
prismatic glimpse into the intricate distinction between science and philosophy in the development of 
modern European thought, a distinction which I discussed in the context of twentieth-century Chinese 
intellectual history in the previous chapter. Let me proceed by taking up from where we left off there 
by investigating how the fundamental differentiation between scientific and philosophical knowledge 
was further elaborated and refined in the aftermath of the post-1923 “metaphysical” turn towards the 
subject and towards spirit by New Confucian thinkers. As a starting point, I will comparatively draw on 
the general import of the arguments Husserl puts forward in his 1911 text with reference to the genesis 
of New Confucianism as a form of philosophy, specifically in relation to the thought of its founding 
father,  Xiong  Shili 熊 十 力 (1885-1968)  and  his  student  Tang  Junyi,  before  carrying  over  this 
problematic into the second part  of this chapter focused on the work of Xiong's  most famous and 
philosophically accomplished pupil,  Mou Zongsan. In doing so,  I  will  try to provide a provisional 
1 J.G. Fichte, Concerning the Concept of the Wissenschaftslehre  (Ueber den Begriff der Wissenschaftslehre), in  Fichte:  
Early Philosophical Writings, translated and edited by Daniel Breazeale, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993, p.130 
(footnote).
2 Niklas Luhmann, A Systems Theory of Religion, Stanford (Cal.): Stanford University Press, 2013a, pp.93-94.
3 “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science”, in Edmund  Husserl,  Shorter Works, Notre Dame (Indiana): University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1981, pp.166-196. 
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indication  of  the  factual  universality  of  the  problems  involved  in  the  modern  reclassification  of 
knowledge  which  Confucian-inspired  thinkers  too  had  to  somehow  accommodate  or  account  for. 
Husserl's take on the differentiation between science and philosophy can provide some insight into why 
the signatories of the 1958 New Confucian  Manifesto  could later proclaim with a certain matter-of-
factness that it is essentially wisdom (zhihui智慧) the Western world should learn from China and can 
also begin to clarify what the intermediary category of wisdom refers to and means in this regard.4 
From Husserl's  text,  one  initially  gets  the  impression  that  he  tried  to  position  his  own project  of 
phenomenological philosophy somewhere in between the natural and the human sciences, that is to say, 
between what he condemned as a “naturalistic” and “psychologistic” positivism setting out to analyze 
human consciousness as any other object of exact scientific inquiry without according it a privileged 
position (as the supreme source of all possible cognitive, practical, and affective fields resulting from 
intentional acts of consciousness) on the one hand5, and the approach of philosophy as providing a 
broader  Weltanschauung  marked by historical, cultural, and social specificities on the other.6 Husserl 
believed that the “naturalization” of consciousness in experimental psychology and the grounding of 
the various disciplines of logic, epistemology, aesthetics and ethics in the study of the human psyche 
had  turned  (empirical)  consciousness  into  the  central  point  of  reference  for  an  increasingly  large 
number of disciplines, but only at the cost of debasing it to the role of the shaky center of a bewildering 
diversity and flux of experiences from which it could no longer be clearly set apart. The naturalistic  
standpoint made consciousness indistinguishable from any other naturally given “object”, whereas in 
Husserl's view it had to be grasped as the transcendental condition and “pure” ground for any possible 
objectivity and for all experiential distinctions resulting from cognitive acts.7 For Husserl this had far-
reaching implications,  which as I will try to show in what follows, are remarkably close to Xiong 
Shili's8 and Tang Junyi's efforts to safeguard the foundational role of consciousness in relation to its 
4 See Tang et.al., [1958a], pp.910-925.
5 Husserl, 1981, pp.169-185.
6 Husserl, 1981, pp.185-196.
7 Husserl,  1981,  pp.171-172.  “[I]f  knowledge  theory  will  nevertheless  investigate  the  problems  of  the  relationship 
between consciousness and being, it can have before its eyes only being as the correlate of consciousness, as something  
“intended”  after  the  manner  of  consciousness:  remembered,  expected,  represented  pictorially,  imagined,  identified, 
distinguished,  believed,  opined,  evaluated,  etc.  It  is  clear,  then,  that  the  investigation  must  be  directed  towards  a  
scientific essential knowledge of consciousness, toward that which consciousness itself “is” according to its essence in 
all its distinguishable forms.” Ibid., p.173.
8 For  a  concise comparative study between Xiong Shili  and  Husserl,  see  Qingxiong Zhang,  “Die  Grundstruktur  des 
Bewusstseins:  Husserl  und Xiong Shili  im Vergleich”,  in  Heaven,  Earth,  and In-Between in the Harmony of  Life, 
Analecta Husserliana, vol.XLVII, edited by Anna- Teresa Tymieniecka, Dordrecht: Springer, 1995, pp.85-114.
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plethora of object-horizons (jing 境 ): “That objectivity is, and must manifest itself cognitively as so 
being,  must  precisely become evident  purely from consciousness  itself  […] the  essential  study of 
consciousness includes also that of consciousness-meaning and consciousness-objectivity as such.”9 
For  Tang  Junyi  too,  what  Husserl  called  the  “natural  attitude”  –  which  does  not  reflect  on  the 
involvement  of  consciousness  as  the  “phenomenological  residuum”10 in  the  constitution  of  an 
“objective” world that must be “nullified” to reveal the absolute being of pure consciousness11 – is 
already the result of subject-dependent determinations, even if the latter “naturally” present themselves 
in commonsense and everyday observations of the world. Like Husserl, Tang is of the opinion that “at 
the onset, all people are natural born realists who believe in the existence of objective entities” (人初皆
為一天生之信有客觀存在之實在論者)12. 
Husserl presents the demise of the Hegelian system of philosophy in 19th century Europe as sounding 
the death knell of an ambitious but unsuccessful attempt to arrive at a unity of knowledge in the form 
of an all-embracive system, a system which Tang Junyi once unkindly compared to an impenetrable 
fortress (堡壘)13 functioning like a “big killing-machine” (大殺機) that eradicates all particularity and 
difference instead of serving as a bridge (梁橋 ) leading to an “inclusive” (baohan 包涵 ) and not a 
“subsumptive” (nangkuo囊括) unity.14 Husserl thinks this systematic unity was radically corroded and 
eventually undone both through the progress of the exact sciences and the growth of historicism in the 
9 Husserl, 1981, p.173. Cf. Cartesian Meditations. An Introduction to Phenomenology, The Hague: Martinus Nijhof, 1982, 
p.84: “Every imaginable sense, every imaginable  being, whether the latter is called immanent or transcendent, falls 
within the domain of transcendental subjectivity, as the subjectivity that constitutes sense and being. The attempt to 
conceive  the  universe  of  true  being  as  something  lying  outside  the  universe  of  possible  consciousness,  possible 
knowledge, possible evidence, the two being related to one another merely externally by a rigid law, is nonsensical.  
They belong together essentially; and, as belonging together essentially, they are also concretely one, one in the only 
absolute concretion: transcendental subjectivity. If transcendental subjectivity is the universe of possible sense, then an 
outside is precisely nonsense. But even nonsense is always a mode of sense and has its nonsensicalness within the sphere 
of possible insight.”
10 Edmund Husserl, Ideas. General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, New York and London: Routledge, 2012, p.63
11 Husserl, 2012, pp.93-95.
12 Life, Existence, and the Horizons of the Mind (Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie 生命存在與心靈境界 ), Beijing: 
Zhongguo shehui  kexue chubanshe,  [1977] 2006, p.547.  Cf.  p.548:  “In  the objective horizons,  there is  naturally a 
subjective living existence and mind which observes this objective horizon. It is only that this living existence and mind  
has not yet become aware that what it observes is included in what it can observe, hence, [the subject] remains a sort of 
background for the appearance and existence of the objective horizon, which remains hidden and unseen because one is  
not aware of it, as if it did not exist (在客觀境中，自有觀此客觀境之主觀之生命存在與心靈在。唯此生命存在與
心靈，未能自覺其所觀，即在能觀之，故稱客觀境。在此客觀境中，以主觀之生命存在與心靈，雖存在而不自
覺其存在，故只為此客觀境之呈現與存在之一背景，此背景以不自覺，即如隱而不見，亦若不存在). My italics. 
13 Cf. “Reflections from a Journey to Korea” (You Han lü si游韓旅思), [1967] in ZB, p.763.
14 Tang, [1977], p.15. Cf. p.420.
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humanistic disciplines. The latter tendency towards the introduction of spatiotemporal variables into 
the study of reason had come to undermine the absoluteness and closure of rationality, and ironically 
stemmed  from Hegel's  own  roadmap  for  the  “calvary  of  Spirit”,  in  which  the  various  shapes  of 
consciousness  take  a  dialectical  detour  through  history  on  their  long  way home.15 Husserl  quotes 
Wilhelm Dilthey's (1833-1911) remark that “the formation of a historical consciousness destroys more 
thoroughly than does surveying the disagreement of systems a belief in the universal validity of any of 
the philosophies that have undertaken to express in a compelling manner the coherence of the world by 
an ensemble of concepts.”16 In other words: historical discontinuity clashes with the normative unity 
and universality of reason and destabilizes claims to general validity. In short, the phenomenologist 
thinks that neither scientific naturalism nor historicism can provide a stable foundation for philosophy 
as a science of consciousness in its own right, since both approaches end up introducing “impure” 
contingency, either in the form of physically quantifiable sense data or as culturally specific historical 
variations,  into  what  would  have  to  become  an  autonomous  and  self-grounding  study  of  pure 
consciousness. Consequently, philosophy is “falsified” by being reductively explained away in terms of 
either  nature  or  spirit.17 What  Husserl  wants  to  accomplish  through  his  double  distinction  of 
phenomenology from both natural science and the historicist human sciences is to securely ground 
philosophy as a, as far as he is concerned, wholly novel and revolutionary discipline which partakes 
both in the rigor and stringency of science as well as in the richness of Weltanschauung philosophies, 
all while steering clear from the reductionism he associates with positivist science and the lack of 
analytical clarity and the danger of skeptical relativism he connects to rooting philosophy in the diverse 
and evolving variables of cultural and historical formations. 
Towards the end of Husserl's text, the notion of “wisdom” makes a short but intriguing appearance in 
the establishment of this two-sided distinction. As we saw in the context of the turn towards the subject 
resulting from the 1923 debate in China, thinkers who were of the opinion that philosophy should not 
hopelessly try to emulate the ideal of the exact sciences, but instead understand and present itself as a 
form of Weltanschauung intrinsically bound up with historical consciousness, presupposed another kind 
of subject and a different temporal frame than the naturalistic scientism which dissolves consciousness 
into the indistinct plane of empirically and impersonally accessible sense data which are assumed to be 
15 See Husserl, 1981, p.168. 
16 Husserl, 1981, p.186. On Dilthey's idea of Weltanschauung and Husserl's critique, see David K. Naugle, Worldview. The 
History of a Concept, Grand Rapids (Michigan): William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2002, pp.108-121.
17 Husserl, 1981, p.169.
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identical and invariable from one subject to another. Tang Junyi expressed his understanding of the 
kind of subject underlying the scientific attitude in the following vivid terms: 
If one says that [the mind in scientific observation] is dependent on something, then [one should add
that] it  is as if there were a great empty distance between [the mind] and that on which it  depends
[…] Its observations are conducted within a forgetfulness of the existence of its own observation; the
functioning of this horizon is manifested through this self-forgetfulness, a forgetfulness which it does
not in turn observe.18 
如說其有所依，亦與其所依者之間，如有一遙相距之虛的距離 [...] 其觀照，乃在一自忘其觀
照之有中進行，亦即以此自忘，以凸顯此境之用，而亦不見此自忘。
History  and  concretely  situated  subjectivity  find  themselves  squarely  at  odds  with  the  procedural 
eradication of subject- or spirit-dependent apprehension and time in science.19 Like Zhang Junmai and 
his  supporters,  for  Husserl  too,  Weltanschauung  philosophy “has  a  great,  even unique  teleological 
function” in  the development  of  the human spirit  and counts  as  “the  highest  elevation of  the  life 
experience, education, and wisdom of its time”.20 Still, in his view, the approach personified by Dilthey 
in his emphasis on the historical character of thought and the Lebenszusammenhang (“life-nexus”) of 
knowledge can lead to a  potentially highly corrosive and self-refuting relativism resulting in  what 
Husserl describes as  sacrificing eternity (i.e. the eternal validity of science) “for the sake of time”.21 
This is why he seeks to bring philosophy into a closely knit alliance with science. The supra-individual, 
18 Tang, [1977], p.255.
19 Husserl, 1981, p.191: “The “idea” of Weltanschauung is consequently a different one for each time […] The “idea” of 
science, on the contrary, is a supratemporal one, and here that means limited by no relatedness to the spirit of one time.”
20 Husserl, 1981, p.189. The cultural dimension became much more marked in the later Husserl's revolt against positivist  
science in the  Crisis. At stake for him in the “struggle for the meaning of man” was nothing less than the following 
question: “[W]hether European humanity bears within itself an absolute idea, rather than being merely an empirical  
anthropological type like "China" or "India"; [...] whether the spectacle of the Europeanization of all other civilizations  
bears witness to the rule of an absolute meaning, one which is proper to the sense, rather than to a historical non-sense,  
of  the  world.” The  Crisis  of  European  Sciences  and  Transcendental  Phenomenology.  An  Introduction  to  
Phenomenological Philosophy, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970, p.16. Cf. p.15: “To bring latent reason 
to  the  understanding  of  its  own possibilities  and  thus  to  bring to  insight  the  possibility of  metaphysics  as  a  true  
possibility—this is the only way to put metaphysics or universal philosophy on the strenuous road to realization. It is the 
only way to decide whether the telos which was inborn in European humanity at the birth of Greek philosophy—that of 
humanity which seeks to exist, and is only possible,  through philosophical  reason, moving endlessly from latent to 
manifest reason and forever seeking its own norms through this, its truth and genuine human nature—whether this telos,  
then, is merely a factual, historical delusion, the accidental acquisition of merely one among many other civilizations  
and histories, or whether Greek humanity was not rather the first breakthrough to what is essential to humanity as such,  
its entelechy.” Niklas Luhmann provides an interesting discussion of this aspect of Husserl's work in the context of the 
nexus between modernity and science in Theories of Distinction: Redescribing the Descriptions of Modernity, Stanford 
(Cal.): Stanford University Press, 2002, pp.33-60.
21 Husserl, 1981, p.193.
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spiritual function of philosophy as a communal “world view” or a “life view” can in Husserl's opinion 
be adequately captured by “the old-fashioned word 'wisdom' ”, referring back to the original meaning 
of  philosophia  as the “love of wisdom”.22 Wisdom, he explains, “is no mere accomplishment of the 
isolated personality (this latter  would moreover be an abstraction);  rather it belongs to the cultural 
community  and  to  the  time”23.  Husserl's  qualified  appraisal  of  the  importance  of  historically  and 
culturally  determinate  wisdom,  in  which  knowledge  is  always  bound  up  with  an  individually 
transmitted form of practice24, takes place within a clear division of labor and an anterior delineation of 
epistemological  boundaries  between science and philosophy as wisdom. Since he flatly rejects  the 
historicist  approach to  philosophy as equally relativizing and flawed as the naturalist  one,  Husserl 
stresses  that  it  is  crucial  for  the  dimension of  wisdom – always  bound up with  particular  places, 
peoples, cultures, and times – not to be confused with the territory of science. Indeed, wisdom should 
“in all honesty relinquish the claim to be a science, and thereby at the same time cease confusing minds 
and  impeding  the  progress  of  scientific  philosophy.”25 The  categorical  separation  of  wisdom from 
science as bound to two markedly different forms of temporality – subject/spirit-dependent and subject-
invariant respectively – suggests that rather than positioning himself against the complete dissolution of 
intersubjectively and culturally transmitted knowledge as wisdom into the homogeneous “eternity” of 
science after the manner  of the Chinese “metaphysicians”,  Husserl  is  much more concerned about 
keeping  the  “profundity”  of  wisdom26 safely  contained.  What  has  to  be  considered  then,  is  the 
possibility that “wisdom” as a residual category in the differentiation of philosophy and science is as 
much  an  (albeit  largely informal)  part  of  the  modern  disciplinary  categorization  of  knowledge  as 
science  and  philosophy  are,  and  that  this  was  even  the  case  for  thinkers  who  were  a  lot  more 
sympathetic to the cause of wisdom than Husserl was.27 
22 Husserl, 1981, pp.189-190.
23 Husserl, 1981, p.189.
24 Husserl, 1981, p.195.
25 Husserl, 1981, p.194.
26 Husserl, 1981, p.195.
27 What would be needed for a completer picture is a genuine genealogy of the modern idea of wisdom as a counterconcept  
to both scientific and philosophical knowledge, set in the historical context of colonialism and Orientalism and the 
global spread of modern categorizations of information. In the case of China, this would require investigating how the 
idea of wisdom formulated by pioneers of Orientalism such as Max Müller (1823-1900) was rejected and criticized, or,  
more often,  taken over and reinterpreted by Chinese philosophers  in comparatively forging an identity for  Chinese 
philosophy  and  for  the  specificity  of  Chinese  culture  at  large.  The  works  of  the  itinerant  philosopher  Hermann 
Keyserling (1880-1946), whom I quoted in one of the epigraphs to the previous chapter, such as his Travel Diary of a  
Philosopher  from 1919 (Das Reisetagebuch eines Philosophen,  English translation by J. Holroyd Reece, New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1925) would be an interesting point of departure. Keyserling (凱瑟林 in Chinese), who 
would  now  seem  to  be  reckoned  as  a  minor  and  relatively  unknown  figure  in  early  twentieth-century  European 
philosophy, was greatly appreciated and applauded by both Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan. See Yuh-Cheng Fan,  Tang 
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3.1.2 The tension between identification and differentiation in Xiong's and Tang's outlooks on 
science (knowledge) and philosophy (wisdom)
Unsurprisingly,  most New Confucian philosophers can be located on the opposite side of Husserl's 
elevation of a “rigorously scientific” philosophy above wisdom. They were not only highly concerned 
about  differentiating  and  somehow  keeping  the  peace  between  science  and  philosophy,  but  were 
equally preoccupied with distinguishing Chinese from Western, and Confucianist from Buddhist and 
Daoist thought. For Xiong Shili, who, as I already noted, did not directly participate in the 1923 debate, 
the difference between philosophy and science could be neatly matched onto that between China and 
the West as different and autonomous cultures. This is clear from the text of a lecture entitled Chinese 
Philosophy and Western Science (Zhongguo zhexue yu xiyang kexue 中國哲學與西洋科學 ), which 
Xiong delivered in 1946 to the rather unlikely audience of the privately funded Huanghai Research 
Society for Chemical Industry (Huanghai huaxue gongye yanjiushe黃海化學工業研究社) in Tianjin
天 津 founded  by  the  industrialist  Fan  Xudong 范 旭 东  (1883-1945).28 Like  many  other 
“metaphysicians”  of  a  traditionalist  bent,  Xiong  Shili  did  not  oppose  the  scientific  outlook  and 
enterprise as such, nor did he deny that it was necessary and urgent for China to adopt science and 
technology from the West. He simply believed that such an adoption would never be successful and 
could never have socially beneficial effects without a secure basis in Chinese, and more precisely, 
Confucian learning.29 Xiong argued that in the West, science had initially grown from inquiries into the 
Junyis Synthese chinesischer und westlicher Philosophie, Neuried: Ars Una, 2000, pp.41-43. From Keyserling's Travel  
Diary, it is clear that his Orientalist praise for the “wisdom” of China is often intertwined with condemnations of the 
“Chinaman's” “lack of the capacity for sympathy” (Keyserling, 1925, vol.2, p.36) and tendency towards “superstition” 
(pp.44-45). As such, it often diminishes what it sets out to celebrate in the very same gesture: “Every Chinaman until  
this day, no matter how superficially he may have thought […] demonstrated a deep philosophy in his life; he counted 
the outer world as something truly external and sought essentials in other dimensions. In Europe only women do this,  
they are accordingly by far the profounder philosophers of life.” (p.56). “Philosophizing is, as it were, unnatural to the  
Chinese, although they lead the most philosophical of all lives; their wisdom expresses itself in what they represent by 
their lives, not by their thoughts about it.” (p.110). In another work, Keyserling revealing states that “ the East has not  
understood its own depth” (quoted in Fan, 2000, p.42). Passages such as the following probably resonated more deeply 
with the New Confucian philosophers: “It becomes clearer to me every day that if China is in need of reform it is not 
because the old system as such, but because the old spirit has disappeared from it.” (Keyserling, 1925, p.86, my italics). 
“[I]t would appear to be the foremost problem of the leaders of New China to invoke the authority of Kung Fu Tse for all 
the reforms which they contemplate. (p.88). “A regeneration of China, I am convinced, is conceivable only in the spirit  
of Confucianism. May God grant that it still possesses the requisite strength”. (p.87, my italics). They may have had 
more  difficulty  stomaching  the  fact  that  Keyserling  immediately  goes  on  to  add:  “Unfortunately,  the  spirit  of 
Confucianism […] is very little suited to renovation.” 
28 Chinese Philosophy and Western Science (Zhongguo zhexue yu xiyang kexue 中國哲學與西洋科學 ),  Shanghai: 
Shanghai shudian chubanshe, [1946] 2005.
29 Xiong, [1946], p.123, p.137.
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inner workings of nature under the impetus of an objectively oriented Greek philosophy, eventually 
leading to an instrumental domination and exploitation of the natural world in centuries to come. From 
the above-mentioned text, it immediately becomes clear that he stresses the historical origins of science 
in philosophical thought in order to subordinate science to philosophy, the latter continuing to serve as 
the root (根荄) for science even after scientific and philosophical rationalities had become separated as 
distinct  forms  of  knowledge  with  their  own methods,  vocabularies,  and  purposes.30 In  a  by  now 
probably somewhat more familiar twist, Xiong claimed that the fact that China had never developed 
modern science could be explained as a result of a decline and a rupture in the transmission of the 
authentic teachings of Confucius concentrated in the Yijing 易經, a decline already setting in with the 
establishment  of  the  unified  Qin  empire  and continuing  with  the  rise  of  a  distorted,  authoritarian 
Confucianism in the Han dynasty. He further blamed the underdevelopment of scientific learning and 
logical reasoning, the germinal principles of which were in his view already fully present in the Book 
of  Changes,  on the influence  of  Daoist  and Buddhist  teachings,  with their  putatively escapist  and 
otherworldly orientation. Moreover, Daoism and Buddhism had also prevented a practically effective 
and democratic form of “outer kingliness” (waiwang 外王 ) from being installed on the basis of the 
egalitarian philosophy of the Yijing.31 As in the case of Mou Zongsan (see below), Xiong Shili's take on 
science is thus fundamentally related to his understanding of the Chinese political tradition as well as to 
a cultural typology which proceeded from the idea that “Western people are unable to realize that the 
ten thousand things are one self” (西洋人不能會萬物為一己)32. For Xiong, the opposition between 
things and the self (wu wo duiqi 物我對崎)33 had both a scientifically instrumental function as well as 
politically negative effects. He saw an unmistakable link between the scientific focus on establishing 
universal  laws  of  nature  in  an  objectifying  manner  and  the  domination  of  society  and  collective 
relations over the individual and subjective freedom.34 The epistemological conditions and social and 
moral consequences of science and politics are thus already fundamentally interrelated in Xiong's texts. 
30 Xiong, [1946], p.124.
31 Xiong, [1946],  p.124, p.146. “The learning of the inner sage and the outer king are both fully present in the Book of  
Changes” (內聖外王之學皆備於《易》). Xiong, Originary Confucianism (Yuanru原儒), Shanghai: Shanghai shudian 
chubanshe, [1956] 2009, p.317. For Xiong's criticism of the ontological-political deficiencies of Daoist and Buddhist  
thought, see his Explanation of Qian and Kun (Qiankun yan 乾坤衍), Shanghai: Shanghai shudian chubanshe, [1961] 
2009,pp.89-92 and Xiong, [1956], pp.108-111.
32 Xiong, [1946], p.129.
33 Xiong, [1946], p.129.
34 Xiong, [1946], p.139.
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In his later works dating from the 1950s and 60s, Xiong Shili,  who had continued residing on the  
mainland after the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949, engaged in a highly controversial, 
though  not  entirely  novel,  reinterpretation  of  the  Confucian  political  tradition  by  representing 
Confucius as a revolutionary social  critic and a champion of freedom instead of as a conservative 
transmitter. The influence of Kang Youwei's seminal  Treatise on Confucius as a Reformer  (Kongzi  
gaizhi lun 孔子改制論) from 1897, a text which Xiong took issue with as far as some of Kang's more 
specific philological and philosophical claims were concerned, is unmistakable in these writings.35 In 
his  Explanation of [the Trigrams] Qian [Heaven] and Kun [Earth]  (Qiankun yan  乾坤衍 ), Xiong 
introduces a polemical distinction between “Confucians of the Limited Unity” (xiaokang zhi ru 小康之
儒) and “Confucians of the Great Way” (dadao zhi ru大道之儒), a distinction which is intended to 
keep Confucianism from being associated with imperial  “feudalism” and the  zongfa 宗法  (“clan-
centered) system.36 For Xiong, the first were the followers of an earlier phase in Confucius's thought, 
developed  when  the  Master  was  still  an  autocratic,  ritualistic,  and  conservative  transmitter  of  the 
example of the Zhou dynasty. These conservatives distorted the original texts for their own political 
purposes. According to Xiong, damaging interpolations had already crept into the texts of the canonical 
classics (jing 經) even before the Han dynasty. From this perspective, Xiong vehemently condemns the 
institutionalization of the “three bonds” (sangang 三綱 ,between ruler and servant,  father  and son, 
husband and wife) and the “legalistic” version of the “five constant virtues” (wuchang 五常)37 which 
took place during this period. In his view, the sangang and the wuchang were not originally Confucian 
at  all,  but  served  as  instruments  of  socio-political  oppression  custom-designed  by  renegade 
opportunists  attempting  to  legitimate  imperial  power  and  tyranny.  He  takes  them  for  Han-time 
distortions of Confucius's egalitarian philosophy resulting in an undue extension of filial piety (xiao孝) 
to the ruler (zhong jun忠君). This authoritarian deviation from the Confucian Way was first transmitted 
from the  Master's  (bad)  student  Zengzi 曾子 ,  to  whom authorship  of  the  Classic  of  Filial  Piety  
(Xiaojing 孝經 ) is  traditionally ascribed, to Mencius 孟子 ,  who repressively stressed hierarchical 
divisions in society by maintaing that “some labor with their physical power, while others labor with 
their minds; the latter govern and the former are governed” (或勞心，或勞力；勞心者治人，勞力者
35 See Xiong's Originary Confucianism (Yuanru原儒), Shanghai: Shanghai shudian chubanshe, [1956] 2009, pp.16-96.
36 See Xiong, [1961], pp.3-118.
37 Humaneness (ren 仁), righteousness (yi 義), ritual propriety (li 禮), wisdom (zhi智), integrity (xin信).
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治於人 ).38 Xiong Shili criticizes these “petty Confucians” (xiaoru 小儒 ) for mistaking the idea of 
xiaokang 小康 (“moderate prosperity”, recently invoked as a slogan by the Hu Jintao administration in 
the PRC) in the  Liyun 禮運 chapter of the  Book of Rites (Liji 禮記 ) – a chapter which according to 
Xiong once formed a separate canonical text authored by Confucius, called the Liyunjing 禮運經39–
for  a  prescriptive  and  normative  conception,  instead  of  as  Confucius's  covert  criticism of  a  self-
centered society where everyone only takes care of himself and his own. According to Xiong, unlike 
the authoritarian “petty Confucians”, the “Confucians of the Great Way” were followers of the later 
Confucius, the compiler of the  Yijing  who had stressed permanent change and revolution instead of 
conservative restoration and dictatorial rule. In the eyes of Xiong, a phrase in the Yijing, commenting 
on the trigram (gua卦) “Heaven” (qian乾,  ☰), according to which “the herd of dragons has no leader” 
(群龍無首), is not to be taken solely as an ontological principle (there is no first cause or transcendent  
God among the myriad entities),  but also as representing Confucius's mature ideal of political  and 
social freedom and incarnating “the ultimate principle of the society of the Great Unity” (大同社會之
極則 )40, a society in which any categorical division into rulers and ruled is rejected and overcome.41 
This helps explain why for Xiong, the Six Classics (liujing 六經 ),  which he sees as having been 
composed by Confucius himself, are all centered around the Yijing, as the veritable center of an already 
central matrix of thought which can give rise to philosophy, science, as well as politics in modernity.42 
38 See Xiong, [1961], p.54, p.58 and Xiong, [1945], pp.159-160. Translation adapted with modifications from The Works  
of Mencius, translated by James Legge, New York: Dover, 1970, pp.249-250 (3A,4).
39 See Xiong, [1961], p.55.
40 See Xiong, [1956], p.320. Cf. p.333 and Xiong, [1946], p.140.
41 See Xiong, [1961], p.226 and Xiong, [1956], p.20. 
42 The third lecture in his Essential Instructions on the Reading of the Classics is mostly devoted to the Yijing, taking up 
half of the whole work, with the other five classics receiving a much briefer treatment. See Dujing shiyao讀經示要 , 
Shanghai: Shanghai shudian chubanshe, [1945] 2009, pp.231-329. Additionally, Xiong takes the Book of Changes to be 
the origin of all schools of Chinese thought: Daoism is a “side-stream” (biepai 别派) of the Yijing. The Tianzhi 天志
chapter of the Mozi墨子 is derived from the more theistic parts of the Shanghu尚書 and the Shijing 詩經, while Mozi's 
concept of “impartial care” (jian'ai兼愛) is drawn from the Chunqiu 春秋 and the Lunyu 論語. Legalism resulted from a 
misreading of the Chunqiu. See Xiong, [1945], pp.4-5 and pp.146-147. Xiong's revisionist traditionalism challenged the 
common understanding of tradition and was concerned about saving Confucius from his supporters as much as from his  
detractors. His radical reordering of the classical jing was severely criticized, not in the least by former pupils and fellow 
travelers, such as the intellectual historian Xu Fuguan徐復觀. See Chen Shaoming陈少明, “Protecting the Way for the 
Sake of Freedom – Xu Fuguan's Thought, Works, and Character (Wei ziyou er wei dao – Xu Fuguan de sixiang, xueshu  
yu renge 为自由卫道 — 徐复观的思想、学术与人格 ), in Historical Essays on Twentieth-Century Chinese Thought  
(Ershi shiji Zhongguo sixiang shi 二十世纪中国思想史论), edited by Xu Jilin许纪霖, Shanghai: Dongfang chubanshe 
zhongxin, 2000, p.359. The break with Xu Fuguan had already set in because of Xiong's refusal to accept the association 
traditionalist thinkers commonly made between Legalism and communism, a parallel also established by communist 
intellectual historians themselves.  Xiong believed that communism was quite close to Confucianism in its  radically 
egalitarian ideas. See Xiong's  Evaluation of Master Han Fei (Han Feizi pinglun 韓非子評論 ), Shanghai: Shanghai 
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Xiong Shili believed that in order for an egalitarian, democratic political order as well as a socially 
beneficial form of modern science (subordinated to philosophy) to flourish in China on the basis of the 
authentic Confucian tradition, a tradition repressed through the combined forces of dictatorial imperial 
rule, originally non-Chinese or non-Confucian doctrines and teachings (Buddhism and Daoism43), and 
the onslaught of Western capitalism and imperialism44, the philosophical teachings of the Yijing opening 
up onto a vision of the world as a harmonious process of unending transformation would have to be 
rediscovered  and  reinvigorated.  The  epistemological  equivalent  of  the  ideal  of  freedom and  self-
determination he adhered to on a political level can be found in his conceptualization of the mind and 
the subject in relation to the objectifying form of observation he associated with science. 
Let us have a closer look at the line of reasoning behind his idea that science would have to be (re)born 
from the spirit of philosophy. Xiong Shili assumed that unlike science, philosophy presupposed the 
spontaneous power of involvement (zhudongli 主動力 ) of the subject in the active constitution and 
establishment (shishe施設 or sheding 設定) of an “objective” world, or rather of a world of cognitive 
objects which simply would never able to come into being without consciousness. Consciousness has 
to interpose what Xiong, undoubtedly inspired by Kant, called “categories” (fanchou範疇)45, the latter 
counting as “both subjective and objective” (兼屬主客) determinations which can “tailor” (裁制) the 
objective world of experience in function of a perceiving subject that does not merely reflect its objects 
like a mirror or a camera (Xiong's own examples), but actively posits and constructs them.46 Science 
shudian chubanshe, [1949] 2009, p.24-25. From a more general perspective, it would be interesting to investigate the  
post '49 work of traditionalist thinkers who stayed on the mainland after the founding of the PRC, and were often under  
a lot of pressure to recant their former “idealism” (such as in the well-known cases of Feng Youlan 馮友蘭 and Jin 
Yuelin金岳霖). Perhaps in some cases the external pressure to deliver “self-criticism” resulted in more than a forced  
profession of faith in the “truth” of Marxism-Leninism and was a (tragic) opportunity for intellectual creativity, even if  
under considerable constraints. See  Kam Louie,  Inheriting Tradition. Interpretations of the Classical Philosophers in  
Communist China, 1949-1966, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986. 
43 “The  Daoists  tend  to  get  their  understanding  and  experience  of  the  Way  from  within  vacant  stillness.  This  is 
diametrically opposed to the Book of Changes, which allows people to gain insight into essential reality by indicating its 
energetic and transforming function. That is why Laozi presents weakness as useful, and although he is spiteful and 
envious of the ruling classes, he does not dare to take the lead in the world and does not allow for revolution.” (道家偏
向虛靜中去領會道。此與《大易》從剛健與變動的功用上指點、令人於此悟實體者，便極相反。故老氏以柔弱
為用，雖忿嫉統治階層而不敢為天下先，不肯革命).  Treatise on Substance and Function (Tiyong lun體用論), 
Shanghai: Shanghai shudian chubanshe, [1958] 2009, p.5.
44 See Xiong, [1945], p.21, pp.23-24.
45 In his New Treatise on the Uniqueness of Consciousness, Xiong distinguishes five (dual) categories: time and space (時
空), being and non-being (有無), quantity (數量), identity and difference (同異), cause and effect (因果). See Xin weishi  
lun 新唯識論 ),  Changsha: Yuelu shushe, [1932] 2010, pp.227-228, pp.238-242. Xiong claims that Kant could not 
account for the objective applicability of his categories, so that the latter remained purely subjective. 
46 See Cheng Zhihua 程志华 , “Science Originates from Philosophy – Xiong Shili on the Possibility of Science” (Kexue 
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(object) and philosophy (subject) could not be separated for Xiong. This conviction led him to declare 
that “all those who propagate science while dismissing philosophy are not only ignorant of philosophy, 
but actually also have not understood anything about science” (凡揚科學而遂棄哲學者，不獨昧於哲
學，實亦未了科學也 ).”47 At the same time, Xiong placed clear limitations on the pretensions of a 
philosophically grounded science, and these limitations betray that he was only willing to go so far in  
elaborating what has often been characterized as his own radically immanent ontology. His ontological 
anti-dualism based on the inseparability of substance (ti 體 ) and function (yong 用 ) is paired with a 
strictly applied principle of epistemological division which places duality and non-duality in separate 
and restricted fields:48 
No matter how far science progresses and what it is able to reach in its investigations, it will always
ultimately be limited to the external level of the universe (that is, the phenomenal world). In other words,  
[science] investigates the laws behind the mutual connections of all things, but it cannot hope to inquire
into the source of things or into the true characteristic of the universe (true characteristic referring to
substance). Chinese philosophy is grounded in the great Book of Changes, and the guiding thread of this
book is to simultaneously clarify the meaning of the unchanging and of change. That change [arises]
from the unchanging means that substance forms function […] To observe the unchanging within change 
is to know substance through function […] Science only investigates an externally posited world from
the  aspect  of  change,  but  cannot  reach  the  unchanging substance  (“unchanging substance”  being  a
pleonastic expression, since there is no change in substance).49
科學無論如何進步，而其所研究所及，終限於宇宙之表層，即現象界。易言之，即研究一切事物
互相關系間之法則。至於事物之根源或宇宙實相，實相猶云本體。終非科學所能過問。中國哲學
以大《易》為宗，其書綱領在雙闡不易、變易二義。不易而變易是即體成用 [...] 於變易見不
易是即用識體。科學只從變易方面設定為外在世界而研究之，而不易實體，不易實體四字作為復詞用，
yuanchu zhexue – Xiong Shili  lun  kexue  heyi  keneng 科学源出哲学 —  熊十力论科学何以可能 ),  2013, 
http://www.guoxue.com/?p=9931. 
47 Xiong, [1946], p.128. Cf. Xiong, [1932], p.174.
48 Chang Hao, “New Confucianism and the Intellectual Crisis of Contemporary China”, in The Limits of Change. Essays  
on Conservative Alternatives in Republican China, edited by Charlotte Furth, Cambridge (Mass.) and London: Harvard 
University Press, 1976, pp.284-285: “Although Hsiung insisted on philosophy as a metaphysical monism, his intellectual 
outlook in fact contained a dichotomous view of the world which emphasizes the division between the phenomenal 
realm and the realm of metaphysical reality. Regarding the former realm, the goal of human knowledge is scientific  
truth. As for the latter the efforts to search for scientific truth would be misdirected.” Also see Zheng Jiadong郑家栋, 
Ontology and Method – From Xiong Shili to Mou Zongsan (Benti yu fangfa – cong Xiong Shili dao Mou Zongsan 本体
与方法 — 从熊十力到牟宗三), Shenyang: Liaoning daxue chubanshe, 1992, p.20. 
49 Xiong, [1946], p.128. The passages in between brackets in my translation are set in a smaller font in Xiong's original 
text. 
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實體無變易故。則科學不可涉及。
Xiong stands diametrically opposed to Husserl in adhering to the idea that the dimension of eternity 
and the unchanging is categorically foreclosed to science. He sees temporality and impermanence as 
intrinsically linked to scientific knowledge, the ontological level of an inherently unchanging substance 
being accessible through  wisdom  (zhihui 智慧 )  alone.50 Xiong often renders the distinction between 
scientific knowledge and philosophical wisdom as the difference between knowledge in the strict sense 
of the word, i.e. as the cognition of an external object distinct from and opposed to the subject; and 
wisdom, which does  not  really cognitively relate  itself  to  anything external  but  always  contains  a 
reflective movement through which the subject engages in concerned introspection and thereby returns 
to itself (fanqiu反求, fanji反己)51. “Wisdom is the substance, substance does not know anything yet 
leaves  nothing unknown.  That  it  does not  know anything means that  it  does not dispose over  the 
cognitive capacity to discriminate and analyze concrete things. That it knows everything means that it 
is the source of all cognitive capacities.” (智慧即是本體，本體是無知而無不知。無知者，非預儲
有辨析一切事物之知能故。無不知者，是為一切知能之源 )52.  The challenge for Xiong would 
become to demonstrate how knowledge is dependent on and secondary to wisdom without severing the 
link between the two. 
Traditionally, the idea of wisdom, for example in Daoist and Buddhist thought and practice, or in the 
Dionysian cults  in  ancient  Greece,  has very often been metaphorically linked to  a special  type of 
“ignorance”, as well as to “madness”, or “folly”. There is Zhuangzi's pointed assertion that “knowledge 
that rests in what it does not know is the most accomplished” (知止其所不知，至矣)53. There is the 
well-known case reported by Plato in the  Apology of the wisdom of Socrates, which expressed itself 
through the latter's insight into the depth of his own ignorance.54 For Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464), the 
50 Xiong, [1932], p.63: “Substance is hidden, without shape, and does not have a temporal nature. Substance is everlasting, 
has neither beginning nor end, and does not have a temporal nature” (本體是幽隱的，無形相的，即是沒有空間性的 
[...] 本體是恆久的，無始無終的，是沒有時間性的).
51 See  Jana  Rošker,  “Modern Confucian Synthesis of Qualitative and Quantitative Knowledge: Xiong Shili 熊十力 ” , 
Journal of Chinese Philosophy, vol.36, no.3, 2009b, pp.383-384 and Guo Meihua 郭美华 ,  An Investigation of Xiong 
Shili's Ontological Philosophy (Xiong Shili bentilun zhexue yanjiu 熊十力本体论哲学研究), Chengdu: Bashu shushe, 
2004, pp.161-178.
52 Xiong, [1946], p.135.
53 Translation based on Burton Watson (trans.), The Complete Works of Zhuangzi, New York: Columbia University Press, 
2013, p.14.
54 See Mary Margaret  MacKenzie,  “The Virtues  of  Socratic  Ignorance”,  The Classical  Quarterly,  vol.38, no.2,  1988, 
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mystery of  God and the  Incarnation  could  only be,  if  not  fully fathomed,  than  at  least  somehow 
indicated through a form of “learned ignorance”, paradoxically allowing “the precise truth [to] shine 
incomprehensibly within the darkness of our ignorance”55. In Mahāyāna Buddhism (for example in the 
stanzas and treatises ascribed to Nāgārjuna), there is none of the theologian's qualifying insistence that 
although “in theological matters negations are true and affirmations are inadequate […] nonetheless, 
the  negations  which  remove  the  more  imperfect  things  from the  most  Perfect  are  truer  than  the 
others”56. Instead, in the refusal to make (n)either affirmations (n)or negations captured by Nāgārjuna's 
tetralemmas (x, not x, both x and not x, neither x nor not x)57, what remains is the idea of a more radical 
non-duality between ignorance and enlightenment, or between saṃsāra (lunhui輪回) – the world of an 
endless cycle of impermanence, rebirth, and suffering – and the “realm” or perhaps rather “state” of 
nirvāṇa (nieban 涅槃 )  where all karmic consequences have been extinguished (or have never even 
arisen to begin with58). Very broadly speaking, the difference between ordinary or even specialized 
technical and theoretical knowledge on the one hand, and wisdom on the other essentially hinges on 
what could be called a difference in orientation: what Xiong Shili called the cognitively, logically, and 
experientially mediated “pursuit of the external” (外驰) as opposed to a direct, practical, and intuitive 
“insight into one's own true self” ( 真的自己底覺悟 )59, or “outbound” and “inbound” knowledge 
respectively.  As  such,  wisdom can  be  understood  as  referring  not  only  to  the  ability  to  know or 
accomplish certain things by means of either a natural or an acquired outlook or know-how, but above 
all to a reflexive capacity of self-observation resulting in knowledge concerning what one does and 
does not know, a capacity which in turn enables the subject to act wisely in function of the limitations 
of his or her knowledge. Once the necessity of engaging with and retroactively applying categories 
such as science, philosophy, religion, and politics to tradition enters the picture however, the functional 
differentiation of modern society and the factual operative autonomy of its subsystems complicate the 
relation between the paradoxical “ignorance” of subject-oriented wisdom and “outbound” knowledge 
in a different way. The problem of distinguishing wisdom from knowledge by placing limits on what 
one can know and acting wisely by respecting these limitations is coupled to the equally dire need to 
pp.331-350.
55 Nicholas of Cusa,  De Docta Ignorantia, translated by Jasper Hopkins, Minneapolis:  Arthur J. Banning Press, [1440] 
1981, p.46 (online edition available at jasper-hopkins.info/DI-I-12-2000.pdf). 
56 Nicholas of Cusa, [1440], p.46.
57 a, ￢a, a  ∧￢a, ￢(a  ∨￢a). 
58 See Seng Zhao's 僧肇 (c.378–413) Treatise on the Immobility of Things (Wu bu qian lun 物不遷論), in Chao Lun. The 
Treatises of Seng-chao, translated by Walter Liebenthal, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1968, pp.45-53. 
59 Xiong, [1932], p.5.
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reconcile wisdom with knowledge, which, in Husserl's case at least, meant limiting the pretensions of  
wisdom as well. It is no longer enough to say that wisdom is a check on the ambitions of (secular, 
commonsensical, scientific) knowledge when it is the information generated by science which already 
severely limits the domain of objects and affairs (Liang Qichao's exceptional “small part” of things 
which matters much more than the norm) that is left for wisdom to be wise about. Consequently, the 
question can arise whether it is perhaps not unwise to let wisdom meddle in the affairs of science. Even 
when the act of limiting the pretensions of wisdom is interpreted as being intrinsic to wisdom itself (as 
knowing what one does not or cannot know) by referring to the traditional reflexivity of wisdom, the 
problem remains that the “ignorance” produced or presupposed by science (for example in the idea of 
falsifiability)  is  of  a  different  nature  than  the  self-conscious  “ignorance”  through  which  wisdom 
functions. Scientific knowledge constantly alters the expectations concerning what it can or might one 
day  come  to  know  as  it  is  produced  and  disseminated,  turning  categorical  limits  (“never”)  into 
problems to be resolved through time (“not yet”). This means that the negatively designated category of 
the “never” foreclosed to science can shrink in and over time. The double need for differentiation as 
well  as  identification  also  entails  that  the  semantics  of  wisdom  can  begin  to  take  on  certain 
characteristics ascribed to  the scientific  form of observation.  For Tang Junyi,  who was very much 
influenced by Xiong Shili on this point, wisdom is always bound up with concrete situations instead of 
abstract generalities, expresses itself in a form of knowledge that works immanently in function of a 
given state of affairs in all its specificity, and, contrary to science, does not operate on the basis of a 
disinterested, detached mode of knowing characterized by abstraction and logical reasoning. However, 
for  Tang,  it  was  equally  crucial  to  make  sure  that  wisdom does  not  get  all  too  mixed  up  in  or  
contaminated  by  the  concreteness  it  takes  into  full  consideration  in  making  wise  judgments  and 
decisions.60 Otherwise, the subject that practically (morally)  transforms itself  by engaging with the 
world through wisdom would run the risk of becoming completely equalized with (tonghua 同化) and 
reified to (wuhua 物化) the level of particularity and concreteness with which it is concerned and with 
which it “resonates” (ganying 感應 ). As a consequence, it would turn into a subject that “forgets its 
own existence” (忘其自身之存在) instead of keeping a necessary (minimal, but irreducible) distance 
to the objective world allowing it to “clearly overlook concrete things [while] remaining above and free 
60 See the appendix entitled “Wisdom and Morality” (道德與智慧) to Tang's The Establishment of a Moral Self (Daode 
ziwo zhi jianli 道德自我之建立), [1963] reprinted in Three Books on Human Existence (Rensheng sanshu 人生三書), 
Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2005, pp.112-141.
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from them” (昭臨超拔於具體事物之上).61 The detachment Tang attributed to the scientific mode of 
observation, where it entails a functional “self-forgetfulness” ruling out the possibility of the observer 
standing in his  own line of sight,  is  thus at  the same time the transcendental quality or procedure 
enabling the wise subject to know and act wisely without forgetting itself. 
What is left largely unanswered in Xiong's work as well as in that of Tang, and what would be much 
more  elaborately theorized by Mou Zongsan as  we will  see in  the second part  of  this  chapter,  is 
precisely  how  wisdom  as  a  form  of  unmediated,  “inbound”  knowledge  is  related  to  a  mode  of 
“outbound” knowing characterized by opposition and mediation. In his reply to a letter  from Tang 
Junyi, who had queried his teacher as to how one should understand the relation and the possible unity 
of scientific and metaphysical knowledge and truth, Xiong wrote to his student that
if one attaches oneself to the realm of phenomena as actually existing, one cannot observe substance.
Therefore,  it  is  crucial  to  brush  aside  [phenomenal]  characteristics62.  But  on  the  other  hand,  it  is
absolutely necessary to establish a phenomenal world. Otherwise, the universe which we inhabit in our
everyday lives, that is to say the realm of experience, cannot be established. In that case, our knowledge
would find no place to be settled, and science would become impossible.63 
若執取現象界為實在者，即不能見體。故非掃相不可。然另一方面，卻必須施設現象界。否則吾
人所日常生活之宇宙，即經驗界，不得成立。 因之，吾人知識無安足處所，即科學為不可能。
Philosophy must serve as the foundation for science and keep it in check while at the same time making 
sure not to completely override the latter's relative autonomy. The priority of “knowledge of essential 
nature”  (xingzhi 性智 )  appertaining  to  the  “original  mind”  (benxin 本心 )  over  the  “quantitative 
knowledge” (liangzhi量智) characterizing the “habituated mind” (xixin 习心)64 of sense perception65 
61 See Tang, [1963], p.133.
62 Soothill  glosses  the Buddhist  term 相 (xiang,  lakṣaṇa) as  “distinctive  mark,  sign,  indication,  characteristic”.  See  A 
Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2003, p.309.
63 “Scientific Truth and Metaphysical Truth (A Reply to Tang Junyi)” (Kexue zhenli yu xuanxue zhenli (da Tang Junyi) 科
學真理與玄學真理（答唐君毅）), [1936b] in The Complete Works of Xiong Shili (Xiong Shili quanji 熊十力全集), 
Wuhan: Hubei jiaoyu chubanshe, 2001, vol.8, pp.133-134. Cf. p.142: “Truth in the metaphysical sense has the same 
meaning as “essential reality”. The term “truth” in “scientific truth” designates the laws of concrete things. The former 
[…] is absolute reality, the reality of the latter […] is restricted to the world of experience.” (玄學上真理一詞，乃為實
體之代語。科學上真理一詞，即謂事物間的法則。前者[...]為絕對真實，後者[...]之真實性，祗限於經驗界).
64 Translation taken over from Rošker, 2009b, p.381.
65 See Xiong, [1932], pp.3-10.
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should not inhibit the emergence of the latter. In the end however, we are left with the vague indication 
that “wisdom is the root and source, whereas cognitive capacities are the streams and the offshoots” (智
慧為本為源，知能為流為末 )66 and, in Tang's case, with the idea of a plurality of mutually non-
exclusive  perspectives  that  are  not,  as  in  Mou's  case,  systematically  unified  in  an  elaborate 
transcendental account.67 In other words, the problem Mou Zongsan tried to further address was that of 
–  in  a  reversal  of  the  traditional  Buddhist  idea  of  transforming the  attachments  of  cognition  into 
enlightened wisdom (轉識成智) – “transforming wisdom into knowledge” (轉智成識). 
At the same time, Xiong Shili's and Tang Junyi's take on the relation between scientific knowledge and 
philosophical wisdom points towards a basic aspect and feature of their work which Mou shared in 
common with them, namely a paradoxical  wavering between transcendence and immanence and a 
constant  oscillation  between  identity  and  difference.  Within  the  philosophical  framework  of  the 
“horizons of the mind” (xinling jingjie 心靈境界) articulated in his final work completed a year before 
his death in 1977 – Life, Existence, and the Horizons of the Mind (Shengming cunzai yu xinling jingjie
生命存在與心靈境界 )  –  Tang  analyzed  the  socially  disastrous  consequences  of  science  and 
technology, symbolized by the invention of the atomic bomb68, as resulting from the “regressive” (下
轉) and “externalizing” (外轉) extension of the (fifth) “horizon of detached observation” (guanzhao 
lingxu jing觀照凌虛境)69 in which mathematical, geometrical, and logical knowledge are formed, to 
the external, sensible world. This regressive application had resulted in both a theoretical and a factual 
relapse of human beings to the lowest horizon of “the scatteredness of the ten thousand things” (wanwu 
sanshu jing 萬物散殊境), in which only atomized singularities (wei yi wu er 唯一無二) remain. For 
Tang, this lowest sphere of perception and being also had a political dimension, designating the purely 
negative, abstract, and indeterminate freedom of “self-enclosed” (ziwo fengbi 自我封閉 ) individuals 
66 Xiong, [1946], p.134.
67 According to King Pong Chiu, Tang's appropriation of the Buddhist method of doctrinal classification (panjiao判教) 
was instrumental in epistemologically accommodating the scientific worldview, while at the same time restricting its  
validity to a carefully circumscribed set of objects. See Thomé H. Fang, Tang Junyi, and the Appropriation of Huayan  
Thought, Doctoral Dissertation, University of Manchester, 2014, pp.145-147, pp.179-184.
68 See Tang, [1977], pp.661-663.
69 A more literal translation would be “the sphere of the observation of pure emptiness”, but this hardly captures Tang's  
meaning.  What  Tang  describes  here  is  a  sphere  of  “pure  knowledge”  ( 純粹知識 )  devoid  of  any  questions  of 
applicability, in which the mind is only directed towards meaning (意義) and the characteristics (相) of cognitive and 
logical objects, and is detached from the objective world accessible through sense perception. 
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whose  liberty  can  only take  the  form of  an  isolation  from the  bonds  of  family,  community,  and 
culture.70 However,  the  fact  that  for  Tang,  all  the  epistemological,  ontological,  cosmological,  and 
ethical  perspectives  which  develop  from one  horizon  to  the  next  have  to  be  realized  through  an 
“unending processional sequence” (無窮之歷程次序) asymptotically bridging the gap between the is 
(shiran 實然) and the ought (dangran 當然)71 means that all these fields of apprehension have to be 
preserved and not abolished, or as he puts it, “swallowed up” (吞沒 )72 in its highest stage, i.e. the 
Confucian “horizon of the flow of heavenly virtue” (tiande liuxing jing 天德流行境), where subject 
and object finally cease being “hostile entities” (敵體 )73. In relation to the problem of science, this 
means that  the possibility of  an undue extension of one horizon (e.g.  of scientific  observation)  to 
“objects” that do not belong to it and over which it should have no say (e.g. ethical relations) can only 
be kept in check by asserting a dialectically articulated form of hierarchical division that ensures that 
the higher stages of development (the last  three horizons in which the subject-object dichotomy is 
overcome in Christianity, Buddhism, and Confucianism)74 have a form of transcendental dominion over 
the spheres of perception which focus exclusively on either the objective or the subjective: “All lower 
levels of the mind are unaware of the fact that there are higher levels. Higher stages of the mind 
however, are necessarily aware of the fact that there are lower stages” (凡低層位之心皆不知有高一層
位之心。而高一層位之心，則必知有低一層位之心)75. As I will try to show in the next subsection, 
this  tension  between  the  demands  of  a  form  of  philosophical  systematicity  and  non-reductive 
“inclusiveness” or “encompassiveness” (baohan)  able  to accommodate science as an (objectifying) 
perspective on the one hand, and the goal of safeguarding the purity of consciousness and spirit, even 
in the form of a wisdom which is always oriented towards the particular and the concrete, from what 
Kant called the “pathological” on the other, is already clearly discernible in the philosophy of Xiong 
Shili and was inherited in a distinct form by both of his pupils. 
70 See Tang, [1977], pp.662-664.
71 Tang, [1977], p.684.
72 Tang, [1977], p.695.
73 Tang, [1977], p.2. Tang writes that the Chinese words for subject (zhu 主, “host”) and object (ke客, “guest”) are already 
the mark of a form of what we might call “epistemological hospitality”. 
74 Tang calls these the “horizons of the transcendence of subjectivity and objectivity” (超主觀客觀境), “horizons which 
are neither subjective nor objective” (非主非客境), “absolute horizons” (絕對境) or “metaphysical horizons” (形上境). 
See Tang, [1977], p.396.
75 Tang, [1977], p.4.
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3.1.3 Lopsided identities in the philosophy of Xiong Shili
As is generally known, Xiong Shili started out as a student of the Indian school of Yogācāra (Yuqie瑜
伽) Buddhism under the guidance of Ouyang Jingwu 歐陽竟無 (1871-1943)76, who at the turn of the 
twentieth  century  was  the  most  prominent  exponent  of  the  school  of  “consciousness-only” 
(vijñaptimātra, weishi唯識), or “dharma-characteristics” (dharmalakṣaṇa, faxiang 法相). This current 
of Buddhist thought and practice, after having lost most of its institutional and doctrinal standing in 
China since the Yuan元 dynasty (1279-1368), went through a remarkable Chinese revival from the end 
of the nineteenth century onwards, not in the least because of its perceived theoretical proximity to 
modern logical methods, epistemology, and psychology.77 Traditionally, Yogācāra Buddhism had been 
centered on yogic meditation and carrying out subtle epistemological and logical analyses in function 
of the broader soteriological goal of the Buddhist doctrine, that is to say, of transforming cognitive 
delusions and attachments into enlightened wisdom. In the context of the school of consciousness-only,  
“epistemology” is thus only admissible as a designation if one keeps the underlying practical dimension 
of these analyses in mind.78 Xiong Shili's encounter with the intricate theoretical edifice of Yogācāra 
Buddhism gradually gave way to a conversion to  a Confucianist  outlook drawn from the  Book of  
Changes  and led him to the composition of his magnum opus, the  Xin weishi lun 新唯識論 , which 
grew from a commentary on Xuanzang's玄奘 (602–664) Treatise on the Perfection of Consciousness-
only (Cheng weishi lun 成唯識論). The appearance of the first edition in 1932 resulted in protracted 
polemics with his former teachers and colleagues at the China Inner Learning Institute (Zhina neixue 
76 See Edward F. Connelly, Xiong Shili and His Critique of Yogācāra Buddhism, Phd Dissertation, Australian National 
University, pp.24-26 and John Makeham, “Xiong Shili's Critique of Yogācāra Thought in the Context of his Constructive 
Philosophy”, in Makeham (ed.), 2014, p.242. 
77 See the fascinating contributions to a recent volume edited by John Makeham: Transforming Consciousness: Yogācāra  
Thought in Modern China, New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. On the relation between Yogācāra and science 
specifically see Erik J. Hammerstrom, “Yogācāra and Science in the 1920s: the Wuchang School's Approach to Modern 
Mind Science”, on pp.170-197 and Huayu Chen, “Wang Enyang’s Response to Modern Science in the Early Twentieth 
Century”, Hsi Lai Journal of Humanistic Buddhism, 8, 2007, pp.222-241.
78 Of crucial importance in Yogācāra thought was working out the complex relations and interrelations between the 5 forms 
of  sensory  (visual,  auditory,  olfactory,  gustatory,  tactile)  and  cognitive  consciousness  on  the  one  hand,  and  a 
“storehouse-consciousness”/“seed-consciousness” (ālāyavijñāna, alaiyeshi阿賴耶識, zangshi藏識 or zhongzhishi種子
識) on the other. The assumption was that the storehouse-consciousness is “perfumed” (vāsanā, xunxi薰习) by the other 
modes of consciousness and gathers the results of karmically charged actions as “seeds” (bīja,  zhongzi 種子 ) within 
itself, thus giving rise to a “deluded mind” (kliṣṭamanas,  monashi末那識) and the illusion of a permanent self which 
causes attachment and impedes salvation from the cycle of rebirth and suffering. See Bart Dessein and Ann Heirman, 
Boeddha, zijn Leer en zijn Gemeenschap [The Buddha, his Teaching, and his Community], Gent: Academia Press, 2005, 
pp.184-185. 
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yuan支那內學院) in Nanjing, with refutations (破) and refutations of refutations (破破) going back 
and forth.79 
In the text of this treatise, the renegade Buddhist Xiong is immediately very clear on the fact that the 
character 唯  (wei)  in  the title  of his  most  important  philosophical  work does not  mean “only” or 
“alone” (du 獨 ),  but  rather  “unique” or “particular” (teshu 特殊 ).80 Not  wholly unlike traditional 
Yogācāra philosophy, he does not want to propagate the idea that there is literally only subjective 
consciousness (as in the case of solipsism) or that there is no external reality outside of the mind, as is  
implied by the routine but misleading translation of his Xin weishi lun 新唯識論 as New Treatise on 
Consciousness-only, but simply that consciousness is “unique” in being inextricably involved in the 
constitution of an “objective” world. The mind (xin 心 ) and its object-horizon (jing 境 )81 are “two 
different aspects of a single totality” (一個整體的不同的兩方面)82, inextricably linked together in “a 
totality which contains an internal contradictory development” (具有內在矛盾的發展底整體)83. The 
following  passage  can  stand  as  a  summary  of  what  Xiong  is  up  to  in  his  New Treatise  on  the  
Uniqueness of Consciousness84:
Speaking of the uniqueness of consciousness is only meant to do away with the erroneous view that
there  are  horizons  external  [to  consciousness],  it  certainly does  not  mean  that  there  are  no  object-
horizons  at  all85,  but  because  these  are  not  present  independently  from the  mind,  I  speak  of  the
uniqueness of consciousness […] The mind is what differentiates, whereas the object-horizon is  the
differentiated aspect, the latter can only appear in the presence of the former, [which is why] one should
79 See the texts collected in The Modern Struggle between Confucianism and Buddhism (Xiandai ru fo zhi zheng現代儒佛
之争), compiled by Lin Anwu 林安梧, Taibei: Mingwen shudian, 1990. Xiong himself claimed to be more interested in 
the truth than in petty quarrels and rivalries between Buddhists and Confucianists. See Xiong, [1932], p.140.
80 Xiong, [1932], p.6 (preface). Also see Connelly, 1978, pp.74-75 and Makeham, 2014, p.248 and footnote 18 on the same 
page.
81 The Buddhist term,境 jing  (visaya  in Sanskrit) refers to a “sphere” or “object” of consciousness in general. See  The 
Princeton Dictionary of Buddhism, edited by Robert E. Buswell Jr. and Donald S. Lopez Jr., Princeton (New Jersey): 
Princeton University Press, 2013, p.981.
82 Xiong, [1932], p.15.
83 Xiong, [1932], p.24. Cf. p.180.
84 John Makeham's complete English translation in which the title is rendered in this way is due to appear in 2015.
85 “Saying that there are no external object-horizons does not at all imply that they do not exist. You should know that  
people who cling to the existence of external horizons do not come to this attachment out of thin air; it is only because a  
horizon is present that they can start to differentiate it from the mind in the first place and take it for something that exist 
externally to the mind” (說無外境，並不謂境無。須知，執有外境的人，也不是憑空能起這種執的，因為有當前
的境，他才依著此境而起心分別，以為這個境是離我的心而外在的). Xiong, [1932], p.29.
233
speak of the uniqueness of the mind, and not of the object-horizon.86 
唯識的說法，但斥破有外境的妄見，並不謂境是無的，因為境非離心獨在，故說唯識。[...] 心是
了別的方面，境是被了別的方面，境必待心而始呈現。應說唯心，不言唯境。
What Xiong Shili radically objects to in the Yogācāra school of Buddhism initiated between the 4 th and 
5th century CE by the half-brothers Asanga無著 and Vasubandhu 世親87 is the fact that they had in his 
view  erroneously  transformed  the  core  Buddhist  doctrine  of  conditioned  or  co-dependent  arising 
(pratītyasamutpāda, yuanqi 緣起) – according to which all entities are devoid of self-nature (svabhāva, 
zixing 自性) since karmic conditioning rules out the self-sufficient existence of individual beings and 
even that  of  constituent  elements  of  being  (dharmas,  fa 法 )  –  into  a  theory with  a  “constructive 
meaning” (構造的意義). As a result, the causes and conditions actually precluding the possibility of 
self-nature came to acquire a positive meaning as irreducible, constitutive factors endowed with an 
irreducible identity of their  own.88 Their  approach,  Xiong thinks,  led to a bifurcation of substance 
(benti 本體 ) and phenomena (xianxiang 現象 ) and resulted in an epistemological attachment to the 
phenomenal  level  which the doctrine of conditioned arising was in his  view precisely designed to 
overcome. In Xiong's philosophy, the ultimate unreality of phenomena as “false characteristics” (虚假
相) that have to be “emptied out” (kong空) thus negatively points towards the fundamental reality of 
the  mind  as  the  source  of  cognitive  discriminations  which  can  be  mistaken  for  ontologically 
“constructive” elements given without the involvement of consciousness.89 In short, one must “break 
through characteristics in order to show essential nature” (破相顯性)90. This also expresses itself in a 
not straightforwardly “cognitive” way. As Xiong explains, “the substance of all things is not a horizon 
external to the mind, meaning that it is not a realm which can be reached through the operations of 
cognition” (一切物的本體，非是離自心外在境界，及非知識所行境界)91. 
86 Xiong, [1932], p.25. This also leads Xiong to the Kantian conclusion that the laws of nature are imposed on rather than 
discovered in reality. See ibid., p.26.
87 See Dessein and Heirman, 2005, p.182.
88 Xiong  Shili  was  a  trenchant  critic  of  the  Yogācāra  theory  of  “seeds”  which  he  saw  as  a  form of  “metaphysical  
pluralism”, or an “amassing theory” (堆集論 ).  See Connelly,  1978, pp.103-106. See Xiong, [1932], pp.19-24 and 
Comprehensive  Explanation  of  Buddhist  Terms  (Fojia  mingxiang  tongshi 佛家名相通釋 ),  Shanghai:  Zhongguo 
dabaikequanshe chubanshe, [1936a] 1985, pp.18-21 for his critique of such “atomism”.
89 See Xiong, [1932], pp.47-50.
90 Xiong, [1932], p.116.
91 Xiong, [1932], p.3.
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Originally Xiong had intended to compose the  New Treatise  in two separate parts: a “discussion of 
cognitive horizons” (jinglun 境論) dealing with issues of ontology and cosmology; and a “discussion of 
quantitative [knowledge]” (lianglun 量論 ) providing an independent theory of knowledge, but only 
managed to complete the first section.92 This does not mean however that there are no epistemological 
considerations to be found in his New Treatise, far from it.93 What is in my view so remarkable about 
this  work  and  about  Xiong  Shili's  philosophy  in  general,  is  that  Xiong  sets  out  to  grasp  the 
inseparability  of  metaphysical  substance  (ti)  and  phenomenal  function  (yong),  and  thus  of  the 
fundamental absence of ontologically charged dichotomies, precisely on the basis of what would at first 
glance appear to be a strictly idealist presupposition, namely that the objectivity and externality of 
reality are constituted “inside” and through the mind alone, or, in Husserl's words, that “objectivity is, 
and  must  manifest  itself  cognitively”.  It  is  fascinating  that  Xiong  chose  to  depart  from  the 
reinterpretation of an outlook completely at odds with the very notion of anything “substantial” in order 
to ground the reality of substance, a process in which he by his own admission “roamed in between 
Buddhism and Confucianism” (游乎佛與儒之間)94. Xiong shows no hesitation whatsoever in declaring 
that the independent existence of objective things is “purely a construction for the practical demands of 
consciousness” (純是意識因實用的需要而構造的 )95.  However,  his  arguments  for  the  basic 
“unreality” of the external world in abstraction from the mind are always articulated in the form of an 
opposition to the illusory hypostasisation of a universe characterized by incessant transformation into a 
fixed and static thing. The oppositional relation between the mind (xin) and its object-horizon (jing) or 
between knower (nengyuan 能緣) and the known (suoyuan所緣)96 as subject and object respectively, is 
thus  overcome  through  the  idea  that  the  epistemological  relations  characterizing  the  “quantitative 
knowledge” of the “habituated mind” (xixin) through which science operates are positively absent from 
the mind in its original state (benxin), the latter expressing itself in the form of wisdom and not as 
knowledge in the strict sense of the word. In other words, epistemological oppositions are secondary to 
92 See Xiong, [1932], p.4 (preface) and Xiong, [1945], p.180. He mentions this incompleteness in his 1936 letter to Tang 
Junyi as well. Also see Liu Junping 劉軍平 and Qing Ping秦平, “Contemporary Chinese Studies of Xiong Shili 熊十
力”, Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy, vol.5, no.1, 2005, pp.166-168.
93 According  to  Liu  Aijun,  Xiong  was  unable  to  finish  the  second  part  of  his  work  because  he  could  not  separate 
epistemological from ontological questions. See Liu Aijun刘爱君, Cognition and Intuitive Knowledge – A Study of Mou  
Zongsan's Epistemological Thought (Shizhi yu zhizhi – Mou Zongsan zhishilun sixiang yanjiu 识知与智知 — 牟宗三
知识论思想研究), Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2008, pp.13-14.
94 Xiong, [1932], p.145. Also see pp.93-94.
95 Xiong, [1932], p.14.
96 See Xiong, [1932], p.37.
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ontological unity. The original mind, as Xiong stresses, “is not something which I can personally claim 
for myself; rather, it is true nature in which I am completely united with the ten thousand things in one 
single substance” (非吾身之所得私也，乃吾與萬物渾然同體之真性也 )97. It is only for the 
habituated mind, which Xiong revealingly describes as “the reifier” (wuhua zhe 物化者)98, that there 
are  “objective” things opposed to  the subject to begin with.  The original  mind on the other  hand, 
“incarnates things without becoming reified by them […] it can command things without becoming 
subordinated to them” (體物而不物於物 [...] 能御物而不役於物也)99. As such, it is not something 
that directly serves a cognitive, but rather an ontological function as the ultimate ground of all reality. 
To the culturalized differentiation between science (West) and philosophy (China), largely along the 
lines  of  the  arguments  put  forward  by  the  metaphysicians  in  the  1923  debate,  Xiong  adds  the 
universalistic  intra-philosophical  distinction  between  epistemology  (knowledge)  and  ontology 
(wisdom). This is what causes Xiong to claim that “the only thing that allows philosophy to stand its  
ground is the fact that ontology cannot be wrested away from philosophy by science” (哲學所以站腳
得住者，只以本體論是科學所奪不去的)100. It also explains why he finds it so disturbing that a great 
deal of modern philosophers “loathe ontology” (厭聞本體論)101. The epistemological subordination of 
objectivity to consciousness, which, when taken to its extreme, could shed doubt on the reality of the 
non-mental world and degrade it to the status of a mere subjective illusion, is thus supplemented with 
an even more fundamental ontological identity of the mind in its pure state with the essential nature 
(xing性) of all entities that can enter into an object-horizon, a place where they can subsequently be 
cognized, doubted, and even denied. 
Within the framework of this tension between epistemology and ontology, there is what one might call  
a  certain  “bias”  at  work inside  the  various  conceptual  identities  Xiong Shili  continuously tries  to 
establish and defend throughout  the  New Treatise,  a  bias  which exceeds that  of  his  programmatic 
assumptions  concerning  the  uniqueness  and  privileged  position  of  the  mind  vis-à-vis  its  object-
horizons. Crucially, this is the case for the fundamental identity of permanence and change102 which 
97 Xiong, [1932], p.8.
98 Xiong, [1932], p.8.
99 Xiong, [1932], p.9.
100Xiong, [1932], p.6. My italics. 
101Xiong, [1958], p.11.
102“If one says that substance is unchanging, then change is already included; if one says that substance is changing, then  
this already includes the unchanging” (若說本題是不變易的，便已涵著變易，若說本體是變易的，便已涵著不變
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Xiong  sees  as  underlying  all  existence  and  the  coming  into  being  of  the  whole  universe.  The 
“permanent transformation” (hengzhuan恆轉) that comes about through a polar cosmological process 
of interaction between “contraction”/“closing” (xi翕) and “expansion”/ “opening” (pi闢)103 – as two 
different aspects of a function (identical to substance) that gives rise to matter (wuzhi 物質) and spirit 
(jingshen 精神) respectively – is clearly dependent, not on the changeability, but on the permanence of 
the  identity  of  permanence  and  change,  permanent  transformation  “ultimately  always  remaining 
identitical to its own nature” (畢竟常如其性 )104. As Xiong announces in his preface to the  New 
Treatise to  set  himself  apart  from Hegelian  dialectics, his  intention  is  “to  observe  what  is  truly 
permanent within change, and to recognize harmony within oppositions” (於變易而見”真常，於反
動而識衝和)105. Now Xiong Shili is certainly no run-of-the-mill idealist. He is not willing to introduce 
a  categorical  ontological  separation  between  the  “expansion”  which  gives  rise  to  spirit  and  the 
“contraction” conditioning the existence of matter and the generation of determinate objects which 
effectively constitutes “the circulation of the great function” (大用的流行 ), even if the latter can at 
times “approximate reification” (近於物化)106 and thus no longer bear the mark of the ceaseless 
change from which it originally came forth. At various instances it becomes clear that he thinks both 
materialism and idealism are partial and biased outlooks that can never hope to grasp the foundational 
identity of substance and function in its various guises.107 Still, his rejection to accord a higher place to 
spiritual  “expansion”  than  to  material  “contraction”108 does  not  prevent  Xiong  from  making  the 
following arguments: 
contraction originally submits to expansion; in other words, contraction [also] has the nature of being
directed upwards [and not only downwards]. This is because contraction is submissive to expansion, and 
since expansion is directed upwards, the same goes for contraction as well […] In summary, contraction
and expansion are fundamentally not separate substances, but simply [designate] a difference in capacity. 
Expansion can only function once there is contraction, and contraction can only begin to circulate after
易了). Xiong, [1932], p.63.
103Interestingly enough,  Xiong was inspired by Yan Fu's  use of these terms from the  Yijing.  Yan saw the process of 
alternation  between  xi  and  pi  as  somehow close  to  modern  conceptions  of  evolution. See  Lin Zhenguo 林鎮國 , 
Emptiness and Modernity (Kongxing yu xiandaixing空性與現代性), Taibei: Wenxu wenhua shiye, 1999, pp.79-80.
104Xiong, [1932], p.67.
105Xiong, [1932], p.7 (preface). Cf. pp.129-130.
106Xiong, [1932], p.68.
107See for example Xiong, [1958], pp.92-93.
108See Xiong, [1958], p.14, p.73.
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there is an expansion by which it is governed. If there were to be only expansion without contraction,
then there  would just  be an empty vastness without  any concrete  things […] Should there  be only
contraction and no expansion, then that would amount to a complete reification and the universe would
turn into a solidified and dead thing. As a dead thing it would have no force of its own, or in other words, 
it  would not  have  any governing  power  and would be completely mechanical,  whereas  in  fact  the
universe is a totality circulating without any obstruction […] Now expansion may have characteristics,
but it does not have any shape […] it is present everywhere and directed upwards […] it extends and is
full  of  vigor.  Contraction  [on  the  other  hand]  is  shaped,  has  a  [determinate]  place  […]  and  [is
characterized by] a tendency to sag downwards. In this sense, the force of contraction runs contrary to
substance [as the unity of contraction and expansion]109 […] expansion [alone] may not be identical to
substance […]110 but  since  it  is  not  reified,  it  arises  from  substance [itself].  It  has  no  shape,  is
omnipresent, is upwardly oriented and so on, precisely because it manifests the self-nature of substance.
In other words, it is [because] substance elects substance to complete its function [...] Only expansion
can truly be called functioning, and even though contraction is also [a part of] function, it cannot be  
named function as far as its reifying aspect is concerned.111
翕本來是順從乎辟的，易言之，翕是具有向上性的。因為翕是順從乎辟，而辟是向上的，則翕亦
是向上的了 […] 總之，翕和辟本非異體，只是勢用之有分殊而已。辟必待翕而後得所運用。翕
必待辟而後見為流行，識主宰。如果只有辟而沒有翕，那便是莽莽蕩蕩，無復有物 […] 如果只
有翕而沒有辟，那便是完全物化，宇宙只是頑固堅凝的死物。既是死物，他也就無有自在的力用，
易言之，即是沒有主宰的勝用，而只是機械的罷了，然而事實上宇宙卻是流行無礙的整體 […]
夫辟，是有相而無形 […] 是無所不在的，是向上的 […] 是伸張的，是猛進的。夫翕，是形成的，
是有方所的 […] 是有下墜的趨勢的。據此說來，翕的勢用是與其本體相反的 […] 而辟雖不即是
本體 […] 卻是不物化的，是依據本體而起的。他之所以為無形，為無所不在，為向上等等者，
這正是本體底自性的顯現。易言之，即是本體舉體成用 […] 唯辟可正名為用，而翕雖亦是用，
但從其物化之一點而言，幾可不名為用矣。
I think passages such as this show that inside of the ontological and cosmological identity of expansive 
spirit and contracted matter, there is still  an elective affinity between the identity of substance and 
function on the one hand, and one of the aspects in which this unity realizes and manifests itself, 
109Cf. Xiong, [1932], p.78 and Xiong, [1958], p.13.
110This and the previous four lacunae in my translation are in-text auto-commentaries in the original text which I have  
omitted for the sake of brevity.
111Xiong, [1932], pp.69-70. Emphasis added. 
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namely the expansion equivalent to mind or spirit, on the other112. This affinity allows Xiong to say 
that, in relation to expansion, contraction is “an instrument it employs” (所運用之具 )113 and that 
“ultimately, expansion contains contraction, and contraction is subordinated to expansion” (辟畢竟是
包涵著翕，而翕究是從屬於辟的)114. Although he declares that neither materialism nor idealism are 
able to simultaneously distinguish  and identify substance and function115, it is hard not to notice that 
Xiong spends a lot more time and effort debunking the materialist misinterpretations of the identity of 
substance and function than the idealist ones. If anything, this tendency becomes perhaps even more 
marked in two of his later works, the Treatise on Substance and Function (Tiyong lun體用論) and the 
Chapter Elucidating the Mind (Ming xin pian 明心篇 ) from 1958 and 1959 respectively,  which are 
sometimes presented as constituting a definitive move towards a complete rejection of dualism and a 
more radical form of ontological monism.116 Why else would he go to the trouble of demonstrating in 
these texts that spirit cannot possibly be a by-product (副產物) of matter, that organic and conscious 
life are not reducible to their material constituents, and indeed even arguing that there cannot be any 
causal relations (yinguo guanxi因果关系) between matter and spirit at all “since there is not a single 
point of similarity between them” (以其決無類似處故耳)?117 The idea that causal connections between 
matter and spirit have to be excluded impossible hinges on a Buddhist-inspired distinction which has 
been  gratefully  employed by New Confucian  thinkers  from Liang  Shuming to  Mou Zongsan and 
beyond, namely between “real causes” (zhengyin正因) or “causes of the same kind” (zileiyin 自類因) 
on the one hand, and “accompanying causes” (pangyin旁因), “auxiliary conditions” (zhuyuan助緣), 
or “external conditions” (waiyuan 外緣) on the other. It is only the former that can be called causes in 
the proper sense of the word.118 I already indicated in the previous chapter that this distinction was 
often bound up with rejections of historical materialism and pleas for the notion of culture as Spirit. For 
Xiong, the difference between causes and conditions primarily has a conceptual function in ruling out 
the possibility of any causal impact of the external conditions of matter on the internal trajectory of 
112Xiong, [1932], p.76.
113Xiong, [1932], p.71.
114Xiong, [1932], p.77.
115See Xiong, [1958], p.92.
116See the previous chapter, page 173, note 317.
117See Xiong, [1958], pp.93-96.
118See Xiong, [1958], pp.95-96 and Chapter Elucidating the Mind (Ming xin pian 明心篇), Shanghai: Shanghai shudian 
chubanshe, [1959] 2009, pp.112-114.
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spirit, and the other way around as well. Matter and spirit can only “gaze at each other” (相望 )119. 
However, in line with the long quote I gave in the above, Xiong proceeds to elucidate the “specificity 
of spirit” (精神之特殊處) in the context of the categorical dissimilarity between the spiritual and the 
material by stressing that unlike matter, spirit is not constrained or “enclosed” (封畛 )120 in any way, 
ultimately supervises, controls, and steers the material dimension, and makes all forms of development 
and evolution possible on a cosmological scale.121 The identity of matter and spirit that is supposed to 
be more essential than their difference remains strictly asymmetrical, and is constituted through its, so 
to speak, conceptually “protruding” side.122 At the same time, Xiong himself is the first to insist in these 
very  same  texts  that  the  greatest  error,  especially  prevalent  in  Western  philosophy,  consists  in 
conceiving of essential reality (shiti 實體 ) as something “absolute” (juedui  絕對 ) with a “singular 
nature” (danchunxing單純性). Such assumptions preclude grasping the dynamic “composite nature” 
(fuzaxing复雜性) of metaphysical essence, which actually thrives on its internal contradictions. Still, 
in the end, Xiong resolves these contradictions by appealing to the “containment” or “encompassing” 
(baohan 包涵 )  of  one  of  the  two sides  of  the  distinction  (contraction,  matter)  through the  other 
(expansion, spirit), with only the latter enabling them to be presented as  internal in the first place.123 
My point is not to show that Xiong Shili contradicts himself or is being inconsistent. Nothing is solved 
by calling Epimenides the Cretan a liar. The hierarchical procedure of l'englobement du contraire (“the 
encompassing of contraries”)124 in his work can,  I think, be better  understood when one takes into 
account that the perceived need, resulting from the forceful encounter with the modern categorization 
of knowledge, to differentiate between wisdom and science, distinguish China from the West, and at the 
same  time  join  together  what  thereby comes  to  be  divided  and  opposed,  resulted  in  the  positive 
affirmation of an “inbound” form of knowledge that is designated as the origin of distinctions which it 
must  be able  to  reconcile  and overcome  internally  without  thereby eradicating or  excluding them. 
Already in Xiong's writings, one can see a strong affinity being established between the objectivity of 
“outbound” knowledge and scientific reasoning (an objectivity that is approached with a dominantly 
119Xiong, [1959], p.114.
120Xiong, [1958], p.96.
121Xiong, [1958], pp.99-102. Also see Xiong, [1959], pp.114-118, pp.149-151, p.161.
122As a consequence, Xiong appears as an unabashedly anthropocentric thinker who claimed that  “the position of the 
human race within heaven and earth and the ten thousand things is much like that of the brain within the body” (人類之
在天地萬物中也，殆猶大腦之在人體內). Xiong, [1932], p.254. Cf. Xiong, [1958], p.153. 
123See Xiong, [1959], pp.118-121.
124The expression is by the French anthropologist Louis Dumont (1911-1998). Quoted in and from Luhmann, 2002, p.39.
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pragmatic  and  functional  attitude,  since  wisdom  should  not  override  science,  lest  it  turn  into 
ignorance), and a form objectivity that violates the categorical dependency of knowledge on wisdom 
and on the subject, the latter “reifying” form of objectivity also being tentatively associated with socio-
political pathologies and a reductionism or a force of abstraction that is not so much abstract as it is  
real. This tendency would become much more strongly developed in the work of second generation 
New  Confucians,  where  there  is  a  clear  difference  between  objectification  (Objektivierung, 
duixianghua 對像化) as a “neutral” and functional procedure without which there would be no science, 
and reification (Verdinglichung, wuhua 物化) as the pathological objectification and alienation of what 
is inherently subjective. Of course, this difference did not prevent them from associating objectification 
with alienating reification.125 Admittedly, only objectification is developed into a full-blown concept, 
whereas  the  term reification  remains  in  play  like  a  metaphor  among  concepts  that  changes  their 
historical import. 
3.1.4 The sense of transcendence and the place for spirit in the philosophy of Tang Junyi
The  work  of  Tang  Junyi  offers  another  good  opportunity  to  observe  how  a  certain  internal 
“lopsidedness” continues to accompany many New Confucian assertions of non-duality and identity. 
Roger Ames, who is one of the few prominent Western sinologists to have extensively drawn on the 
modern Confucian's to this day very much understudied philosophy126, has repeatedly presented Tang 
as an avatar for his own notion of a non-individualist Confucian “role ethics”, an ethics which is not 
grounded in an abstract, formal, and rationalistic (“Western”) fashion imploding morality into quasi-
legal criteria (the name of Kant looms large here), but is based on natural family ties and the basic 
125See Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness, London: Merlin Press, 1971, p.xxiv: “[O]bjectification is indeed a 
phenomenon that cannot be eliminated from human life in society. If we bear in mind that every externalization of an  
object  in  practice  (and  hence,  too,  in  work)  is  an  objectification,  that  every  human  expression  including  speech  
objectifies human thoughts and feels, then it is clear that we are dealing with a universal mode of commerce between 
men. And in so far as this is the case, objectification is a neutral phenomenon […] Only when the objectified forms in 
society acquire functions that  bring the essence of man into conflict  with his existence, only when man's nature is 
subjugated, deformed and crippled, can we speak on an objective societal condition of alienation.” Though he was never 
so clear on the matter as the Marxist Lukács,  Mou Zongsan observed a minimal distinction between “natural/normal 
reification” (天然的物化) and “intentional reification” (作意的物化). See “Introspections after a Great Disaster” (Da 
nan hou de fansheng大難後的反省), [1947] in ZW2, pp.989-993. In Tang Junyi's writings, the socially determinate 
dimension of the term wuhua 物化 , linked to a quasi-Weberian idea of rationalization and specialization, is generally 
much more explicit. 
126For a systematic, if somewhat descriptive, study of Tang's oeuvre, see Anja Steinbauer,  Tang Junyis System der neun  
Horizonte des Geistes, Hamburg: Hamburger Sinologische Gesellschaft, 2005.
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human emotions  which  accompany and run  through these intersubjective  relations.127 For  Ames it 
stands  beyond all  doubt  that  “Tang Junyi's  New Confucianism is  not  so  new” 128.  As  far  as  he  is 
concerned, Tang's philosophy positively lacks novelty, though of course not creativity, because of its 
age-old and typically (although one could argue not at all uniquely) Confucian stress on the primordial 
role  of  “family feeling”  as  the  very direct  and tangible  foundation  of  moral  behavior  and ethical 
relations, politics in turn being “a direct extension of the family.”129 The ethical outlook Ames ascribes 
to Tang Junyi is coupled to a somewhat unfounded insistence on the putative absence of ontological 
dualisms and the elaboration of a radical form of anti-substantialism and immanence in the latter's 
philosophical thought.130 What Ames leaves out of consideration in the course of defending his idea of 
role ethics through the medium of Tang Junyi is the fact that what appealed to Tang so much in the 
work of German idealist philosophers such as Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, was precisely what he called 
their stress on the “transcendent character” (chaoyuexing超越性), “all-inclusiveness” (hangaixing涵
蓋性) and “sovereignty” (zhuzaixing 主宰性) of the mind over the objective world as a subjectively 
preconditioned and circumscribed horizon.131 I think it is safe to say that, with the notable exception of 
“morality” and “moral” (daode 道德), “transcendence” (chaoyue超越) is the term one most frequently 
127“Confucian role  ethics  is  not  just  an abstract  theory that  provides  principled  moral  judgments  for  those particular  
problematic situations we might encounter along the way, nor does it give primacy to developing a deliberate, rational  
means to achieve some moral end […] Confucius offers a way of trying to live consummately in family and community 
through achieving relational virtuosity (仁 ) in one's conduct.”  Roger T. Ames,  Confucian Role Ethics: a Vocabulary,  
Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2011, pp.164-165.
128Ames, 2011, p.133.
129Ames, 2011, p.167.
130To make his case, Ames usually refers to one of Tang's earliest pieces of writing, “An Interpretation of the Fundamental 
Spirit of Chinese Culture” (Zhongguo wenhua genben jingshen zhi yi zhong jieshi 中國文化根本精神之一種解釋 ), 
[1935] in Collection of Comparative Essays on Chinese and Western Philosophical Thought (Zhongxi zhexue sixiang zhi  
bijiao lunwen ji 中西哲學思想之比較論文集), vol.11 of TJ, pp.1-40. It seems to me that Ames's definition of what he 
and David Hall call “strict transcendence” is so broad and vague is that could be applied to any explanatory principle,  
regardless of its philosophical leanings, either towards or away from dualism: “Strict transcendence may be understood 
as follows: a principle, A, is transcendent with respect to that, B, which it serves as principle if the meaning or import of  
B cannot be fully analyzed and explained without recourse to A, but the reverse is not the case.”  David L. Hall and 
Roger T. Ames,  Thinking through Confucius, Albany (N.Y.): State University of New York Press, 1987,  p.13. I think 
Christian  Uhl  is  quite  right  to  point  out  in  the  context  of  his  critique  of  poststructuralism that  “[i]n  fact,  every 
explanation is in a way “metaphysical,” since an explanation, in order to be one, has to relate to a deeper reality behind 
what it explains (a reason why), and to what as such is reduced, and degraded to a mere surface phenomenon (such as a 
“superstructure”). Yet, such a hierarchy of depth and surface, of essence and appearance, etc., is precisely what the  
above two-dimensional metaphors—the various “in-betweens,” “third spaces,” “middle zones,” “contact nebulae,” and 
so forth—are designed to deny. They are an expression of the liberal wish to flatten the world. What remains is sheer,  
abundant  diversity and  anarchic  complexity (and  what  can  be  more  anarchic  and  complex  than  a  paradox?).  This 
complexity can be empirically described, and metaphorically depicted;  but it  shall  not  be explained (beware of the 
“hubris of reason”).”
131See Tang, [1951-1952], pp.607-608.
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encounters in reading through Tang's oeuvre, sometimes even ad nauseam.132 Additionally, as we saw 
in the first chapter, for Tang, human beings are not only constituted by their direct intersubjective social 
roles and natural family ties, but also, and I am tempted to say above all, by their relation to a subject of 
a wholly different order, that is to say, to culture as “the God of the Chinese people”. A Chinese person  
cannot really qualify as an individual if he or she is not and does not behave as culturally Chinese as 
well. In this sense, Spirit stands in between the self and the proximate other, interposes itself in the 
relation  of  an  individual  to  himself  or  herself  as  well,  and  mediates  any supposedly  natural  and 
emotional immediacy to a considerable extent in the process. Perhaps a naturalization of culture into a 
quasi-genetic  code  could  restore  immediacy to  subjectivity  and  intersubjectivity,  but  unfortunately 
Tang Junyi's account of culture is an unabashedly lopsided one. Subjects become subjects by virtue of 
Spirit. As far as I can tell, Ames does not really take this problematic dimension of Tang's thought into 
account. 
In  my opinion,  Tang  Junyi  is  a  lot  closer  to  being  an  idiosyncratic  example  of  a  philosopher  of 
transcendental  subjectivity  than  Ames  would  probably  be  willing  to  admit.  There  are  numerous 
indications  that  for  Tang,  intersubjectivity  is  ultimately  but  one  of  the  possible  modalities  of  
transcendence, and not the other way around. As he writes unreservedly: “Transcending the self to 
observe the self is the root of all goodness.” (超越自己以觀自己，乃萬善之本 )133. It has to be 
stressed from the onset  that for Tang, “transcendence” (chaoyue)  is  not merely a  figure of speech 
denoting the overcoming of egotistic self-interest and an ethically pernicious attachment to one's own 
“limited  self”  (xiaoji 小己 ),  but  is  intrinsically linked to  the  faculties  of  consciousness  and self-
consciousness and to ontological differences and gradations that have nothing immanent about them at 
all.  Self-consciousness (zijue 自覺 )  is  made possible  through and reveals transcendence.134 In this 
regard, it is revealing that Tang understands the role of Confucius in the development of the Confucian 
teaching primarily in transcendental terms, by arguing that Confucius self-consciously reformulated 
what had remained a merely unreflective social and ethical framework inherited from the sage kings. In 
the figure of Confucius, Confucianism becomes conscious of the direct ethical relations it had perhaps 
132Thomas Metzger notes that “his writing is fairly redundant, reflecting the religious impulse to return repeatedly to the 
same healing message.”  Thomas A. Metzger,  A Cloud Across the Pacific. Essays on the Clash between Chinese and  
Western Political Theories Today, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2005, p.185.
133Cultural Consciousness and Moral Reason (Wenhua yishi yu daode lixing 文化意識與道德理性), Beijing: Zhongguo 
shehui kexue chubanshe, [1958b] 2005, p.29.
134Tang, [1977], pp.671-672.
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been emphasizing all along.135 Tang does not hide the fact that he  believes it is consciousness that 
serves  as  the  ultimate  assurance  for  the  possibility  of  a  genuinely  moral  life. 136 As  a  result, 
intersubjectivity functions more as an intermediary mechanism for transcendence than as a final station, 
constituting what he calls “an occasion for the broadening and the surpassing of the horizons of one's 
own life” (自己之生活境界之擴大超升之機 )137. In the encounter between different human beings, 
self and other mutually recognize and confirm each other's independent existence as beings that are 
external to each other, and by doing so confirm both each other and themselves as self-conscious, 
moral, and autonomous beings that can subsequently reconnect through the medium of morality, and 
thus again, by way of transcendence.138 The constant point of reference in Tang's works is not so much 
the relation of the self to the other, but rather how the self relates to itself, amongst others through the 
medium of intersubjectivity. As I will indicate in what follows, what is even more primordial for Tang 
than  the  human  subject  is  the  reflexivity  and  a  transcendental  relationality  stemming  from 
transcendence,  a  reflexivity of  which,  at  least  in  Tang's  most  radically  immanent  of  philosophical 
conceptualizations, the subject in turn in a certain sense becomes but another modality. 
Luckily, more straightforward confirmations of the paramount importance Tang attached not to natural 
and unmediated  emotions,  but  to  the  ability of  human beings  to  act  rationally and consciously in 
function of what Kant called “the moral law within” can be found as well. In a concise definition at the 
beginning of his  The Establishment of a Moral Self  (Daode ziwo zhi jianli 道德自我之建立 ), Tang 
states that a moral life consists in “self-consciously controlling oneself through one's own efforts” (自
覺的自己支配自己)139. In a perhaps even more categorical statement, he claims that “what makes a 
moral mindset moral, is that it only relies on its own activity of self-transcendence. It is only when one 
transcends oneself that one can reach other people and the natural world; therefore, it  is only self-
transcendence which constitutes the essence of all forms of a moral mentality” (道德心理之所以成為
道德心理，則唯賴自己超越之活動。才從自己超越，即達於人與自然，故唯此自己超越，為構
135See  The Spiritual Values of Chinese Culture  (Zhongguo wenhua zhi jingshen jiazhi 中國文化之精神價值 ), Guilin: 
Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, [1953b] 2005, p.37.
136See Tang, [1977], pp.348-351.
137Tang, [1977], p.361.
138See Tang, [1977], pp.370-371.
139The Establishment of a Moral Self  (Daode ziwo zhi jianli 道德自我之建立 ),  reprinted in  Three Books on Human 
Existence (Rensheng sanshu 人生三書), Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, [1963] 2005, p.11. Cf. Sequel to 
the Experience of Human Life  (Rensheng zhi tiyan xubian 人生之體驗續篇 ), reprinted in  Three Books on Human 
Existence (Rensheng sanshu 人生三書), Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, [1961c] 2005 p.8. 
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成諸道德心理之本質)140. This also entails that in the eyes of Tang Junyi, even seemingly pedestrian 
activities and habits such as eating, through which “coarse nutrients are transformed into fine cells” (粗
糙的食物，將變成了精致的細胞), somehow count as counterintuitive expressions of the ability of 
human beings to establish a kind of rudimentary connection (goutong 溝通 ) and “interpenetration” 
(huxiang shenrong互相滲融) between self and non-self through which individuals transcend their self-
enclosure.141 It will be clear that in this case, the “non-self” or “other” does not have to be another 
subject at all. If we carry his own line of reasoning to an extreme, Tang would be forced to concur with  
Zhuangzi's daring declaration that the omnipresence of the Way implies accepting that it “is in piss and 
in shit” (在屎溺)142 as well. No doubt, he would only be willing to do so on the condition that urine and 
feces can be reinterpreted as symbolizing and incarnating transcendence in one way or another. For 
Tang, even the existence of hypocrisy and the mere pretense of acting or being moral is a sufficient 
proof for the irreducibility of goodness, since, as he argues, “that human beings are obliged to use 
goodness as a mask proves that they cannot forget about the good” (人們必須以良善為面具，這是證
明了人們是忘不了良善的 ).143 That Tang's arch-enemy Nietzsche could say more or less the same 
thing about horror and monstrosity in Beyond Good and Evil is something I will not dwell on here. The 
obvious problem with what has often be termed Tang's “pan-moralist” approach144 is that the category 
of transcendence provides a totally amoral  criterion. Couldn't one say with equal right that a suicide 
bomber also engages in an act of ultimate “self-transcendence” by relinquishing his earthly existence 
and possessions  in  the service of  a  greater  good,  even if  one takes  the latter  to  be fundamentally 
misguided and his action to be morally despicable? In the end, the ambiguity of transcendence as a 
criterion for morality forces Tang to fall  back on what Hegel called the “empty formalism” of the 
Kantian categorical imperative145 in order to differentiate moral from immoral transcendence. Quite 
often, Tang Junyi sounds very much like a straightforward idealist and an extreme mind-body dualist 
who disparages  the  body as  a  prison inhibiting  the  transcendence  of  the  mind and condemns  the 
shackles of the material world as standing in the way of the realization of goodness. This becomes 
140Tang, [1963], p.28.
141The Experience of Human Life  (Rensheng zhi  tiyan 人生之體驗 ),  reprinted in  Three Books on Human Existence  
(Rensheng sanshu 人生三書 ),  Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, [1944] 2005, pp.45-46. Also see Tang, 
[1963], pp.83-90.
142Burton Watson (trans.), The Complete Works of Zhuangzi, New York: Columbia University Press, 2013, p.128.
143Tang, [1944], p.34.
144See Sin Yee Chan, “Tang Junyi: Moral Idealism and Chinese Culture”, in Contemporary Chinese Philosophy, edited by 
Chung-Ying Cheng and Nicholas Bunnin, Oxford: Blackwell, 2002, pp.305-326.
145See Tang, [1958b], p.315 and Tang, [1961c], p.7 (preface). 
245
rather obvious when he declares that “the true victory of spirit occurs when it raises its brilliant banner 
on top of the enemy's fortress” (精神真正的戰勝，是在它敵人的城堡上，插下他耀目之旗幟)146, 
the enemy and the fortress in question of course being the human body, its physical needs, and material  
desires.147 When talking about “feelings of filial piety” (孝之情 ) for example, what concerned Tang 
most of all was confirming that these kind of feelings “are purely spiritual, and not biological” (純精神
的，非生物性的).148 Commenting on physical love and sexual reproduction, which in his view also 
constitute  instances  of self-transcendence,  Tang notes  that  “the body of the child  is  nothing but  a 
symbolic signifier” (兒子的身體，也只是一象征的符號)149 for the love between husband and wife. 
This  phrase  alone  would  suffice  to  raise  the  question  as  to  how  radically  or  straightforwardly 
“immanent” Tang's ethical and ontological outlook really is. His bottom-line assumption that all human 
activities, and indeed the universe as a whole, are expressions, manifestations, or at least symbolic 
signifiers  of  morality,  value,  and  meaning  presupposes  the  kind  of  metaphysical  and  ontological 
distinctions  Ames  thinks  an  archetypally  Confucian  thinker  such  as  Tang  Junyi  would  be  almost 
automatically averse to. 
Crucially,  bridging  the  gap  between  signifier  and  signified,  unavoidably  introduced  when  the 
evaluation of behavior and actions comes to be predicated on the moral value they express and the 
meaning they symbolize through the attributed quality of transcendence, caused a lot of conceptual 
difficulties for Tang. His highly complex essay “Introduction to the World of Sense” (Yiwei zhi shijie  
daoyan 意味之世界導言) from 1944 warrants our attention in this respect.150 Tang begins this text by 
boldly asserting that 
the whole world is a world of sense. The world is nothing but sense; both spiritual and material entities
of  both  the  higher  and  lower  orders  are  all  identical  to  sense.  From the  standpoint  of  sense,  the
distinctions  between spiritual  and material,  as  well  as  between higher  and lower  seize  to  have any
meaning, nor can one continue to maintain distinctions between all different kinds of entities.151 
146Tang, [1944], p.51.
147Also see Tang, [1961c], pp.21-24 and the whole of his Mind, Matter, and Human Existence (Xinwu yu rensheng 心物與
人生), [1953a] vol.2 of TJ.
148Tang, [1977], p.503.
149Tang, [1944], p.46.
150Introduction to the World of Sense” (Yiwei zhi shijie daoyan 意味之世界導言 ),  in  Collected Philosophical Essays  
(Zhexue lunji 哲學論集), [1943] vol.18 of TJ, pp.93-118.
151Tang, [1943], p.93.
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整個世界即是一意味的世界。世界即是意味，一切精神物質的存在，上界下界的存在，都是意味。
從意味的觀點，也不復有所謂精神、物質，上界、下界之分別，也不復有各種存在之分別。
Remarkably enough, these holistically-sounding and strikingly anti-dualist announcements lead Tang to 
conclusions which are far removed from his own programmatic intentions. That “the world is nothing 
but sense” takes on a whole different meaning in the winding course of this fascinating and mind-
boggling  essay.  Let  us  have  a  look  at  how Tang  arrives  at  these  observations  and  try  to  briefly 
summarize his line of reasoning. He opens his essay by drawing a distinction between “meaning” or 
“reference” (yiyi 意義) on the one hand, and what could be translated as “sense” (yiwei 意味) on the 
other. In short, “meaning” for Tang entails the indication of a discrete object in reality. The “meaning” 
of the word “dog” for example is a particular four-legged, barking, tail-wagging animal referred to by a 
speaker in a certain context. Meaning is therefore tied to a real, concrete object, and is always specific,  
fixed,  and  determinate  insofar  as  what  is  referred  to  in  reality  can  count  as  a  stable  correlate  of 
empirical cognition to which a speaker can refer. Meaning or reference is an “instrument” (gongju工
具 ) and a “symbol” (xiangzheng象微 ) that has to be “transcended” in order for the communicating 
subject to arrive at what is referred to in a certain statement.152 Conversely, inquiring into the meaning 
of a given thing involves leaving behind and overcoming the concreteness and particularity of the 
sensible object that can be signified and meant. According to Tang, if one immediately goes on to apply 
this rudimentary theory of linguistic signification to the world as a totality, by asserting that the whole 
world is nothing but “meaning” (yiyi 意義 ), this would imply that the whole world “should also be 
taken as a symbol, pointing at and referring to another thing, [so that] the entire phenomenal universe 
becomes an emblem for something else” (亦當可當作一符號，而指示引導我們到另外一東西，整
個宇宙現象只是一另外東西的象微 )153. Such an outlook however, is totally unacceptable for Tang, 
since  it  would  transform  the  universe  as  a  totality  of  signifiable  and  signified  things  into  an 
indiscriminate, chaotic mess in which all individual differences are erased and nothing determinate can 
be indicated anymore; leaving only the vague and largely unspecified belief  that  there is  “another 
thing” outside of the ensemble of phenomena referred to by the “emblematic” or “symbolic” universe 
as a whole. That the meaning of the world would come to be located outside of the world itself clashes 
with his anti-dualist intentions and would turn the entire world into a mere stand-in for another, wholly 
152See Tang, [1943], pp.93-94.
153Tang, [1943], p.94.
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unknowable realm divorced from the immanence of subjective life. If the whole world is turned into 
“meaning”,  it  becomes a  meaningless signifier  for an indeterminate referent.  Allow me to note in 
passing that the abstract equivalence resulting from this totalization of the world into a bare signifier 
bears  an  uncanny  resemblance  to  the  operational  logic  of  capital  analyzed  by  Marx.  From  this 
perspective, it is obviously not meaning as exchange value, but rather as a form of irreducible intrinsic 
value Tang Junyi is after; a value where all distinctions would fall away in a different manner, that is to 
say, in which they are not effaced and made equivalent but positively sublated. This is what leads Tang 
to the introduction of the term “sense” (yiwei 意味), which he does not directly define but describes as 
“an appreciation of a meaning that has not yet been [fully] cognized” (未意識到的意義之領略 )154. 
“Sense” is another form of signification that allows the externality and opposition between signifier and 
signified on which “meaning” as the reference to discrete, objectively given phenomena hinges to be 
overcome. In contrast to meaning, the sense (yiwei) of a particular thing is not so much located in the 
thing itself, as it is “in the relation between the object itself and the meaning which it contains” (在其
與其所含意義之關系上 )155. Simply put, “sense” is to be looked for, not in the object, but in the 
relation between the object and its  meaning, a relation to be established by the knowing or rather 
“sensing” subject, who can vaguely yet unmistakably “sense” something – by means of association, 
memory, expectation, imagination, and so on – in a given object to which it can relate in a cognitive 
and/or emotional manner without being fully conscious of its definitive and determinate meaning, a 
procedure Tang compares to the experience of tasting a certain flavor.156 Though Tang is far from clear 
on  the  exact  “meaning”  of  the  idea  of  “sense”,  it  soon  becomes  obvious  that  the  operation  of 
transcendence which already played an important role in carrying out acts of standard signification 
(“meaning”) is once again called upon to give an intricate transcendental account of the workings of 
sense and sensing. He claims that in order for the sense or the value (jiazhi价值)157 of any given thing 
to be observed, “it is necessary to transcend the object in question” (必須超越此對象)158, implying in 
effect that “the objective world [must] be annulled” (取消對象世界)159. What Tang means by this is 
that the straightforward oppositional relation between subject and object characteristic of attributions of 
meaning takes on a completely different form in the act and the experience of sensing: 
154Tang, [1943], p.95. 
155Tang, [1943], p.97.
156See Tang, [1943], pp.95-97.
157On the equivalence between sense and value see Tang, [1943], p.113 and p.118.
158Tang, [1943], p.98.
159Tang, [1943], p.101.
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When looking for the sense of an object, one's gaze cannot get bogged down in the object, but neither
should one think it possible to go from the object to its meaning, because knowing the meaning of an
object is not the same as apprehending its sense. Apprehending the sense of something is to provisionally
appreciate its meaning without as of yet knowing [exactly] what it is, which means that one can only
apprehend it without looking for it [as something that can be definitively known]. The mental horizon
involved in the transcendence of the object in apprehending sense is one of a pure transcendence which
does not arrive at anything [fixed]. It is only because one does not arrive at anything [definitive] that one 
does not leave the object [as is the case with meaning, where one leaves the object as soon as one has
understood  its  meaning];  therefore  the  relation  between  the  mental  horizon  and  the  object  in  the
apprehension of sense is one of both non-identity and non-separation.160
要求感一對象之意味者，目光不能停滯於對象，然而又不能想由認識對象到認識其意義，因為認
識意義不等於感意味。感一意味是尚未認識其意義而在現在領略其意義，所以感意味只能感不能
求，感意味時之超越對象是一純粹的超越而無所到的心境。唯其無所到所以又不離此對象，因此
感意味的心境與對象之關系；是一種不即不離之關系。
In this form of “pure transcendence”, both the object and the subject are left behind in order to put a 
stop to the externality of signifier and signified that Tang thinks is invariably introduced by engaging in 
the  activity  of  assigning  reference  and  meaning.  In  assigning  meaning  to  something,  everything 
different from the thing in question (the world outside of the specific state of affairs “meaningfully” 
designated and signified) becomes a potential predicate subordinated to meaning as a subject in both a 
grammatical and an epistemological sense. This pure transcendence enables the subject to access sense 
as a relation between subject and object in which it too must be transcended and “forgotten” (忘掉).161 
In the experience and the apprehension of sense, subject and object are no longer opposed, and by 
virtue of the removal of their mutual opposition, the world indeed would seem to have become a place 
of total and far-reaching immanence, where “all senses are subjects, subjected to other subjects” (一切
意味都是主體，都是隸屬於其他主體 )162.  However,  the relation of sense emerging from the 
reciprocal  cancellation of  subject  and object,  transcending themselves  by parting with the identity 
established in opposition to one another, has nothing to do with intersubjectivity in the strict sense of 
the word, but designates a relation between concepts argumentatively and structurally grounded in the 
160Tang, [1943], p.98.
161See Tang, [1943], pp.99-101. 
162Tang, [1943], p.101.
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category of transcendence. In the movement of sense in a neither subjective nor objective relation of 
subject to object, transcendence ends up leaving even the subject behind as it is reflexively deployed. 
What is important then, is to observe that Tang does not simply depart from what he too would take to  
be a dogmatic and question-begging confirmation of immanence as the essential  feature of human 
existence or being as such, but arrives at a vision of radical immanence in the form of a world of sense 
where all distinctions have been actively overcome and forgotten exactly through various stages of 
transcendence. This becomes abundantly clear in the remaining portion of the essay, where Tang Junyi's 
train of thought takes a cosmological turn by describing the whole universe as an expression of the 
“pure movement” (chundong純動) of sense in terms that unmistakably betray the influence of Xiong 
Shili.163 What happens in these pages  is  quite  astounding in the light of the conclusions Tang had 
arrived at  so far. He goes on to reinstate stratified, dualistic distinctions between inanimate things, 
living organisms, and conscious human beings in a dialectical logic of development that describes a 
“transcendence in stages” (層層的超越) and a form of “layered sense” (層層的意味).164 It becomes 
obvious  that  not  everything is  sense  in  the  same sense  of  the  word.  For  Tang,  material  forms  of 
existence are only endowed with “a kind of external unity” (一種外在的統一), but cannot sense let 
alone know that they are “together”, since they “cannot apprehend this higher unity” (不能感此更高的
统一 ), and “cannot apprehend that their own apprehension is the same apprehension they share in 
common with other things” (不能感他們自己之感與他物之感是同一的感).165 In the end it is again 
mind, spirit, consciousness, and self-consciousness that are drummed up to introduce qualitative and 
hierarchical distinctions into what Tang Junyi himself had managed to quite spectacularly unify into a 
harmonious totality of value and sense.
Another  good example  of  Tang Junyi's  wavering  between confirming  immanence  and reserving a 
hierarchical  supremacy  for  consciousness  can  be  found  in  a  fascinating  manuscript  entitled  The 
Philosophical Spirit of Modern Western Idealism (Xifang jindai lixiangzhuyi zhi zhexue jingshen西方
近代理想主義之哲學精神 ) composed between 1951 and 1952. The text of the manuscript also 
presents us with an opportunity to briefly discuss Tang Junyi's mature philosophy and the historical 
conditions of the notional fault lines discernible in his whole oeuvre. In the longest and most intricate  
163See Tang, [1943], pp.102-104.
164Tang, [1943], pp.105-110. 
165Tang, [1943], p.105.
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chapter of this text, devoted to the philosophy of Hegel, Tang goes to great lengths in arguing against 
the possibility of philosophy attaining what Hegel called “absolute knowledge”: 
If there really is absolute philosophical spirit and absolute philosophical thought which becomes self-
aware of the truth of all its objective material, then this kind of thought becomes one with its object;
since there is no longer an object which has the semblance of being external to philosophical thought, we 
can say that at this point there is no longer anything resembling the activity of thought, leaving only a
truth regarding the object of thought, or the merely internal complete manifestation of the fully real […]
When we determine a particular object through a universal [concept], then the external signification of
this universal must necessarily transcend [and remain outside of] this [specific] object, [whereas] the
meaning of the particular always remains outside of [the totality of] what is contained by the universal,
which also contains something else. This means that in the normal cognition of objects, there is bound to
remain an opposition between the activity of thought and a seemingly external and objective object [of 
cognition].  Such  an  opposition  cannot  be  overcome  by non-dialectical  philosophers  […]  The  real
problem  is  therefore  the  following:  at  the  instance  when  I  become  aware  of  the  fact  that  the
universal enters into a more concrete particular, or at the point where the content of the universal is
united to what is called a particular and concrete content, that is to say at the instance when truth is
attained, whether or not one can still speak of something like thinking at all […] When thought reaches
its goal, it ceases to be thinking […] When the activity of philosophy reaches its target, it stops being
philosophy.166
如果真是有一絕對的哲學精神哲學思維，將一切對象材料之真理均加以自覺；則此時因無對哲學
思維宛然外在之對象，則此思維與對象合一，而將可說此時無所謂思維之活動，而只有關於思維
對象之真理或只有一內在之全部實在之整幅呈露 [...] 我們以一普遍者規定一特定對象則普遍者
之外指意義，必超越此對象之外，而特殊者之意義則恆除包含此普遍在所涵之外，且包含其他。
此即注定了一般對象之思維中必不免思維之活動與似外在之客觀對象之對待。此對待在非辯證法
的哲學家，恆視為不能泯除的 [...] 真正之問題在：當吾人自覺普遍者融入更具體之特殊者之際
或普遍者之內容合所謂具體特殊者之內容之際，即所謂得真理之際，是否尚可說有所謂思維？
[...] 思維在達其目的時，則停止是思維。哲學之活動在達其目的時，則停止是哲學。
166The Philosophical Spirit of Modern Western Idealism (Xifang jindai lixiangzhuyi zhi zhexue jingshen西方近代理想主
義之哲學精神) [1951-1952], in Tang Junyi,  Collected Philosophical Essays (Zhexue lunji 哲學論集), vol.18 of TJ, 
pp.677-679. Emphasis added. 
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The inner tension in Tang's work resulting from an attempt to resist completely imploding the objective 
(particular)  into the subjective as well  as the other way around is  apparent in this  passage and its  
broader  context.  Referring  to  the  British  Neo-Hegelian  F.H.  Bradley's  (1846–1924)  metaphor  of 
“thought's happy suicide”167 – the self-cancellation of a form of thought that ceases to think anything 
outside of and different from itself, and in this sense ends up “alone” in reaching its own goal – Tang 
suggests that  a complete  overcoming of the distance between the subjective and the objective and 
between universal concepts and particular entities is detrimental to the Hegelian undertaking. Indeed, 
the dialectic between the thinking subject and the conceptualized object should be prevented from 
coming to a halt, and has to keep itself going by leaving “something else” (其他 ) unthought in the 
object and refusing to completely assimilate the particular with the universal. Dissociating himself from 
Hegel's idealism however, is not Tang Junyi's only, and in fact not even his primary concern. For Tang, 
the dynamic of transitions (zhuan轉) from one field of apprehension to the next are grounded in the 
mind's drive towards transcending its present limitations and overcoming the  apparent externality of 
different cognitive fields to the mind.  Because in his view, “the transcendence of thought is the true 
condition for attaining the truth” (思維之超越，正是得真理之條件)168, the dialectical development of 
cognition and conceptualization ultimately hinges on the overcoming of a distance and an opposition 
(duidai 對待) that has to be preserved instead of undone. Therefore, the irreducibility of the particular 
and the objective is needed as a guarantee for the possibility of transcendence, not in order to ensure 
that they are kept from being subsumed by the subject as such. Let us note in passing that Tang's 
standard  but  quite  mistaken  identification  of  Hegel's  dialectic  with  the  infamous  triad  of  “thesis-
antithesis-synthesis” (a simplistic scheme which actually Hegel never formulated or “applied” at all169) 
prevented him from seeing that this contradictory motion of simultaneously overcoming and preserving 
is precisely what Hegel meant by Aufhebung (“sublation”). 
In any case, it becomes clear in the course of the text of this manuscript that what ultimately matters for 
Tang Junyi then, is not so much the reduction of the particular to the universal and the subsumption of 
being  under  thought  as  such,  but  rather  that  these  overinflated  idealists  tendencies  endanger  the 
propensity of a dialectic operating on the basis of transcendence. The non-identity between subject and 
object is bound up with the self-identity of consciousness. The ultimate condition for the dialectic is 
167See F.H. Bradley, Ethical Studies, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962, pp.234-235.
168Tang, [1951-1952], p.679.
169See Frederick Beiser, Hegel, New York and London: Routledge, 2005, p.161.
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that it does not suicidally fulfill its own mission, but rather that it keeps going instead of coming full 
circle. Paradoxically enough, Tang's insistence on keeping the dialectic mobile, by deferring its lonely 
moment of realization in a form of thought without a semblance of anything non-identical and external,  
is in turn based on domesticating the restlessness of dialectical development by furnishing it with a 
“meta-dialectical” (chao bianzheng超辯證) ground, that is to say in a “transcendental consciousness” 
(chaoyue xinjue 超越心覺 )  centered in the “moral personality” (daode renge 道德人格 ).170 The 
transcendental status of the meta-dialectical consciousness is thus the condition of the possibility for 
continuing the dialectical movement of transcendence, the latter presupposing that “something remains 
outside the universal” and in that sense “transcends” the universal.171 Tang understands the introduction 
of a “meta-dialectical” moral consciousness as involving a return to the Kantian position of the primacy 
of practical reason, which can in his view stabilize the dialectic by providing it with an anchoring point: 
“The  philosophical  activity  which  consists  in  my  thinking  of  [conceptual]  categories  can  at  any 
moment  halt  [its  course]  in  order  to  cognize  the  transcendental  consciousness  itself  which 
comprehensively interiorizes the categories” (吾人思維範疇之哲學活動，遂隨時可停下以識取統攝
範疇於其內之超越心覺自身)172. In this way, the subject arrives at “the manifestation of consciousness 
itself” (心覺自身之顯示)173, determinate conceptual knowledge on the other hand merely counting as a 
“by-product or trace of philosophical thinking” (哲學思維之流出物或留痕 )174. The text of Tang's 
1951-1952  manuscript  also  gives  an  explicit  clue  to  the  stakes  behind  the  tension  between  the 
immanent mobility of the dialectic subjecting everything to contradiction and change and the meta-
dialectical  status  of  the  transcendental  mind.  The immunity of  a  morally  grounded transcendental 
consciousness as a “pure rationality” (chunjing lixing純淨理性) to phenomenal change ensures that it 
is free from internal contradictions, and thus makes sure that the Hegelian cannot be reversed (diandao
顛倒 ) into dialectical materialism.175 Outside of the conditioned and evanescent field delineated by 
historical materialism, consciousness itself as the ground of thought and practice “uninterruptedly seeks 
to remain identical to itself and positively manifest its own spirit of transcendence” (不斷的求是其自
170Tang, [1951-1952], pp.679-688.
171In the latter meaning of “transcendence” as an instance of extra-conceptual facticity, Tang is not so far removed from 
Heidegger's notion of transcendence. See below, section 3.2.3.
172Tang, [1951-1952], p.682.
173Tang, [1951-1952], p.683.
174Tang, [1951-1952], p.685.
175Tang, [1951-1952], pp.696-705.
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身如其自身而積極顯發其超越精神)176. No wonder then that his extensive discussion of Hegel leads 
into two critical,  though philosophically less interesting,  chapters attempting to further expose and 
render  Marxist  reification  inoperative  through  the  power  of  transcendence.177 All  of  this  can  help 
explain why in most of Tang's works, immanence (neizaixing 内在性) is rhetorically brought forward 
as denoting the presence of the transcendent within the real world of everyday comings and goings, 
without however thereby undoing the necessary distance between the immanent and the transcendent 
without which the very idea of transcendence would lose any ontological import. Tang is too concerned 
about the theoretical and socio-political dangers of historical materialism and scientistic reductionism 
to  embrace  immanence  on  its  own terms.  At  the  same time,  his  non-dualist  approach  led  him to 
formulate this counterconcept in the form of a paradox, that of “transcending the already formed world 
within the world [itself]” (在世間中超出已成之世間)178. This makes it understandable that for him, 
transcendence was a  far more likely candidate as a  counterconcept to  reification (wuhua)  than the 
typically postmodern celebration of immanence. His opposition to the materialist dialectic led him to 
cling to the necessity of supplementing the Hegelian dialectic with a “meta-dialectical” foundation in a 
moral  “transcendental  consciousness”  that  is  not  caught  up  in  permanent  change  and  free  from 
contradiction and negation. 
In  his  Life,  Existence,  and  the  Horizons  of  the  Mind,  the  residual  facticity,  designated  by  the 
“something else” contained in the particular which cannot be erased in the movement of the universal,  
constantly stands on the verge of being overrun and obliterated by the reflexivity of transcendence. 
Like Xiong Shili, Tang continues to maintain that the mind connected to its various object-horizons 
does not literally create its own environment, even if, again following Xiong, he assumes “objectivity” 
to be a specific schema of “resonating” (ganying 感應) between subject and object and therefore does 
not pertain to horizon-free objects as a property that merely needs to be discovered and observed from 
a detached position in which the subject actively forgets itself in order to be able to take the object on 
its own terms.179 Such a detachment has now acquired a different meaning, and is not only the specific 
mode  of  observation  characteristic  of  science,  but  transcendentally  operates  throughout  the  whole 
system of alterations and transitions from one cognitive and observational horizon to the next. Tang 
176Tang, [1951-1952], p.698.
177Tang, [1951-1952], pp.706-752.
178Tang, [1977], p.490.
179Tang, [1977], p.3.
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insists that “there always remains a certain distance between [the mind] and its horizon, so that a space 
for spirit can be formed” (與此所觀境間，時時有一距離，以形成一精神的空間)180. Through the 
faculty of self-consciousness, the mind must remain aware of the irreducible difference between itself 
and its object-horizons (even if the latter come in the form of horizons where the difference between 
subject and objective is overcome!), in order to avoid becoming attached (舔附) or subordinated to (隸
屬 ) its horizons. This “place for spirit” (jingshen de kongjian 精神的空間 ) then, is nothing but the 
difference and the distance between subject and object. It is the subject that must remain permanently 
present (常在 ) in the fleeting transitions from one horizon to the next and sustain itself above their 
identity and proximity.181 Once again, this means that, as Giorgio Agamben writes concerning Aristotle, 
life is not so much defined as it is “divided and ruled”182: 
We can say that the life-activities of everything that exists in the world that is not yet able to be self-
conscious pass away irrevocably, in relation to myself as well as in relation to themselves. There is no
real clarity in the interconnections between past and future, nor is there a meaning of existence which
can be grasped from the clarity of this interconnection. When human beings are not yet self-consciously
active,  all  their  activities  pass  away irrevocably,  go  towards  non-existence  from existence,  and  are
devoid of a meaning of existence. It is only when human beings become self-conscious of their activities  
that there is a mental and living existence, and this living mental existence and self-consciousness have
the same meaning. Therefore, only a self-conscious living mental existence is a real entity.183
一切世間之存在，凡尚未能自覺者，其生命活動對吾人為存在者，皆對其自身，為已逝即不回者。
其活動即皆非真前後互相貫通透明，亦無由此貫通透明而見之存在意義者。人在未有自覺之活動
時，其所歷之活動之一逝不回者，亦為由存在，以向於不存在，而無此一存在意義者。唯在人有
自覺之活動，人方有其心靈與生命之存在，而此生命心靈之存在，與其自覺，即同義語。故唯有
一自覺的心靈生命之存在，方為真實義之存在。
180Tang, [1977], p.576.
181Tang, [1977], pp.583-596.
182Giorgio Agamben, The Open. Man and Animal, Stanford (Cal.): Stanford University Press, 2004, pp.13-16.
183Tang, [1977], p.654.
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3.1.5 The struggle between Buddhism and Confucianism in the works of Xiong, Tang, and Mou
The above made observations on the “biased” nature of New Confucian conceptual identities can also 
shed some light on Xiong Shili's prolonged “roaming” in between Confucianism and Buddhism, his 
“conversion”  having  seemingly  lasted  nearly  a  lifetime  instead  of  being  reducible  to  a  singular 
epiphanic  event.  “Conversions”  from  Buddhist  to  Confucianist  positions  continue  to  function  as 
argumentative structures in texts written long after his change of heart towards the Yogācāra school. 
Lin Zhenguo 林鎮國 is one of the many scholars who has rightly emphasized the important role played 
by Buddhism as a competitor, an adversary and a semi-indigenous source of philosophical and religious 
knowledge in the formation of modern New Confucian philosophy in general. In his view, which I 
strongly support, what thinkers such as Xiong Shili and Mou Zongsan were ultimately after in their 
encounter with Buddhist thought was coming to terms with modernity.184 Although New Confucian 
polemical  condemnations  of  Buddhism's  putative  “nihilism”  and  “escapism”  (accusations  which 
someone like Nāgārjuna already tried to debunk centuries ago) can sometimes appear to be merely 
rehashing an  age-old Confucian tradition of  Buddha-bashing going back to  Han Yu and the more 
puristically minded among the Song-Ming Confucianists (for whom someone like Zhou Dunyi 周敦頤 
(1017–1073) was a covert Daoist and Buddhist because of the cosmological linkage he established 
between wuji無極 and taiji太極)185, the stakes had become markedly different in the meantime. On the 
level of philosophical discourse, “Buddhism” was now a symbolic signifier with which the discursive 
element  “Confucianism”  could  be  identified  in  certain  respects  and  from  which  it  had  to  be 
distinguished in  others.  These  strategic  operations  of  identification  and distinction  began to  occur 
within  the  context  of  the  relations  different  thinkers  wanted  to  establish  between  Confucianism, 
modernization,  and  the  new  disciplinary  order  of  knowledge.  Crucially,  with  the  rise  of  modern 
Chinese nationalism, a renewed emphasis was placed on the foreign origins of Buddhism in India, the 
British rule in colonial India being seen as a cautionary example of the tragic fate that would befall 
China if it failed to modernize, become a strong nation-state, and ward off the forces of imperialism. 186 
Against this background, it is obvious that the story about Laozi converting the barbarians, which never 
really seems to have convinced anyone, could no longer offer sufficient reassurance for the “sinicity” 
184See Lin Zhenguo, 1999, pp.69-94.
185See for example Xiong, [1961], p.127. 
186See Pankaj Mishra, From the Ruins of Empire. The Revolt against the West and the Remaking of Asia, London: Penguin 
Books, 2013, pp.219-220.
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of Buddhism. Lin Zhenguo and more recently Jason Clower have both argued that what the latter calls 
the New Confucians' nationalist ressentiment, predicated on the idea that Confucianism constitutes the 
essence and the core of Chinese culture and of the (future) Chinese nation-state, fed and strengthened 
their ambivalent attitude towards Buddhism as a non-Confucian and by the same token non-Chinese 
teaching.  According  to  Clower,  their  cultural  nationalist  predilections  eventually  made  them lose 
interest in a philosophical encounter on equal terms, choosing instead to elevate Confucianism above 
Buddhism and present the teachings of the Buddha as almost but not quite as perfect as those of the 
Sage.187 
Bearing in mind Mou Zongsan's seemingly arbitrary yet historically conditioned and in that precise 
sense  meaningful  association  between  Buddhism  and  revolutionary  communism,  Tang  Junyi's 
observations  in  the  following  passage  will  be  instructive  in  briefly  approaching  the  philosophical 
dimension to the New Confucian disagreements with Buddhism: 
From a Confucian point of view, death is in itself also a [form of] permanent being. This permanence of
being is what is revealed through the ability of recollection and remembrance and [subsequently] comes
to be engraved in the human heart or in the form of written characters, thus forming historical records.
Of all peoples East and West, there has certainly never been one that attached as much importance to
history as the Chinese people. Attaching importance to history means stressing the responsive reactions
of  continuation  and  transmission  to  what  is  recalled  and  brought  to  mind  in  the  memories  and
remembrances of human beings. The Buddhists were able to see that former and future life is in a state
of co-dependent arising, which means that the things related to the Buddha and to all living beings arise
through mutual dependence. But they did not yet  realize that the greater co-dependent arising in the
human world consists in [the ability of ] the living to relate to the dead through [acts of] continuation and
transmission.188 
若依儒家義說，則死者之事，自亦是一有而永有。此一有而永有，即由人之能回憶追念之所展
187See Lin Zhenguo, 1999, p.85 and Jason Clower,  “Chinese  Ressentiment and Why New Confucians Stopped Caring 
about Yogācāra”, in Makeham (ed.), 2014a, pp.377-411.
188Tang, [1977], p.630. Cf. pp.495-498. Arguing against the Buddhist position that livings beings know nothing of their 
former and future lives and their position among the “six destinies” (liudao 六道 ) Tang writes that “within this “not-
knowing” there is not only an expression of ignorance, but there is also an expression of a kind of transcendence of one's 
place of origination; that one does not know of it means that one has forgotten it, and that one has forgotten it means that 
one has transcended it, and since transcendence is the good, therefore forgetting is good; and because forgetting is good,  
not-knowing is also [a form of] goodness, and is not only ignorance.” (此“不知”中，不只表示一無明，而亦表示對
其來處與根源之一“超越”，其不知之，乃其忘之，其忘之，乃其超越之，超越為善，故忘為善；忘為善，故
不知亦為善，而非全是無明也) Tang, [1977], p.497.
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示，而為人所銘刻於心，或見之文字，以成其歷史之記載者。東西文化民族，固未有如中國民族 
之重歷史者也。重歷史，即重人之回憶追念，與人對此所回憶追念者之一切繼志述事之回應也。
佛家能言前生後生之事，互為緣起，及佛與眾生之事互為緣起矣。然未知當今之生人，對死者
之繼志述事，即人間世界之大緣起也。
What this boils down to is that for Confucians like Tang, there has to be a difference between what they 
take  to  be  a  typically  Confucianist  and  Chinese  “continuity  of  discontinuity”  and  a  Buddhist 
“discontinuity of continuity”. The “uninterrupted arising and perishing from one kṣaṇa to the next” (剎
那剎那生滅不住) has to be redefined as a “ceaseless creativity from one kṣaṇa to the next” (剎那剎那
生生不息).189 Not wholly unlike Nicholas of Cusa, they too in their own way maintain that “negations 
which remove the more imperfect things from the most Perfect are truer than the others.” Because the 
identity of permanence and change is a lopsided one, and is biased in favor of permanence as that 
which “encompasses”, includes, and conditions change, it is no wonder that Mou Zongsan for one 
showed a certain fondness for the Madhyamaka (zhongguan 中觀, or kongzong空宗) Buddhist thinker 
Seng Zhao's僧肇 (c.378–413) Treatise on the Immobility of Things (Wu bu qian lun 物不遷論), where 
Seng reinterpreted the doctrine of co-dependent origination as implying that karmic causal conditioning 
ultimately shows that  nothing really comes into being or  perishes to  begin with.190 Nothing arises 
precisely because there is conditional dependence. Therefore, there is no reason to negate what never 
came into being or passed away to begin with. Of course, what bothered Mou in this case was that in  
Seng's treatises, the permanence of immobility is still conceived of in terms of emptiness (kong空), i.e. 
emptiness  of  self-nature,  instead  of  with reference  to  the  unchanging nature of  a  substance and a 
metaphysical essence that stays the same precisely in and through self-transformation. After all, what 
would Mou' Zongsan's Hölderlinian God do without his ability to temporarily retreat from a fallen 
world? In this sense,  time is  just  as important for thinkers like Mou to resolve non-identity,  more 
specifically discontinuity, as an instance in the self-transformation of the identical and the continuous, 
which is why they did not simply dualistically and perhaps more straightforwardly assert the hegemony 
of eternity over time. In the latter cause there would have been no paradoxes that indicate a problem 
189Xiong, [1932], p.85.
190“[W]hat people call permanence, I call impermanence and vice versa. But then impermanence and permanence, though 
seemingly different,  are ultimately the same […] Then the four seasons,  fleeting as the wind, and the Great  Bear,  
revolving with lightning speed […] rapid as they are, do not move […] That is why the beneficial act of the Tath āgata 
remains effective for thousands of generations” Translation quoted from Liebenthal, 1968, pp.51-52. 
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beyond the reach of conceptual sublation. The lopsided identity still contains difference, even if in a 
carefully contained form. It was even harder for philosophers such as Mou and Xiong to stomach the 
assertion by the founder of the Madhyamaka current of Buddhism, Nāgārjuna龍樹(c. 150-250 CE), in 
the  Fundamental Verses of the Middle Way  (Mūlamadhyamakakārikā,  Zhongguan lun 中觀論 ) that 
even emptiness itself had to be in turn seen through as empty, in the sense that one should take care not  
to  hypostatize the fact that no being or constituent of being can claim a form of self-sufficient and 
permanent existence for itself by mistakingly turning emptiness into a paradoxical form of ultimate 
reality distinct from and opposed to the world of saṃsāra. The “ultimate” lesson of Nāgārjuna's texts, 
taken to heart by the Tiantai 天台 school in the doctrine of the three truths, would seem to be that 
distinctions such as the one between “conventional” / “provisional” (jia假) and “empty” (kong空) fall 
away in  the  Middle  Way (zhong 中 ).191 The  Middle  Way of  enlightenment  is  not  different  from 
emptiness and the “convention” that individual entities do exist; it is neither empty nor conventionally 
established; it is both of these, neither of them, and so on. Xiong192 and Mou193 on the other hand, take 
the idea that “the emptiness too in turn is empty” (kong yi fu kong 空亦復空 ) as a proof for the 
nihilistic predispositions and the limitations of Buddhism vis-à-vis Confucianism. What they embraced 
in Buddhist thought was the idea of non-duality (between substance and function, subject and object 
etc.), but only insofar as it allowed them to reinstate a hierarchical dependence of non-duality on one of 
the  reconciled  terms  which  is  presented  as  bringing  about  the  ontological,  cosmological,  or 
epistemological  reconciliation.  Contraction is  unified in a  totality with expansion, not  by virtue of 
itself, but because of its participation in an expansion by which it is governed and controlled. In other  
words,  they cannot  tolerate  the  total  effacement  of  distinctions,  even within  the  most  unified  and 
harmonious  of  metaphysical  levels.  The  same  goes  for  their  doctrinal  syntheses  and  creative 
combinations of Sinitic thought. As Fu Weixun (aka Charles Wei-Hsun Fu) 傅偉勳 (1933-1996) aptly 
pointed  out,  it  is  remarkable  and  worrisome  that  even  though  Mou  was  of  the  opinion  that 
Confucianism and Buddhism both constituted “perfect teachings” (yuanjiao圓教, further hierarchically 
subdivided in both cases), he still insisted on portraying Confucianism as possessing something even 
more perfect than the Buddhist perfection.194 
191See Dessein and Heirman, 2005, pp.170-173 and pp.205-206.
192See Xiong, [1958], p.44-46, p.68.
193See Mou Zongsan's  Appearance and Thing-in-itself  (Xianxiang yu wuzishen 現象與物自身 ), vol.21 of  MJ, [1975d] 
pp.381-393.
194See  “Buddhist Learning, Western Learning, and the Contemporary New Confucians – A Philosophical Investigation 
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Instrumental in maintaining this asymmetrical relation and inequality in the perfection of Confucianist 
and  Buddhist  teachings  was  the  distinction  between  being  and  thought,  i.e.  the  differentiation  of 
ontology and epistemology. As I  tried to demonstrate in the previous sections,  Xiong Shili  always 
insisted on placing ontology above epistemology, and according to Lin Zhenguo the same goes for Mou 
Zongsan as well.195 Although the overlap is far from complete and not quite as neat as one would like, 
in their writings the difference between epistemology and ontology was often made to coincide with 
that between Buddhism and Confucianism respectively. That philosophy was immunized against the 
analytic,  objectifying,  and “anatomizing”  (剖割 )  perspective  of  science  through an  appeal  to  the 
irreducibility of ontology and that the Buddhist perspective of emptiness was seen as inhibiting the 
emergence of scientific thought196 is also something to be kept in mind. In his  New Treatise on the  
Uniqueness  of  Consciousness,  Xiong  makes  no  secret  of  the  fact  that  for  him,  the  Madhyamaka 
school's insistence on the conditioned emptiness of all entities can only serve as an “expedient means” 
(upāya,  fangbian 方便 , itself a concept of Buddhist origin) for clearing away erroneous conceptions 
which disregard the foundational  role  of consciousness  as  the source of  distinctions  which do not 
pertain to object-horizon themselves but to the mind as the “discriminating aspect” of the contradictory 
totality of mind and object-horizon.  However,  Xiong thinks it  is  not sufficient  to  stick to such an 
“epistemological perspective” (認識論的觀點)197 without at the same time positively confirming that 
subtance is not only identical to all existing entities devoid of self-nature and thus itself empty (by 
saying it is nothing but “the real nature of all constituents of existence”, zhufa shixing諸法實性), but 
also and above all fully and actively manifests (xianxian顯現) itself in them. This manifestation occurs 
in a way that cannot be captured by the idea of emptiness without undermining the ontological reality 
and cosmological creativity of the identity of substance and function. Xiong believes that Buddhists 
risk ending up becoming attached to the emptiness that was supposed to overcome the attachment to 
the self. In other words, the illusory hypostatization of an objective reality existing independently from 
consciousness,  a  hypostatization  which  Xiong  himself  firmly  rejects,  in  the  end  only  has  an 
epistemological validity, and should not be transferred to a level of ontology that cannot be “emptied 
within a Broad Perspective” (Foxue, xixue yu dangdai xin rujia – hongguan de zhexue kaocha佛學、西學與當代新儒
家. ── 宏觀的哲學考察), Ershi yi shiji shuang yuekan 二十一世紀雙月刊), 1996, 38, p.73.
195See Lin Zhengguo, 1999, p.88.
196See Xiong, [1932], p.143, p.174.
197Xiong, [1932], p.117. 
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out” (kong 空), where substance is and remains identical to the original mind itself.198 The unreality of 
independent object-horizons is simultaneously a confirmation of the reality of the mind. It is the latter 
that can choose to either confirm or cast doubt on them. Consequently, there can only be a “relative 
non-being” (bieji wu 別計無 ), i.e. relative to the essential reality and positive being of the original 
mind, no “absolute non-being” (zongji wu 總計無) and therefore no “horizon of empty nothingness” 
(空洞的無的境界).199 For Xiong, identity statements (jishi 即是, “is nothing but”) which completely 
do away with distinctions and discriminations have to be clearly distinguished from identity statements 
following the logic of manifestation (xianxian) that allow one to assert that substance manifests itself in 
all things without becoming reified and subordinated to them.200 For Tang as well, “manifestation and 
hiddenness are both equally being, there can be no talk of non-being here” (顯隱同是有，無所謂無)201.
 Instead of an assertion of complete identity and the resulting non-existence or “emptiness” of the 
asserted identity occurring in Buddhist thought (where identity ultimately amounts to non-existence), 
the logic of manifestation allows for a distinction between essence and appearance to be reintroduced 
inside of the identity of substance and function. In this way, the whole universe can be presented as a  
continuum, while at the same time dividing it into non-identical stages (matter, life, mind/spirit) that 
are only truly unified at the highest stage of a stratified evolution, i.e. with the emergence of conscious 
and  self-conscious  life.202 Nevertheless,  there  is  once  again  not  so  much  a  perfectly  self-assured 
conceptual closure as there are unresolved tensions and contradictions, since on other occasions, Xiong 
asserts that, purely philosophically speaking, there is little reason for according a privileged status to 
human  beings  among  the  “ten  thousand  things”.203 In  the  work  of  Mou  Zongsan,  the  oscillation 
between  “Confucian”  ontology  and  “Buddhist”  epistemology  finally  converges  in  his  idea  of 
constructing a “Buddhistic ontology” (佛教式存有论)204. For Mou, the Buddhist logic of emptiness 
functioning in a “struggle for non-being” (為非有而鬥爭 ) precludes the possibility of finding or 
producing any statements with a strictly ontological import in Buddhism. Emptiness cannot have an 
ontological dimension. Still, he believes the Buddhist principle of non-duality can and should be drawn 
198Xiong, [1932], pp.116-126.
199See Xiong, [1932], pp.58-63 and Xiong, [1958], p.10.
200See Xiong, [1932], p.118 and Guo Meihua, 2004, p.136. Also see Tang, [1977], pp.632-636.
201Tang, [1977], p.635. Cf. p.508.
202See Xiong, [1961], pp.182-185, pp.190-191, p.198, p.227.
203See for example Xiong, [1956], p.193.
204See Jason Clower,  The Unlikely Buddhologist: Tiantai Buddhism in Mou Zongsan’s New Confucianism, Leiden: Brill, 
2010, pp.189-191.
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upon in articulating a Confucian ontology in a Buddhist “style” or “manner” (shi式).205 As I will try to 
show in  the  next  part  of  this  chapter,  the  historical  and socio-political  background of  the  tension 
between thought and being can be more clearly identified within the context of Mou Zongsan's oeuvre 
and the development of his philosophical thought.
205See “Buddhist Ontology”, (Fojia de cunyoulun佛家的存有論), [1975b] in WW, pp.235-247 and Record of Lectures on  
Aristotle's Theory of the Four Causes (Siyin shuo jiangxi lu 四因說講習錄), [1997] vol.31 of MJ, pp. 121-136.
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3.2 Mou Zongsan's modernity and the modernity of Mou Zongsan
3.2.1 Preliminary remarks on Mou Zongsan's oeuvre and his relation to Kant
Mou Zongsan  is  a  towering  figure  within  the  New Confucian  current  of  modern  philosophy.  His 
persistent  and serious  engagement  with thinkers such as Russel,  Whitehead,  Wittgenstein,  Leibniz, 
Hegel, and most importantly Kant, has made him into what is beyond doubt the single most studied and 
commented on modern Chinese philosopher in Western Sinology. Instead of vague, piecemeal, largely 
nondescript, and somewhat tedious references to a few core ideas associated with the names of famous 
European philosophers (e.g. Leibniz = monadology, Schopenhauer = Will, Nietzsche = Übermensch, 
Bergson = élan vital) such as one generally finds in the writings of Liang Shuming, Xiong Shili, and 
even Mou's lifelong friend and collaborator Tang Junyi, his books are replete with extensive quotations 
and comments on the works of thinkers who inspired and/or irritated him.206 I have already indicated 
that at least in his early politically and socially engaged writings, this was even the case for his arch-
enemy Karl Marx, who, to be clear, continued lurking in the background long after Mou had stopped 
directly confronting and denouncing him. Mou's consistently comparative approach has turned him into 
an  ideal  yet  highly  unwieldy  object  of  investigation  for  present-day  students  of  comparative 
philosophy. The latter can follow in his footsteps by comparing, say, Mencius and Kant, through the 
lens of Mou's conceptual framework built around the opposition between (Chinese) moral metaphysics 
(daode de xing'ershangxue 道德的形而上學) versus a (Western) metaphysics of morality (daode de 
xing'ershangxue 道德底形而上學)207, but are at the same time obliged to inquire into how he arrived at 
a common ground between these two figures and into what enabled him to proceed on the basis of this 
in  many  ways  improbable  equivalence  in  the  first  place.  Interpreters  are  thus  forced  to  compare 
comparisons  and  to  do  so  in  the  absence  of  a  predetermined  and  complete  understanding  of  the 
206“There is a great deal of cultural reductionism in Mou Zongsan's thought, a phenomenon that we also find in many 
Chinese authors of the same generation whose exposure to the West remained limited […] However, when it comes to 
analysis  and  commentary on  Western  philosophical  texts  directly linked  to  his  philosophical  project,  the  situation 
changes radically. Mou Zongsan becomes extremely specific and sophisticated.” Sébastien Billioud, Thinking through 
Confucian Modernity: A Study of Mou Zongsan's Moral Metaphysics, Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2012, p.34.
207On the difference between the possessive modifiers 的 and底, see the previous chapter, note 455, p.207. In the context 
of this particular distinction, the implication is that whereas Kant provided a metaphysical account of morality, and thus  
applied a transcendental mode of exposition in his investigation of practical reason, Chinese philosophy managed to  
grasp the basic, “metaphysical” structure of reality as essentially run through with morality, the ontological order (“is”) 
and the normative order (“ought”) ultimately being interrelated and convertible. For a more extensive discussion of the 
meaning and implications of Mou's opposition between “moral metaphysics” and “metaphysics or morals”, see Serina 
Chan, The Thought of Mou Zongsan, Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2011, pp.119-157.
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determining ground of comparison. My overall argument in the third section of the previous chapter 
was that the underlying form of philosophical equivalence at work here is fundamentally grounded in 
an active abstraction from historical specificity which came about under the pressure and within the 
constraints of historical time. Outside of the evanescence of history, encounters can take place between 
figures who are no longer the same even before they are confronted with each other. Still, providing a 
more specific and determinate account of how this general logic operates in or affects the work of Mou 
Zongsan in particular is, to put it mildly, hardly an easy undertaking. Leafing through one of the 32 
thick volumes which make up Mou's complete  works208 is  enough to ascertain that  his  breadth of 
reference is astounding and presupposes a familiarity with systems of thought as varied as German 
Idealism, Wei-Jin Neo-Daoism, Tiantai and Madhyamaka Buddhism, and last but not least the rich 
tradition of Song-Ming Confucianism. Apart from his personal contributions to philosophy, Mou also 
wrote  extensively  on  the  history  of  Confucian,  Daoist,  and  Buddhist  ideas,  and  these  prolonged 
ventures  into  the history of  Chinese thought  are  intrinsically enmeshed with his  own constructive 
philosophical project. At the risk of exaggerating somewhat, one could say that there are relatively few 
issues in the long history of Chinese thought Mou did not voice an opinion about. Consequently, his 
interpretations have appeared as recurring vantage points in contemporary studies in intellectual history 
and remain visible in a variety of fields and subdisciplines. Some of his favorite catchphrases, such as 
the idea of the need for a “third period” (儒學第三期) in the development of Confucianism taken over 
by Tu Weiming, have already become standard clichés in contemporary Confucian revivalist rhetoric. 
Even when his various classifications and categorization schemes, such as the contested downgrading 
of the  great Neo-Confucian thinker  Zhu Xi 朱熹  (1130-1200), are criticized and rejected, they still 
continue to function negatively as ineluctable reference points. What Michel Foucault observed with 
regard to Marx and Freud, whom he took to be “initiators of discursivity”,  namely that these two 
masters of suspicion “have not simply made a certain number of analogies possible, but also (and 
above all) a number of differences”, by having “opened up a space for the possibility of something 
different from themselves, which nonetheless at the same time belongs to what they have founded”209, 
applies in a more limited sense to Mou Zongsan as well. Fu Weixun for one was of the opinion that the  
future of modern Chinese philosophy would take shape by confronting and coming to terms with Mou, 
by means of either analogy or difference.210 
208Published in 2003. For an overview of its contents, see Chan, 2011, pp.16-23.
209Michel Foucault, “Qu'est-ce q'un auteur?”, in Philosophie. Anthologie, Paris: Gallimard, 2005, p.312.
210Quoted in Zheng, 1992, p.199. Also see Jason Clower, The Unlikely Buddhologist: Tiantai Buddhism in Mou Zongsan’s  
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As is the case with many great thinkers, it  can at  first  be hard not to feel bullied into submissive 
reverence and passive admiration when confronted with such an impressive oeuvre,  which has no 
equivalent  in  modern  Western  philosophy  in  terms  of  its  cultural  diversity  and  interpretative 
eclecticism. Any engagement with an ambitious and systematic thinker of this kind is bound to be 
partial and biased in function of one's own interpretative horizon. A list of elements I have left out of 
consideration would be longer than the present chapter. This is the reason I would like to begin by 
saying a few words about a crucial aspect of this monumental body of work which I will not be dealing 
with directly or at least not for its own sake in what follows, namely the relation between Mou Zongsan 
and the one whom Nietzsche once mockingly called “the Chinaman from Königsberg”211. As is well 
known,  Mou's  own constructive  philosophy departs  from a  highly idiosyncratic  appropriation  and 
reinterpretation of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), whose three critiques he translated into Chinese (on 
the  basis  of  English  translations),  and  is  usually  seen  as  culminating  in  the  three  monographs 
Intellectual Intuition and Chinese Philosophy (Zhi de zhijue yu Zhongguo zhexue智的直覺與中國哲
學, 1971), Appearance and Thing-in-itself (Xianxiang yu wuzishen現象與物自身, 1975), and Treatise  
on the Supreme Good (Yuanshan lun圓善論, 1985).212 For Mou, Kant was the Western philosopher par 
excellence to be interrogated as well as overcome in order for Chinese philosophy to develop its own 
distinctive identity and lay claim to a renewed validity in the modern world. Unlike Kant himself, who 
in the  Critique of Pure Reason (1781) was concerned with repositioning metaphysics as the toppled, 
disgraced “queen of the sciences” in relation to the advances of the natural sciences in his age (most 
importantly Newtonian physics) and ridding philosophy from its dogmatic lack of reflexivity213, Mou 
did  not  primarily  draw on  the  German  thinker  to  imbue  philosophy with  scientific  validity  or  to 
neutralize  the  conflicts  between  philosophy  and  science  in  general,  but  in  order  to  place  the 
unsystematic “material” of  Chinese thought in a space where it could formally confront a reputedly 
systematic Western philosophy on equal terms. Mou's take on the relation between mediated, scientific 
knowledge on the one hand and intuitive, moral knowing on the other, cannot be considered apart from 
his sustained attempts to underpin the specificity of Chinese thought through the distinction between 
New Confucianism, Leiden: Brill, 2010, pp.8-9.
211See Stephen Palmquist, “How 'Chinese' was Kant?”, 2011, http://staffweb.hkbu.edu.hk/ppp/srp/arts/HCWK.html.
212Due to the constraints and the intentions of the present study, my understanding of Mou's mature philosophy is mainly  
derived from a reading of the first two works. I have not aimed for a comprehensive and exhaustive treatment and only  
deal with these last two works in a selective fashion for my own limited purposes. 
213See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, London: Penguin Books, 2007, p.5 (preface to the first edition, Aviii).
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objectivity (“nature”) and subjectivity (“life”) within a discursive context where “science” was still 
seen as both originally and fundamentally Western and at the same time as a positive signifier  for 
progress and modernity in need of being reconciled with, or rather realized by, the Confucian tradition. 
For  Mou,  aligning  himself  with  the  Kantian  turn  towards  the  subject  as  both  epistemologically 
constitutive of what can be experienced and known, as well  as inherently practically oriented and 
compelled to  apply its  metaphysical  “natural  disposition”214 in  the field of morality,  thus  played a 
crucial role in distinguishing Chinese from Western philosophy, all while freeing Chinese thought from 
the  suspicion  of  being  irrational,  illogical,  incompatible  with  science,  or  unable  to  live  up  to  the 
standards of systematicity set  by categorized academic philosophy. “Failing to pass through Kant”, 
Mou claimed in one of his later lectures, “can only result in bad philosophy” (不通過康德的哲學則只
會有壞的哲學)215. At the same time, he saw the sage from Königsberg as something of an exception 
within the tradition of Western philosophy, due to the latter's insistence on the primordial importance of 
practical reason, that is to say of morality, in allowing ideas such as God, the freedom of the will, and 
the immortality of the soul produced by pure reason to be employed as  regulative ideals or practical 
postulates  instead  of  being  fatally  misconstrued  as  constitutive in  the  expansion  of  a  priori 
knowledge.216 In Mou's view too, morality, or more specifically moral practice (gongfu 工夫 ), could 
offer a way out of what can only remain irresolvable antimonies and paradoxes for a speculative reason 
trying to outreach its own limitations and conditions.217 In this respect, he was very close to Johann 
Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), an important post-Kantian thinker he only referred to incidentally and in 
the most general terms.218 With the crucial exception of Hegel's dialectics, which he in my opinion quite 
214Kant, 2007, p.50 (B21).
215Fourteen Lectures on the Encounter between Chinese and Western Philosophy (Zhongxi zhexue zhi huitong shisi jiang  
中西哲學之會通十四講), [1990b] vol.30 of MJ, p.47.
216Already  in  the  Standard  of  Logic  written  between  1938  and  1939,  Mou  makes  the  following  remarks:  “The 
transcendental dialectic has proven that ideal concepts [such as the unconditioned, freedom as a special type of causality 
etc.] cannot be proven from the side of the understanding and cannot find a corresponding object in the phenomenal 
world. Looking for [the objectivity of] these ideals here will necessarily lead to contradictions. Thus one must turn  
towards the internal  and towards practical reason in order to obtain proof for them. Kant showed great  wisdom in 
[commending] this transition.” (超越辯證論就是證明這些理想概念在理解方面不能得到證明，在現象界裏不能尋
得對象與之相應，如要想在這方面求，必是矛盾。這個必須轉而向內，向實踐理性上證得，在這個轉變上，康
德是大有智慧的). Luoji Dianfan 邏輯典範, [1941], vol.11 of MJ, p.685.
217“[T]he ideas  of  reason are not,  like the categories  [of the understanding],  helpful  to us in some way in using the 
understanding with respect to experience, but are completely dispensable with respect to such use, nay, are contrary to 
and obstructive of the maxims for cognition of nature through reason, although they are still quite necessary in another 
respect [i.e. as postulates of practical reason].” Immanuel Kant,  Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics that Will Be  
Able to Come Forward as Science, Cambridge (N.Y.): Cambridge University Press, 2004, p.83 (§44).
218Zheng Jiadong has noted Mou's understudied relation to Fichte. Zheng, 1992, p.281. For two more extensive studies, see 
two articles by Pong Wen-Berng彭文本: “Self-Consciousness and Conscience – A Comparative Study of the Theories 
of Mou Zongsan and Fichte (Ziwo yishi yu liangzhi – Mou Zongsan yu Feixite de lilun zhi bijiao yanjiu 自我意識與良
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simply could not do without, Mou generally only engaged with post-Kantians such as Fichte and Hegel 
in context of his social and political philosophy, and continued to take Kant as the supreme and in a 
way complete and self-sufficient point of reference for dealing with “purely philosophical” problems. 
Because he clearly believed that Kant had already touched upon, proposed, or at least sketched out and 
delineated all major philosophical problems as well as the path to their solution, the “all-destroyer” 
(Alleszermalmer, Moses Mendelssohn's nickname for his friend Kant) could thus continue to serve as 
his principal interlocutor.219 That Kant often stands diametrically opposed to some of Mou's most basic 
beliefs220 perhaps made him all the more fascinating for him as simultaneously an exception to and an 
incarnation of the Western philosophical tradition seen through New Confucian eyes. 
Sébastien Billioud has drawn attention to the fact that the deliberate omission of figures like Fichte and 
Schelling from Mou's comparative treatment  of  the concept  of intellectual  intuition in  drawing an 
essentialistic distinction between Chinese and Western philosophy constitutes a serious limitation of 
Mou's philosophical horizon of comparison.221 Much like the proper name “Marx”, which consistently 
appears in his oeuvre as a shorthand symbol for everything Mou thought was wrong with modernity,  
the name “Kant” too at times seems to function like an authoritative signifier for (Western) modernity 
知──牟宗三與費希特的理論之比較研究), Guoli Taiwan daxue zhexue lunping 國立台灣大學哲學論評, 37, 2009, 
pp.163-188 and “Der Begriff der intellektuellen Anschauung von Fichte und Mou Zongsan”, Fichte Studien, 38, 2013, 
pp.285-307.  For Fichte too, the Kantian antinomy between freedom and necessity, or between faith and reason, could 
only be solved practically. Even the existence of a mind-independent external world has to “posited”, and will remain a 
mere supposition until practical reason takes over from a theoretical reason unable to come up with an indubitable 
solution to the dilemmas stemming from its own operations: “Speculative philosophy [i.e. the philosophy of Kant], taken 
to its conclusion, has taught me or will teach me that these supposed rational beings outside of me are nothing but  
products of my own mind, that I just happen to be compelled, according to demonstrable laws of my thought, to present  
the concept of myself and that, by the same laws, this concept can only be transferred to certain determinate intuitions.  
But the voice of my conscience calls to me: whatever these beings may be in and for themselves, you ought to treat them  
as  self-subsistent,  free,  autonomous  beings  completely  independent  of  you  […]  Speculation  has  no  difficulty 
demonstrating how the presentation of such [external] things is developed solely from my presenting capacity and its 
necessary modes of activity […] only through its relation to me does anything whatsoever exist for me. But everywhere 
only one relation to me is possible, and all others are only subspecies of this one: my vocation to act ethically […]  
Consciousness of the real world proceeds from the need to act; the need to act does not proceed from consciousness of  
the world. The need to act is first, not consciousness of the world, which is derived. We do not act because we know, but  
we know because we are meant to act; practical reason is the root of all reason” J.G Fichte,  The Vocation of Man, 
Indianapolis: Hackett, [1799] 1987, pp.76-79. One of the earliest extensive discussions of Fichte's philosophy in China 
can be found in Tang, [1951-1952], pp.617-632.
219See Mou, [1990b], p.47.
220Consider the following passage where Kant attacks the idea of a “holy will”: “For men and all rational creatures, the 
moral necessity is a constraint, an obligation. Every action based on it is to be considered as duty, and not as a manner of 
acting which we naturally favor or which we sometimes might favor. This would be tantamount to believing […] we,  
like the independent deity, might come into possession of holiness of will through irrefutable agreement of the will with  
the pure moral law becoming, as it were, our very nature.”  Critique of Practical Reason, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 
1993a, p.82. My italics.
221Billioud, 2012, pp.81-89.
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as a normative project grounded in the category of moral autonomy (zilü 自律 ).222 Taking the highly 
complicated post-Kantian trajectory of Western philosophy into account would have fundamentally 
compromised Mou's strategic identification of Kant's critical philosophy with the representative end-
point of the conceptual development of this form of rationality and normativity. He needed examples 
more than exceptions. By way of Schelling and Feuerbach, it would have also brought him face to face 
with Marx again223, and with the heteronomy (talü他律) he associated with the historical materialist 
inability to see beyond the “materially motivated will” (物質地機動化的意志)224. 
Of course, as I will indicate in the course of the following subsections, there are other, more specific 
reasons for Mou Zongsan's lifelong fascination with Kant, reasons which, to use the expressions by 
Cheng  Zhihua  I  mentioned  in  my  introduction,  can  be  interpreted  both  “internally”  as  well  as 
“externally”, or ideally, through a careful combination of both. Suffice it for the moment to remind the 
reader that Mou was convinced that a fruitful encounter and exchange (huitong會通) between Chinese 
and  Western  philosophy  would  only  be  possible  through  the  delicate  medium  of  the  Kantian 
transcendental distinction between noumena and phenomena. He believed this distinction constituted a 
universally valid philosophical frame (zhexue jiagou 哲學架構) which could be applied to the Chinese 
tradition precisely because it had already been implicitly present and even tentatively articulated there, 
for instance in Zhang Zai's張載 (1020–1077) opposition between “sensible knowledge” (jianwen zhi  
zhi見聞之知) and “knowing by natural virtuousness” (dexing zhi zhi 德性之知)225, and in the Buddhist 
222See Olf  Lehmann,  Zur moralmetaphysischen Grundlegung einer  konfuzianischen Moderne: 'Philosophisierung'  der  
Tradition und 'Konfuzianisierung' der Aufklärung bei Mou Zongsan, Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2003, pp.43-
135, Stephan Schmidt,  “Mou Zongsan, Hegel, and Kant: The Quest for Confucian Modernity”,  Philosophy East and 
West, 2011, vol.61, no.2, pp. 260-302. and Billioud, 2012, pp.25-67.
223Manfred Frank,  Der unendliche Mangel an Sein: Schellings Hegelkritik und die Anfänge der Marxschen Dialektik , 
München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1992.
224“Moral Idealism and Theories of Human Nature” (Daode de lixiangzhuyi yu renxing lun 道德的理想主義與人性論 ), 
[1949a] in DY, p.33.
225See Intellectual Intuition and Chinese Philosophy (Zhi de zhijue yu Zhongguo zhexye智的直覺與中國哲學), [1971] 
vol.20 of MJ, pp.237-245. From the text of Zhang Zai's Correction of Youthful Ignorance (Zhengmeng正蒙) it would 
seem that the difference between these two forms of knowledge really has very little to do with drawing epistemological  
distinctions as  such, but rather with a moral distinction between “common people” and “sages” that can be bridged 
through praxis: “The mind of common people is limited to what they see and hear. The sages, by exhausting their nature, 
do not allow sensuous knowledge to bind their minds. There is not a single thing in the whole world which they do not 
see as themselves, and what Mencius called “exhausting one's nature” refers to knowing nature and knowing heaven 
precisely in this way. Heaven is boundless and has no outside, therefore a mind that sees things as being outside of itself  
is not able to unite with the mind of Heaven. Sensuous knowledge emerges through contact with [external] things, it is 
not what is known by our virtuous nature. Knowledge through natural virtuousness does not originate in the visible or  
the audible” ( 世人之心，止於聞見之狹。聖人盡性，不以見聞梏其心，其視天下無一物非我，孟子謂盡心則知
性知天以此。天大無外，故有外之心不足以合天心。見聞之知，乃物交而知，非德性所知；德性所知，不萌於
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doctrine according to which “one mind opens two gates” (see below). Mou thought that neither the 
Western nor even the Chinese tradition had managed to harmoniously reconcile the immanence of a 
phenomenal world marked by what he, following Heidegger, called “finitude” (Endlichkeit) with the 
transcendent, noumenal dimension. In the form of a wholly otherworldly God, thinkers in the West had 
treated  the  transcendent  as  completely  detached  and  categorically  inaccessible  to  human  beings, 
whereas traditional Chinese thought had remained overtly focused on (or “attached to”) the noumenal 
level of morality to the detriment of an objectifying but necessary occupation with the phenomenal, 
thus ultimately inhibiting the emergence of science and the passage to technological modernity. Mou 
believed that East and West could complement each other and make up for each others defects through 
a renewed observation of each other's philosophical heritage through the prism of the transcendental 
difference.226
It  will  already be  clear  from these  initial  remarks  that  the  at  times  bewildering  convergence  and 
intermingling  of  Confucian,  Kantian,  Buddhist,  and Heideggerian  notions  forces  the  interpreter  to 
follow in Mou Zongsan's footsteps by “daring to compare”227. In my view, it is just as important to try 
to  simultaneously  delineate  the  historical  horizon  in  which  he  conducted  his  philosophical 
comparisons, something Mou himself was not at all interested in doing. He would no doubt reject such 
a  contextualizing  approach  as  an  interpretative  form  of  attachment  (zhi 執 )  to  the  realm  of  the 
phenomenal and the contingent.228 Philosophy provided him with a field in which history could be an 
(incidental)  subject  matter  (in  a  “philosophy of  history”  for  instance),  without  ever  allowing it  to 
impinge on the internal affairs of philosophy,  where it  has no business peddling its  factual goods. 
見聞。). Quoted from Collection of Texts by Zhang Zai (Zhang Zai ji 張載集), Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1978, chapter 
8 of Zhengmeng (Daxin pian 大心篇), p.24.
226See Mou, [1990b], pp.83-110.
227Xiaofei Tu, “Dare to Compare: The Comparative Philosophy of Mou Zongsan”, Kritike, vol.1, no.2, 2007, pp.24-35.
228Mou,  [1949b],  p.341:  “That  China  exists  in  this  day  and  age  cannot  be  coincidental  [...]  The  meaning  of  “not 
coincidental” is that there is a reason. But where are we to look for this reason? If you focus exclusively on phenomenal  
development, then it will most certainly prove impossible to find the clue to historical development and you will also be 
unable to establish a future with a clear meaning [...] Therefore, if you want to understand why history has led to the  
present day and what the next stage will be like exactly, then you must first grasp where the spirit of the age is located  
[...] The spirit of an age is the general principle that directs the activities of a people within the various causal changes of  
every stage [of  historical  development].  Therefore,  if  one wants  to  understand  the spirit  of  an age,  one  must  first 
understand this principle.” (中國之有今日,決非偶然 [...] 「非偶然」即函著說：有一個理由。這個理由從那裡找
呢？你若只知著眼現象的推移，你決找不出歷史發展的線索，你也決定找不出一個確定內容的未來 [...] 所以，
你要想明瞭歷史發展何以有今日，下一階段的確定內容是什麼，你就必須把握住時代的精神之何所是。[...] 而
時代的精神，則是指導一個民族的活動之總原則在各階段之種種因緣中的變形。所以欲了解時代精神，必須先
了解那個原則).
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Zheng Jiadong郑家栋 voices a recurring criticism when he accuses Mou of having simply “walked out 
of history”229, and, contrary to Liang Shuming and to some extent even Feng Youlan, having left behind 
a purely “abstract, transcendent, academic” legacy without any real social force or relevance.230 There 
is little point in denying that Mou was not much of an engaged thinker or even a public intellectual.  
Nevertheless, what I am interested in is trying to chart the winding road he took on his way out in order  
to show that history followed him to places where he most certainly did not intend to escort it. What 
has to be taken into account in this regard, and what I have adopted as my overall point of departure in 
this part of my chapter, is that Mou explicitly professed that he saw the urgent need for philosophy as  
stemming from something very timely indeed, namely the problem of ideology, by which he of course 
meant the communist ideology holding mainland China in its grip through the rule of the CCP.231 He 
believed that it is because there is ideology – a term which Mou often idiosyncratically rendered, in 
what  is  simultaneously  a  translation  and  a  transcription,  as  yidelaojie 意底牢結  (roughly:  “the 
imprisoning bonds of ideas”)232 – that there has to be philosophy. Since Mou Zongsan was convinced 
only philosophy could offer a counterweight against what he, quoting Wang Fuzhi王夫之(1619-1692), 
liked to call “establishing principles to constrain actual affairs” (立理以限事) and provide a remedy 
against the splitting of the world into different standards of truth (真理标准) by ideology233, we have no 
choice but to follow him from history into thought.
229See  Zheng Jiadong, “Between History and Thought. Mou Zongsan and the New Confucianism that Walked Out of 
History”, in Contemporary Chinese Thought, vol.36, no.2, 2004, pp.49-66. Also see Schmidt, 2011.
230Zheng, 2004, p.62. Zheng has also harshly criticized Mou's undervaluation of the problem of factual suffering and  
misery in the everyday world: “Could it be that all we need to do in order to realize the dream of all human beings 
becoming sages and worthies is to close our eyes to the evil side of human nature? […] Do we really believe that the 
moral  level  of  our  people  is  higher  than  that  of  certain  developed countries  because  Confucians talked  about  the  
goodness of human nature and bombastically sang the praise of becoming sages and worthies for two thousand years?”  
(难道我们的认识只要对人性恶的方面视而不视，就可以实现人人成圣成贤的梦想？ [...] 难道我们真的相信由于
儒家讲了两千年的人性善，唱了两千年成圣成贤得高调，所以今天我们民族的道德水准也就高于某些发达国
家？) Zheng, 1992, p.329. 
231See “The Use of Philosophy” (Zhexue de yongchu 哲學的用處), [1983c] in SS, p.150, pp.156-157.
232See for example “The Catastrophe of Ideas” (Guannian de zaihai 觀念的災害), [1962] in SS, pp.27-40.
233Mou, [1990b], p.3.
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3.2.2 Mou's early work on logic and epistemology: criticism of dialectical 
materialism and the strategic distance between being and thought
When considering the New Confucian turn towards the subject following the 1923 debate on science 
and metaphysics we encountered in the previous chapter, it is worth drawing attention to the fact that in 
both Mou Zongsan's and Tang Junyi's writings on history and culture, the non-Han Manchurian Qing 
dynasty is routinely presented as a radical interruption and a fundamental break in the trajectory of the 
Spirit of Chinese (often explicitly identified with Han) culture which paved the way for the downfall of 
the  imperial  order,  the  advent  of  Western  imperialism,  and  finally  the  disastrous  introduction  of 
communism into China.  Specifically, they portrayed the rise of evidential studies (kaozheng 考證 ) 
accompanying the revival of Han Learning (hanxue漢學), centered around philological research and 
textual criticism, in Qing Confucianism as a direct precursor to the positivist scientism attacked by 
Zhang Junmai and his supporters in the 1923 debate.234 In his classic study, Joseph Levenson already 
pointed  out  that  the  focus  many  revolutionary  and  reformist  intellectuals  placed  on  the  non-
Chineseness of the Qing dynasty served as a way of attributing the inferiority of the Chinese nation in 
the global balance of power to the Manchurian takeover instead of to China as a nation defined by Han 
ethnicity.235 Thomas Metzger notes that Tang Junyi viewed these evidential studies, though not wholly 
without merit236, “as largely taking the same path of “passively” empirical, specialized scholarship that 
the  modern  West  had  taken,  forsaking  the  metaphysical  outlook  needed  actively  to  confront  and 
transform the given empirical world.”237 Mou too considered the empirical orientation of Qing learning 
towards the analysis of words (zi字) instead of meaning (yi 義) to be the beginning of what he called 
the superficial rationalism and “quantitative socialism” (量的社會主義 ) of May Fourth and of a 
socially disastrous intellectual “imprisonment in reality” (拘囚於現實中 ) which would have to be 
234See for example Tang's The Spiritual Values of Chinese Culture (Zhongguo wenhua zhi jingshen jiazhi 中國文化之精神
價值), Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, [1953b] 2005, p.54, p.333; Tang, “Reflections on the Cultural Spirit of 
Learning since the Qing Dynasty in China” (Zhongguo qingdai yilai xueshu wenhua jingshen zhi shengcha 中國清代以
來學術文化精神之省察 ), [1950d] in RJ, pp.105-126; Tang, [1977], p.667; and Mou, “A Cultural Consciousness to 
Oppose Communism and Save the Nation” (Fangong jiuguo de wenhua yishi反共救國的文化意識 ), [1953a] in DY, 
pp.309-315. 
235Joseph B. Levenson, Confucian China and its Modern Fate. The Problem of Intellectual Continuity, London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1958, p.88. 
236See The Development of the Chinese Humanist Spirit (Zhongguo renwen jingshen zhi fazhan 中國人文精神之發展 ), 
[1957] vol.6 of TJ, pp.27-28.
237Thomas A. Metzger, A Cloud Across the Pacific. Essays on the Clash between Chinese and Western Political Theories  
Today, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2005, p.252.
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dialectically overcome in order  to  save China from perdition.238 In  a  style  which has  undoubtedly 
become quite familiar to the reader in the meantime, Mou argued that 
ever since the end of the Ming dynasty up to the present day, spirit has constantly been in a state of
being  subjected  to  negation  […]  All  the  while,  spirit  has  been  steadily disappearing  by becoming
flattened out, attached to and engulfed by external things. However, spirit is something humanity cannot
live without. When the attachment of people to the scattered [external] things they are fixated on has
reached its most critical point, spirit must necessarily leave those depthless things for what they are and
set itself off against them, return to itself and recover its pure subjectivity. In this way, after having been
pursued,  external  things  are  now  pushed  aside  and  become  an  object  to  which  spirit  is  opposed
[literally: “objective objects”]. At this moment, spirit withdraws into and returns to itself from its state
of  dispersal  in  pursuit  [of  external  things],  and  retreats  into  a  sphere  of  a  sort  of  contemplative
observation. In this way, subject and object come to be opposed, and if the subject is to revive its own
subjective being, then things must first be pushed away to become objects [opposed to the subject] [...]
The Chinese people [...] has reached the moment when it must revive its subjectivity […] That spirit
withdraws into itself in order to successfully establish  its  pure  subjectivity is  the  “thesis”.  The  things
which are pushed aside and thus become objects are the “antithesis”. When this antithesis has completed
its  negating function [...]  it  must  in turn be negated.  This second negation occurs when spirit,  as a
subject,  begins  to  orbit  around  things,  gathers  and  appropriates  them  and  brings  them  under  its
command, this is called the synthesis: a synthesis established through spirit as  a subject. What I mean to
say is that only when spirit has revived its subjective being, will the science and democracy extolled by
rigid  rationalism  return  to  their  source  and  thereby  find  a  place  to  be  settled  and  realized;  and
quantitative socialism too will be transformed into qualitative socialism, thereby obtaining its true value. 
This  is  called  a  “harmony  of  the  second  order”,  a  harmony  which  has  passed  through  sublation
[Aufhebung, aofuhebian 奧伏赫變].239
「精神」，從明亡一直到現在，是在被否定的狀態中 [...]精神一直在消散而平鋪凝結吞沒於外物
中。但是，精神總是人類必然有的東西。當人們的眼睛隨物的散開而貼服於其上，到了窮極的時
候，精神就必然離開了那平鋪的物而顯示出它自己來，回歸於自己，而恢復其純粹的主體性 
(pure subjectivity)。如是，物經過了追逐以後，現在把它推置出去，而成了一個客觀的對象。
精神，這時就從追逐的散開狀態中收回來而歸於其自己，而退處於一種觀照的境界中。如是，主
238See “The Future in the Necessity of History” (Lishi biran zhong zhi weilai 歷史必然中之未來), [1949b] in DY, pp.341-
353.
239Mou, [1949b], pp.352-353. Compare with the passage on the “retreat of God”, quoted in section 2.2.2 of the previous 
chapter.
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體與客觀對立起來，主體先恢復其為主體。則物即必然被推出去為客體 [...] 中華民族 [...] 正是
要恢復它的主體的時候 [...] 精神回歸於其自己而成就其純主體性，便是「正」，所推置出去的
「物」便是客體，亦就是「反」。這個「反」盡了它的否定作用 [...] 現在就要被否定。這個第
二否定，就是「精神」這個主體來運轉物，收攝物，使之統攝於它自己，這就叫做合：以精神為
主而成的綜合。這意思即是說：在精神恢復其為主體的時候，僵化的理智主義所歌頌的科學與民
主始得到其本源的安頓與實現，而量的社會主義始能轉化為質的社會主義而得到其價值。這個叫
做「第二度和諧」，經過了奧伏赫變得和諧。
Since Tang and Mou saw the intellectual trends in the Qing dynasty as fundamentally complicit with 
the attack on the Confucian tradition and the rise of Marxism in twentieth-century China, the Qing and 
its scholarly developments thus became the déjà-là of Chinese communism for them.240 Apparently, the 
assimilative power241 both of them ascribed to Chinese civilization, a power which Tang appealed to in 
explaining that “the result of war [in Chinese history] was always nothing but the unification of the 
people of the central plain with all the other ethnicities and the broadening universal spread of Chinese 
culture” (戰爭之結果，唯是中原民族與四方民族之同化，中國文化之廣度的普被 )242, did not do 
the trick with the Manchu rulers. Mou expressed this sentiment by stating that despite the fact that the 
capital of the Ming dynasty had been located in Beijing for almost 300 years, this “sinicizing” and 
civilizing influence was completely canceled out (抵消 ) by the rule of the Manchurian Qing, which 
cleared the way for the “contamination” (沾污) of communism: 
240A strong anti-Manchu sentiment continues to echo as a recurring trope in the works of the younger generation of New 
Confucians. Cai Renhou蔡仁厚, a student of Mou Zongsan, for example writes the following: “The Great Ming dynasty 
came to an end and the Manchurian Qing dynasty took power. Our national life was thus set back and our cultural life  
distorted.” (大明既亡，满清人入主。民族生命受挫折，文化生命受歪曲), The Spiritual Orientation of the New  
Confucians  (Xin rujia de jingshen fangxiang 新儒家的精神方向 ), Taibei: Xuesheng shuju, 1984, p.36. Cai directly 
echoes Mou's statement that “when the Manchurian Qing took office, the life of the people was twisted. From the end of  
the Qing until the present day, it has never been able to restore its healthy original form.” (满清入关，民族生命乃受曲
折。降至清亡，以迄今日，未能复其健康之本相 ). Mou, [1949d], p.2. Cf. p.14.  Even more recently, Cheng 
Zhongying 成中英 has faulted the loss of the “Confucian spirit” under the Qing as the ultimate cause for the invasion of 
China by European colonial powers and later by Japan. See Chung-Ying Cheng, “Developing Confucian Onto-Ethics in 
a Postmodern World/Age”, Journal of Chinese Philosophy, vol.37, no.1, 2010, p.12. 
241Julia Schneider, Ethnicity and Sinicization. The Theory of Assimilative Power in the Making of the Chinese Nation State  
(1900s–1920s), PhD dissertation, University of Ghent and Göttingen, 2012.
242Tang, [1953b], p.10. Also see “The Conference on Eastern and Western Philosophers and the Problem of “Alienation” in 
World Culture” (Dongxi zhexue xueren huiyi yu shijie wenhua zhong zhi 'shuwai' wenti東西哲學學人會議與世界文化
中之「疏外」問題), [1970] in ZJ, pp.434-437. 
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Beiping [Beijing] has truly been unfortunate! That city and old capital has always been filled with the
stench of  barbarians.  It  is  also  here  that  the  New Culture  Movement  after  May Fourth  came  into
existence, which has continuously influenced the mindset of present day intellectuals. That old cultural
city really cannot symbolize a country built on the basis of the cultural life of China. But where then is
Chinese culture? Which place could symbolize it? I say: it is nowhere, and there is no place which can
symbolize it.243 
真是不幸的北平！那個古城，那個古都，一直是充滿了夷狄的氣息。五四後的新文化運動亦在那
裡發祥，一直影響著今日知識分子之心靈。那個文化古城實不能象微以中國文化生命之根所建造
之國家。然則中國文化在那裡？什麼地方可以象微？曰：沒有那裡，亦無地方可以象微。
Examples  such as  these would seem to contradict  Zhang Hao's  idea that  the distinctive difference 
between New Confucianism and earlier forms of cultural conservatism can be located in the absence of 
a racial  definition of identity.244 Inspired by the discovery of the so-called “Peking Man” in 1929, 
Xiong Shili went further back in time to establish the supremacy of the Han above other ethnicities245 
by trying to prove that Manchus, Mongols, Hui, and Tibetans had originally all been side-branches 
(fenzhi分支) of the Han race, with the Yellow Emperor as their common ancestor.246 There is thus a 
clear Han-centric racial dimension to Xiong's assertion that the study of history (as “comprehensive 
history”,  tongshi通史 ) should reveal the innate tendency from and towards unity in Chinese history 
and in the Chinese as a people, which has “split into different branches from the same root, and will  
return and unite in the same body from these differences” (中華民族由一本而分支，又由分支而合
歸一體).247 On a concrete level, unity is thus established through one of the privileged components of 
the unity. However, a racially infused discourse about culture was by no means unique to traditionalist 
intellectuals. Interestingly enough, the very same Qing dynasty “empiricists” vilified by Mou and Tang 
were praised by the likes of Ding Wenjiang and Hu Shi, as well as the historian Fu Sinian 傅斯年 
(1896–1950)  and  even  Liang  Qichao248, as  pioneers  of  the  enlightened,  scientific  spirit  who  had 
243Philosophy of History (Lishi zhexue 歷史哲學), [1955b], vol.9 of MJ, p.458.
244See Zhang Hao, “New Confucians and the Crisis of Thought in Contemporary China” (Xin rujia yu dangdai Zhongguo 
de sixiang weiji 新儒家与当代中国的思想危机), 1982, in Essays of Zhang Hao, Selected by the Author (Zhang Hao 
zixuanji 张灏自选集), Shanghai: Shanghai jiaoyu chubanshe, 2002, p.83.
245See Xiong's  Lectures on Chinese History  (Zhongguo lishi  jianghua 中國歷史講話 ),  Shanghai:  Shanghai  shudian 
chubanshe, [1938] 2005, pp.4-25.
246See James Leibold,  “Competing Narratives of Racial  Unity in Republican China. From the Yellow Emperor to the 
Peking Man”, in Modern China, vol.32, no.2, 2006, pp.203-205.
247Xiong, [1938], pp.84-85.
248See Jing Haifeng 景海峰, “The Method of Philosophication in the Modern Interpretation of Confucian Thought and its 
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managed  to  break  away  from  the  “metaphysical”  speculation  and  emphasis  on  individual  self-
cultivation  in  Song-Ming  Confucianism.  Instead  of  the  Manchurian  Qing,  Ding  singled  out  the 
Mongolian  Yuan 元 dynasty  (1271-1368)  as  the  principal  cause  for  what  he  took  to  be  the  near 
disappearance of Han culture.249 In the case of Mou Zongsan however, things were arguably still more 
complicated. One can even find passages where his theoretical opposition to Marxism and his acerbic 
anti-communism is bizarrely intermingled with unadulterated anti-Semitism:
You have to remember that Marx is a Jew, and Jews do not have a notion of the nation 250, because they
were already deprived of their country from early on. Because they do not want to return to their home
country either, they are called “international Jews”.251 The only thing they care about is money and using
their slyness and cunning to make a living, which is why they only display craftiness and intelligence
and do not manifest morality or emotions. Their heart has already accustomed itself to a pitch-black dark 
where there is neither light nor heat and only gloomy obscurity. They are particularly fond of the dark
side  of  things  and  enjoy  speaking  in  a  negative  way  to  expose  everything  you  have  positively
established. This is fundamentally a form of demonic evil. Both Marx and Freud are like this.252
你須知馬克思是猶太人。猶太人沒有國家觀念的，因為他們早就沒了國，他們也不想復國。所以
叫做「國際的猶太人」。他們只知道錢，只知道奸詭以謀生，所以只表現聰明智力，而不表現道
Significance” (Rujia sixiang xiandai quanshi de zhexuehua lujing ji qi yiyi 儒家思想现代诠释的哲学路径及其意义), 
2005, http://www.confucius2000.com/admin/list.asp?id=2507. Jing Haifeng also points out that Xiong Shili vehemently 
opposed the Qing Confucianists. 
249See Ding Wenjiang, “Science and Metaphysics”, in Zhang et.al., 2011, pp.23-24. Also see Charlotte Furth,  Ting Wen-
chiang: Science and China's New Culture, Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1970, p.10, pp.66-93.
250Cf. Mou, [1949d], p.4.
251This expression and the myth connected with it  was spread and popularized by the American automobile producer  
Henry Ford in a series of anti-Semitic tracts and pamphlets from the 1920s, which counted a certain Adolf Hitler among  
their readers. In a text collected in Moral Idealism, Mou remarks that “Hitler truly did have some original insights into 
the influence of Marxism, the character of Jewish people and the deficiencies of democratic politics” (希特勒對於馬克
思主義的影響，猶太人的性格，以及民主政治的流弊，確有其獨到的體會). Mou, [1949c], pp.64-65.
252“Critique of the Communist International and the Chinese Communist Party” (Gongchan guoji yu zhonggong pipan 共
產國際與中共批判), [1952a], in Zhongguo wenzhe yanjiu tongxun 中國文哲研究通訊, vol.19, no.3, 2009, p.6. At 
another instance, Mou even made the bewildering suggestion that Hitler's idea of a Volksstaat (種族國家) had its origins 
in the Jewish idea of the chosen people. See Mou, [1940], p.961. Zhang Junmai, inspired by Bertrand Russel (see the 
chapter  on Augustine in  his  A History of  Western Philosophy,  New York:  Simon and Schuster,  1967,  pp.363-364), 
portrayed Marxism as a form of religion – with Marx as the Messiah (彌賽亞 ), the Party as the church (教會 ), the 
revolution as the seconding coming (第二次来) – and attributed these similarities to the strong influence of Judaism and 
Christianity  on  Marx.  Zhang  takes  over  Russell's  table  of  “correspondences”  between  the  Judaic/Christian  and 
communist eschatologies. The idea of a secularization of eschatology in modern historical and political thought was also  
advocated in a more elaborate fashion by Karl Löwith and Jacob Taubes. According to Zhang Junmai, Marxism is not so 
much a philosophical theory (哲學學說 ) as it is a religious dogma (教条 ) used to attract followers and eliminate 
political opponents. Zhang thus uses the distinction between philosophy and religion to attack politics. See Refutation of  
Dialectical Materialism  (Bianzheng weiwu zhuyi bolun 辯證唯物主義駁論 ), Taibei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 
[1958] 1967, pp.114-115 and Zhang Sanping, 2011, pp.51-52. Cf. Tang, [1955], pp.178-179.
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德與情感。因此，他們的內心早已訓練成漆黑無光明，無熱力，只有陰森黑暗。他們專喜黑暗面，
專喜說反面的話，拆穿你的正面建樹的一切。這本是一種魔性。馬克思是如此，佛洛依特也是如
此。
Time and again it becomes clear that for Mou, the problem was not the ghost of metaphysics, but the  
demonic specter of communism253, which he associated with materialism as a scientific, philosophical, 
ethical, and political outlook. He applied the denunciatory epithet of “materialist” as a transhistorical 
signifier to anything from the legalism of Han Feizi and the evidential studies of the Qing dynasty to 
the “Jewish” economism of Marx, rhetorically linking these together in doing so. One can only wonder 
what Mou would have thought of Marx's comments on Judaism in On the Jewish Question, in which 
the  latter  wrote  that  “money  is  the  jealous  god  of  Israel  […]  The  god  of  the  Jews  has  become 
secularized and has become the god of the world. The bill of exchange is the real god of the Jew.”254
In his earlier writings, Mou was mainly preoccupied with systematically researching and expounding 
formal  logic  and  pursuing  an  initial  study  of  Kant's  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  (focused  on  the 
Transcendental Dialectic) in an attempt to formulate universal a priori laws of rational thought and 
provide  a  foundation for  both logic  and mathematics  through Russell's  and Whitehead's  Principia  
Mathematica.255 At  that  time,  he  still  formulated his  opposition to  communism and the  theoretical 
framework of dialectical materialism in “colorless” universalist terms, proposing to adopt a “scientific 
253Mou,  Autobiography at  Fifty (Wushi zishu 五十自述 ),  1957c], vol.32 of  MJ,  p.95: “How could this international 
roaming specter be called a citizen of the world?” (此是國際遊魂，何得謂世界人).
254Karl  Marx,  On  the  Jewish  Question,  [1844]  https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/jewish-question/. 
Postone's  Marxist  take  on  modern  anti-Semitism  is  worth  taking  into  consideration  in  this  regard:  “A careful 
examination of the modern anti-Semitic worldview reveals that it is a form of thought in which the rapid development of  
industrial capitalism with all of its social ramifications is personified and identified as the Jew. It is not that the Jews  
merely were considered to be the owners of money, as in traditional anti-Semitism, but that they were held responsible 
for  economic  crises  and  identified  with  the  range  of  social  restructuring  and  dislocation  resulting  from  rapid 
industrialization, explosive urbanization, the decline of traditional social classes and strata, the emergence of a large, 
increasingly organized industrial proletariat, etc. In other words, the abstract domination of capital, which – particularly 
with rapid industrialization – caught people up in a web of dynamic forces they could not understand, became perceived 
as  the  domination  of  International  Jewry.”  See  “Anti-Semitism  and  National  Socialism”,  26  August  2008, 
https://libcom.org/library/anti-semitism-national-socialism-moishe-postone. Marx himself should not be excluded from 
this Marxist perspective. 
255Three excellent in-depth studies are Liu Aijun刘爱君, Cognition and Intuitive Knowledge – A Study of Mou Zongsan's  
Epistemological Thought (Shizhi yu zhizhi – Mou Zongsan zhishilun sixiang yanjiu 识知与智知 — 牟宗三知识论思想
研究 ),  Beijing:  Renmin chubanshe,  2008,  Rafael  Suter,  Ursprünge  der  Ordnung – Die  logische  Grundlagen des  
Neukonfuzianismus im Frühwerk Mou Zongsans, Phd Dissertation, University of Zürich, 2011b, and Wang Xingguo王
兴国, A Study of Mou Zongsan's Philosophical Thought – From Logical Analysis to Philosophical Construction (Mou 
Zongsan zhexue sixiang yanjiu – cong luoji sibian dao zhexue jiagou 牟宗三哲学思想研究 — 从逻辑思辨到哲学架
构), Beijing: Renming chubanshe, 2007.
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outlook on culture” (科學之文化觀)256 as a solution to the growing threat of communism. Not much 
mention is  yet  made of Chinese culture in particular,  let  alone of ethnicity or race.  In his  earliest 
critiques of dialectical logic and concomitant defenses of the inviolable nature of logical laws (the 
principle of the excluded middle,  the principle of identity,  and the law of non-contradiction), Mou 
invoked  the  universality  of  scientific  truth  over  and against  any particularizing  approaches  which 
sought to introduce historical and social contingencies such as class interest and social status into the 
study of logic and dared to condemn as “bourgeois” the notion of a universal and invariable truth.257 
Though allowing for formally different systems of logical reasoning and notation, Mou took logic to be 
“the development of reason itself” (理性本身的發展)258, purified of all external determinations, and 
not as conditioned by the socio-historical environment, let alone as a social or cultural convention. 
Logic was only meant to deal with the potential and the formal, not with the actual and the materially  
real.259 Freeing reason and logic from empirical contingency by abstracting from specificity on the level 
of content had to guarantee the a priori identity of reason and logic and the invariability of their truth. 
As such, the study of logic for Mou was not meant to deal with the correctness or incorrectness of the 
content of propositions, but only with the correctness of their formal structure, and with the coherence 
or incoherence resulting from their interrelation and combination. What Mou called for was not yet the 
realization  of  “concrete  universals”,  but  the  development  of  “a  sense  of  abstraction”  ( 抽象感 ) 
necessary for both science and philosophy, as well as individual people, to avoid becoming “caught in 
the chains of interrelations between concrete particulars” (陷溺於特相與特相的交引鍊子中)260 and to 
steep themselves in the element of the universal in order to ward off the reifying reduction of culture 
256“A Comparison of Two Trends of Thought in China” (Guonei liang da sichao zhi duibi 國內兩大思潮之對比), [1935b] 
in ZW2, pp.827-828. 
257See “Is the Dialectical Method the Truth?” (Bianzhengfa shi zhenli ma? 辯證法是鎮裡馬？), [1931] in ZW1, pp.3-12, 
“Logic and Dialectical Logic” (Luoji yu bianzheng luoji 邏輯與辯證邏輯 ), [1934c] in  ZW1, pp.93-138, and “The 
Limits of Dialectical Materialism” (Bianzheng weiwulun de xianzhi辯證唯物論的限制), [1934d] in ZW1, pp.139-152. 
The last two texts were included in the collection The Debate on Materialist Dialectics (Weiwu bianzhengfa lunzhan唯
物辯證法論戰 ), edited by Zhang Dongsun 張東蓀 ,  Taibei : Pami’er shudian, [1934] 1980, pp.71-133. Of course, a 
universalist, non-constructivist approach to truth does not exclude, and can in fact be perfectly combined with a strong 
political  engagement.  Although their work did not deal  with politics or history and in fact can be characterized as  
fundamentally  ahistorical  (science  =  invariant  truth),  most  logical  positivists  of  the  Vienna  Circle  had  socialist  
inclinations. Otto Neurath (1882-1945) for example was a fervent (traditional) Marxist, who saw metaphysical thought  
and idealism as complicit with social stagnation. See Michael Friedman,  A Parting of Ways. Carnap, Cassirer,  and  
Heidegger,  Chicago and La Salle:  Open Court,  2000,  pp.11-23 on the  political  dimension of  Rudolf  Carnap's  and 
Neurath's attack on metaphysics. 
258Mou, [1934c], p.104. Also see the preface to his Standard of Logic (Luoji Dianfan邏輯典範), [1941], vol.11 of MJ, 
pp.3-11. 
259Mou, [1934c], p.114.
260See “Introspections after a Great Disaster” (Da nan hou de fansheng大難後的反省), [1947] in ZW2, pp.973-978.
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and human existence to its concrete, material dimension.261 
However,  already  in  his  first  published  article262,  aside  from  vouching  for  the  universality  and 
timelessness of science, he also began to invoke cultural determinations against dialectical materialism. 
In this youthful piece, Mou suggested that Heraclitus (“War is the father of all things”) must be held 
responsible for the oppositional nature of most Western conceptions of dialectics which stressed the 
productive nature of contradictions and conflict, and had culminated in the Marxist concept of violent 
class struggle and the mechanical dynamic between base and superstructure. He further contrasted this 
belligerent, Western type of dialectics with a non-conflictual form of Chinese dialectics stemming from 
the  Yijing,  where the  synthesis and reconciliation of oppositions was stressed in a way which Mou 
likened  to  the  method  of  Hegel.  Still,  despite  the  incidental  occurrence  of  such  rough  cultural 
specifications, the theoretical and methodological baseline in these early writings was a rejection of 
materialist dialectics as a dogmatic “metaphysical theory” (yuanxue lilun元學理論) buttressed by an 
appeal to the scientific solidity of formal logic.263 Simply put: formal logic was scientifically sound, 
dialectical logic was not.  Mou thought that “if  one holds on to the basic  meaning of the logic of  
negation, then that which calls itself materialism is actually idealism” (保持矛盾邏輯的根本義，則自
稱為唯物論的即是唯心論)264, since it endowed historical and natural reality with abilities of negation 
and contradiction, properties which he thought could only be ascribed to conceptual operations. In 
another remarkable polemical reversal, Mou chided the communists for being too idealist in all their 
efforts to defend the theories of historical and dialectical materialism, using the latter as a smoke bomb 
(煙幕彈 ) to distract both themselves and the largely uninformed and ignorant populace from social 
realities  which  contradict  their  overtly  abstract  and  detached  speculations.265 For  Mou,  dialectical 
materialism was nothing but a misuse and distortion of Hegel's “immobile ontology” (靜的本體論), 
immobile in the sense that Hegel did not subject the dialectical transitions between various categories 
of being and thought to temporal determinations. Mou thought that the immobility of Hegel's otherwise 
quite restless, but as he saw it, strictly notional dialectics had its own full development as a result and 
261See “The Sense for the Concrete and the Sense for Abstraction with Chinese People” (Zhongguoren de jutigan yu 
chouxianggan 中國人的具體感與抽象感), [1936] in ZW1, pp.279-294 and “On Realism” (Lun xianshizhuyi 論現實主
義), [1939b] in ZW2, p.916.
262Mou, [1931].
263Mou, [1934d], pp.139-142.
264Mou, “Establishing the Basic Principles of Society” (Shehui jiben yuanze zhi queli社會基本原則之確立), [1933b] in 
ZW2, p.654.
265“Politicians and Revolutionaries” (Zhengzhijia yu gemingjia 政治家與革命家), [1937b] in ZW2, pp.876-877.
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could not be applied to the “material” realms of history and society.266 He tried to discredit the Marxist 
misappropriation  of  the  dialectic  in  its  application  to  society  and  nature  as  mistakingly  and 
ideologically introducing distinctions into a reality which “does not have classes, or distinctions of 
higher and lower, and is undifferentiated” (沒有階級，沒有高下，是一色的 ).267 Not unlike Jin 
Yuelin, who characterized the “world of original being” (benran shijie 本然世界 ) as being “without 
perspective” (wuguan無觀)268, Mou still conceived of reality as essentially ontologically neutral:
On the basis of Zhuangzi's “observation through the Way” or what more recently Zhang Shenfu 269 has
called “pure objectivity”, [we can say that] the “nature” we observe is “naturally self-so”, “is simply
what it is”, “has no meaning”, “has no value”, “has no distinctions between good and bad”, which means  
that even if there were to be contradictions [in reality], then these would not necessarily be [in a state of]
struggle.270 
根據莊子的「道觀」或近代張申府先生所謂「純客觀」，我們所看的「自然」是「自然的」，
266Mou,  [1934c],  pp.117-118,  Mou,  [1934d],  p.150.  Also see  Mou,  [1933b], pp.653-654,  pp.656-657.  Tang Junyi  too 
thought that the Hegelian dialectic remained restricted to the level of concepts. Additionally,  Tang believed that the  
procedure of double negation and affirmation in Madhyamaka Buddhism (不 X 不 Y, 非X 非 Y, 即 X 即 Y), as a higher 
form of dialectical  reasoning (ranked 6th in a total  of 8 types of dialectics he distinguishes,  the materialist  version 
occupying the lowest place), showed the inapplicability of contradictory distinctions to the realm of being more clearly 
than the Hegelian variant. See “Types of Dialectics” (Bianzhengfa zhi leixing辯證法之類型 ), [1961a] in Tang Junyi, 
Collected Philosophical Essays (Zhexue lunji 哲學論集), vol.18 of TJ, pp.427-429. Of course the obvious problem is 
that the distinction between being and thought cannot be so easily applied to Hegel's logic. 
267Mou, [1931],  p.8. Mou compared the formal structure of dogmatic adaptations of the scheme of “thesis-antithesis-
synthesis”  and of  the  three  “laws” of  the dialectic  formulated  by Engels  in  his  Dialectics  of  Nature (the unity of 
opposites,  the reversal  of  quantitative  changes into qualitative  ones,  the negation of  the  negation)  to  the  old rigid 
structure of the eight-legged essay (八股文 ). See Mou, [1933b], p.648. Also see Li Changzhi 李長之 , “The Eight-
Legged Form of Dialectics” (Baguwenshi de bianzhengfa 八股文式的辯證法 ) [not dated], in Zhang Dongsun (ed.), 
[1934], pp.328-338. As Fredric Jameson aptly points out, “Hegel's own analysis would seem to show that the dialectic is 
out  to destroy the concept of law rather  than to offer the chance of  formulating some new ones.”  Valences of  the  
Dialectic, London and New York: Verso, 2009, p.14. A recent neo-traditionalist pamphlet (which shares nothing of the 
universalism of the 1958  Manifesto) entitled  Manifesto for the Renaissance of  Chinese Culture: Struggling for the  
Advancement  of  the Rebirth of  the Chinese People and Peace and Development  of  the World in the New Century  
(Zhonghua wenhua fuxing xuanyan: wei cujin xin shiji  zhonghua minzu weida fuxing he shijie heping yu fazhan er  
fendou 中华文化复兴宣言：为促进新世纪中华民族伟大复兴和世界和平与发展而奋斗), written by Li Bochun李
伯淳, signed by 85 academics (among whom Zhang Dainian) and published in October 2001 on the occasion of the 52 nd 
anniversary of  the  PRC,  identifies  three  major  particularities  of  Chinese  culture  (the  unity of  man and  heaven,  a  
dialectical frame of thought, and the idea of harmonious unity) and seems bent on formalizing what it takes to be the 
dialectical  features  of  Chinese  thought  into three  laws in  a  manner similar  to  Engel's  attempt  to  put  the Hegelian 
dialectic in a straitjacket. For the text of this Manifesto go to: http://www.ruyirensheng.com/xyfx.htm.
268Yvonne Schulz Zinda, Jin Yuelin's Ontology. Perspectives on the Problem of Induction, Leiden: Brill, 2012, pp.167-168.
269Zhang Shenfu 張申府 (1893-1986) had been Mou's mentor in logic during his studies at Peking University. Zhang was 
the first to translate Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus into Chinese. Much to Mou's displeasure, he was also 
one of the founding members of the CCP.
270Also see Mou, [1933b], p.649. Cf. p.670.
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「是其所是」，「沒有意義的」，「沒有價值的」，「沒有好壞高下的」；所以雖有矛盾，不必
鬥爭。
Mou repeatedly stressed that “affirmation and negation belong to thought, not to being. The principles 
of logic are manifested from thought and not from being” (肯定、否定是思的，不是有的。邏輯之
理由思顯，不是由有顯 ).271 In general, he still kept being and thought strictly separated in order to 
insulate logic from both the contingencies of facticity and the illusions of a dogmatic metaphysics 
claiming to be able to reach the unconditioned without recourse to experience. When applied to what is 
accessible through sense experience, the cognitive structures of the understanding (lijie 理解) and the 
procedural rules of thought that can be a priori derived from a pure logic which “is not mixed up with 
any elements of experience” (不雜有任何經驗特性 ), has the nature of being fundamentally “self-
caused” (自因性)272 and “does not originate from a perceptual horizon” (不自境出)273, the a priori laws 
of logic can “treat things as things without becoming reified by them” (物物而不物於物)274. Moreover, 
Mou strongly insisted that being and knowledge have their own distinct principles.275 The logically 
grounded principles rendering cognition of the external world possible have to be kept apart from those 
which realize (shixian 實現 ) being, since the former only regulate (jigang 紀綱 ) the perception and 
conceptual determination of being as phenomena276:
Logic belongs to the sphere of thought and nowhere else. We do not oppose [the idea] that thought
exists. But if one says that thought is  being, or observes thought from [the perspective of] being, then
271Mou, [1941], p.7.
272Mou, [1941], p.739.
273Mou, [1941], p.131.
274Mou, [1941], p.734 This sentence is taken from the Shanmu山木 chapter in the Zhuangzi. See Burton Watson (trans.), 
The Complete Works of Zhuangzi, New York: Columbia University Press, 2013, p.157. Watson translates it as “treating 
things as things but not letting them treat you as a thing.” Also see Xiong Shili's use of this phrase in Xiong, [1932], p.9 
and Tang, [1951-1952], p.612, who employs it to refer to the spontaneity of the understanding in Kant. 
275Rafaël  Suter,  “Erkenntniskritik  und  Selbstreflexion:  Kritik  als  Praxis.  Überlegungen  zu  einem neukonfuzianischen 
Begriff  der  “Kritik”  anhand  des  Frühwerks  von  Móu  Zōngsān  (1909–1995)”,  polylog,  26,  2011a,  p.79:  “Die 
transzendentale Analyse lässt aufgrund ihres epistemologischen Charakters nur die Erkenntnis der apriorischen Struktur 
der Repräsentation der Wirklichkeit zu, sie eröffnet indessen keine Erkenntnis der Welt in ihrer Faktizität”.
276See Mou, [1941], pp.127-143, pp.739-749. Also see Wang Xingguo 王兴国 , “Mou Zongsan's Principle of Realization 
and Principle of Regulation, Including a Comparison with Kant's Regulative and Constitutive Principle” (Mou Zongsan 
de shixian zhi li yu jigang zhi li – jian yu Kangde de guiyue yuanze he gouzao yuanze bijiao 牟宗三的实现之理与纪纲
之理——兼与康德的轨约原则和构造原则比较 ), 2001, for a comprehensive and systematic study of this highly 
complex distinction throughout the whole of Mou's oeuvre. 
     http://www.confucius2000.com/confucian/mzssxzlyjgzl.htm 
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one is taking a metaphysical standpoint.  It should not be adopted when discussing logic. Otherwise,
logic risks no longer being logic, so that its principle would not be its own, but a metaphysical principle
[…] That thought and being are not one and the same does not mean that “thought” as a factual reality is
not also a kind of “being”. It only means that the principles which manifest themselves in thought are not 
principles which are established with regard to being. What is established [in the case of thought] are
judgments and descriptions of the subject concerning existence, [but] what is displayed [in this case] is
the manifestation of thinking itself. Therefore, the principle of thought is directed towards itself, whereas 
the principle of being takes on the perspective of things. The latter has a substantial reality, whereas the
former does not.277
邏輯是思界，如此而已。我們不反對思是有。但說思是有，或以有看思，那是元學的觀點。於講
邏輯不應采取。否則邏輯就會不是邏輯，而其理亦非邏輯之理，而為元學之理 […] 思與有不
可合一者；並非說「思」這件事實，不是一種「有」。乃只是說，「思」上所顯之理不就是關於
「有」所立之理也。立者是我對於存在之斷定或陳述；顯者是思維本身之呈露。故思之理是反身
的，有的理是物觀的。物觀的有「體」，反身的無「體」。
We are still far from Mou Zongsan's later notion of intellectual intuition as a mode of practical insight 
which is not restrained by the bounds of sensibility and provides access to the noumenal dimension of 
value as a “thing-in-itself”. At this stage in his philosophical development, he firmly positioned himself 
against what he took to be a neglect of the difference between being and thought in Kant's “highest 
principle of synthetic judgments” according to which “the conditions of the possibility of experience in 
general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience”.278 A telling 
example of the outspoken modesty of the early Mou's ontological claims can be found in the in itself 
rather  grandiose  conceptual  deduction  (tuiyan 推 演 ) apophantically unfolding  the  a  priori 
characteristics of ontological substance (benti 本體) provided towards the end of the second volume of 
his Critique of the Cognitive Mind (Renshixin zhi pipan認識心之批判).279 The “logical construction” 
(luoji  gouzao 邏輯構造 )  of  an  unchanging  absolute  Mou  undertakes  here  starts  out  from  the 
assumption that an unchanging metaphysical substance has no place in sensible intuition (zhijue直覺) 
277Mou, [1941], p.137, p.143. 
278Kant,  Critique of  Pure Reason,  London:  Penguin Books, 2007, p.189 (B197).  According to Wang Xingguo,  Mou's 
appropriation and critique of this principle runs through his whole work like an Ariadne's thread. See Wang, 2007, pp.1-
12.
279See  Critique of the Cognitive Mind  (Renshixin zhi pipan 認識心之批判 ), [1956b], vol.19 of  MJ, pp.661-698.  The 
manuscript for the massive Critique of the Cognitive Mind was already completed in 1949, but was only published much 
later in 1956.
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subject to space and time (時空), where there are only “things which arise conditionally” (緣起事)280 
and “contingently occurring things” (偶起之事 )281. Substance can be accessed neither through the a 
priori “empty frames” (xu jiazi虛架子, xufa虚法) on which the mind relies in cognition282, nor through 
the “pure principles” (chunli純理) of logic, which “have no content, and all have a homogeneous and 
purely formally constitution” (無內容，純為同質而形式的).283 Such an absolute then cannot be given 
in  experience,  but  demands  a  transcendent  use  of  cognitive  reason.  Before  embarking  on  the 
challenging deduction itself,  Mou already cautions that “this kind of construction follows a logical 
procedure and only provides formal determinations. Whether or not the concept of substance formally 
determined in this way will turn out to be real and objectively adequate has to be ascertained on the  
basis of whether or not it can afterwards meet the conditions of a construction through intuition” (蓋此
種構造是按照一種邏輯手續而只作形式的決定也。此種形式的決定所決定之本體概念是否能有
真實性或客觀妥實性，但視其後來是否能滿足直覺構造之條件 )284. There is not necessarily any 
proof for the “objective efficacy” (客觀有效性) of what is nonetheless a legitimate “pursuit of reason” 
( 理性之追求 ).285 The  deduction,  structured  in  numbered  paragraphs  (1.00-3.32)  reminiscent  of 
Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, ends with the equally sobering conclusion that strictly 
speaking, nothing can be determined concerning the absolute as far as its existence is concerned, and 
that the entire deduction has only a logical or notional and not any ontological necessity and validity.286 
Mou seems to have taken to heart Kant's idea, formulated in the context of the latter's frontal attack on 
the ontological proof for God's existence in the Transcendental Dialectic287, that “being is not a real 
predicate”288.  In Mou's own words: “Although it  may well  be that  there are  no errors in a logical  
280Mou, [1956b], p.669.
281Mou, [1956b], p.672.
282Mou used  the  term “reference schemes”  (gedu 格度 )  in  this  context  to  designate cognitive schemata that  do not 
designate the properties of objects in themselves, supposedly in contrast to the Kantian “categories” ( fanchou 範疇 ), 
whose function they nonetheless very much resemble. At this point, Mou still assumed that Kant's categories had a 
overambitious ontological dimension conflating the distinct realms of being and thought. See Wang Xingguo, 2007, 
p.395, p.399.
283Mou, [1956b], pp.663-666.
284Mou, [1956b], p.669.
285Mou, [1956b], p.663.
286As Wang Xingguo makes clear, in the Critique of the Cognitive Mind, Mou positively appropriates Berkeley's dictum 
that “to be is to be perceived” (esse est percipi ,存在即被知) by taking it to mean not that perception creates being, but 
that outside of experience open to cognition and perception, nothing can be known or said to exist. For Mou, Berkeley's  
dictum has no positive ontological import, since what is given in experience “is taken up by the mind, and certainly not  
created by it” (為心所攝，並非為心所造). See Wang, 2007, pp.277-288.
287Kant, 2007, pp.500-506 (B620-630).
288See  Kant, 2007, p.504 (B626). “The small word  is  […] only serves to posit the predicate in relation to the subject.” 
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construction, still, logical claims do not amount to proofs [of existence]” (邏輯構造本身雖可以無邏
輯之弊，而邏輯要求不等於證明)289. This conclusive moderation of the overtly metaphysical claims 
made throughout the deduction of the metaphysical absolute, circumscribed and relativized as merely 
“logically  constructed”  and only endowed with  a  conceptual  certitude,  is  all  the  more  remarkable 
seeing how in the course of the lengthy deduction itself, Mou states that “ontological substance is not 
only [identical to] its own essential constitution, but is also its own existence” (本體不惟是其自己之
體性，且亦是其自己之有), adding that “its essence cannot be separated from its being (existence)” 
(不能區別其體性與其有（存在）).290 He thus has to assume a radical difference between the “being” 
referred to in the assertion that one cannot differentiate between the essence and the being of substance, 
and  the  meaning  of  “being”  or  “existence”  in  the  context  of  his  own skeptical  admission  that  it 
ultimately cannot be proven whether or not a substance in which essence and existence coincide really 
exists.291 His restriction of the objective validity of what can be logically and conceptually deduced 
concerning a  metaphysical  absolute  thus  comes  about  by means  of  a  distinction  between the  real 
existence of substance on the one hand, and the notional existence of this being, whose essence it is to  
exist,  on  the  other.  This  remarkable  (and,  from a  Hegelian  point  of  view,  untenable)  distinction 
grounding the internal unity and self-identity of substance through a differentiation of being, allows 
Mou  to  go  on  to  ascribe  properties  such  as  omnipresence,  omniscience,  omnipotence,  and  pure 
goodness  to  an  absolute  which  becomes  more  and  more  divine  (and  Christian)  as  the  deduction 
progresses, while at the same time bracketing the question concerning “the relation between substance 
and the real world” (本體與現實世界之關系 )292 as something that will have to be accounted for 
through the elaboration of a “moral metaphysics” where a non-sensible form of apprehension could 
provide what has already been established as conceptually necessary with the intuition required for it to 
become fully objectified and real.293 The circumscriptive distinction between being and thought thus 
(Ibid., B626-627).
289Mou, [1956b], p.694. Cf. Kant, 2007, p.505 (B628-629): “If, then, I try to think a being as the highest reality (without  
any defect), the question still remains as to whether it exists or not. For although in my concept there may be wanting 
nothing of the possible real content of a thing in general, something is wanting in relation to my whole state of thought,  
namely,  that  the  knowledge of  this  object  should be  possible also  a posteriori  […] Whatever  and however  much, 
therefore, our concept of an object may contain, we must always step outside it in order to attribute existence to the  
object.” Also see Mou, [1956b], pp.695-696.
290Mou, [1956b], p.671. “Substance is its own essential constitution, if it were not to be its own existence, then it would  
necessarily exist on the basis of something else, so that it would no longer exist because of its own essence.” (本體是其
自己體性，如果它不是其自己之有，則必因別的而為有，而不是因其體性而為有). Ibid.
291See Mou, [1956b], p.672. Mou explicitly invokes the authority of Kant here. 
292Mou, [1956b], p.673. Cf. p.684.
293Mou, [1956b], p.694. 
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allows Mou to maintain a non-duality of being and thought (as well as of being and essence, will and 
inclination  etc.)  internal  to  substance,  while  simultaneously  enabling  him  to  ensure  that  the 
discriminating force of the distinction prevails over this “indoor” identity by keeping it an “internal 
affair” of substance. The latter is thereby saved from being subjected to the influence of empirical 
causality and contingency which would be introduced by appealing to sensible intuition in furnishing 
proof of existence in the full sense of the word. The question concerning the existence of a being whose 
essence presupposes existence (St. Anselm's putatively apodictic definition of God) is thus addressed 
“inside” a distinct domain insulated from the “real world”, a domain which can even manage to contain 
an absolute that is supposed to have no outside, presumably tolerates nothing external to itself 294, and is 
capable of not being “fractured by the scattered existence of [individual] entities” (不因現實存在之散
立而破裂)295 in which it is immanently present. Mou does not yet call upon dialectics to bridge this gap 
between (real) existence and (notional) being, but leaves it intact and visible as something still to be 
thought  through.  In  other  words:  for  now,  epistemological  considerations  (the  Kantian  limits  of 
thought) win out over the task of settling (安頓) and satisfying (滿足) ontological demands, in clear 
contrast to Mou's mature philosophy, where epistemology itself comes to be ontologically grounded as 
an instance of “attachment” constituted through dialectical self-negation. 
As I showed in the above, it was crucial for Mou in his early critiques of materialist dialectics to ensure 
that the categories of negation and contradiction have no ontological import or reference, and can only 
be used as a method of exposition in conceptual analysis while remaining under strict supervision of 
the law of non-contradiction. To recapitulate his uncompromising position on the matter: “There are no 
contradictions in systems of logic, in the layered structure of nature, in a fact, or in a true proposition; 
and neither will be there any contradictions in the application of the dialectical method to explain facts 
[...] The only contradiction lies in the objectification of the dialectic.”(邏輯系統無矛盾，自然層壘無
294Mou, [1956b], pp.685-688. “Not a single a real thing exists separated from substance” (一切現實存在不離本體而自
存 ), ibid., p.686. “Divine knowledge does not only know itself [completely], but also knows everything [else]; this 
omniscience is based on the fact that substances envelops everything and that there is not a single actual entity which is  
not  dominated  by  substance.  Supposing  that  there  were  to  be  a  concrete  thing  lying  beyond  the  reach  of  divine 
knowledge which would not be mastered by substance, then this thing would ground itself independently from substance 
and would be something substance cannot envelop, in which case subtenancy would not be able to become itself” (神智
不但自知，且知一切，其知一切也，基於本體之無不涵蓋，一切現實存在無不以本體為之宰。假若有一物既是
一具體存在而又不為神智之所及，不為本體之所宰，則此物即脫離本體而自立，而本體有所不能涵蓋者。假若
本體有所不能涵蓋者，則本體不成其為本體). Ibid., p.674.
295Mou, [1956b], p.675.
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矛盾，一件事實無矛盾，一個真命題亦無矛盾；而用辯證的方法來反復解說事實已不會有矛盾 
[...] 矛盾唯在辯證之客觀化)296. At times, he already moved in another direction by giving tentative 
indications that the dialectical method had its proper place in moral practice, that is to say in a non-
conceptual path towards a metaphysical reality only accessible through spiritual practice and closed to 
rational forms of cognition subservient to logic.297 However, these suggestions only crystallize much 
later in his mature system, which can sometimes give the reader the impression of having been written 
by an entirely different person. Nevertheless, I think it can be argued that the strongest, if not the only 
clearly identifiable continuity in Mou Zongsan's entire oeuvre is negatively ensured by his life-long 
revolt against communism and the materialist insurgence against Spirit, a revolt which took on a host 
of  different  forms  as  his  thought  evolved,  not  in  the  least  in  response  to  changing  historical 
circumstances.  It  is  important  to  keep in  mind that  the  young Mou's  interest  in  formal  logic  was 
instigated by the debates on dialectical materialism in China which took place in the first decades of the 
twentieth century.298 His early critiques of intuitionist and conventionalist approaches to logic which he 
held responsible for contaminating the a priori nature and transcendental purity of logical laws are 
taken up and continued in his later endeavor of granting the moral domain the status of something 
noumenal and positing a corresponding form of intuitive knowledge as in turn providing access to the 
“in itself”. What he called the “self-constriction” (收斂 ) of the logical self (luoji ziwo 邏輯自我 ) 
necessary to ensure the latter's a priori and transcendental status is thus related to Mou's later theme of 
self-negation, in which the same movement of reflexive constriction is applied by the moral subject in 
order to give rise to cognition as a faculty.299 Right up to his latest writings, logic and morality would 
continue to figure as two equally “unchangeable substances” (dingchang zhi ti 定常之體)300 free from 
the relativizing intrusion of empirical causality and social conditions. His philosophical struggle with 
the confusion of the autonomous domains of knowledge and being by both psychologistic empiricism, 
historical materialism (and apparently to a certain extent even Kant) is thus a shadowy precursor to his 
own attempts  to  overcome the gap between knowledge and existence in  his  mature philosophy. 301 
296“Contradiction and the Theory of Types” (Maodun yu leixing shuo矛盾與類型說), [1933a] in ZW1, pp.90-91. Also see 
Mou, [1941], pp.715-721.
297See Study of Logic (Lizexue 理則學), [1955c], vol.12 of MJ, pp.323-330, Mou, [1941], p.685, Mou, [1952a], pp.21-25, 
Mou, [1952b], p.99. Also see Tang, [1951-1952], p.651.
298See Wang, 2007, p.32, Suter, 2011b, pp.30-37 and Thoraval, 2003, pp.12-13.
299See Wang, 2007, pp.190-191.
300See “The Double-Leveled 'Unchanging Substance' ” (Liang chong 'dingchang zhi ti' 兩重「定常之體」), [1990a] in 
WW, pp.489-495.
301See Mou's retrospective remarks on his earlier work in his Autobiography, [1957c], pp.63-64.
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However,  his  later  extension  of  dialectics  to  Chinese  culture  and  history  as  a  mobile  and  self-
transforming Spirit  would  make this  earlier  restriction  of  the  dialectic  to  the  “immobility”  of  the 
notional  largely  untenable.  By  then,  his  cultural  and  historical  conceptions  had  already  come  to 
presuppose dialectical  negativity as something much more than a  merely conceptual  determination 
without any corresponding reality or ontological import. This made it necessary for him to introduce 
new distinctions, for example by distinguishing between the atemporal validity of logic as a pure and 
universal  manifestation of  reason itself  on the one hand,  and the eternal  mobility characteristic  of 
culture as a Spirit which expresses and manifests itself in time and history without succumbing to or 
becoming affected by the factical contingency of “external conditions” (waiyuan) on the other.
By the time he was working on the impressive amount of texts which would later be collected in his  
“Three  Books  on  New Outer  Kingliness”  (Xin  waiwang  sanshu 新外王三書 ),  presented  as  an 
expression of his “objective grief” (keguan de beiqing 客觀的悲情)302 and “concerned consciousness” 
(youhuan yishi 憂患意識)303, Mou had already come to consider his youthful opposition to communism 
purely on the basis of science and formal logic as flawed and inadequate.304 As we saw in the long 
302See chapter 5 of Mou's Autobiography, [1957c], pp.75-120.
303Mou adopted this expression from Xu Fuguan 徐复观. He took it to denote a sense of moral responsibility and positive 
engagement with social and political problems, and contrasted it with the Christian consciousness marked by (echoing 
Kierkegaard) fear and trembling (kongbu yishi 恐怖意識 ) and the Buddhist consciousness of suffering and karmic 
retribution (kuye yishi苦业意識). See Mou, [1973], pp.12-19.
304After the founding of PRC, Mou would reproach Jin Yuelin  for remaining confined to purely technical issues in his 
philosophical works. See “A True Man of Freedom” (Yi ge zhenzheng de ziyouren 一個真正的自由人 ), [1952e] in 
SSXB, p.50. According to Liu Aijun, Jin Yuelin investigated epistemology in order to resolve epistemological problems, 
whereas Mou researched epistemology to tackle the issue of the modernization of Chinese philosophy. Liu, 2008, p.23. 
On Mou's  ambigious  stance  towards  Jin  Yuelin,  also see  Wang Xingguo,  “Mou Zongsan  on  the  Modern  Field of  
Philosophy  in  China”  (Mou  Zongsan  lun  Zhongguo  xiandai  zhexue  jie 牟 宗 三 论 中 国 现 代 哲 学 界 ),  2000, 
http://www.confucius2000.com/confucian/mzslzgxdzxj.htm.  Mou  also  blamed  Jin  for  having  stayed  behind  on  the 
mainland and for having “capitulated” to the communist authorities, pointing out that logical analysis was not sufficient 
to oppose communist ideology and uphold Chinese culture. Mou's attack on Jin led to a impassioned rebuttal by the 
Taiwanese liberal thinker Yin Haiguang殷海光, a fierce advocate of free speech who opposed the GMD monopoly on 
power in postwar Taiwan.  Yin was a former student of Jin Yuelin,  and was especially angered by Mou's use of  a  
confessional article (written by Jin's students, among whom Zhang Shiying 张世英), in which Jin had been forced to 
recant his “idealism” and “bourgeois” views. According to Yin, the scientific method and logical analysis were the most  
powerful  weapons  to  combat  the  “Red  Demon”.  See  Ruelin  Chen,  “Morality  Versus  Science:  The  Two  Cultures 
Discourse in 1950s Taiwan”, East Asian Science,Technology and Society, 4, 2010, pp.104-105. A criticism of Marxism 
from the standpoint of science would be continued by Ye Qing 葉青  (1896-1990). See Ye's  A Critique of Marxism  
(Makesizhuyi pipan 馬克思主義批判 ), Taibei: Pami’er shudian, 1974. Ye Qing is most known in modern Chinese 
intellectual history for his polemics with the Marxist Ai Siqi concerning the introduction of Soviet “new philosophy” 
into China at a time when Ye himself identified science with historical and dialectical materialism and advocated the  
“Annihilation of Philosophy” (哲學消滅 ). See Werner Meissner,  Philosophy and Politics in China. The Controversy  
over Dialectical Materialism in the 1930s, London: Hurst & Company, 1990, pp.50-59. Also see Romana Recker, Zhang 
Dongsun  und  Ye  Qing  und  ihre  Auseinandersetzung  über  den  dialektischen  Materialismus,  Doctoral  Dissertation, 
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quote which I gave at the beginning of this subsection, he had begun to see such “rigid rationalism” as 
linked to  “quantitative  socialism”.  In  this  way,  the  timeless  objectivity  of  the  scientific  field  was 
identified as a space of technological development, industrial productivity, reductionism, reification 
and  historical  oblivion.305 Science  became  increasingly  associated  with  scientism  and  communist 
ideology,  as equally totalizing approaches marked by an exclusive focus on the material  and by a 
quantifying  and  calculative  form  of  rationality.306 For  Mou,  both  positivist  science  as  well  as 
communist practice were characterized by a total lack of awareness of the pivotal position of the human 
subject.307 Towards  the  end  of  his  career,  Mou  suggested  that  analytical  philosophy,  a  form  of 
philosophy that is too closely aligned with science and ends up being bogged down in the analysis of 
language (語言分析) as a mode of unveiling the meaninglessness of metaphysical problems, would do 
better to apply itself, not to attacking metaphysics and ridiculing the philosophy of Hegel, which he still 
saw as something of a bulwark against the negative aspects of modernity symbolized by Marx, but to 
uncovering the abuse of language by a communist ideology employing the “dark magic of language” 
(文字魔术 ) in order to deceive the Chinese people.308 After his increased turn towards cultural and 
socio-political  problems,  he  would  come  to  think  of  analytical  philosophy  as  not  so  much  an 
independent form of philosophy in itself, but rather as a discussion of methodological and “technical” 
issues.309 Eventually, in an article from 1991, he would sound even harsher and progressively more 
Heideggerian when writing that “modern philosophy has been reduced to linguistic analysis under the 
conditions of advanced civilization, with logic having been changed into applied computing; this can 
no longer be called philosophy, and merely signifies the degeneration of philosophy into technology” 
(現在的哲學只剩下高度文明下的語言分析，講邏輯變成應用電腦，這其實不算是哲學，只是哲
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, 1992.
305Cf. Tang, “The World of Science and the World of Humanism” (Kexue shijie yu renwen shijie科學世界與人文世界), 
[1949a] in RJ pp.39-52.
306See Mou, [1954b], pp.17-18 and “Comments on Logical Positivism” (Luoji shizhenglun pingshu 邏輯實徵論評述 ), 
[1958] in WW, pp.121-129. In the last text (p.121), Mou makes some negative comments on the Jewishness of what he  
takes to be the anti-Hegelian currents of modern Western thought (Marx, Freud, Einstein, Lenin,...) in line with the 
passage I cited in the above. For Tang Junyi, the logical positivism of Carnap and Schlick had followed in the footsteps  
of Kant's critical philosophy without taking over its positive side, i.e. the transference of theoretical aporias to practical  
reason. See Tang, [1951-1952], p.611.
307See “Refutation of the Communist Treatise on Practice” (Pi gongchanzhuyizhe de 'Shijian lun' 闢共產主義者的「實踐
論」), [1952c] in DY, pp.120-123.
308Fourteen Lectures on the Encounter between Chinese and Western Philosophy (Zhongxi zhexue zhi huitong shisi jiang  
中西哲學之會通十四講), [1990b], vol.30 of MJ, p.8.
309See “Kant and the Orientation of Contemporary Western Philosophy” (Kangde yu xifang dangdai zhexue zhi quxian康
德與西方當代哲學之趨向), [1980a] in WW, p.300.
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學之淪落為技術)310. The monumental body of work Mou left behind makes it clear that he sought to 
overcome this  degeneration of philosophy brought on by science and ideology through philosophy 
itself. 
3.2.3 Mou's double-leveled ontology: the transcendental distance between fact and value in the 
light of the tension between history and thought 
3.2.3.1 Mou and Wittgenstein on the limits of the sayable
Mou Zongsan's preface to his 1987 translation of Wittgenstein's 1922 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 
(with the classical-sounding Chinese title Mingli lun名理論)311 presents us with a good opportunity to 
gain a better insight into the changed stance towards analytical or “scientific” philosophy in his later 
period and can serve as a point of entry into a more elaborate discussion of the final presentation of his 
own  ontology  and  epistemology  in  Intellectual  Intuition  and  Chinese  Philosophy  (1971)  and 
Appearance and Thing-in-itself (1975). In his own preface Wittgenstein had written that “the aim of the 
book is to draw a limit to thought, or rather—not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts: for in  
order to be able to draw a limit to thought, we should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable (i.e. 
we should have to be able to think what cannot be thought).”312 Mou takes up this foundational issue by 
departing from the final proposition of the Tractatus (“What we cannot speak about we must pass over 
in silence.”313) and uses his translator's preface as an opportunity to provide a new understanding of the 
relation between the sayable and the unsayable (可說與不可說) in a small treatise consisting of fifteen 
numbered paragraphs, thus mimicking the formal structure of the  Tractatus. Mou begins by arguing 
that for Wittgenstein, “only things which can be experienced within space and time can be spoken of” 
310“Objective Understanding and the Reconstruction of Chinese Culture” (Keguan de liaojie yu Zhongguo wenhua zhi  
zaizao 客觀的了解與中國文化之再造), [1991] in WW, p.432. Translation based on Jason Clower, Late Works of Mou 
Zongsan. Selected Essays on Chinese Philosophy, Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2014b, p.52.
311Mou,  [1987],  vol.17  of  MJ,  pp.3-18.  Mou  worked  on  the  translation  between  1980  and  1986.  He  adopted  the 
idiosyncratic rendering of the title from his former teacher Zhang Shenfu. As Joachim Kurtz makes clear, the term 
mingli as a translation of “logic” has a longer history: “mingli tan名理探 ‘the investigation of the patterns of names’, 
minglixue名理學 ‘the science of . . .’, and mingli zhi lun 名理論 ‘the theory of . . .’, had been used as a vague general 
designation for matters related to argumentation since the early Han dynasty (second century BC) and gained greatest  
prominence in the lively culture of learned debate emerging in third- and fourth-century China.” Joachim Kurtz,  The 
Discovery of Chinese Logic, Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2011a, p.55.
312Wittgenstein, 2001, p.3. Emphasis added.
313Ludwig Wittgenstein,  Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, London and New York: Routledge, [1921] 2001, (paragraph 7) 
p.89.  
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(只有時空中的經驗事件始可說 )314. He adds that “what can be spoken of can be described in a 
proposition” ( 可說者可陳述之為一命題 ),  propositions  in  turn  being combined to  form what 
Wittgenstein called a “picture” (圖象) of the relations between things which are the case and which, 
when taken together, make up the world as a whole.315 These, Mou thinks, are the minimal conditions 
for an enunciation about a given (set of) object(s) to qualify as “scientific” and hence as sayable in a 
logical and scientific sense. He immediately goes on to note that this conception of the limits of the 
sayable would seem to exclude logic itself from the domain of what can be spoken of, since logical  
propositions  are  nothing but  “tautologies”  (taotaoluoji 套套邏輯 ),  in  the  sense  that  they do not 
ultimately denote the meaning of any real state of affairs, but merely express their own formal validity 
and internal  coherence,  and cannot  be  approached in terms  of  objective correctness  as  adequation 
between (subjective) thought and (objective) being. As such, the structure of logical propositions “does 
not say anything at all, and therefore also cannot express anything” (一無所說，故亦無所表象).316 
Mou thinks that the early Wittgenstein's approach to what is sayable is far too narrow, and proposes 
instead that the category of what can be spoken about should not be limited to a specific domain of  
objects (concrete states of affairs which are subject to the conditions of space and time and which can 
be described in logically coherent scientific propositions), but should be defined on the basis of the 
mode of enunciation, that is to say, by determining whether or not a given enunciation qualifies as 
being part of a “discursive process” (辨解的歷程). Let me already note in passing that in Mou's mature 
epistemology,  the  term  “discursive”  functions  as  a  shorthand  for  (empirical)  cognition,  which  is 
essentially characterized by mediation instead of the immediacy and self-sufficiency of “wisdom”. 
These  highly condensed and somewhat  elliptical  arguments  bring  Mou to  a  new definition  of  the 
sayable, which runs as follows: “Everything which can be placed within a certain relation is sayable” 
(凡可以被置於關系中者皆為可說者).317 This much broader definition, Mou believes, allows one to 
reinstall the traditional questions and objects of metaphysics, theology, and ethics explicitly excluded 
by Wittgenstein into the realm of the sayable. The category of the sayable would thus have to include 
“God, the Way, the freedom of the will, the unlimited mind” (上帝、道、自由意志、無限心), which 
314Actually, as far as I can tell, Wittgenstein does not himself introduce this qualification, but merely gives it as an example  
to describe the limits of possible states of affairs which make up the world. See Wittgenstein, 2001, (2.0121) p.6.
315Mou, [1987], p.8.
316Mou, [1987], p.8. See Wittgenstein, 2001, (6.1-6.13) pp.71-78.
317Mou, [1987], p.10.
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are, he stresses, actually one and the same “thing”318 insofar as they are all what Kant called “noumena” 
(zhisiwu智思物), that is to say, objects of intelligibility, but not of the understanding (Verstand), which 
always operates under the conditions of sensible intuition (感觸直覺 ), i.e. space and time.319 Mou 
assumes that even though these noumenal objects cannot be positively determined by placing them in 
empirical relations with other “objects”, since they are not determinate, finite objects conditioned by 
the limits of sensibility, they can still be negatively determined and indirectly expressed and accessed 
through  a  form of  “enlightened  insight”  (wuru 悟入 )  which  allows  the  finite  human  subject  to 
apprehend and clarify the internal  “transcendental  relations” (超越的關聯 )320 between noumena. 
Elaborating on his expanded conception of the sayable, Mou further introduces the distinction between 
“analytic discourse” (fenjie shuo分解說) and “non-analytic discourse” (fei fenjie shuo非分解說).321 
He stresses that “although what is spoken of in a non-analytical way points towards the unsayable, this 
does not mean that it is not clear and even less that it is not rational; it is just that it is spoken of in the 
manner of [what Laozi called] “dark unity”322 and in a cryptic-paradoxical manner” (非分解地說者雖
指點不可說，然並非不清楚，亦並非不理性，乃只是玄同地說，詭譎地說).323 The non-analytical 
mode of enunciation thus refers to a manner of expression which is not mediated by either concepts or 
the restraints of sensibility, and provides human beings with a way of speaking about that which cannot 
be spoken about, while allowing them to make clear in the very act of speaking that one is not talking 
about something given or at hand as a simple collection or totality of objective facts. The unsayable is 
not accessible in an objective, scientific manner, but through a specific kind of relation of the subject to 
itself. In general, Mou associated science and philosophy with two different orientations of the subject: 
a “congruous apprehension” (shunqu 順取 ) directed towards the objective world, and a “reflective 
318Mou, [1987], p.10.
319Mou, [1987], p.13.
320Mou, [1987], p.10.
321Mou, [1987], pp.11-12. Also see lecture 16 in Nineteen Lectures on Chinese Philosophy (Zhongguo zhexue shijiu jiang
中国哲學十九講), [1983b], vol. 9 of MJ, pp.331-366 and the appendix to the second volume of Mou's Buddha Nature 
and Prajñā (Foxing yu bore佛性與般若), vol.4 of MJ, pp.1193-1219. Mou also drew a (Buddhist-inspired) difference 
between “explaining through expression” (biaoquan表詮) and “explaining through concealment” (zhequan遮詮). See 
Mou, [1990b], pp.179-180 and Mou, [1956b], pp.667-668. In a modern context, the terms 表詮 and 遮詮 were already 
used by Mou's teacher Xiong Shili. See Xiong, [1932], p.50, p.57 and Xiong, [1958], p.31.
322The expression xuantong玄同 occurs in chapter 56 of the Daodejing 道德經, which opens with the famous lines “one 
who knows does not speak, one who speaks does not know” (知者不言，言者不知). Translation quoted from Hans-
Georg Moeller, Daodejing (Laozi). A Complete Translation and Commentary, Chicago and La Salle: Open Court, 2007, 
p.131. On the character xuan also see Moeller's introduction, pp.xi-xii.
323Mou, [1987], p.12.
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cognition”  (nide 逆得 or  nijue 逆覺 )  referring  to  subjective  self-consciousness  and  moral  self-
awareness respectively.324 He saw the latter movement of the subject turning back to itself instead of 
pursuing external objectivity as granting access to “the meaning and source behind the realm of facts” 
(事實界背後的意義與根源 ).325 The non-externality of the transcendent  (the noumenal)  to the 
immanence of subjective (moral) consciousness, which can “darkly unite” with the transcendent by 
turning onto itself, is thus called on as a guarantee that the subject is always on “both sides of the limit 
thinkable”326. 
As  an  example  of  such a  non-analytic  kind  of  discourse,  which  he  calls  a  form of  “inspirational 
language” (啟發語言) or “indicational language” (指點語言)327, Mou uses one of his favorite Buddhist 
phrases culled from the Prajñāpāramitāsūtras (Boleboluomi jing般若波罗蜜经): “the true and only 
characteristic, is what is called being without any characteristics [wuxiang,  alakṣaṇa], namely having 
the character of suchness” (實相一相，所謂無相，即是如相).328 The openness of this ontological 
realm where all discriminations have fallen away, or no longer stand in each other's way, to cognition 
and  (paradoxical)  linguistic  expression  has  to  be  ensured  through  the  movement  of  a  subject 
“reversely” apprehending itself as the ultimate source and possible endpoint of discriminations. The 
realm of “suchness” (zhenru 真如 ,  bhūtatathatā) denoted here, surpassing yet at the same time not 
being above or beyond what is accessible through perception and cognition, is obviously a different 
kind of “suchness” – negatively “characterized” by the absence of ontological determinations – than the 
absence of conceptual discriminations and distinctions in the extra-conceptual reality which Mou had 
posited as immune to the forces of dialectical negativity and contradiction in his earliest works on logic 
and epistemology. Towards the end of his small treatise, it becomes clear that what Mou objects to most 
of all in Wittgenstein's  Tractatus  is the often quoted paragraph 6.41, where Wittgenstein makes the 
following rather “inspirationally” formulated remarks:
324Cf. Intellectual Intuition and Chinese Philosophy (Zhi de zhijue yu Zhongguo zhexye 智的直覺與中國哲學 ), [1971], 
vol.20 of MJ, p.24. Also see Suter, 2011a, pp.51-56.
325See “Concise Discussion of Science and Philosophy” (Jianlun kexue yu zhexue 簡論科學與哲學 ), [1953b] in  WW, 
pp.9-14 and Mou, [1956b], (preface) pp.11-12.
326Wittgenstein, 2001, p.3.
327Mou, [1987], p.17. Wittgenstein, 2001, (4.1212) p.31 : “What can be shown, cannot be said.”
328Quoted in Mou, [1987], p.11. Mou glosses相 (xiang, lakṣaṇa) as jueding 決定 (“determination”), having a meaning and 
function comparable to the Kantian categories which determine how what is “given” in sense-perception appears to the  
subject. Mou, [1983b], p.272. Jason Clower notes that the phrase 實相一相所謂無相即是如相 is not scriptural, but 
Mou's own reconstruction. See Clower, 2010, p.82, note 57.
291
The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the  world everything is as it is, and everything
happens as it does happen: in it no value exists—and if it did exist, it would have no value. If there is
any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case. For
all that happens and is the case is accidental. What makes it non-accidental cannot lie within the world,
since if it did it would itself be accidental. It must lie outside the world.329
3.2.3.2 Kant, Heidegger, Mou: transcendental subjectivity, finitude, and the value of the thing-in-
itself
It should be kept in mind that by the time Mou Zongsan wrote the dense preface to his translation of  
Wittgenstein's work, he had already fully elaborated his famous but highly controversial “two-tiered 
ontology”  or  “double-leveled  ontology”  (liang  ceng  cunyoulun 兩層存有論 )  on  the  basis  of  a 
reinterpretation of Kant, in turn inspired by Heidegger's reading of Kant's first Critique.330 Needless to 
say I cannot even begin to do justice to the subtlety and complexity of Mou's impressive conceptual 
architectonic here and will only attempt to point towards the fundamental problems he in my opinion 
tried to  address  through his  two-tired ontological  paradigm. A careful  look at  his  New Confucian 
ontology is in order before briefly returning to his belated dispute with Wittgenstein in continuing our 
investigation of Mou Zongsan's philosophical modernity.
Kant's epochal inquiry into the a priori conditions of the possibility of knowledge in the  Critique of  
Pure Reason (1781) took the form of a “Copernican” turn331 to the (transcendental) subject, which is 
329Wittgenstein, 2001, p.86. Also see Mou's comments on this passage in Mou, [1958], p.125.
330The most extensive treatment of the Kant-Heidegger-Mou connection can be found in Billioud, 2012, pp.93-160. Also 
see Sébastien Billioud, “Mou Zongsan's Problem with the Heideggerian Interpretation of Kant”,  Journal of Chinese  
Philosophy, vol.33, no.2, 2006, pp.225-247.
331The well-known passage runs as follows: “Hitherto it has been supposed that all our knowledge must conform to its  
objects. But all attempts to establish something about them  a priori  by means of concepts,  and thus to expand our 
knowledge have on this supposition come to nothing. We should therefore attempt to tackle the tasks of metaphysics 
more successfully by assuming that the objects of knowledge must conform to our knowledge […] We are here in a  
similar  situation as  Copernicus was in  at  the beginning.  Unable to proceed satisfactorily in  the explanation of  the 
motions of the heavenly bodies on the supposition that the entire collection of stars turned round the spectator, he tried to 
see whether he might not have greater success by making the spectator revolve and leaving the stars at rest. A similar  
experiment  may be tried in metaphysics,  as regards  the intuition of  objects.  If  the intuition had to conform to the 
constitution of objects, I would not understand how we could know anything of them a priori; but if the objects (as 
objects of the senses)  conformed to the constitution of our faculty of intuition, I  could very well  conceive such a  
possibility.” Kant, 2007, p.18 (preface to the second edition, Bxvi-xvii).
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why this reorientation has also been described as “Ptolemaic”332. As Kant notes in the introduction to 
his revolutionary “inventory”333 of pure reason, “I call all knowledge transcendental which deals not so 
much with objects as with our manner of knowing objects insofar as this manner is to be possible  a 
priori”.334 In his lectures on Kant's first  Critique, Adorno stresses that the fundamental novelty and 
specificity of Kant's “Copernican revolution” is not so much the focus on the (perceiving, categorizing, 
judging, thinking) subject in his inquiry into the origins and functioning of knowledge as such, an 
evolution in the history of Western philosophy which is routinely seen as already having begun with 
Descartes335, but the fact that for Kant, “objectivity itself, that is, the validity of knowledge as such, is  
created by passing through subjectivity, by reflecting on the mechanisms of knowledge, its possibilities, 
and  its  limits.”336 Let  me  already  point  out  that  this  grounding  of  objectivity  in  the  subject,  as 
essentially  a  conditioned  modality  of  subjectivity,  is  something  that  appealed  to  Mou  Zongsan 
enormously. Inquiring into how objects must appear and “conform to our knowledge”337 in order to be 
given to us and to become accessible in empirical intuition (Anschauung) involved seeing the subject as 
actively  constituting  a  world  (through  the  application  of  the  categories  to  what  is  available  in 
experience) which has the understanding (Verstand) as its “lawgiver”. As Robert Pippin explains, this 
can be boiled down to the idea that “the mind is not a passive receptacle or a mirror (even of itself), 
but, in Kant's language, a “spontaneity”. This means that it is a self-determining activity, not originally 
determined by a “given”, because already determining for itself what counts as a given.”338 At the same 
time, Kant constantly insisted that knowledge remains bound by the limits of sensibility (with time and 
332Quentin Meillassoux,  After Finitude. An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, London and New York: Continuum, 
2008, p.119.
333Kant, 2007, p.11 (preface to the first edition, Axx)
334Kant, 2007, p.52 (B25).
335With Descartes, it is ultimately still the goodwill of a non-deceiving God which stands as the ultimate guarantee for the 
existence of the doubting cogito, whereas in Kant, the divinity is radically subordinated to reason, insofar as the godhead 
is transformed into a postulate which, his existence ultimately being a practical assumption serving the demands of 
moral  reason (“it  is  morally necessary to  assume the existence of  God”,  Kant,  1993a,  p.132) has  to  abide by the  
categorical imperative as well and is not exempt from but grounded in the dictates of morality:  “[M]an (and every 
rational being) is an end in himself, i.e., he is never to be used merely as a means for someone (even for God) without at 
the same time being himself an end”, Kant, 1993a, p.138. My italics.
336Theodor W. Adorno, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001, p.33. Cf. p.94.
337Kant, 2007, p.18 (preface to the second edition, Bxvii).
338Robert  R.  Pippin,  Modernism as  a  Philosophical  Problem.  On  the  Dissatisfactions  of  European  Culture,  Oxford: 
Blackwell,  1999, p.53.  According to Karl  Mannheim, the Kantian shift  to the philosophy of  consciousness  can be 
sociologically grasped as a conceptual consequence of the end of “the objective ontological unity of the world”, and the 
attempt “to substitute for it  a unity imposed by the perceiving subject”.  Karl  Mannheim,  Ideology and Utopia. An 
Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge, London and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1960, p.58. Mannheim adds 
that this atemporal unity of consciousness (the unity of apperception, the cogito which must implicitly accompany all 
possible  representations)  was  later  to  be transformed into a  historically,  nationally and culturally variable unity of 
consciousness, thereby rendered “dynamic and in constant process of becoming” (p.61). 
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space figuring as the a priori “inner” and “outer” forms of sensible intuition) and can thus only access 
an objective world as appearance, simply because “the special conditions of our sensibility cannot be 
made the conditions of the possibility of things, but only of their appearances”339. The fundamental 
“spontaneity” of the categories of the understanding which open up onto a determinate perceptual 
world restricted by or, which is the same thing, attuned to the limitations of human sensibility, is paired  
with  the  inescapable  “receptivity”  of  empirical  impressions.  Objects  of  experience  must  be  both 
“given” and “thought”.340 Since, in other words, consciousness cannot get beyond its own involvement 
and investment in what it perceives, the determination of reality by the “inner” constitution of the 
observer implies that human beings are not so much little demiurges who can freely think the world 
they perceive and inhabit into being, as they are fundamentally captivated both by their specific mode 
of receptive sensibility which determines how the sensible manifold of impressions of a supposed 
reality as it is “in itself” is given, as well as by the categorical selection and filtering mechanisms (of 
quantity, quality, relation, and modality) they have at their disposal, or which rather operate on their 
behalf,  in  “spontaneously”  (that  is  to  say  automatically,  or,  one  is  tempted  to  say,  systemically) 
arranging the matter  provided through sense perception into determinately formed perceptions  and 
cognitions in an a priori fashion.341 One can only go on to say, as Schopenhauer would later do, that the 
world is a representation (Vorstellung) resulting from the will  because the will  in this sense is not 
employed with reference to the individual subject in a psychologistic sense, but refers to the wholly 
anonymous force of a will to life that is neither accountable to nor understandable in terms of personal 
volition. That for Kant, the limits of the understanding which make sure that experience is not just an 
incoherent “rhapsody of perceptions”342 are in a sense “self-imposed”343 is thus as much a mark of 
epistemological captivity as it is one of freedom. Simply put, it is not the individual empirical subject, 
but  transcendental  subjectivity which ensures  that  “all  appearances of nature,  must,  as far  as their 
combination is concerned, be subject to the categories”344, and this applies as much to “external” nature 
as it does to the subject in its interiority, or to what Mou called “reflective cognition” (nijue). Hence, 
for  Kant,  even in  self-consciousness  the subject  “does  not  intuit  itself  as  it  would  represent  itself 
339Kant, 2007, p.65 (B44).
340Kant, 2007, pp.85-86 (B74-76).
341No wonder then that Tom Rockmore sees Kant as the initiator of constructivism. See In Kant's Wake. Philosophy in the  
Twentieth Century, Oxford: Blackwell, 2006, pp.37-48. For a concise discussion of Kant's relation to Luhmann, see 
Hans-Georg Moeller,  Luhmann Explained. From Souls to Systems, Chicago and La Salle: Open Court, 2003, pp.167-
171.
342Kant, 2007, p.188 (B196).
343Kant, 2007, p.261 (B312).
344Kant, 2007, p.165 (B165).
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immediately and self-actively, but according to the manner in which it is affected from within, and 
consequently intuits itself as it appears to itself, not as it is.”345 Fichte on the other hand would later use 
the concept of intellectual intuition (Intellektuelle Anschauung) precisely in order to express what he 
took to be the essential immediacy and unmediated nature of self-consciousness as “positing” (Setzen) 
both itself and its external limitations in the form of a “check” (Anstoß) on its self-identity,  which 
would otherwise remain without an external world opposed to and different from itself.346 
In  the  existential-phenomenological  interpretation  presented  in  his  Kant  and  the  Problem  of  
Metaphysics from 1929, Martin Heidegger reads these programmatic Kantian presuppositions and their 
consequences  in  the  light  of  his  own  analysis  of  human  Dasein  as  run  through  with  a  finitude 
(Endlichkeit) resulting from the determination of existence by time. In this respect, the dependence of 
knowledge on sensibility is not the cause, but simply a mark of the finitude of human beings347 for 
Heidegger:
Human intuition […] is not “sensible” because its affection takes place through “sense organs”, but
rather the reverse. Because our Dasein is finite – existing in the midst of beings that already are, beings
to which it has been delivered over – therefore it must necessarily take this already-existing being in
stride […] The essence of sensibility exists in finitude.348 
I will attempt to summarize Heidegger's line of reasoning in his controversial  Kantbuch very briefly: 
Heidegger proceeds by trying to argue, contra modern neo-Kantians such as Ernst Cassirer, that the 
345Kant, 2007, p.81 (B69). Emphasis added. “If, then, with regard to the determinations of the outer senses, we admit that  
through them we know objects only insofar as we are externally affected, then we must also admit, with regard to the  
inner sense, that we intuit ourselves through it only as we are internally affected by ourselves; in other words, we must  
admit that with regard to inner intuition we known our own subject only as appearance, and not as it is in itself” Kant,  
2007, p.154 (B156). “[I]t is not given to us to observe even our own mind with any intuition but that of our inner sense”,  
Kant, 2007, p.275 (B334).
346On  Fichte's  notion  of  intellectual  intuition,  see  Frederick  C.  Beiser,  German  Idealism.  The  Struggle  against  
Subjectivism, 1781-1801, Cambridge (Mass.) and London: Harvard University Press, 2002, pp.294-301. On the concept 
of the  Anstoß,  see Daniel  Breazeale,  “Check or Checkmate? On the Finitude of the Fichtean Self”, in  The Modern 
Subject. Conceptions of the Self in Classical German Philosophy, edited by Karl Ameriks and Dieter Sturma, Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1995, pp.87-114.
347“More original than man is the finitude of the Dasein in him” Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 
Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997, p.160.
348Heidegger, 1997, p.19. Cf. p.15: “The finitude of reason […] in no way consists only or primarily in the fact that human 
knowing demonstrates many sorts of deficiencies such as instability, imprecision, and the potential for making errors.  
Rather, this finitude lies in the essential structure of knowledge itself. The tactical limitedness of knowledge is first and  
foremost a consequence of this essence.”
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Critique of  Pure Reason,  is  not  primarily a theory of (scientific)  knowledge349,  but  constitutes the 
veritable  groundwork  for  a  renewed  metaphysics350,  or  rather  a  “fundamental  ontology”  centered 
around the finitude of human existence.351 For Heidegger, the true significance of Kant's transcendental 
philosophy is that it “does not investigate the being itself, but rather the possibility of the preliminary 
understanding of Being, i.e. […] the constitution of the Being of the being”352. “Transcendental” thus 
takes on the meaning of “ontological”. Like Mou Zongsan, who was also of the opinion that Kant did  
not  manage to adequately pursue and express some of his  own foundational insights353,  Heidegger 
wants to show that Kant, perhaps unknowingly354, already pointed a way out of the oblivion of being 
and  towards  an  analysis  of  Dasein  pursued  by Heidegger  himself  in  Being  and  Time  (1927).  As 
Sébastien Billioud notes, both of them thus end up pulling Kant in opposite directions (towards and 
away from finitude respectively).355 In order to bring the Critique's ontological dimension to the fore, 
Heidegger tries to demonstrate Kant's (disavowed and hidden) insistence on the priority of sensible 
intuition (receptivity) over the understanding (spontaneity) in the genesis of human knowledge356 and 
emphasizes the “servile relationship”357 between self-active thought and an intuition conditioned by 
(spatio)temporal  restrictions.  Heidegger  understands  the  fact  that  Kant's  critical  philosophy  was 
conceived of as a transcendental investigation which inquires into the conditions of the possibility of 
perceptual objects, instead of trying to determine the (unknowable) internal constitution of objects of 
experience in themselves, as being poised towards arriving at “a preliminary understanding of Being, 
349Heidegger, 1997, p.11.
350For Heidegger, “[e]very question concerning the Being of a being […] and even the question concerning the Being of  
that  being  to  the  constitution  of  whose  Being  finitude  as  the  understanding  of  Being  belongs,  is  metaphysics.” 
Heidegger, 1997, p.161. This means that for Heidegger, metaphysics is not so much a philosophical discipline in the 
categorization of knowledge, as it is “the basic happening for the incursion into the being which occurs with the factical  
existence of something like man in general.” Heidegger, 1997, p.170.
351Heidegger therefore interprets Kant's “Copernican turn” as implying that “not “all knowledge” is ontic, and where there 
is such knowledge, it is only possible through ontological knowledge.” Heidegger, 1997, p.8.
352Heidegger, 1997, p.10.
353Appearance and Thing-in-itself (Xianxiang yu wuzishen現象與物自身), vol.21 of MJ, [1975d] p.2. Mou also thinks 
that his own endeavors constitute a “natural development of Kant's thought” (康德思想之自然的發展). Mou, [1971], 
p.449.
354Heidegger himself admits that he is not so much interested in “what Kant says”,  but rather in “what occurs in his  
ground-laying.” Heidegger, 1997, p.150. 
355Billioud, 2006, p.230.
356“In order to understand the Critique of Pure Reason this point must be hammered in, so to speak: knowing is primarily 
intuiting.” Heidegger, 1997, p.15. “He[idegger] is to protest, repeatedly, whenever Kant seems to yield to the temptation 
of diluting the priority of the sensory in some kind of rationalistic formula. Whatever nonsensory elements may be 
demonstrated  as  essential  to  experience  [...]  the  ultimate  focus  of  any knowledge  is  its  essential  reference  to  the  
particular perceptions or appearances represented in sense intuition. Charles M. Sherover,  Heidegger, Kant and Time, 
London and Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1971, p.39. 
357Heidegger, 1997, p.47.
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i.e. […] the constitution of the Being of the being”358 in an “ontological analytic of the finite essence of 
human beings”359. “Thinking as such”, Heidegger proposes, “is already the mark of finitude”360. This 
leads him to a labyrinthine demonstration drawing on Kant's notorious transcendental schematism, an 
obscure and maddeningly difficult section in the Critique361 where Kant tries to explain how the a priori 
categories of the understanding which are arrived at in complete independence and abstraction from 
anything empirical can be applied to the phenomena given in experience in order to make the latter 
knowable and intelligible,  and where Kant introduces a mediating faculty called the transcendental 
imagination362 in  order  to  bridge  the  gap between  intuition  and the  understanding,  this  faculty,  to 
Heidegger's  great  delight,  in  turn  hinging  on  time  and  temporal  finitude  in  the  construction  of 
“schemata” interposed between sensible intuition and the categories. I do not feel competent at all to 
say anything about the merits of Heidegger's interpretation, nor even about what Kant is actually up to 
in devising his schematism, which, as far as I am aware, is a source of bewilderment even for Kant 
specialists.  More important in the present context is  that Heidegger's  insistence on the category of 
finitude  as  a  point  of  entrance  into  Kant's  work  managed to  motivate  Mou Zongsan  into  writing 
Intellectual Intuition and Chinese Philosophy363 and continued to resonate throughout Appearance and 
Thing-in-itself as well. Insofar as Mou too only employed Heidegger's Kantbuch for his own particular 
purposes, it is not necessary to get lost in Heidegger's interpretation of Kant any further. 
Mou Zongsan's mature engagement with Kant takes off by means of an opposition against what he calls 
Heidegger's  “misplacement”  (誤置 )  of  metaphysics  in  temporal  finitude.364 Mou  thinks  that  “his 
existential approach can be adopted, but his phenomenological method is not appropriate” (存在的入
路是可取的，但現象學的方法則不相應 )365. Now and then, he gives conceptually somewhat 
underdeveloped stabs at Husserl's putative ignorance of the difference between returning “to things 
themselves”  (Zu  den  Sachen  selbst,  the  phenomenologist's  motto)  as  entities  given  in  the  pure 
358Heidegger, 1997, p.10.
359Heidegger, 1997, p.1.
360Heidegger, 1997, p.17. Cf. p.20: “Finite intuition […] is dependent upon the understanding, which not only belongs to 
the finitude of intuition, but is itself still more finite in that it lacks the immediacy of finite intuiting.”
361Kant, 2007, pp.176-183 (B176-187).
362This faculty also plays an important role in the “Transcendental Deduction” in the first edition of the  Critique (A96-
130). 
363See Mou, [1971], pp.6-7 (preface). Mou provides a Chinese translation of (excerpts from) sections 4, 5, 16, and 25 of 
Heidegger's work in the eight, seventh, and ninth chapter respectively, pp. 43-50, pp.31-38, pp.55-63. He also gives a 
rendering of the ninth section of Being and Time in an appendix, pp.473-490.
364See Mou, [1971], pp.447-472.
365Mou, [1971], p.7. 
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immanence of consciousness and the turn to  things-in-themselves as transcendentally distinct  from 
phenomena, a negligence inherited by Husserl's student Heidegger.366 What Mou objects to the most is 
Heidegger's attempt to submit practical reason to the same procedure as theoretical reason by relating it 
to the transcendental imagination, and thereby to time, as well.367 He thinks that such a temporalization 
(時間化) of morality would corrode the moral law's (daode faze 道德法則) purity from the empirical 
or  “pathological”  and thus  undermine  the  autonomy of  morality  defended by Kant.368 Heidegger's 
analysis of the “care” (Sorge, guanxin關心) bound up with the “thrownness” (Geworfenheit) of human 
existence as a being-towards-death can only result in a one-sidedly “immanent metaphysics” (neizai  
xingshangxue內在形上學) and not a “transcendent metaphysics” (chaojue xingshangxue超絕形上學) 
in the proper sense of the word369. It will be apparent that Mou and Heidegger clearly have completely 
different  and  totally  opposed  conceptions  of  transcendence.370 The  German  thinker  believes  that 
“[t]ranscendence  […]  is  finitude  itself”371,  meaning  that  for  Heidegger,  “[w]hat  is  “behind  the 
appearance” is the same being as the appearance […] the “mere” in the phrase “mere appearance is not 
a  restricting  and  diminishing  of  the  actuality  of  the  thing,  but  is  rather  only the  negation  of  the 
assumption that the being can be infinitely known in human knowledge”372 He would no doubt have 
characterized Mou's moral idealism and humanism as another instance of Seinsvergessenheit.373 For the 
Confucian philosopher on the other hand, there can be no transcendence without a certain difference in 
ontological levels irreducible to what Heidegger called the ontological difference between Being and 
beings, that is to say, without a distance between the immanent and the transcendent as a metaphysical 
“reality” (shiti 實體). 
These differences aside, Mou still agrees that Kant's Critique is not merely a theory of knowledge, but 
can also be read as a foundation for metaphysics (albeit a transcendent one) and approvingly invokes 
366See Mou, [1971], p.450, p.464.
367Heidegger, 1997, pp.109-112. See Billioud, 2006 and Billioud, 2012, pp.130-139.
368Mou, [1971], p.457.
369This  is  also  why  Mou  takes  issue  with  Heidegger's  exclusive  focus  on  the  Transcendental  Aesthetic  and  the 
Transcendental  Logic  to  the  detriment  of  the  Transcendental  Dialectic,  where  Kant  delineated  and  restricted  the 
possibility of the transcendent metaphysics of the kind Mou wants to salvage. See Mou, [1971], p.451.
370See Po Hei-Lau劉保禧, “Tiandao and Horizon – Mou Zongsan and Heidegger on Transcendence (Tiandao yu jieyu –  
Mou Zongsan yu Haidege'er lun chaoyue 天道與界域 —— 牟宗三與海德格論超越), Dongwu zhexue xuebao東吳哲
學學報, 8, 2003, pp.97-133.
371Heidegger, 1997, p.64.
372Heidegger, 1997, pp.23-24.
373See Heidegger's “Letter on Humanism”, in Pathmarks, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp.239-276.
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Heidegger's insistence on the intimate relation between Kant's famous three questions (“What can I 
know?”, “What should I do?”, “What may I hope?”)374 and a fourth question added by Kant in his 
Lectures on Logic: “What is the human being?”375, which Heidegger sees as a germinal formulation of 
the  question  concerning  Being  (Seinsfrage).376 Unsurprisingly,  Heidegger  insists  that  the  fourth 
question is the truly essential and authentic one, and that, as Kant himself had suggested, the three other 
queries  are  rooted  in  the  question  concerning human  Dasein.  Commenting  on Kant's  suggestions, 
Heidegger writes that “human reason is not finite just because it poses the three questions cited above, 
but the reverse: it poses these questions because it is finite […] The three questions […] do not simply 
allow themselves to be related to the fourth. Rather, in themselves they are in general no different from 
it”377 Mou opens Appearance and Thing-in-itself by asserting that Kant's entire Critique and in fact his 
whole philosophy hinges on two related premises, namely 1) the transcendental difference (chaoyue de 
qufen超越的區分) between appearance (xianxiang現象) and thing-in-itself (wuzishen 物自身, wu zhi  
zai  qi  ziji 物之在其自己 )378,  and  2)  the  finitude  of  human  existence  (youxianxing 有限性 or 
fengxianxing封限性). According to Mou, the second premise logically includes (包含) the first, but he 
states that Kant failed to give a convincing and systematic explanation for why the premise of human 
finitude implies (函蘊) the assumption of an a priori difference in cognition between appearances and 
thing-in-themselves and why human beings are categorically restricted to knowing appearances only.379 
Crucial for Mou in this regard was trying to determine how the notion of intellectual intuition (zhi de  
zhijue智的直覺) – a faculty Kant explicitly denied to human beings and would seem to have merely 
employed as a contrastive limiting concept pointing to a boundary that cannot be crossed by human 
reason – could be related and applied to the transcendental difference between appearance and thing-in-
itself implied by human finitude.  In doing so, Mou put forward intellectual intuition as a mode of 
unmediated  cognition  or  apprehension380 which  grants  human  beings  access  to  reality  not  as 
374Kant, 2007, p.635 (B833).
375Lectures on Logic,  Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press,  1992,  p.538: “Metaphysics  answers  the first  question, 
morals the second, religion the third, and anthropology the fourth. Fundamentally, however, we could reckon all of this 
as anthropology, because the first three questions relate to the last one.” See Mou, [1975d], pp.22-23.
376Heidegger, 1997, p.145.
377Heidegger, 1997, p.152. Quoted by Mou in Appearance and Thing-in-itself, Mou, [1975d], pp.26-27.
378For a history of Chinese translations of this term see Joachim Kurtz, “Domesticating a Philosophical Fiction: Chinese  
Translations of Immanuel Kant’s ‘Things in Themselves’ ”, Concept and Communication, 7, 2011b, pp.165–202. 
379Mou, [1975d], pp.1-2.
380Sébastien Billoud makes the following important  remark:  “[...]  zhi  [智 ]  has both an epistemological  and a moral 
meaning, which is echoed in the syntagm智的直覺. This is much less the case in the German expression intellektuelle  
Anschauung, in which the adjective intellektuel mainly has an epistemological dimension.” Billoud, 2012, p.76.
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appearances, that is to say insofar as they are phenomenally given as possible objects of experience 
within the a priori spatiotemporal forms of sensible intuition and mediated by the relations established 
through  the  categories  of  the  understanding  which  provide  the  “rules  for  the  exhibition  of 
appearances”381, but as objects as they are in themselves outside of these subjective determinations. 
Kant himself stressed that “appearances actually  do relate to something distinct from them (and so 
entirely heterogeneous), in that appearances always presuppose a thing in itself, and so provide notice 
of such a thing, whether or not it can be cognized more closely”382. Mou Zongsan however cannot settle 
for this heterogeneity between appearances and things-in-themselves and departs from what would at 
first sight seem to be a downright rejection of the basic outlook of Kant's critique of reason. He goes so 
far as to make the possibility and validity of the entire tradition of Chinese philosophy dependent on 
the existence of an intellectual intuition allowing human beings to access both sides of the limiting 
distinction by which their thinking and perceiving operates.383 Clearly, such an  intuitus orginarius384 
hypothetically ascribable to God flies in the face of Kant's intentions and is completely out of bounds 
for him:
[A]ll our intuition is nothing but the representation of appearance; that the things we intuit are not in
themselves what we intuit them as being, nor are their relations so constituted in themselves as they
appear to us […] if we remove our subject or even only the subjective constitution of the senses in
general, then the entire constitution and all relations of objects in space and time, nay space and time
themselves, would vanish […] It remains completely unknown to us what objects may be in themselves
and apart from all this receptivity of our sensibility.385
Following  Kant386,  Mou  takes  care  not  to  confuse  the  (strictly  transcendental)  difference  between 
381Kant, 2007, p.256 (B304). “[T]he proud name of ontology, which presumes to supply, in a systematic form, different  
kinds of synthetic a priori knowledge of things in themselves […] must be replaced by the more modest name of a mere 
analytic of the pure understanding.” Ibid. 
382Kant, 2004, p.106. Emphasis added.
383Mou, [1971], p.5 (preface).
384Kant, 2007, p.83 (B72). In the famous letter to Markus Hertz from 1772 which is sometimes quoted as marking the 
beginning of Kant's “critical” phase, Kant makes a difference between an  intellectus archetypus, “an intellect whose 
intuition is itself the ground of things” pertaining to the divinity, and an intellectus ectypus, which “derive[s] the data for 
its logical procedure from the sensuous intuition of things”. Correspondence, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997, p.133.
385Kant, 2007, p.75 (B59). Fredrick Beiser notes that Kant associated the notion of intellectual intuition with mysticism, 
adding  that  he  “disliked  mysticism chiefly  because  of  its  dogmatism.  Mysticism would  attempt  to  justify  certain 
ontological claims—the existence of archetypes or spirits—by appealing to an esoteric intellectual intuition, which could 
be had only by an elite.” Beiser, 2002, p.62. Kant's scathing criticism of the visions of the Swedish theologian and  
mystic Emanuel Swedenborg (1688-1772) played an important role in the genesis of his critical philosophy. 
386See Kant, 2007, p.75-77 (B59-64). “Even if we could impart the highest degree of distinctness to our intuition, we  
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appearance and thing-in-itself with the (merely empirical) distinction between subjective (valid for or 
given to an individual subject, thus potentially including delusions or deceptions of the kind Descartes 
tried to rule out) and objective (universally agreed upon and correct) cognitions and judgments. The 
“objective”, universally valid truth of say a scientific proposition concerning the position or the speed 
of a physical body in space and time does not make the observations through which it is arrived any 
less subject to the constraints of the phenomenal world. One does not get a single step closer to the 
thing-in- itself by moving from a splitting headache (“subjectively” experienced by a patient) to the 
brain tumor (“objectively” observed by a physician) causing it.387 The limitation of human knowledge 
to appearances is thus not a question of degree, but one of principle.  Mou could not follow Kant's 
restrictive  definition  according  to  which  “the  thing  in  itself  is  not  an  object  given  outside 
representation,  but  merely  the  position  of  a  thought-entity  [ens  rationis]  which  is  thought  of  as 
corresponding to the object”388, but strongly supported his assertion that that “the difference [between 
an object as a phenomenally conditioned appearance and as a thing-in-itself] does not lie in the objects,  
but  merely  in  the difference  of  the  relation  in  which  the  subject  apprehending the  sense-object  is  
affected for the production of the representation itself”389. For Mou however, a noumenon (zhisiwu智
思物, or wuziti 物自體)390, by which Kant meant “a thing insofar as it is not an object of our sensible 
intuition”391, had to be more than a mere “Gedankeding” that can only be employed negatively, serving 
as “an object of the pure understanding […] the problematic concept of an object for an intuition and an 
understanding totally different from our own, of an object, therefore, that is itself a problem”392. Still, it 
is  obvious  that  Mou  does  not  seek  to  overthrow  the  Kantian  distinction  through  his  positive 
interpretation of this problematic object, but tries to sublate it, that is to say, to preserve the distinction 
should not thereby come one step nearer to the constitution of objects in themselves.” Kant,  2007, p.75 (B59).  As 
Heidegger  expresses  it:  “Appearances  [Erscheinungen]  are  not  mere  illusion  [Schein],  but  are  the  being  itself.” 
Heidegger, 1997, p.22.
387See Mou, [1975d], pp.5-8 and Mou, [1971], pp.128-131. Engels completely misses the point when he writes that “if we 
are able to prove the correctness of our conception of a natural process by making it ourselves, bringing it into being out  
of its conditions and making it serve our own purposes into the bargain, then there is an end to the Kantian ungraspable 
“thing-in-itself”. The chemical substances produced in the bodies of plants and animals remained just such “things-in-
themselves” until organic chemistry began to produce them one after another, whereupon the “thing-in-itself” became a 
thing  for  us”  Friedrich  Engels,  Ludwig  Feuerbach  and  the  End  of  Classical  German  Philosophy,  [1886], 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1886/ludwig-feuerbach/ch02.htm. 
388Immanuel Kant, Opus Postuum, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993b, p.173.
389Kant, 1993b, p.179. Emphasis added. Quoted in Heidegger, 1997, p.23 and in Mou [1975d], p.16.
390There is considerable dispute over whether the two pairs noumenon/phenomenon and thing-in-itself/appearance have the 
same significance in Kant's work, but since I have not found the time to delve into this matter sufficiently, I have used 
them interchangeably, as Mou Zongsan seems to do on most occasions. 
391Kant, 2007, p.258 (B307). “The concept of a noumenon is […] necessary to prevent sensible intuition from extending to 
things in themselves; that is, in order to limit the objective validity of sensible knowledge”. Kant, 2007, p.260 (B310).
392Kant, 2007, p.281 (B344).
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while altering the significance and the import of the distinction quite radically. 
Of crucial importance is that Mou thinks that the only way for Kant's transcendental difference to be 
adequately grounded or,  as he usually puts it,  “stabilized” (穩定 ),  is by relating it  to the idea of 
intellectual intuition as a positive faculty and an actual possibility, and by reinterpreting the thing-in-
itself as what he calls a “concept of value and meaning” (價值意味底概念) that has a quintessentially 
moral  significance  instead  of  as  a  “factual  concept”  (事實概念 ).393 This  means  that  for  Mou, 
entertaining the possibility of an access to reality as  it  is  “in itself”  does not automatically imply 
overstepping Kant's critical restrictions on the limits of factual  cognition, but simply comes down to 
lifting these restrictions from “intellectual” intuition insofar as the latter is bound up with the valuing 
subject as a moral being and allows it to relate to a moral reality unconditioned by yet inseparable from 
actual  appearances.  Mou  is  Kantian  enough  to  agree  that  such  a  reality  cannot  be  approached 
“discursively” (辨解的 ) or “analytically”. Unlike for Kant, the thing-in-itself is no longer a mere 
“procedural placeholder”394 or  a limit-concept on human knowledge in Mou's work,  but something 
which  can  fully  “present”  (chengxian 呈現 )  itself  and  can  be  directly  apprehended  by a  subject 
manifesting its own innermost nature in the process. Mou's whole point in his mature ontology, built 
around the linked notions of the noumenal and intellectual intuition, is distinguishing fact from value, 
while at the same time matching the Kantian distinction between phenomenon and noumenon onto the 
difference between fact and value395 and giving value ontological priority over fact. This is precisely 
why he cannot stomach Wittgenstein's argument that there is no value in the world, but only “in” an 
outside about which one cannot say anything meaningful. Since Mou has the impression that in the 
Tractatus, Wittgenstein rejects the very distinction between the phenomenal (fact) and the noumenal 
393See Mou, [1975d], pp.1-20. “The meaning of infinite/limitless is one of value and meaning, it is not meant to imply that 
[the thing-in-itself] is really a limitless entity” (無限性之意義是一個價值意味，不是說它是一個現實的無限存在). 
Ibid., p.13.
394Nicholas Bunnin, “God's Knowledge and Ours: Kant and Mou Zongsan on Intellectual Intuition”, Journal of Chinese  
Philosophy, vol.40, supplement no.1, 2013, p.616.
395See Lu Xing卢兴 and Wu Qian吴倩, “Is the Distinction between Fact and Value the Same as that between Phenomenon 
and Noumenon? – A Examination of Mou Zongsan's Theory of the 'Self-Negation of Moral Reason' ” (Shishi/jiazhi  
dengyu xianxiang/benti ma? – Dui Mou Zongsan ' liangzhi ziwo kanxian shuo' de yi ge jiantao  事实/价值等于现象/本
体吗?——对牟宗三“良知自我坎陷说”的一个检讨, Henan shehui kexue河南社会科学, vol.19, no.4, 2011, pp.71-
74. The authors stress the fundamental novelty of the (Weberian) opposition between fact and value in philosophically 
exploring the conceptual difficulties resulting from the fact that Mou “valorizes the ontological world/ontologizes the 
world of value” (将本体世界价值化, 将价值世界本体化), but strangely enough go on to ascribe this double procedure 
to the Confucian tradition itself.
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(value)  as  “not  false,  but  nonsensical”396,  he  thinks  that  the  possibility  of  keeping  what  is  non-
analytically expressible open as a horizon of value and meaning is thereby unduly foreclosed.397 The 
value of the world – which, as Tang Junyi would say, is identical to the world itself – must be prevented 
from becoming identical with and being reduced to what Mou takes to be Wittgenstein's “depthless” 
world made up of a factual totality of phenomenally constricted appearances. At the same time, he 
wants  to  steer  clear  from the  heteronomy  that  would  result  from  turning  the  thing-in-itself  into 
something beyond the reach of human beings as a projected absolute in which they no longer recognize 
themselves. The task of reconciling the contradictory demands of the non-identity of the phenomenal 
(appearances) and the noumenal (thing-in-themselves) on the one hand, and the accessibility of the 
noumenal to human beings marked by finitude on the other, thus comes to rest with the subject as both  
the transcendental origin and the practical solution for the difference between fact and value. 
Mou follows Heidegger in relating the transcendental difference to the problem of human finitude and 
in assuming that “the concepts “appearance” and “thing in itself” […] is oriented towards the difference 
between finite and infinite knowledge.”398 For both thinkers, this has the radical consequence that “only 
for finite knowledge is there anything at all like an object. It alone is delivered over to the being which 
already is.”399 Mou further supports Heidegger when the latter proposes that the hypothetical object of 
an infinite form of knowing unconstrained by the bounds of existential facticity would strictly speaking 
not be an “object” (Gegenstand, duixiang 對象) at all, but something like an “e-ject” or “a thing which 
stands forth” from of out itself (Enstand, zixiang 自相, ziru 自如, or (chusheng) zizaiwu (出生)自在物).
 For Mou, the latter has its proper place in a Confucian moral metaphysics, where the thing-in-itself 
396Wittgenstein, 2001, (4.003) p.22.
397Strangely enough, Mou does seem to note that Wittgenstein himself is at his most mystical, or at least “non-analytical”, 
in the last paragraphs of the Tractatus which he subjects to so much criticism. Here, Wittgenstein speaks of his whole 
treatise as a “ladder” that must be discarded after it has served its purpose of showing what can and cannot be said, the  
latter refering to things “that cannot be put into words”, but “make themselves manifest”.  Wittgenstein, 2001, (6.522) 
p.89. Mou was also probably unaware of what Wittgenstein had written to his publisher concerning the Tractatus: “The 
book’s point is an ethical one. I once meant to include in the preface a sentence which is not in fact there now, but which 
I will write out for you here, because it will perhaps be a key to the work for you. What I meant to write, then, was this:  
My work consists of two parts: the one presented here plus all that I have not written. And it is precisely this second part  
that is the important one.” quoted in Adrian Kuzminksi,  Pyrrhonism. How the Ancient Greeks Reinvented Buddhism, 
Lanham:  Lexington  Books,  2008, p.137.  For an  interesting  interpretation  see  Michael  Kremer,  “The  Purpose  of 
Tractarian Nonsense”, in  Noûs, vol.35, no.1, 2001, pp.39-73. Perhaps it is actually not Mou but Wittgenstein who is 
closer to the Buddhist idea when he writes that “not how but that the world exist is the mystery”. Mou's identification of  
the Buddhist  notion of “suchness” with the level  of “value” on the other  hand poses  considerable difficulties.  See  
Kantor, 2006 for an excellent discussion.
398Heidegger, 1997, p.23.
399Heidegger, 1997, p.21.
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figures as “not [as] another object, but another mode of making oneself into an object”400:
Perfect and direct apprehension does not manifest itself within the relation between a subject and an
object, and does not have a determinate “thing” as its object; in this way, the intuiting subject becomes
aware that it is itself in turn not limited by any particular thing [as an object opposed to it]. Therefore the  
subject [here] is not the subject of sensibility and of the understanding, but a subject of perfect and
immediate apprehension. It has transcended the relational form of subject and object and has absorbed
the oppositional characteristics of subjectivity and objectivity [within itself] […] Therefore, in knowing
everything, knowledge in perfect apprehension really “knows” nothing at all. Nevertheless, within the
complete clarity of direct apprehension all things are fully illuminated as e-jects (created by the original
mind itself) […] which are cognized neither by means of the categories (cognitively mediating universal 
characteristics [of objects]),  nor through what  is  empirically known in sensible intuition (thought as
having a specific content). In the latter [sensible] form of thought and knowledge, there is only thinking
and knowing, and no creation [of the object of thought and knowledge], meaning that what is thought
and  known  in  that  case  is  precisely  an  object  [as  opposed  to  an  e-ject],  or  what  is  called  a
“phenomenon”. Within the clarity of perfect and immediate apprehension on the other hand, [things] are
illuminated as e-jects, so that they manifest themselves as “things-in-themselves”, or noumena […]401
此圓照之知不是在主客關系中呈現，它無特定之物為其對象（ob-ject），因而其心知主體亦不
為特定之物所限，故既非感性主體，亦非知性主體，而乃是圓照主體。它超越了主客關系之模
式而消化主客相對之主體相與客體相，[...] 故圓照之知無所不知而實無一知，然而萬物卻盡在其
圓照之明澈中，恰如其為一自在物（由本心自身所自生者）而明澈之 […] 不是通過範疇而思之
（思其曲折的普遍的性相）與通過感觸直覺而經驗地知之也（知其特殊的內容）。此後者之思與
知亦只是思與知之，而不能創造之，故其所思所知者亦確是一對象，此即所謂 「現象」。而圓
照之明澈則如其為一自在物而明澈之, 即朗現其為一「物之在其自己」者, 此即物自體 [...]
The “e-ject” which the subject knows and through which it becomes aware of its own unlimitedness is 
neither opposed to the subject nor determined and constrained by the conditions of empirical cognition 
and the discursive limits imposed by the categories.402 Therefore, the categories of the understanding 
would be of no use whatsoever in any possible cognition of noumenal things as they are in themselves 
through intellectual  intuition.403 Mou Zongsan thus  fully  agrees  with  Heidegger  that  knowledge is 
400Kant, 1993b, p.181.
401Mou, [1971], pp.241-242.
402Heidegger, 1997, pp.22-23. See Mou, [1971], pp.42-43, p.46, pp.50-54, pp.136-137.
403Mou, [1971], pp.159-160.
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fundamentally bound up with the limitations imposed by time and space as what Kant called pure 
forms of (sensible) intuition. The latter are not objective properties of things as they are in themselves 
outside of the particular constitution of human sensibility which imposes these characteristics on them. 
Drawing on Heidegger, Mou argues that “things” (wu 物) cannot come to exist as objects (duixiang 對
象 )  distinct  from  and  opposed  to  the  subject  without  a  transcendental  act  of  objectification 
(duixianghua de huodong 對象化底活動), subsequently applied to what sensible intuition never creates 
but must “apprehend congruously” (shunqu 順取) or “take in stride”, encounters as already at hand, 
and to which it is, in Heidegger's words, “delivered over”. However, what is essential for Mou is that 
objectification is  essentially but  one of the modalities  of subjectivity,  meaning that  the limitations 
conditioning the subject  in  its  acts  of  objectification do not  categorically affect  or  predetermine a 
subject which essentially reflexively  limits itself  in objectifying “things” as “e-jects” into “objects”. 
This explains why the phrase “human beings can become unlimited even though they are finite/limited” 
(人雖有限而可無限)404 appears like something of a mantra throughout Appearance and Thing-in-itself. 
Additionally, the relation between finitude and its overcoming is conceived of in a dialectical manner, 
as  interdependently linked in  the  context  of  moral  practice:  “[Human  beings]  are  originally  finite 
entities, yet they can attain an unlimited nature, and it is because of this that they are valuable. There is 
nothing praiseworthy in finitude which is merely finite or in unlimitedness that is merely unlimited. To 
be finite while struggling to obtain an unlimited nature; only that is of value.” (本是一有限的存在﹐
而卻能取得無限性﹐這就是他的可貴。有限只是有限不可貴﹐無限只是無限亦無所謂可貴。有
限而奮鬥以獲得一無限性﹐這便可貴)405. This is also why it is important for Mou to demonstrate that 
the  spontaneity  (zifaxing 自 發 性 )  characterizing  the  a  priori  genesis  of  the  categories  of  the 
understanding, which are always subject to the receptivity (jieshouxing接受性) of sensibility in their 
objective  application  to  the  manifold  appearances,  is  of  an  essentially  different  nature  than  the 
spontaneity of morality, no such submission to the empirical being involved in the realization of the 
moral  law.  Whereas  the  freedom  of  the  will  which  makes  moral  behavior  possible  is  genuinely 
autonomous and self-given (真自給), only coming forth from itself (由其自己) and relying on nothing 
else (無所自 ), the understanding cannot lay claim to such creativity (chuangzaoxing 創造性 ). The 
404Mou also expresses this in Buddhist terms, by stating that “finitude does not obstruct being unlimited” (有限不礙無限) 
and that “delusion is identical to wisdom” (煩惱即菩提). See Mou, [1975d], pp.28-29.
405Mou, [1971], p.448.
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deduction of the postulates (shezhun 設準) of the understanding relies on the ontological reference of 
these  postulates,  that  is  to  say,  their  applicability  to  objects  of  experience  and  thus  to  a  sensible 
manifold which has to be given and passively received.406 
Kant, Heidegger, and Mou thus all seem to agree that cognition is fundamentally linked to limitation in  
one  way or  another.  The  linkage  of  cognition  and limitation  takes  on  a  peculiar  and particularly 
complex form in Mou's work. In his own words: “the limited mind is the attached mind, it is also the 
cognitive mind, so that we can speak of the attachment of the cognitive mind” (有限心即是執著心，
亦就是識心，故云識心之執 )407.  Let us have a closer look at what Mou means by this. In his 
somewhat more accessible Nineteen Lectures on Chinese Philosophy (Zhongguo zhexue shijiu jiang 中
国哲學十九講, 1983), Mou creatively adopts the Buddhist idea of “one mind opening two doors” (yi  
xin kai  er  men 一心開二門 )  described in  the  Treatise  on the Awakening of Faith in  Mahāyāna  
(*Mahāyānaśraddhotpādaśāstra,  Dacheng qixin lun 大乘起信論 )408 in order to clarify his position. 
Mou resorts  to  the  doctrine  of  two distinct  yet  fundamentally  identical  truths  (conventional  truth, 
saṃvṛtisatya,  sudi 俗諦 and  ultimate  truth,  paramārthasatya, zhendi 真諦 )  expounded  here  in 
interpreting cognition as a form of “attachment” (zhizhuo執著), which “enables” (or rather forces) the 
originally unattached and unlimited mind (wuxian xin 無限心 )  to  come to know objects  by first 
attaching itself to something distinct from and external to itself – an externality which is fundamentally 
“posited”  (zhiding 直 定 )  in  a  Fichtean  sense  –  and  endowing  it  with  determinate,  knowable 
characteristics (dingxiang 定相). Both the “gate of saṃsāra” (shengmiemen 生滅門) opening onto a 
finite, spatiotemporal phenomenal world where nothing comes into being without perishing, and “the 
gate of suchness” (zhenrumen 真如門) devoid of all, including temporal, determinations, are possible 
modalities of the mind.409 Knowledge of an external reality endowed with and known through specific 
categorical discriminations is only one of the mind's functions. “Attachment” here does not have a 
moralistic connotation, but has a properly transcendental sense as the condition of the possibility which 
406See Mou, [1971], pp.17-20, p.27.
407Mou, [1975d], p.17.
408Traditionally ascribed to  Aśvaghoṣa 馬鳴  (c.80-c.150 CE), but probably composed in 6th century China according to 
philological evidence. See Buswell Jr. and Lopez Jr., 2013, p.221. On Mou's plea for the “authenticity” of this text, see 
Clower, 2010, pp.114-116.
409Xiong Shili had already used the Buddhist doctrine of the two truths, the wordly (sudi 俗諦 ) and the absolute truth 
(zhendi 真諦) in order to both distinguish and reconcile science with metaphysics. See Xiong, [1958], p.23 and Cheng 
Zhihua, 2013.
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lets  an  objective  world of  cognitive  objects  distinct  from the  subject  come into  being in  the  first 
place.410 Conversely,  this  allows  the  mind  to  go  from (cognitive)  attachment  to  an  unattachment 
coinciding with the cessation of cognition in the strict sense, thereby, in a metaphor Mou adopts from 
the  Vimalakīrtinirdeśasūtra  (Weimojie suoshuo jing 維摩詰所說經 ) “removing the disease without 
wiping out the dharmas” (除病不除法).411 For Mou, this implies that the a priori knowledge untainted 
by empirical contamination arrived at through logic and mathematics are also fundamentally the result 
of  a  prior  attachment.  In  other  words,  logical,  mathematical,  or  in  short,  scientific  objectivity, 
invariability,  and  “timelessness”  are  still  dependent  on  attachment  in  the  transcendental  act  of 
objectification  through  which  time  becomes  a  determinate  characteristic  of  what  is  devoid  of  all 
determinations as a thing-in-itself.412 In the case of a priori logical reasoning however, the “purity” of 
the unattached and noumenal mind and its freedom from the empirical manifold of sensible intuition  is 
still to some extent transfered to the subject of logical thought, albeit within an “enclosed state” (封限
的狀態中).413 In order to address the question as to exactly how “one mind” is supposed to “open two 
doors”, i.e. how the unattached and unlimited mind can give rise to a spatiotemporally limited world of  
determined and conditioned cognitive objects resulting from a transcendental act of attachment, Mou 
resorts  to  Hegelian  dialectics  in  formulating  his  paradigm of  the  “self-negation  of  moral  reason” 
(liangzhi ziwo kanxian 良知自我坎陷 ).414 In order to allow for a cognitively accessible world of 
410See Mou, [1983b], pp.265-312 (lectures 13 and 14). 
411See Mou, Record of Lectures on Aristotle's Theory of the Four Causes (Siyin shuo jiangxi lu 四因說講習錄) [1997], 
vol.31 of MJ, pp.133-134.
412In  The Philosophical Spirit of Modern Western Idealism, employing terms and concepts inspired by Xiong Shili that 
would appear to predate Mou Zongsan's mature theory of cognition by almost two decades, Tang Junyi had already  
argued that the “substance of the mind” (xinti 心體) is originally “unattached” (wuzhi無執) to its “cognitive objects”, 
that  is  to  say,  before the  latter  become objects  cognitively opposed to  the mind to begin  with:  “The ability to  be 
objectified  and  externalized  is  only  the  function  of  this  [substantial]  mind,  the  function  of  objectification  and 
externalization first becoming apparent in its attachment to the characteristics of a certain thing to which it restricts  
[itself] after reaching it through the luminosity of its [direct] insight” (可客觀化外在化者，只是此心之用。此心之用
之客觀化外在化，首即見於其智照之明之及物而陷於對物之相之一執 ). Tang, [1951-1952], p.686. For Tang too, 
objectivity is thus not simply given, but transcendentally established by a consciousness “attaching” itself to a reality it 
externalizes in the process and thereby endows with “the characteristic of objectivity” (wuxiang 物相). See Tang, [1951-
1952], pp.690-693. The crucial difference is that Tang understands sensible intuition as already in itself a form of “blind  
or ignorant transcendence” (盲目或無明之超越) in which an anterior subject-object identity can be directly experienced 
without  the  mediation  of  rational  categories  of  thought,  and  thus  before  objective  reality  “emerges  from  being 
determined by the characteristic of objectivity” (被物相所規定而生). For Tang, sensible intuition qualifies as direct 
experience. For Mou on the other hand, sensibility is the mark of epistemological attachment and finitude and thus 
cannot lead to an “unattached perspective” of immediacy. 
413Mou, [1975d], p.172.
414The term kanxian 坎陷 , which Mou routinely glosses in English as “self-negation” has its origins in the Yijing, where 
the trigram kan 坎 is explained as xian 陷 and refers to water entering a sinkhole. See Yan Binggang颜炳罡, Integration 
and Recasting – An Investigation of Mou Zongsan's Philosophical Thought  (Zhenghe yu chongzhu – Mou Zongsan  
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phenomenal  objects  to  appear,  the  immediate  apprehension  of  directly  and  immediately  manifest 
noumenal “e-jects” has to negate itself and suspend the immediacy of its apprehension. He stresses that  
the attachment resulting from self-negation is not at all “ignorant” or “deluded” (無明) but comes about 
in a “self-conscious” (自覺) manner through a voluntary act of  objectification on the part of the moral 
mind,  which  needs  to  make  room for  the  faculties  of  cognition  in  order  to  avoid  “withering  and 
withdrawing” (枯萎而退縮)  into itself.415 Fung Yiu-ming馮耀明 , who voices his objections to the 
most  well-known representatives  of  New Confucian  philosophy by pointing  out  the  many logical 
inconsistencies in their work, something it is safe to say they in all likeliness could not have cared less 
about seeing how someone like Mou sought to dialectically ground the possibility of formal logic, still 
manages to describe the latter's philosophical predicament rather succinctly: 
If what the contemporary new Confucianists pursue or search for is not a mere mental projection, but
something  with  ontological  and  cosmological  significance,  they  should  observe  the  principle  of
individuality, that is, no entity without identity and no identity without objectification […] to emphasize
the nonduality of the ultimate reality is to make a duality of the nonduality of the ultimate reality on the
one hand and the duality of the nonultimate phenomena on the other. Any claim for non-duality […] is
self-refuting.”416 
“Precisely!”, one can easily imagine Mou Zongsan exclaiming in response, “and it is precisely through 
this self-refutation of the non-dual ultimate that the phenomenal world characterized by duality comes 
into being.” In my opinion, instead of resorting to a formalized logification of the problems that appear 
in Mou's philosophy, it would be more fruitful to take the broader discursive context of his whole 
oeuvre into account. From this perspective, it can be argued that it is still Marx who is at the back of  
Mou's mind, about whose historical materialist formula he had the following to say in an earlier text: 
“Marx said “existence determines consciousness”; this  may be admissible from an epistemological 
point of view, but “consciousness determines existence” is true from the point of view of practice.” (馬
zhexue sixiang yanjiu 整合与重铸 — 牟宗三哲学思想研究), Beijing: Beijing daxue chubanshe, 2012, p.171. For an 
overview of some the critiques this concept has had to endure and an attempt at a defense, see Luo Yijun罗义俊, Living 
Existence  and Cultural  Consciousness:  Historical  Essays on Modern Confucianism (Shengming cunzai  yu wenhua 
yishi: dangdai xin rujia shilun 生命存在与文化意识：当代新儒家史论), Shanghai: Xuelin chubanshe, 2009, pp.214-
245. Also see Liu Aijun, 2008, pp.328-345.
415See Mou, [1975d], pp.125-133.
416“Three Dogmas of New Confucianism: A Perspective of Analytic Philosophy,” in Two Roads to Wisdom? Chinese and  
Analytic Philosophical Traditions, edited by Bo Mou, Chicago: Open Court, 2001, p.255. My italics.
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克思說“存在決定意識”，這在認識關系上是可以說的，但“意識決定存在”是從實踐上講
的 )417.  Through  his  double-leveled  ontology,  where  epistemological  relations  of  opposition  and 
attachment are interpreted as the results of the reflexivity of transcendental subjectivity realizing itself 
through self-negation, the epistemological “truth” of the Marxian formula can be both reconciled with 
and subordinated to the “practical” truth that it is consciousness, in its noumenal guise at least, that 
gives rise to all the specific determinations of objective, material existence. It has to be stressed here 
that Mou does not use the word “unlimited” (無限) with reference to the mind in any literally spatial or 
temporal sense, but employs this term to designate the fact that in its pre-objectified state, the mind is  
fundamentally  unconditioned  by the spatiotemporal objectivity it has still to give rise to through the 
procedure of voluntary self-negation. According the dimension of morality and value with the status of 
something that is “in-itself”, could thus be read as a delicate procedure through which moral value is 
immunized against dialectical changes and transformations, which in Mou's view the unattached mind 
disposes over as a means to realize itself in time, by first of all allowing time to emerge from the 
timeless through reflexive negativity. In this sense, for Mou, “stabilizing” the transcendental difference 
between appearance and thing-in-itself and thereby maintaining what Tang Junyi called a “place for 
spirit” where value cannot be reduced to fact is more fundamental or rather prior to the confirmation of 
the possibility of intellectual intuition, since it is only because of the grounding of the transcendental 
distinction and the immunization of value as the noumenal that a gap is introduced which the concept 
of  intellectual  intuition  then  serves  to  bridge.418 In  other  words,  from a historical  perspective,  the 
417Record of Lectures at the Humanist Society (Renwen jiangxi lu 人文講習錄), [1954b] vol.28 of MJ, p.39.
418Heidegger's  reading of  Kant  in  terms of  finitude could be  employed within this  line of  reasoning,  as  long as  the 
atemporal category of the finitude of human Dasein as such is historized, something Adorno seems to have been aiming 
for in his reading of Kant's first  Critique. For Heidegger, the status and function of the thing-in-itself is clear: “What 
does the struggle against  the “thing in itself”,  which started with German Idealism,  mean,  other  than the growing 
forgetting of what Kant struggled for: that the inner possibility and necessity of metaphysics, i.e., its essence, are a the  
bottom brought forth and preserved through the more original working-out and increased preservation of the problem of 
finitude?” Heidegger, 1997, p.171. Surprisingly enough, Adorno's take on the status of the thing-in-itself within the  
Kantian system is, purely formally speaking of course, not completely at odds with that of his  bête noire, Heidegger: 
“[W]hile Kant does situate the unity of existing reality and also the concept of Being in the realm of consciousness, he 
simultaneously refuses to generate everything that exists from the realm of consciousness. The consciousness of what  
the modern expression calls the 'ontological difference',that is to say, of the fact that a thing is not fully reducible to its 
concept, that objects and subject are not to be collapsed into each other – this consciousness is powerfully developed in  
Kant […] he always has the consciousness [….] of a 'block' ” Adorno, 2001, p.18. For Adorno, the  Critique of Pure  
Reason constitutes “a philosophy that attempts to ground being in the subject – and also a non-identity philosophy – one 
that attempts to restrict that claim to identity by insisting on the obstacles, the block, encountered by the subject in its 
search for knowledge.”(p.66.) Cf. p.177: “Kant […] would rather acquiesce in the inconsistencies to which we have 
repeatedly drawn attention than create a seamless intellectual harmony which nevertheless would prevent him from 
delivering on his  specific  philosophical  ambitions.  To take matters  to  their  logical  conclusions means denying the 
existence of the block and laying claim to absolute identity. The dialectical or antinomic structure of Kantian philosophy 
means that is aspires to create a system, to provide a central point, which is that of the idea that can construct reality –  
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transcendental  difference  signals  the  real,  underlying  problem  which  the  notion  of  non-sensible 
intuition solves conceptually. It is also obvious that even within the absence of the opposition between 
subject  and  object  in  intellectual  intuition,  an  internal,  lopsided  hierarchy  is  maintained  and  the 
privileged position of subjectivity and consciousness remains firmly in place:
In the perfect insight and perfect apprehension of the free and autonomous unlimited mind, that is to say 
in the divine resonance of the knowledge of essence and clear insight, all entities are things “existing in
themselves”. Perfect insight and perfect apprehension do not possess the nature of time and space and
are not subject to arising and perishing; things as existing in themselves are of course also outside of
space and time and do not have the characteristic of constant change; as self-existing characteristics,
they come into being out of  themselves, having the character of  suchness, the singular character of
suchness, or what is called being without characteristics, which is the true characteristic. [Because] they
are outside of time and space, they cannot be (absolutely) limited [things];  but on the other hand, we
cannot go so far as to say that they are unlimited in the same way that the unlimited essence of the mind
is unlimited,  [since]  they obtain their detachment and self-identity and attain an unlimited meaning
because of and through the presence of the unlimited mind in them.419
在自由自律的無限心之圓覺圓照下，或在知體明覺之神感神應下，一切存在皆是“在其自己”之
存在。圓覺圓照無時空性，無生滅相，“在其自己”之存在當然亦無時空性，無流變相，它們是
內生的自在相，即如相：如相一相，所謂無相，即是實相。無時空性，它們不能是有限（決定的
有限）；但我們亦不能說它們就像“無限心體”那樣的無限，它們是因著無限心體之在它們處著
見而取得解脫與自在，因此取得一無限性之意義。
As  another  example  of  how  this  wavering  between  immanence  and  transcendence  affects  Mou's 
philosophy, we can note that his own defense of the possibility of the inborn givenness and spontaneity 
of “insightful  moral feelings” (jueqing 覺情 )420,  in  which acting morally requires neither,  as Kant 
would have it, a sort of a priori “displeasure” resulting from the constraint of empirical inclinations by 
respect for the moral law, nor dismissing the possibility of moral nature functioning as a veritable drive 
instead of as a conformity to the moral law for the sake of the law itself421, is severely limited, if not 
but at the same time, it refuses to regard the world as identical with that […] I believe this is the deepest thing to be  
found in Kant.”
419Mou, [1975d], pp.116-117. Emphasis added. 
420See Billioud, 2012, pp.161-194. I use Billoud's translation of the term jueqing.
421See Kant, 1993a, pp.75-92. For Kant, “[i]nclination, be it good-natured or otherwise, is blind and slavish; reason, when  
it it is a question of morality, must not play the part of mere guardian of the inclinations, but, without regard to them, as  
pure practical reason it must care for its own interest to the exclusion of all else”. Kant, 1993a, pp.124-125.
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compromised, by the fact that Mou is very quick to join Kant's instance on purity and freedom from 
empirical determinations as the fundamental trait and transcendental guarantee of the morality of the 
will as soon as a historical materialist reification and relativization of the spiritual starts looming on the 
horizon.  The  association  between  communism  and  reification  made  him  just  as  averse  to  the 
introduction of the empirical into the transcendental purity of practical reason as Kant was, though of 
course for historically different reasons. In the context of Mou's engagement with Kant as well, it is 
necessary to  think  through how history is  related to  and conceptually transcribed into  the generic 
philosophical category of heteronomy.422 
The considerable conceptual difficulties and paradoxes which arise in the later Mou's double ontology, 
which is, as Adorno wrote concerning Kant's critical philosophy, more like a veritable “force-field” 
(Kraftfeld)423 than a neat, orderly and perfectly self-enclosed system424,  can in my view be seen as 
stemming from the contradictory demands he places  on his  own philosophical  project  and on the 
reinvention of Confucianism as philosophy at large: 1) one the one hand, he firmly positions himself 
against a negatively characterized form of radical immanence which grounds the identity and equality 
of all entities in the world by reducing them to the contradiction-laden unity of matter, or does away 
with qualitative distinctions altogether and leaves nothing but an indeterminate chaos of atomic facts 
(Russell) or “things which are the case” (Wittgenstein).425 Mou never ceased to associate these outlooks 
with the historical disaster of actually existing communism and socialism. As is obvious from all his 
Three Books on New Outer Kingliness and from recurring incidental remarks in his later monographs 
and lectures, he  keeps invoking a form of moral idealism and the liberating force of transcendence 
against communist reification on both a conceptual and a social level. As he put it quite clearly at one 
point, the meaning of transcendence in this regard is that of “not only” (bu zhi 不只)426, that is to say, of 
not seeing the world only as a totality of facts reducible to matter. 2) On the other hand, he is equally  
concerned about distinguishing Chinese philosophy from Western, in his view essentially Christian, 
422Moishe Postone,  History and Heteronomy. Critical Essays,  Tokyo:  The University of Tokyo Center for Philosophy, 
2009a, p.43.
423Adorno, 2001, p.80. Kant himself already used the metaphor of metaphysics as a “battleground”, a comparison which 
Althusser was found of invoking. See Kant, 2007, p.5 (preface to the first edition, Aviii).
424I fully agree with Liu Tongqi and Zhou Qin when they note that “in interpreting Mou’s anthropocosmic vision,  too 
much attention has  so far  been  paid  to  the  complete  fusion of  and  the  perfect  harmony and equilibrium between 
transcendence  and  immanence.”  “The  Dynamism and  Tension  in  the  Anthropocosmic  Vision  of  Mou Zongsan.  A 
Reflection on the Confucian Concept of tianren heyi”, in Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 22, 1995, p.404
425See “The Guiding Spiritual Principles of the Age” (Lingdao shidai zhi jingshen yuanli領導時代之精神原理), [1951b] 
in SSXB, pp.32-34.
426Mou, [1956b], p.32.
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thought, in which the subject is radically divorced from an Absolute in which it no longer recognizes 
itself.  As  we saw in  the  previous  chapter,  Mou associates  such  a  bifurcation  with  alienation  and 
“unenlightenement” on a social level. In Kantian terms, this separation of the individual (moral) subject 
from its  “innermost  self”  constitutes  a  form of  paralyzing heteronomy for  Mou.  As Olf  Lehmann 
convincingly shows in his monumental study of Mou's philosophy, the rejection of such heteronomy is 
the central clue to his infamous relegation of Zhu Xi to a “collateral line which became the orthodoxy” 
(biezi wei zong別子為宗) in the construction of his new “transmission of the Way” (daotong 道統).427 
The transcendence he wants to ascribe to Chinese thought on the basis of his opposition to materialist 
immanence thus also has to be different (enough, but not too much428) from the “Western” bifurcation 
of fact and value as completely distinct and irreconcilable ontological realms. Perhaps it comes as no 
surprise then that his solution to this paradox, or one might even say contradiction, is found in the in 
itself proudly paradoxical concept of the “self-negation of moral reason”. It is through this concept that 
he  tries  to  ontologically  bridge  a  gap  already  “epistemologically”  overcome  through  the  idea  of 
intellectual  intuition,  a  gap  which  must  only  be  closed  because  he  actually  needed  it  himself  to 
conceptually oppose the reduction of fact and value. Simply put: Mou wants to have his gap and bridge 
it. Hans Joas makes the following remarks concerning the idea of value which are particularly pertinent 
with reference to Mou as well:
[t]he concept of 'value' takes the place once occupied by the concept of the 'good' in the philosophical
tradition.  However,  whereas  the  'good'  could,  according  to  this  tradition,  be  accorded  a  status
ascertainable either by rational contemplation of the cosmos or through divine revelation, and thus had a 
'being'  -  even  a  higher  being  than  other  existents  -  there  is  attached  to  the  concept  of  'value'  an
ineradicable reference to the valuing subject […] The metaphysical unity of the true and the good is
replaced in the philosophy of value by a dualism between 'facticity' and 'validity', between a realm of
427Lehmann, 2003, pp.170-207. See Mou's general introduction in the first volume of Substance of the Mind and Substance  
of  Nature (Xinti  yu xingti 心體與性體 ),  [1968a],  vol.5  of  MJ,  pp.1-335.  Also see Chan,  2011, pp.219-254.  For 
Lehmann, it is clear that “jener enthistorierte 'Zhu Xi' ist, obwohl sich seine Verwandschaft mit dem Autor des Yulei  
nicht leugnen lässt, ebenso ein Produkt der Mouschen Interpretation wie die 'Orthodoxie' selbst.” Lehmann, 2003, p.179.
428“Foreigners say that  Confucianism is something finite,  concerned only with mundane human relations,  and has an 
insufficiently transcendent dimension. Let foreigners talk that way if they must, but we ourselves should not, for it harms 
Chinese culture.” (外人說儒家只可通用於人倫日用，故是有限，而超越意不夠；外人如此說就算了，但我們自
己便不該如此說，這對中國文化是不利的). “Confucian Moral Metaphysics” (Rujia de daode de xing'ershangxue 儒
家的道德的形而上學), [1975c] in WW, p.215. Translation adapted from Clower, 2014b, pp.133-134. As Clower rightly 
notes, “the foreigner foremost in Mou's mind is probably Max Weber”. Ibid., p.134, note 25. The religious nature of  
Confucianism was also stressed (contra Weber) in the 1958 Manifesto. See Tang et. al., [1958a] in ZJ, pp.879-884. Also 
see Yong Chen,  Confucianism as Religion. Controversies and Consequences, Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013, pp.149-
153.
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verifiable facts and, opposed to this, another, peculiar mode of being, in which values and valuations are
given. The philosophy of value does not fix this dualism, but is instead concerned, in its various forms,
to bridge it.429
In order  to  further  arrive at  a  better  understanding of  how these somewhat  abstruse philosophical 
considerations  are  historically  conditioned  and  significant  and  to  clarify  how  the  “non-
analytical”/noumenal is related to the “analytical”/phenomenal in the broader context of Mou's whole 
oeuvre, I propose taking a look at his political philosophy, worked out in the 1940s and 1950s against  
the background of the establishment of the PRC and the victory of Chinese communism. The overall 
significance of the central theme of self-negation can, I think, be most effectively explained in this 
context.430 
3.2.4 The dialectical logic of self-negation in Mou's political philosophy: social mediation and the 
formalization of the subject 
For someone whose lifelong mission it was to uphold and reestablish the Confucian tradition, Mou 
Zongsan's judgment of the traditional Chinese political order can at times sound surprisingly harsh.431 
Not wholly unlike intellectuals and interpreters who take Western modernity as an ideal and a model to 
be emulated, he consequently characterizes tradition as marked by certain “absences”, or by specific 
“lacks” which led to a fatal backwardness of China vis-à-vis the West and prevented the emergence of 
an endogenous modernity from the Chinese tradition itself. However, as we have already repeatedly 
seen,  if  such instances of negativity are  taken up as integral moments in a transhistorically active 
reflexivity which dialectically thrives on its own “withdrawals”, then they can be given a positive twist 
and endowed with a certain transitional and strategic necessity. Keeping this in mind, it comes as less 
of a surprise that we even find Mou approvingly quoting and invoking the infamous excerpt from 
Hegel's  Philosophy  of  History on  the  despotic  “Oriental  World”,  an  extract  that  would  seem  to 
exemplify the worst imaginable Orientalism and Eurocentrism432:
the Orientals have not attained the knowledge that Spirit – Man as such – is free; because they do not
429Hans Joas, The Genesis of Values, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000, p.21.
430See Yan, 2012, pp.161-170.
431See  Stephan Schmidt, “Mou Zongsan, Hegel, and Kant: The Quest for Confucian Modernity”,  Philosophy East and 
West, vol.61, no.2, 2011, p.282.
432See for example Enrique Dussel, “Eurocentrism and Modernity”, in boundary 2, vol.20, no.3, 1993, pp.65-76.
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know this, they are not free. They only know that one is free. But on this very account, the freedom of
that one is  only caprice; ferocity,  brutal recklessness of passion,  or a mildness and tameness of the
desires, which is itself only an accident of Nature, mere caprice like the former. That  one is therefore
only a Despot; not a free man.433
Mou notes that this particular passage has often managed to hurt the feelings of his countrymen, but  
insists that it is necessary to reflect on the fundamental truth of what Hegel is saying here instead of 
rejecting it out of hand out of a misplaced and unreflective sense of national pride. Needless to say, he  
does not conceive of China or the “Orient” in general as a kind of premature and abortive dawning of a 
Spirit which subsequently migrated West and forever turned its back on its place of birth. Like Liang 
Shuming and so many other twentieth-century Chinese thinkers, he conceives of different cultures and 
civilizations  as  being  governed  by  distinct  principles  of  mobility  which  underly  their  historical 
evolution, or even lack of evolution, which is in both cases a strictly internal affair. Still, Mou basically 
agrees with Hegel that the Chinese emperor was an (at best enlightened) despot, since he “did not have 
a constitution with an objective and efficient politico-legal form to constrain [his power]” (皇帝沒有客
觀的政治法律形態之憲法以限制之).434 He further concurs with Hegel when the latter faults the lack 
of a well-developed principle of subjectivity distinct from “the immediate unity of the substantial Spirit 
and  the  Individual”435 in  natural  family life  for  the  historical  absence  of  a  constitutional  form of 
government which would check and limit despotic political power and supplement a merely abstract 
“absolute  freedom”436 lacking in  all  distinctions  with  real  individual  freedom.437 The  emperor  was 
completely “free”  insofar  as  his  powers  were  unlimited,  but  his  freedom remained “abstract”  and 
indeterminate since it was left unmediated by the mutual recognition of the freedom of others. Like 
Hegel, Mou thinks that it is only the state which can ultimately ensure this type of freedom on a social 
level, especially in the face of the “pure negativity” of communism.438 Let us note in passing that for 
Mou,  the Hegelian  notion  that  political  freedom has  to  be realized  within rather  than through the 
433G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of History, New York: Dover, 1956, p.18. This passage is included in Mou's translation of 
selections (based on the English translation by J. Sibree from 1899) from the  Philosophy of  History.  See “Hegel's 
Philosophy of  History”  (Heige'er de lishi  zhexue 黑格爾的歷史哲學 ),  [1956a] in  Collection of  Mou Zongsan's  
Translations (Mou Zongsan xiansheng yishu ji 牟宗三先生譯述集), vol.17 of MJ, pp.288-289. Also see Mou's own 
Philosophy of History (Lishi zhexue 歷史哲學), [1955b], vol.9 of MJ, pp.65-94.
434Mou, [1956a], p.288.
435Hegel, 1956, p.120.
436Hegel, 1956, p.124.
437See Mou, [1955b], pp.74-75.
438See Mou, [1949c] and Mou, [1952a].
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removal or in the absence of institutional and normative constraints had a corresponding theological 
equivalent in the idea inspired by Leibniz that even God cannot simply do whatever he pleases, since 
ascribing such a random, wayward and tyrannical will to him would fundamentally undermine divine 
righteousness.439 For  Mou,  a  “Way of  governance”  (zhidao 治道 ),  referring to  administrative  and 
executive  power  exercised  by  a  bureaucratic  system of  officials, had  been  highly  developed  and 
internally differentiated in imperial China, but a “Way of political authority/sovereignty” (zhengdao政
道) conferring legitimacy on the execution of political power was never rationally established.440 This is 
why he speaks of a “rule by government officials” (lizhi吏治) instead of politics (zhengzhi 政治) in the 
proper  sense  of  the  word.441 As  David  Elstein  explains,  Mou  thinks  that  “[p]olitical  power  was 
transferred  either  by  conquest  or  hereditary  succession”.  Throughout  Chinese  political  history,  a 
publicly  and  democratically  legitimated  form  of  political  authority  could  not  emerge  because 
sovereignty (zhengquan正權), something intrinsically “formal” (形式的), “unchangeable” (定常的), 
“static”  (静态的 )  and  grounded  in  the  people  as  a  nation,  was  always  made  contingent  on  the 
ephemeral existence and the even more variable and transitory goodwill of the individual human beings 
holding power.442 China was thus only held together as a “cultural unit” (wenhua danwei 文化单位) 
instead of as a “national unit” (guojia danwei 國家单位 ).443 In the modern world, Mou thinks, it is 
revolutionary communism which continues to inhibit the cultural nation from becoming solidified into 
a  democratic political  state.  In imperial  China,  governing power could always simply be violently 
“seized” (取) or “stolen” (拿) and passed on from one “revolution” (geming革命) to the next with a 
sufficient basis in popular sovereignty. The people could do nothing but patiently wait and hope for the 
emergence of “sagely rulers and worthy ministers” (shengjun xianxiang 聖君賢相).444 Mou believed 
439See Mou, [1956b], pp.676-684. As Leibniz states in the Discourse on Metaphysics: “In saying that things are not good 
according to any standard of goodness, but simply by the will of God, it seems to me that one destroys, without realizing  
it, all the love of God and all his glory; for why praise him for what he has done, if he would be equally praiseworthy in  
doing the contrary? Where will be his justice and his wisdom if he has only a certain despotic power, if arbitrary will  
takes the place of reasonableness, and if in accord with the definition of tyrants, justice consists in that which is pleasing  
to the most powerful?”. Leibniz, 2005, p.2. Theologically of course, Leibniz's subordination of the divine will to reason 
and morality creates many difficulties which we need not enter into here. 
440See The Way of Political Authority and the Way of Governance (Zhengdao yu zhidao政道與治道), [1961], vol.10 of 
MJ. David Elstein renders the distinction between 政道 and 治道 as “political power” and “governing power”. See 
Democracy in Contemporary Confucian Philosophy, London and New York: Routledge, 2015, p.44.
441Mou adopted the expression lizhi吏治 from Zhang Junmai. See Jiang Nianfeng, 1992, pp.70-71.
442Mou, [1961], p.7, pp.21-23.
443Mou, [1961],  p.55. Cf.  Tang, [1953b], p.50: “After the Han dynasty,  China became what could be called a purely  
cultural country” (漢以後。中國即可謂純為一所為文化國).
444Quoted from Elstein, 2015, p.46. See Mou, [1961], p.27.
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that the universality which grounds political authority must not be particularized by being made to 
depend on the emperor's individual will, personal character and moral excellence. He suggested that in 
relation to political authority (zheng政), the day-to-day administrative governance (zhi治) of a state 
has a secondary role as an application of the former which necessarily involves a certain degree of 
coercion.445 Governance however must be subordinated to and contained by sovereignty in order to 
become rational, objective and legitimate.446 Mou claims that in imperial China, governance was never 
fully  separated  from  authority.  Unlike  many  other  (ontological  and  epistemological)  unities,  this 
unmediated identity of sovereignty and governance is not one Mou is nostalgic about or wishes to  
reinstall.447 Quite to the contrary, his central concern is to rationalize this unity through distinction and 
separation:
Within the situation of a great unified monarchical dictatorship, the emperor was a transcendent and
limitless entity as far as his authority and status were concerned. Because governance and authority
were  not  separated  but  united  in  one  body,  and  the  emperor  further  obtained  his  sovereignty  by
conquering All-under-Heaven, Confucians were also unable to come up with a way to turn sovereignty
into a public good. This amounted to sovereignty remaining without a principle of sovereignty.448
在大統一的君主專制之形態下，皇帝在政與位上是一個超越無限體。因為治權與政權不分，合一
於一身，而其政權之取得又是由打天下而來，而儒者於此亦始終未想出一個辦法使政權為公有。
是即相應政權無政道。
Because of the persistent lack of differentiation between sovereignty and administrative power,  the 
Confucian “rule by virtue” (dezhi 德治) put forward by Confucius and Mencius after the example of 
the ancient sage-kings could not be objectified and rationalized and remained restricted to the level of 
moral self-cultivation of the ruler. The latter's virtuous personality and conduct was supposed to trickle 
down and positively influence the whole of society, the virtuous ruler being, as we read in the Analects, 
“like the Pole Star, which keeps its place and receives the homage of the myriad lesser stars” (譬如北
445Mou, [1961], p.30.
446Mou, [1961], pp.24-25.
447Tang Junyi saw the politicization of science under communism as a negative continuation of the traditional Confucian  
spirit of political and social responsibility which would have to be preserved without violating the integrity of both  
disciplines. See  “The Chinese Cultural Background of the Chaos in Present-day China” (Zhongguo jinri zhi luan de  
Zhongguo wenhua beijing 中國今日之亂的中國文化背景), [1950c] in ZJ, pp.262-23.
448Mou, [1961], p.33. 
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辰，居其所而眾星拱之).449 Much like Jiang Qing's critique of “spiritual Confucianism”, Mou faults 
traditional  Confucian political  conceptions  with an exaggerated orientation towards  (an unfree and 
unobjectified form of) subjectivity and interiority and the lack of an objective institutional and legal 
framework in which virtue can become a performative source of political sovereignty and effective 
social order. Mou could no longer follow Xiong Shili's idea that the difference between morality and 
law  could  be  grasped  as  autonomous  and  internal,  and  heteronomous  and  externally  imposed 
respectively.450 This  is  why  for  Mou,  in  one  of  his  most  concise  and  open-ended  definitions, 
“modernization  is  the  problem of  opening up the  learning of  the  inner  sage  towards  the  external 
[world]” (現代化是由內聖之學向外開的問題).451 The anti-Manchu rhetoric I commented on in the 
beginning of this  section plays a crucial role  in presenting the non-emergence of a viable political 
system (extending, incarnating and realizing self-cultivation) as the result of a “stifling” of the Chinese 
Spirit by the Manchurian rule. Specifically, Mou was of the opinion that late-Ming Confucianists had 
begun to work out an efficient political dimension based on the learning of self-cultivation inherited 
from previous Confucians, efforts which were undone through the Manchu invasion: 
Huang Lizhou [Huang Zongxi], Wang Chuanshan [Wang Fuzhi] and Gu Tinglin [Gu Yanwu]452 began
advocating an opening up of outer kingliness from inner  sageliness, that is to say, an openness to the
outside,  which  is  why  they  started  emphasizing  “statesmanship  for  practical  use”  […]  The  three
hundred-year long rule by the Manchurian Qing caused intellectuals to lose their powers of reflection, so
that the above-mentioned historical opportunity to generate outer kingliness from inner  sageliness was
missed and stifled.  If  the Manchurian Qing had not  ruled for  three hundred years,  then the natural
direction of development of  the Chinese people would not  have differed so much from that  of  the
West.453
黃梨洲、王船山、顧亭林他們就主張從內聖開外王，就是向外開，因此，才重視經世致用之學 
[...]滿清三百年的統治，知識分子喪失思考力，那個歷史運會錯失了，那個從內聖開外王的方
向、要求堵回去了。假定沒有滿清三百年的統治，中華民族發展的自然方向跟西方差不多。
449Translation based on Edward Slingerhand (trans.), Confucius. Analects. With Selections from Traditional Commentaries, 
Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003, p.8.
450See Xiong, [1946], p.131.
451Mou, [1954b], p.109.
452Notably, Huang Zongxi 黄宗羲  (1610-1695), Wang Fuzhi 王夫之  (1619-1692) and Gu Yanwu 顧炎武  (1613-1682) 
were all Ming loyalists fiercly opposed to the Manchu rule. 
453 “The Encounter at the Goose Lake - The Great Synthesis in the Development of Chinese Culture and the Merging of  
Chinese and Western Traditions” (Ehu zhi hui - Zhongguo wenhua fazhan zhong de da zonghe yu zhongxi chuantong de  
chonghui鵝湖之會 — 中國文化發展中的大綜合與中西傳統的融合), [1992] in WW, pp.446-447. Translation based 
on Clower, 2014b, pp.72-73.
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Remarkably  enough,  the  very  same  Qing  period  foreshadowing  the  positivism,  scientism,  and 
materialism spearheading the attack on the Chinese tradition coming in from the West can at the same 
time be held accountable for the fact that China did not enter into the political evolutionary path which 
led to the birth of Western democracy. As a highly unstable signifier, the “Manchurian Qing” is thus at  
the same time the precurrence and the dark side of a modernity conceptualized in terms of science and 
politics. What should be kept in mind here is that for Mou, the “new outer kingliness” (xin waiwang 新
外王) which he hopes will help usher in a new period in the development of Confucianism refers to 
what he called the “universal  dharmas” (gongfa 公法 )454 of science and democracy.455 Science and 
democracy respectively constitute the “formal” (xingshi 形式) and “material” (caizhi材質) conditions 
for  modernization  as  the  externalization,  objectification  and  rationalization  of  “inner  sageliness”. 
Because both conditions must be met in order for a society to qualify as modern in a positive sense, 
Mou rejected communism as a partial and one-sided form of modernization which is only focused on 
developing modernity's “material conditions” (science and technology) and not the requisite “formal 
condition” (democracy).456 He considered the “four modernizations” (si ge xiandaihua四个现代化, i.e. 
of agriculture, industry, national defense, science and technology) propagated in Deng-era mainland 
China to be restricted to the “material” dimension which would remain lifeless and useless without the 
fifth modernization demanded by human rights activists such as Wei Jingsheng 魏京生 (b. 1950), i.e. 
the  modernization  of  politics  towards  representational  democracy.457 Mou  had  no  doubts  about 
constitutional democracy being the final form of political government458 and often gave the impression 
that the only thing standing in the way of global prosperity and world peace was the dictatorship of the 
454See Thoraval, 2003, pp.18-19 and Chan, 2011, pp.90-91. Chan translates the term gongfa as “common paradigms”.
455“If  we want to be our own masters  and continue to exist,  then modernization is something we absolutely have to  
perform. Although modernization first started in the West, it only has to appear in order to shed its regional nature. It  
only needs to be true in order to become universal, and once it has [acquired] universality, all nations should recognize 
it.” (我們要自己做主，要繼續生存下去，現代化是我們必得做的事。現代化雖先發自於西方，但是只要它一旦
出現，它就沒有地方性。只要它是個真理，它就有普遍性；只要有普遍性，任何一個民族都當該承認它). Mou, 
[1961] (preface), p.24.
456See Mou, [1961] (preface), pp.18-19, p.28.
457See “Confirming Freedom and Democracy – A Call for Support to the Youth Movement for Human Rights on the  
Mainland” (Kending ziyou, kending minzhu – shengyuan dalu qingnian renquan yundong肯定自由、肯定民主 — 聲
援大陸青年人權運動), [1979b] in SSXB, pp.275-290, “What Have Intellectuals on the Mainland Thought about in the 
Last Thirty Years?” (Sanshi nian lai dalu zhishifenzi xiang xie shenme 三十年來大陸上的知識分子想些什麼？), 
[1980b] in SS, p.99 and Mou, [1990b], p.4, p.6.
458See for example “The Problem of the Concern for Reality in the Mainstream of Chinese Culture” (Zhongguo wenhua da 
maidong zhongde xianshi guanxin wenti 中國文化大脈動中的現實關心問題), [1983a] in SS, pp.407-408.
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Chinese Communist Party on the mainland.459 
 
Mou's vision on the nature of the political order in premodern China is further complicated by the 
following distinctions drawn within the framework of yet another cultural typology: the Chinese drive 
towards synthesis instead of analysis resulted in what he calls “a functional manifestation of reason” 
(lixing zhi yunyong biaoxian 理性之運用表現), as opposed to the “structural manifestation of reason” 
(lixing zhi jiagou biaoxian 理性之架構表現 ) prevalent in the West.460 The “reason” or “rationality” 
Mou has in mind here is not the “withered, abstract reason” (乾枯的抽象的理性) based on theoretical 
abstraction and analytic distinctions, but a “practical reason” (shijian lixing 實踐理性 ) expressed in 
daily, unreflective moral practice as a manifestation of virtue in which “one sees the substance through 
its functioning” (即用見體 ).461 This kind of practical reason is “functional”, not in any utilitarian or 
instrumental manner, but, calling Xiong Shili to mind, in the sense that it does not exist outside of its  
concrete functioning in virtuous conduct and has no need for an additional “medium” (meiti媒體) or a 
“structure” (jiagou 架構 ).462 Although he has nothing but praise for such immediacy in the field of 
individual and intersubjective moral behavior463, Mou makes it clear that he thinks this conception is 
inadequate on a broader political level. With reference to the influential text of the Daxue, which states 
that “from the Son of Heaven down to the common people, all must regard self-cultivation as the root 
or foundation” (自天子以至庶民，壹是以修身為本 )464, he argues that at present, it is no longer 
possible to establish a direct connection between “inner sageliness” and “outer kingliness”. The latter 
cannot be taken as an immediate extension (直接延長 ) of the former anymore. Self-cultivation and 
459Also see Tang's “How to Decrease the Risk of War Breaking out between Communist China  and Soviet Russia” (Ruhe 
xiaojian Zhonggong yu Su'e zhanzheng de kenengxing 如何消減中共與蘇俄戰爭的可能性), [1973a] in ZJ, pp.681-
686.
460See Mou, [1961], pp.49-68 and Mou, [1955b], pp.192-200.
461Mou, [1961], p.52.
462Mou, [1961], p.53.
463“When we read the Analects, it is clear that the whole life of Confucius was a manifestation of wisdom; from this we 
can see that Confucius's personality was one of complete humaneness. The humaneness as a universal rationality and the 
complete wisdom of Confucius were united into one [in the person of Confucius]. In his person, humaneness was fully 
realized in a real individual, and Confucius as an individual was thus himself a confirmation of humaneness.” (讀論語﹐
可知孔子之生活透體是智慧之呈露﹐因而可知其人格全幅是「仁」之人格。仁之為普遍理性與孔子透體是智慧
之人格打成一片。在孔子﹐仁全幅實現於現實之個人﹐而孔子之個人亦即是仁之證實). Mou, [1949d], p.11. 
Similarly, Tang Junyi spoke of the teachings of Confucius as an “immediate, self-sufficient totality” (当下具足之整体). 
Tang, [1953b], p.41. Also see Tang, [1953b], pp.34-41.
464Translation adopted from Wing-tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton (N.J.): Princeton University 
Pres, 1963, p.87.
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sageliness remain necessary conditions for harmonious interpersonal relations and overall social order, 
but modern societies cannot function without what he calls “complications” (曲折).465 As he declares 
quite unambiguously: “The economy has an independent law that is intrinsic to the economy, politics as 
well has an autonomous law that is internal to itself” (經濟有經濟內在的獨立法則，而政治亦有政
治內在的獨立法則).466 The economic and the political system ideally exemplify or contribute to the 
moral perfection aimed for in self-cultivation, but cannot operate on the basis of the same principles 
and  procedures.  Mou  even  quotes  the  interesting  assertion  that  “those  in  Western  medicine  who 
discovered anesthetics were great Bodhisattvas” (西醫中發明麻醉藥者為大菩薩)467, which he takes to 
mean that compassion for the suffering of all sentient beings ultimately remains empty without the 
means to,  as the familiar  phrase goes, “actually do something”.  Like the sage taking the office of 
president, the bodhisattva too has to submit to “self-negation”, even when his or her compassion for 
those suffering or in need remains the “transcendental ground” (chaoyue de genju超越的根據) for the 
adoption  of  science  and  technology.468 The  general  (culturally  determined)  distinction  between  a 
“functional” and a “structural” form of rationality is thus made to hinge on the category of mediation,  
which has moral, political, as well as epistemological implications: mathematics, logic, science, the 
state, the legal system, and a political sovereignty as distinct from administration are all identified by 
Mou as instances of a structural type of rationality based on conceptual and social mediation missing in 
traditional China.469 
His fellow traveler Tang Junyi had tried to keep modern epistemological and institutional divisions 
together by appealing to his central concept of the “moral self” (daode ziwo 道德自我) as a centripetal 
force serving as “that which commands and unites all divisions of cultural activities” (個門類之文化活
動之統攝者、貫通者).470 Like Mou, he considered all these divisions to be practically inevitable and 
functionally necessary for modern societies. In what is probably his most important and systematic 
work of social and political philosophy, Cultural Consciousness and Moral Reason (Wenhua yishi yu  
daode lixing 文化意識與道德理性) from 1958, Tang put forward the idea that all human activities are 
465See Mou, [1961], pp.61-62 and Mou, “The Path of Cultural Construction” (Wenhua jianshe de daolu 文化建設的道路), 
[1981] in SS, pp.380-382.
466Mou, [1981], p.381.
467Mou, [1961], (preface) p.18.
468See Mou, [1983b], p.279.
469Mou, [1961], pp.56-61.
470Tang, [1953b], p.13.
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unified  and  held  together  by  virtue  of  being  cultural activities  which  count  as  “diversified 
manifestations” (分殊表現) of the “moral or spiritual, transcendent self” (道德自我或精神自我、超
越自我).471 Tang presents a social diversity of phenomena encompassing everything ranging from art, 
religion, philosophy, science, politics and family life, to sports, military affairs, the educational and 
legal system472 as united in a moral reason which expresses its identity through difference. All these 
spheres of activity have an “internal goal” (內在的目的)473 which ensures that each can pursue its own 
course. Tang explicitly objects to the operational logic of one sphere of human activity (e.g. politics) 
being  contaminated  or  undermined  by  that  of  another  field.474 However,  these  internal  goals 
simultaneously serve to realize the more fundamental goal of moral reason striving for its own self-
perfection. All cultural activities are “equally dominated by the moral self”  (同受一道德自我之主
宰)475 which is fundamentally characterized by transcendence and the overcoming of restrictions as the 
source of its goodness. What Tang does not consider is the possibility of overlaps, contradictions, and 
conflict,  occurring  when  the  same  real  object  or  subject  is  taken  up  in  the  internal  strategy  of 
functionally differentiated forms of activity. A human person is a physical body (for medicine), a source 
of labor power (for the economy), a form of electoral potential (for politics), and what is far from clear 
is  how morality is  to  keep these  different  roles  together  except  through the  observation  that  they 
embody transcendence transcendentally.
Now clearly,  the catch is that Mou will not simply settle for a mere “compromise”, “synthesis” or  
indifferent middle ground between morality and modernity, China and the West, or between morality 
and science. He expects “Miss Morality” to give birth to the twins “Mister Democracy” and “Mister 
Science”.  The problem of the relation between the immediate functioning of practical reason and the 
establishment of epistemologically and politically mediating structures which are still somehow related 
and not extrinsic to morality is resolved through Mou's commanding paradigm of self-negation.476 What 
471Tang, [1958b], p.3.
472Tang specifies  that  sports,  military affairs,  the legal  and educational  system” serve an auxiliary supporting role in 
allowing all other cultural activities to pursue their own course and do not constitute goals in themselves. See Tang, 
[1958b], pp.348-372.
473Tang, [1958b], p.348.
474See Tang, [1958b], pp.397ff.
475Tang, [1958b], p.176.
476In a recent article, Yang Zebo杨泽波 tries to supplant the so-called Needham question by means of Mou's paradigm of 
self-negation. See “The Needham Question Considered from the Perspective of the Theory of Self-Negation” (Cong 
kanxian lun de shijiao kan Li Yuese wenti 从坎陷论的视角看李约瑟难题 ),  Qinghua daxue xuebao 清华大学学
报,vol.28, no.6, 2013, pp.85-92. Stephen Angle has recently attempted to appropriate Mou's idea of ziwo kanxian 自我
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Wang  Hui  calls  the  principle  of  division  mobilized  against  the  hegemony  of  science  by  the 
metaphysical camp in the debate of 1923 is thus assumed to be self-grounding as a necessary moment 
in  the  constitution  of  self-identity.  In  short,  Mou  thinks  that  in  traditional  Chinese  thought, 
“knowledge” (zhi智) always remained encapsulated (籠罩) or assimilated (收摄) by “humaneness” 
(ren 仁 ), as a form of intuitive knowing in which the object is not opposed to the subject, since the  
“object” of moral practice is the subject (including its intersubjective life) itself, and does not constitute 
a distinct cognitive object opposed to the subject at all.477 Self-negation is thus the key to reconciling 
the  ontologically  foundational  “lack”  of  opposition  between  subject  and  object  with  a  functional 
“indirectness” (qu曲) and “limitation” (xianzhi限制) necessary for cognition to become possible.478 
This is why Mou proposes that in order for innate moral knowledge (liangzhi良知) to able to give rise 
to a “cognitive mind” (renshi de xin 認識的心 ), “knowledge must momentarily compose itself and 
separate itself from humaneness, in order to become a pure [theoretical] understanding, [because] only 
then can the understanding develop autonomously and accordingly give rise to its own results, namely 
logic, mathematics and science.” (智，必須暫時冷靜下來，脫離仁，成為純粹的知性，才有其自
身獨立的發展，因而有其自身之成果，這就是邏輯，數學與科學 ).479 As Mou writes in a 
memorable passage:
In this peaceful contemplation [of intellectual intuition] scientific knowledge cannot be generated. God
坎 陷 ,  which  he  glosses  as  “self-restriction”  instead  of  “self-negation”.  See  Contemporary  Confucian  Political  
Philosophy. Towards Progressive Confucianism,  Cambridge: Polity Press,  2012,  pp.24-35 (chapter 2).  Angle writes: 
“Mou' s idea, which I endorse, is not that a constitution, laws, and rights are merely compatible with Confucianism, but 
rather that  these objective political  structures are required by Confucianism if it  is  to realize its  own goals.  Mou's  
argument does not depend on an independent commitment to constitutional democracy, but is a critique internal to the  
Confucian tradition.” Angle, 2012, p.29. In Angle's heroic attempt to disentangle the concept of ziwo kanxian from its 
metaphysical dimension, what risks being lost is the genesis of this concept from its historical context as well as the 
“genetic” aspect of the concept itself, that is to say, the idea that moral reason must relinquish its own sovereignty 
without ceasing to ground what results from its self-negation and what is freed up and enabled in this way. What is not  
obvious to me from Angle's take on Mou's idea is why he still considers it necessary to speak of self-restriction instead 
of simply talking about an (external) restriction of morality by democratic politics and the legal system, nor is it clear to  
me  precisely  how  the  continuity  between  that  which  is  restricted  and  what  results  from this  restriction  is  to  be 
guaranteed. Tu Wei-ming, sees the whole paradigm of self-negation developed by Mou as incoherent and unnecessary, 
but does not manage to go beyond the rather bland suggestion of having more “dialog” between the natural and human  
sciences,  and the  vague suggestion that  moral  knowledge could somehow be “deepened” and “expanded” through 
scientific rationality. Tu does not realize that Mou's concept of self-negation can perhaps better be taken as signaling a 
problem instead of  offering an adequate solution. See  Tu Weiming,  “Confucian Encounter  with the Enlightenment 
Mentality of the Modern West”, Oriens Extremus 49, 2010, p.291, pp.294-296. 
477Cf. Mou, [1952c], pp.126-127.
478See Mou, [1956b], p.642.
479“The Fundamental Spirit of Humanism” (Renwenzhuyi de jiben jingshen 人文主義的基本精神), [1953d] in DY, p.201.
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does not create the atomic bomb, and even though there is nothing he does not know, he still has no
scientific  knowledge.  In  other  words,  he  does  no  know in  any scientific  manner.  The  Buddha  has
knowledge of all karmic causes, but the wisdom of the Buddha does not and in fact cannot create an
atom bomb. The knowledge of the Middle Way [described in the phrase] “There is not a single color or
smell that is not the Middle Way” is only knowledge of the true characteristic of things:  the true and
only characteristic, what is called being without any characteristics. [The Buddha] can only lead you to 
liberation, but he cannot give you scientific knowledge.480 
在此靜觀中﹐是並不能開出科學知識的。上帝不造原子炸彈﹔祂雖無不知﹐但沒有科學知識﹐或
換言之﹐祂並不以科學的方式知。佛有一切種智﹐但佛智並不造亦造不出原子炸彈來。「一色一
香無非中道」﹐此中道之知只知實相: 實相一相﹐所謂無相。它只能使你解脫﹐而不能使你有科
學知識。
This intentional process of self-negation, by which a “primary harmony” (原始的和諧) between an as 
of yet  undistinguished subject  and object in moral practice is  sublated through mediation involves 
“emptying oneself in order to yield to things” (虛己以從物  ).481 Occasionally, Tang also seemed to 
subscribe to the idea that inner sageliness must first be separated from outer kingliness in order to be 
reunited  at  a  higher  level.482 What  has  to  be  accomplished  then  anew  in  the  modern  age  is  the 
reinstatement of a duality the spirit of Chinese culture had already overcome since its inception.483 The 
abrogation of the immediate identity of subject and object by the moral subject is thus just as important  
as  overcoming  various  philosophical  oppositions  which  are  brought  forward  as  the  underlying 
consequences of social pathologies at other instances. In this way, a “temporary forgetting” (暂忘) on 
the part of the moral subject becomes as a prerequisite for an effective and authentic realization of both 
the self and the non-self (cheng ji cheng wu 成己成物).484 The distinction between science and (moral) 
metaphysics is no longer straightforwardly grounded in different orientations of the subject towards 
either the objective external world or a “reversal” (ni逆) onto itself, through an appeal to the Confucian 
dictum that “the exemplary person seeks it in himself” (君子求諸己).485 Instead, it is now precisely this 
480Mou, [1975d], p.125.
481Mou, [1951b], pp.40-41.
482“Cultural Problems in Today's World” (Dangqian shijie wenhua wenti 當前世界文化問題), [1961b] in ZJ, p.419.
483See Tang, [1950c], p.268.
484See “The Development of Chinese Culture and Science” (Zhonghua wenhua zhi fazhan yu kexue 中華文化之發展與科
學), [1968b] in SSXB, pp.175-178. Also see the Manifesto, Tang et.al., [1958a], p.899.
485Analects 15.21. Translation based on Slingerhand, 2003, p.182. Also see Tang, [1957], pp.300-303.
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act of the subject turning to itself in the form of a “disjunctive mutation” (轉折上的突變 )486 which 
must give rise to an external world of independent cognitive objects distinct from the subject to begin 
with. In what is perhaps the single most dense and difficult passage in the whole of his  The Way of  
Authority and the Way of Governance (Zhengdao yu zhidao 政道與治道), Mou writes the following:
[t]he meaning of this “reversal” can be established as follows: although virtuous nature does not contain
science and philosophy, which are structurally manifested, within itself in its direct moral significance
and functional manifestation; still, according to its own essential nature, moral rationality cannot but
require the  knowledge represented by science and the justice  and fairness  expressed by democratic
politics.  Furthermore,  when  viewed  internally  from  the  standpoint  of  science  and  democracy,  the
realization of the essence of these two “structural manifestations of reason” goes against the functional
manifestation of moral sense, which is to say that observing and analyzing reason goes against practical
reason. It is precisely here in this “going against” that the meaning of “reversal” becomes clear, which is
to require something going against one's own essential nature. This is clearly a kind of contradiction.
That  which it  [practical  reason] requires can [therefore] only be established through a self-negation
[allowing practical reason to] change into something which goes against its own nature and is contrary to  
itself (that is to say change into observing and analyzing reason). That it demands something which runs
contrary to its own nature would at first  sight appear to be [nothing but] a contradiction. But if we
observe [this whole process] internally and comprehensively, then the fact that [practical reason] can
only satisfy and realize its own demands within this reversal [shows that] this apparent contradiction is
reconciled in being realized or satisfied. Furthermore, this realization is an “objective realization”, which  
means that  [the contradiction] is  resolved in the realization [itself].  The objective realization in this
reconciliation shows that one can establish a connection in an indirect manner [through complications].
This means that in order to arrive at this sort of connectedness, one must first establish an indirect route.
This is a disjunctive mutation formed through reversal. If our virtuous nature would remain in its [direct]
functional manifestation, then there would only be a subjective realization, or an absolute [complete]
realization. If we want to arrive at an objective realization, then we cannot but go through this [form of]
indirect connection. A subjective realization can be expressed through logical reasoning, but in the case
of objective realization which is arrived at through indirect connection, then logical inference is not
enough. If that is the case then one must learn to understand dialectical necessity. One cannot go without 
a dialectical form of proof here.487
這「逆」的意義之形成是這樣的，即：德性，在其直接的道德意義中，在其作用表現中，雖不含
486Mou, [1961], p.62. 
487Mou, [1961], p.63.
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有架構表現中的科學與民主，但道德理性，依其本性而言之，卻不能不要求代表知識的科學與表
現正義公道的民主政治。而內在於科學與民主而言，成就這兩者的「理性之架構表現」其本性卻
又與德性之道德意義與作用表現相違反，即觀解理性與實踐理性相違反。即在此違反上遂顯出一
個「逆」的意義，它要求一個與其本性相違反的東西。這顯然是一種矛盾。它所要求的東西必須
由其自己之否定轉而為逆其自性之反對物（即成為觀解理性）始成立。它要求一個與其本性相違
反的東西。這表面或平列地觀之，是矛盾；但若內在貫通地觀之，則若必須在此一逆中始能滿足
其要求，實現其要求，則此表面之矛盾即在一實現或滿足中得消融。而此實現是一「客觀的實
現」，如是則即在一客觀實現中得消融。由此一消融而成一客觀實現，即表示曲而能通。即要達
到此種通，必須先曲一下。此即為由逆而成的轉折上的突變。如果我們的德性只停在作用表現中，
則只有主觀的實現或絕對的實現。如要達成客觀的實現，則必須在此曲通形態下完成。如只是主
觀實現，則可表之以邏輯推理；而如果是曲通由之以至客觀實現，便非邏輯推理所能盡。此處可
以使吾人了解辯證發展的必然性。辯證的表明，在此處非出現不可。
In the complex movement described here, we have finally come full circle: the self-identity of the 
moral  subject  and  the  immediate  identity  between  subject  and  object  within  its  precognitive, 
“functionally” manifested form of rationality are dialectically reconciled with the non-identity and the 
mediation seen as necessary preconditions for a modern, “structural” grounding of moral reason which 
must enable the latter to become something “objective” and “real”. Mediation and non-identity are thus 
reconciled with, or rather by, immediacy and identity through dialectical negativity and contradiction as 
the  creative  “venom of  all  life”488.  Contradiction  resolves  itself  by being realized  and objectified. 
Obviously,  the  prize  Mou has  to  and is  quite  willing  to  pay for  maintaining  the  identity  and the 
transcendental status of moral reason in relation to the structural mediations, which he sees as both 
epistemologically  and  politically  normative  requirements  of  modernity,  is  that  contradiction  and 
negation, the applicability of which was strictly confined to the level of conceptual “reality” in his early 
work, have to be granted a properly ontological status. Contradiction and negation are now no longer 
notional differentiations introduced into and fundamentally distorting a homogeneous reality empty of 
all  distinctions,  but  constitute  the  very  origin  of  distinctions  resulting  from  a  “reversal”  within 
subjectivity: all such distinctions result from a form of what Fichte called positing which can no longer 
be strictly notional or epistemic, since it is precisely this act of positing itself which is supposed to give 
rise to the indirectness and mediation characterizing all notional and cognitive operations. Mediation 
488F.W.J. Schelling, Ages of the World [Die Weltalter], Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1997, p.214.
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separates the subject from an immediacy which comes to be opposed to it as an external, non-identical 
object,  but  in  doing so,  it  simultaneously allows  the  subject  to  reclaim a  world  which  is  already 
factually  different  and  separated  from itself  as  a  result  of  its  own act  (Tathandlung)  of  positing. 
Dialectical negativity now has to be actually performative in order to be able to give rise to reality in a 
cognitive sense (which can be accessed “congruously” (shun) through science, logic, and mathematics) 
and in order to ensure that the categorical demands of morality can be efficiently realized through the 
political  and legal  institutional  mediations  without  which  Confucianism will  never  be modern  and 
modernity can never become Confucian. Instead of a “self-constriction” of the logical self insulating 
itself from the contaminations of a posteriori sensibility and empirical contingency in general, it is now 
a “disjunctive mutation” which must paradoxically ensure the self-identity of the subject as a moral 
agent. The scientific principle of division behind the modern differentiation of specialized and largely 
autonomously operating fields of knowledge is thus internalized in the figure of the subject. The latter 
must in a sense sacrifice itself and temporarily suspend its natural mode of functioning in order to fully 
realize what are taken to be its own intrinsic demands. In Mou Zongan's theory of self-negation, we are 
not so far removed from the idea of “self-emptying” (kénōsis) in Christian theology, which harks back 
to  the  way Plotinus  established  the  cosmological  relation  between  the  One  and  the  Many in  the 
Enneads, and according to which, in creating the world, God sacrificed himself by renouncing his own 
perfection and self-identity and trading in eternity for a time in which things become and perish, an act 
of divine self-renunciation which was subsequently redemptively repeated in the becoming-human of 
the creator in the person of Christ.  The tensely related attempts to turn Confucianism into a distinct 
form of philosophy while simultaneously distinguishing Chinese from Western thought on the basis of 
the putative domination of Western philosophy by the radical transcendence of an Absolute Subject 
forever out of reach for individual subjects thus end up bringing in the figure of Spirit through the back 
door. Clearly, it is Spirit which Mou must call upon to serve as the conceptual solution to the following 
difficult (yet  self-created) problem: what  it is that ultimately ensures that the double process of self-
negation and externalization does not become irreversible, in the sense that the objectivity of mediating 
structures  would  no  longer  be  genetically  related  to  or  even  (transcendentally)  traceable  to  the 
immediacy of the subject? The relation between identity and non-identity, immediacy and mediation is 
ensured  by a  formal  structure  of  reflexivity  which  allows  objectivity  (grasped  as  a  result  of  the 
differentiation  of  subject  and  object)  to  be  recovered  as  the  result  of  subjective  self-positing. 
Consequently, there is nothing “subjective” about the subject here anymore. Mou is quite clear on the 
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fact that “it is not the actual person, but the substance of the heart-mind and its moral creativity which  
are identical to Heaven” (不是現實的人與天同，而是心之體與天同，心之道德的創造性與天同 
)489.  Instead, the “subject” has become a largely anonymous, reflexive structure which gives rise to 
modes of knowing and institutional forms as indirect extensions of what Liang Shuming would have 
called its own “will”  (yiyu 意欲 ). Even in the dialectical transition from the moral to the epistemic 
subject, the subject for Mou is as much Spirit as it is structure. It is now the subject, turning on itself as 
a structure, that gives rise to cognitive fields through its own disintegration, which has become the 
condition for its integrity.
489Treatise on the Supreme Good (Yuanshan lun圓善論), [1985] vol.22 of MJ, p.132. Cf. Mou, [1975d], p.105.
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3.3 Coda: on philosophy and consequences
As I noted at the beginning of the second part of this chapter, Mou Zongsan understood the task of 
philosophy in the modern world as being oriented towards the lurking danger of ideology,  against 
which philosophy had to immunize both itself and the world held in the grip of misrepresentations and 
deceptions. The question concerning the relation between being and thought would seem to almost 
inevitably lead back to the problem of the nexus between power and representation, even in the work of 
thinkers  who  were  not  at  all  interested  in  becoming  theorists  of  ideology,  let  alone  of  class 
consciousness, but were inclined to believe they could make sense out of history and society in a state 
of  permanent  change through a  form of  philosophy which  had already sublated  “becoming”,  “the 
subject”,  and  “life”,  along  with  everything  that  runs  contrary  to  it,  within  itself.  For  Mou,  the 
consequences  of  thought  had  to  be  contained  by,  in,  and  through thought.  The  combination  of  a 
reflexive, formally subjective structure (ziwo 自我) with the force of dialectical negativity (kanxian 坎
陷) proved a potent instrument for him to accomplish this goal, at least on a philosophical level. What 
he left open was the question as to how (philosophical) thought should speak truth to power. He did not 
consider what truth would do with power if it ever were to acquire any. Tang Junyi appears to have 
been more sober-minded than his fellow Confucian in this regard. Towards the end of his career and 
life as a self-proclaimed “moral idealist” (daode de lixiangzhuyi zhe 道德的理想主義者 ), he had 
grown doubtful of what he had called the “rationalization of immediate life” ( 當下生活之理性化) 
marked by real contradictions and factual fissures (fenlie 分裂 ) through the power of self-conscious 
reflection  (zijue 自覺 ).490 In what  reads  as  a  striking  admission  of  insufficiency that  tempers  the 
prevailing  image  of  Tang  as  a  woolly-eyed,  “Panglossian”  idealist491,  he  writes  the  following 
posthumously published words: 
490See Tang, [1977], p.559-562.
491See Thomas A. Metzger,  Escape from Predicament: Neo-Confucianism and China's Evolving Political Culture, New 
York:  Columbia  University  Press,  1977,  p.36.  In  Metzger's  view,  Tang  “failed  to  analyze  the  “outer”  conditions 
threatening individual freedom; failed to pursue an empirical understanding of the given world; lapsed into utopianism; 
and even failed to appreciate morally imperfect progress with regard to the material well-being and political organization 
of vast populations.” Metzger, 2005, p.191. Also see  Yu Shilin 余仕麟 ,  The Transcendence of the Living Mind: the  
Confucian Theory of the Heart-Mind and Nature and Tang Junyi's Moral Metaphysics (Shengming xinling de chaoyue:  
rujia xinxing lun yu Tang Junyi daode xingshangxue 生命心灵的超越：儒家心性论与唐君毅道德形上学 ), 2010, 
pp.327-335. 
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During the last one or two years I have been thinking about the negative side of things. I have already
solved  this  duplicity  on  a  metaphysical  level,  but  in  the  real  world  there  still  remains  something
unresolved. I am talking about the problem of evil. I still need to rethink this problem. It cannot be
completely accounted for metaphysically in terms of philosophical ideals, since evil does not pose a
problem on the level of philosophical ideals.492
最近這一兩年，我在想反面的東西。這兩面，在形而上學上，我已經解決了，但在現實世界還有
未解決的，就是罪惡的問題。罪惡的問題還要重新再想。罪惡的問題不完全可以就形而上的哲學
理想講，哲學理想上講這個不成問題。
In  an  interesting  text  from 1961  entitled  “Cultural  Problems  in  Today's  World”  (Dangqian  shijie  
wenhua wenti 當前世界文化問題 )493,  Tang had already added a crucial element to (what could be 
reconstructed as) Mou's picture of ideology. In this text, Tang laments the fact that in the modern world, 
“the power of cultural thought has become intrinsically linked to actual and real power” (文化思想之
力量與現實力量結合在一起 )494,  and that all  forms of “cultural  thought”,  including of course 
philosophy as  a supreme crystallization of  culture,  can now become fundamentally complicit  with 
political and economical forces and influences.495 In this sense, for Tang, ideology constituted a kind of 
negative  and  perverted  incarnation  of  an  age-old  Confucian  ideal,  namely  that  of  the  unity  of 
knowledge and action (zhixing heyi 知行合一 ),  dramatically transformed into an inseparable but 
uncontrollable link between knowledge and the extrinsic consequences impinging on its internal goals. 
As he put it on another occasion in the long postscript to his Life, Existence, and the Horizons of the  
Mind from 1977, in a time where “the divine and the demonic are intermingled” (神魔混雜之時代), 
there is no longer anything left that cannot be turned upside down and abused for purposes that run 
contrary to its own intentions, intentions that cannot foresee or control their “corresponding” results:
Although it  has always proven possible for religious and moral  ideals and philosophical  thought to
be instrumentalized, it is only in modern society and politics that all kinds of organizations have been
established, so that not a single person engaged in any kind of philosophical or religious and moral work
and activities can escape finding himself in one of these organizations […] There is not a single sacred
492“The Academic Atmosphere in the Early Republican Period and My Path of Philosophical Inquiry” (Minguo chunian de 
xuefeng yu wo xue zhexue de tujing 民國初年的學風與我學哲學的途徑), [1979] in ZB, p.361.
493See ZJ, pp.403-422.
494Tang, [1961b], p.409.
495Tang, [1961b], pp.407-408.
329
thing of which the value cannot be reversed and put to the service of the demonic in modern society.496
此人之宗教道德理想與哲學思想，無不可加以工具化，雖自昔已然，但唯在現代社會政治中，有
種種組織之建立，為任何之哲學與道德宗教之工作與事業者，乃無所逃於此種種組織之外 […] 
一切神聖之事物，在現在社會中，無不可顛倒其價值，而如為魔鬼之所用。
At this point, he even goes on to praise the “wisdom” (zhihui 智慧 ) of Marx and Nietzsche, not his 
most likely of accomplices, along with psychoanalysis and existentialist philosophy, for having already 
anticipated and seen through the social reversibility of intrinsic value into the equivalence of exchange 
value and the transformation of “the mask of goodness” into a tool for the will to power. Remarkably 
enough then, even for thinkers who adhere to the (Confucian) goal of a unity between knowing and 
acting, and who often complain about the disconnect between reality and their ideals, it can at times 
become equally important to separate and decouple knowledge from action. 
What  characterizes  and  complicates  the  relation  between  knowledge  and  action,  or  between 
philosophical thought and its real consequences (which, in Tang's words, “do not pose a problem on the 
level  of  philosophical  ideals”),  is  neither  the  complete  ineffectiveness  and inertia  of  thought,  nor, 
conversely, that the latter is brutally imposed and thereby “perfectly” realized and fully manifested in 
social reality. Rather, the most salient feature of the relation between knowledge and action in modern 
societies  is  the  increasing  contingency involved  in  the  “transition”  or  rather  the  highly  mediated, 
indirect, and fuzzy coupling between the two.497 “Something” results from knowledge, if only because 
it influences the way things and events are approached, perceived, communicated and evaluated, but 
not from knowledge itself, which like “[t]he light dove, parting the air in her easy flight and feeling its 
resistance, might come to imagine that flight would be easier still in empty space”498. The question 
would of course become whether this is a normal or a pathological state of affairs. Nothing remains 
without consequences, at least not on all occasions and in all situations, not even the “idle speculations” 
of philosophers, but these consequences cannot be internally regulated or contained by who or what 
“causes” them;  the  causal  agents  in  question  perhaps  increasingly merely serving as  the “external 
conditions” (waiyuan 外緣) for processes which go about their business no matter in what way they are 
understood and accounted for.  After all,  even the unity of knowledge and action,  when taken as a 
496Tang, [1977], pp.665-666. Also see Thomas Fröhlich, “Tang Junyi, Max Weber und die Mächte des Dämonischen. Zum 
Politikverständnis eines modernen Konfuzianers”, Asiatische Studien, vol.57, no.4, 2003, pp.813-848. 
497I rely here on Niklas Luhmann, Observations on Modernity, Stanford (Cal.): Stanford University Press, 1998, pp.44-62.
498Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, London: Penguin Books, 2007, p.42 (B9-10).
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notional  unity,  in  turn  becomes  something  to  be  put  into  practice.  An  epistemological  shift  in 
perspective is perhaps a precondition, but not an efficient cause for its realization, and does not turn an 
aition into a telos. From Mou Zongsan's work, we learn that putting this identity into practice possibly 
requires an intermediary uncoupling of  knowledge from action,  subject  from object,  wisdom from 
science, and so on. Negativity is reflexively contained in the subject as a structure, but the latter must 
take leave of its identity in the process. It is doubtful whether anything remains of the living subject – 
what  William  James  called  the  “I  breathe”  that  must  be  able  to  accompany  all  subjective 
representations499 – in the dialectical transition from “function” (yunyong 運用) to “structure” (jiagou
架構 ).  Moreover,  it  is  highly likely that  the unity aimed for will  finally come in the form of an  
observation, and not in that of an event. Niklas Luhmann's programmatic remarks on the structurally 
conditioned shift from ontology to epistemology in modern philosophical semantics (a turn usually 
symbolized by Kant) are worth quoting at some length in this context: 
From now on, no world exists without observations. Instead, the one who states that the world exists is
the one who says that it is so. It is necessary to know, then, that a theory, a system, a science, a mode of
communication, a consciousness, or whatever else could do so, claims that the world has such and such
qualities. In comparison with the tradition, […] ontology is no longer the assumption of a reality that is
shared, and of which it can be assumed that everyone sees the same facts, as long as he or she gives the
matter enough thought. Instead, ontology becomes itself a schema of observation – namely, a schema of
observation on the basis of difference. Something is or is not the case. The difference thus concerns
existence and non-existence […] Whether or not philosophers accept this, we will henceforth always be
dealing with a  world of  description that  filters  the  presentation of  facts,  including purposes,  action
potentials, and so forth, by indicating a reference to an observer. One always faces the question of who
says a particular thing, and who does something, and from which system perspective the world is seen in  
a particular way (and no other) […] [T]he observation of the observers – that is to say, the shift from a
consciousness of reality to a description of descriptions, or the perception of what others say or do not
say – has become the advanced mode of perceiving the world in modern society.500 
The double need on the part of modern philosophers, as well as other social agents, to be able to both  
distinguish and identify, to at times bridge and then again close the gap between being and thought, or  
between action and knowledge, says something about the world we continue to inhabit and about how 
499See William James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, Mineola: Dover Publications, [1912] 2003, p.19.
500Niklas Luhmann, Introduction to Systems Theory, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013, pp.99-100. Emphasis added.
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modern societies function, bequeathing their structural features in the form of conceptual problems to 
philosophers, as observers who are well aware that someone else is observing them in turn. Thinkers 
such as the New Confucians are not alone in displaying great concern over the consequences of their 
own observations and in trying to anticipate how their observations will be perceived and possibly 
relayed by politics and society. They do not only ask whether something is true or not, but also take 
into account what would happen if it were to be perceived as true, would come to count as true, and 
make the leap of faith from truth to power. Especially the work of Tang Junyi is a prime example of this 
kind  of  constant  self-observation,  which  of  course  also  played  an  important  role  in  the  practical 
development of a moral self for him. The fact that each of the three thinkers discussed in this chapter 
and throughout my study had more or less systematic ambitions, in the sense that their philosophical 
gaze covered a wide range of domains and was not restricted to purely academic topics alone, allows a 
present-day observer to identify other, and in my opinion at least, more interesting phenomena than the 
adequacy and correctness of their solutions. By studying their work, one can point at problems that 
change the way these solutions are perceived and how they still relate to us today.
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